securitycheck.c

/*
 * Copyright 2020-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
 *
 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
 * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
 */

#include "internal/deprecated.h"

#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/dsa.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/ec.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/proverr.h>
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
#include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
#include "prov/securitycheck.h"

#define OSSL_FIPS_MIN_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BITS 112

int ossl_rsa_key_op_get_protect(const RSA *rsa, int operation, int *outprotect)
{
    int protect = 0;

    switch (operation) {
    case EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN:
    case EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGNMSG:
        protect = 1;
        /* fallthrough */
    case EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY:
    case EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYMSG:
        break;
    case EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCAPSULATE:
    case EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT:
        protect = 1;
        /* fallthrough */
    case EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER:
    case EVP_PKEY_OP_DECAPSULATE:
    case EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT:
        if (RSA_test_flags(rsa,
                           RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK) == RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSASSAPSS) {
            ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
                           PROV_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE,
                           "operation: %d", operation);
            return 0;
        }
        break;
    default:
        ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR,
                       "invalid operation: %d", operation);
        return 0;
    }
    *outprotect = protect;
    return 1;
}

/*
 * FIPS requires a minimum security strength of 112 bits (for encryption or
 * signing), and for legacy purposes 80 bits (for decryption or verifying).
 * Set protect = 1 for encryption or signing operations, or 0 otherwise. See
 * https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-131Ar2.pdf.
 */
int ossl_rsa_check_key_size(const RSA *rsa, int protect)
{
    int sz = RSA_bits(rsa);

    if (protect ? (sz < 2048) : (sz < 1024))
        return 0;
    return 1;
}

/*
 * FIPS requires a minimum security strength of 112 bits for key-derivation key.
 * https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-131Ar2.pdf.
 */
int ossl_kdf_check_key_size(size_t keylen)
{
    return (keylen * 8) >= OSSL_FIPS_MIN_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BITS;
}

int ossl_mac_check_key_size(size_t keylen)
{
    return ossl_kdf_check_key_size(keylen);
}

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC

int ossl_ec_check_curve_allowed(const EC_GROUP *group)
{
    const char *curve_name;
    int nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group);

    /* Explicit curves are not FIPS approved */
    if (nid == NID_undef)
        return 0;
    /* Only NIST curves are FIPS approved */
    curve_name = EC_curve_nid2nist(nid);
    if (curve_name == NULL)
        return 0;
    return 1;
}

/*
 * In FIPS mode:
 * protect should be 1 for any operations that need 112 bits of security
 * strength (such as signing, and key exchange), or 0 for operations that allow
 * a lower security strength (such as verify).
 *
 * For ECDH key agreement refer to SP800-56A
 * https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3.pdf
 * "Appendix D"
 *
 * For ECDSA signatures refer to
 * https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-131Ar2.pdf
 * "Table 2"
 */
int ossl_ec_check_security_strength(const EC_GROUP *group, int protect)
{
    /*
     * For EC the security strength is the (order_bits / 2)
     * e.g. P-224 is 112 bits.
     */
    int strength = EC_GROUP_order_bits(group) / 2;
    /* The min security strength allowed for legacy verification is 80 bits */
    if (strength < 80)
        return 0;
    /*
     * For signing or key agreement only allow curves with at least 112 bits of
     * security strength
     */
    if (protect && strength < OSSL_FIPS_MIN_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BITS)
        return 0;
    return 1;
}

#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
/*
 * Check for valid key sizes if fips mode. Refer to
 * https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-131Ar2.pdf
 * "Table 2"
 */
int ossl_dsa_check_key(const DSA *dsa, int sign)
{
    size_t L, N;
    const BIGNUM *p, *q;

    if (dsa == NULL)
        return 0;

    p = DSA_get0_p(dsa);
    q = DSA_get0_q(dsa);
    if (p == NULL || q == NULL)
        return 0;

    L = BN_num_bits(p);
    N = BN_num_bits(q);

    /*
     * For Digital signature verification DSA keys with < 112 bits of
     * security strength, are still allowed for legacy
     * use. The bounds given in SP 800-131Ar2 - Table 2 are
     * (512 <= L < 2048 or 160 <= N < 224).
     *
     * We are a little stricter and insist that both minimums are met.
     * For example a L = 256, N = 160 key *would* be allowed by SP 800-131Ar2
     * but we don't.
     */
    if (!sign) {
        if (L < 512 || N < 160)
            return 0;
        if (L < 2048 || N < 224)
            return 1;
    }

     /* Valid sizes for both sign and verify */
    if (L == 2048 && (N == 224 || N == 256))    /* 112 bits */
        return 1;
    return (L == 3072 && N == 256);             /* 128 bits */
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
/*
 * For DH key agreement refer to SP800-56A
 * https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3.pdf
 * "Section 5.5.1.1FFC Domain Parameter Selection/Generation" and
 * "Appendix D" FFC Safe-prime Groups
 */
int ossl_dh_check_key(const DH *dh)
{
    size_t L, N;
    const BIGNUM *p, *q;

    if (dh == NULL)
        return 0;

    p = DH_get0_p(dh);
    q = DH_get0_q(dh);
    if (p == NULL || q == NULL)
        return 0;

    L = BN_num_bits(p);
    if (L < 2048)
        return 0;

    /* If it is a safe prime group then it is ok */
    if (DH_get_nid(dh))
        return 1;

    /* If not then it must be FFC, which only allows certain sizes. */
    N = BN_num_bits(q);

    return (L == 2048 && (N == 224 || N == 256));
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */