Path: blob/main/crypto/openssl/ssl/quic/quic_port.c
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/*1* Copyright 2023-2025 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.2*3* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use4* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy5* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at6* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html7*/89#include "internal/quic_port.h"10#include "internal/quic_channel.h"11#include "internal/quic_lcidm.h"12#include "internal/quic_srtm.h"13#include "internal/quic_txp.h"14#include "internal/ssl_unwrap.h"15#include "quic_port_local.h"16#include "quic_channel_local.h"17#include "quic_engine_local.h"18#include "quic_local.h"19#include "../ssl_local.h"20#include <openssl/rand.h>2122/*23* QUIC Port Structure24* ===================25*/26#define INIT_DCID_LEN 82728static int port_init(QUIC_PORT *port);29static void port_cleanup(QUIC_PORT *port);30static OSSL_TIME get_time(void *arg);31static void port_default_packet_handler(QUIC_URXE *e, void *arg,32const QUIC_CONN_ID *dcid);33static void port_rx_pre(QUIC_PORT *port);3435/**36* @struct validation_token37* @brief Represents a validation token for secure connection handling.38*39* This struct is used to store information related to a validation token.40*41* @var validation_token::is_retry42* True iff this validation token is for a token sent in a RETRY packet.43* Otherwise, this token is from a NEW_TOKEN_packet. Iff this value is true,44* then ODCID and RSCID are set.45*46* @var validation_token::timestamp47* Time that the validation token was minted.48*49* @var validation_token::odcid50* An original connection ID (`QUIC_CONN_ID`) used to identify the QUIC51* connection. This ID helps associate the token with a specific connection.52* This will only be valid for validation tokens from RETRY packets.53*54* @var validation_token::rscid55* DCID that the client will use as the DCID of the subsequent initial packet56* i.e the "new" DCID.57* This will only be valid for validation tokens from RETRY packets.58*59* @var validation_token::remote_addr_len60* Length of the following character array.61*62* @var validation_token::remote_addr63* A character array holding the raw address of the client requesting the64* connection.65*/66typedef struct validation_token {67OSSL_TIME timestamp;68QUIC_CONN_ID odcid;69QUIC_CONN_ID rscid;70size_t remote_addr_len;71unsigned char *remote_addr;72unsigned char is_retry;73} QUIC_VALIDATION_TOKEN;7475/*76* Maximum length of a marshalled validation token.77*78* - timestamp is 8 bytes79* - odcid and rscid are maximally 42 bytes in total80* - remote_addr_len is a size_t (8 bytes)81* - remote_addr is in the worst case 110 bytes (in the case of using a82* maximally sized AF_UNIX socket)83* - is_retry is a single byte84*/85#define MARSHALLED_TOKEN_MAX_LEN 1698687/*88* Maximum length of an encrypted marshalled validation token.89*90* This will include the size of the marshalled validation token plus a 16 byte91* tag and a 12 byte IV, so in total 197 bytes.92*/93#define ENCRYPTED_TOKEN_MAX_LEN (MARSHALLED_TOKEN_MAX_LEN + 16 + 12)9495DEFINE_LIST_OF_IMPL(ch, QUIC_CHANNEL);96DEFINE_LIST_OF_IMPL(incoming_ch, QUIC_CHANNEL);97DEFINE_LIST_OF_IMPL(port, QUIC_PORT);9899QUIC_PORT *ossl_quic_port_new(const QUIC_PORT_ARGS *args)100{101QUIC_PORT *port;102103if ((port = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(QUIC_PORT))) == NULL)104return NULL;105106port->engine = args->engine;107port->channel_ctx = args->channel_ctx;108port->is_multi_conn = args->is_multi_conn;109port->validate_addr = args->do_addr_validation;110port->get_conn_user_ssl = args->get_conn_user_ssl;111port->user_ssl_arg = args->user_ssl_arg;112113if (!port_init(port)) {114OPENSSL_free(port);115return NULL;116}117118return port;119}120121void ossl_quic_port_free(QUIC_PORT *port)122{123if (port == NULL)124return;125126port_cleanup(port);127OPENSSL_free(port);128}129130static int port_init(QUIC_PORT *port)131{132size_t rx_short_dcid_len = (port->is_multi_conn ? INIT_DCID_LEN : 0);133int key_len;134EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;135unsigned char *token_key = NULL;136int ret = 0;137138if (port->engine == NULL || port->channel_ctx == NULL)139goto err;140141if ((port->err_state = OSSL_ERR_STATE_new()) == NULL)142goto err;143144if ((port->demux = ossl_quic_demux_new(/*BIO=*/NULL,145/*Short CID Len=*/rx_short_dcid_len,146get_time, port))147== NULL)148goto err;149150ossl_quic_demux_set_default_handler(port->demux,151port_default_packet_handler,152port);153154if ((port->srtm = ossl_quic_srtm_new(port->engine->libctx,155port->engine->propq))156== NULL)157goto err;158159if ((port->lcidm = ossl_quic_lcidm_new(port->engine->libctx,160rx_short_dcid_len))161== NULL)162goto err;163164port->rx_short_dcid_len = (unsigned char)rx_short_dcid_len;165port->tx_init_dcid_len = INIT_DCID_LEN;166port->state = QUIC_PORT_STATE_RUNNING;167168ossl_list_port_insert_tail(&port->engine->port_list, port);169port->on_engine_list = 1;170port->bio_changed = 1;171172/* Generate random key for token encryption */173if ((port->token_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL174|| (cipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(port->engine->libctx,175"AES-256-GCM", NULL))176== NULL177|| !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(port->token_ctx, cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL)178|| (key_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(port->token_ctx)) <= 0179|| (token_key = OPENSSL_malloc(key_len)) == NULL180|| !RAND_bytes_ex(port->engine->libctx, token_key, key_len, 0)181|| !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(port->token_ctx, NULL, NULL, token_key, NULL))182goto err;183184ret = 1;185err:186EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher);187OPENSSL_free(token_key);188if (!ret)189port_cleanup(port);190return ret;191}192193static void port_cleanup(QUIC_PORT *port)194{195assert(ossl_list_ch_num(&port->channel_list) == 0);196197ossl_quic_demux_free(port->demux);198port->demux = NULL;199200ossl_quic_srtm_free(port->srtm);201port->srtm = NULL;202203ossl_quic_lcidm_free(port->lcidm);204port->lcidm = NULL;205206OSSL_ERR_STATE_free(port->err_state);207port->err_state = NULL;208209if (port->on_engine_list) {210ossl_list_port_remove(&port->engine->port_list, port);211port->on_engine_list = 0;212}213214EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(port->token_ctx);215port->token_ctx = NULL;216}217218static void port_transition_failed(QUIC_PORT *port)219{220if (port->state == QUIC_PORT_STATE_FAILED)221return;222223port->state = QUIC_PORT_STATE_FAILED;224}225226int ossl_quic_port_is_running(const QUIC_PORT *port)227{228return port->state == QUIC_PORT_STATE_RUNNING;229}230231QUIC_ENGINE *ossl_quic_port_get0_engine(QUIC_PORT *port)232{233return port->engine;234}235236QUIC_REACTOR *ossl_quic_port_get0_reactor(QUIC_PORT *port)237{238return ossl_quic_engine_get0_reactor(port->engine);239}240241QUIC_DEMUX *ossl_quic_port_get0_demux(QUIC_PORT *port)242{243return port->demux;244}245246CRYPTO_MUTEX *ossl_quic_port_get0_mutex(QUIC_PORT *port)247{248return ossl_quic_engine_get0_mutex(port->engine);249}250251OSSL_TIME ossl_quic_port_get_time(QUIC_PORT *port)252{253return ossl_quic_engine_get_time(port->engine);254}255256static OSSL_TIME get_time(void *port)257{258return ossl_quic_port_get_time((QUIC_PORT *)port);259}260261int ossl_quic_port_get_rx_short_dcid_len(const QUIC_PORT *port)262{263return port->rx_short_dcid_len;264}265266int ossl_quic_port_get_tx_init_dcid_len(const QUIC_PORT *port)267{268return port->tx_init_dcid_len;269}270271size_t ossl_quic_port_get_num_incoming_channels(const QUIC_PORT *port)272{273return ossl_list_incoming_ch_num(&port->incoming_channel_list);274}275276/*277* QUIC Port: Network BIO Configuration278* ====================================279*/280281/* Determines whether we can support a given poll descriptor. */282static int validate_poll_descriptor(const BIO_POLL_DESCRIPTOR *d)283{284if (d->type == BIO_POLL_DESCRIPTOR_TYPE_SOCK_FD && d->value.fd < 0) {285ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);286return 0;287}288289return 1;290}291292BIO *ossl_quic_port_get_net_rbio(QUIC_PORT *port)293{294return port->net_rbio;295}296297BIO *ossl_quic_port_get_net_wbio(QUIC_PORT *port)298{299return port->net_wbio;300}301302static int port_update_poll_desc(QUIC_PORT *port, BIO *net_bio, int for_write)303{304BIO_POLL_DESCRIPTOR d = { 0 };305306if (net_bio == NULL307|| (!for_write && !BIO_get_rpoll_descriptor(net_bio, &d))308|| (for_write && !BIO_get_wpoll_descriptor(net_bio, &d)))309/* Non-pollable BIO */310d.type = BIO_POLL_DESCRIPTOR_TYPE_NONE;311312if (!validate_poll_descriptor(&d))313return 0;314315/*316* TODO(QUIC MULTIPORT): We currently only support one port per317* engine/domain. This is necessitated because QUIC_REACTOR only supports a318* single pollable currently. In the future, once complete polling319* infrastructure has been implemented, this limitation can be removed.320*321* For now, just update the descriptor on the engine's reactor as we are322* guaranteed to be the only port under it.323*/324if (for_write)325ossl_quic_reactor_set_poll_w(&port->engine->rtor, &d);326else327ossl_quic_reactor_set_poll_r(&port->engine->rtor, &d);328329return 1;330}331332int ossl_quic_port_update_poll_descriptors(QUIC_PORT *port, int force)333{334int ok = 1;335336if (!force && !port->bio_changed)337return 0;338339if (!port_update_poll_desc(port, port->net_rbio, /*for_write=*/0))340ok = 0;341342if (!port_update_poll_desc(port, port->net_wbio, /*for_write=*/1))343ok = 0;344345port->bio_changed = 0;346return ok;347}348349/*350* We need to determine our addressing mode. There are basically two ways we can351* use L4 addresses:352*353* - Addressed mode, in which our BIO_sendmmsg calls have destination354* addresses attached to them which we expect the underlying network BIO to355* handle;356*357* - Unaddressed mode, in which the BIO provided to us on the network side358* neither provides us with L4 addresses nor is capable of honouring ones we359* provide. We don't know where the QUIC traffic we send ends up exactly and360* trust the application to know what it is doing.361*362* Addressed mode is preferred because it enables support for connection363* migration, multipath, etc. in the future. Addressed mode is automatically364* enabled if we are using e.g. BIO_s_datagram, with or without BIO_s_connect.365*366* If we are passed a BIO_s_dgram_pair (or some custom BIO) we may have to use367* unaddressed mode unless that BIO supports capability flags indicating it can368* provide and honour L4 addresses.369*370* Our strategy for determining address mode is simple: we probe the underlying371* network BIOs for their capabilities. If the network BIOs support what we372* need, we use addressed mode. Otherwise, we use unaddressed mode.373*374* If addressed mode is chosen, we require an initial peer address to be set. If375* this is not set, we fail. If unaddressed mode is used, we do not require376* this, as such an address is superfluous, though it can be set if desired.377*/378static void port_update_addressing_mode(QUIC_PORT *port)379{380long rcaps = 0, wcaps = 0;381382if (port->net_rbio != NULL)383rcaps = BIO_dgram_get_effective_caps(port->net_rbio);384385if (port->net_wbio != NULL)386wcaps = BIO_dgram_get_effective_caps(port->net_wbio);387388port->addressed_mode_r = ((rcaps & BIO_DGRAM_CAP_PROVIDES_SRC_ADDR) != 0);389port->addressed_mode_w = ((wcaps & BIO_DGRAM_CAP_HANDLES_DST_ADDR) != 0);390port->bio_changed = 1;391}392393int ossl_quic_port_is_addressed_r(const QUIC_PORT *port)394{395return port->addressed_mode_r;396}397398int ossl_quic_port_is_addressed_w(const QUIC_PORT *port)399{400return port->addressed_mode_w;401}402403int ossl_quic_port_is_addressed(const QUIC_PORT *port)404{405return ossl_quic_port_is_addressed_r(port) && ossl_quic_port_is_addressed_w(port);406}407408/*409* QUIC_PORT does not ref any BIO it is provided with, nor is any ref410* transferred to it. The caller (e.g., QUIC_CONNECTION) is responsible for411* ensuring the BIO lasts until the channel is freed or the BIO is switched out412* for another BIO by a subsequent successful call to this function.413*/414int ossl_quic_port_set_net_rbio(QUIC_PORT *port, BIO *net_rbio)415{416if (port->net_rbio == net_rbio)417return 1;418419if (!port_update_poll_desc(port, net_rbio, /*for_write=*/0))420return 0;421422ossl_quic_demux_set_bio(port->demux, net_rbio);423port->net_rbio = net_rbio;424port_update_addressing_mode(port);425return 1;426}427428int ossl_quic_port_set_net_wbio(QUIC_PORT *port, BIO *net_wbio)429{430QUIC_CHANNEL *ch;431432if (port->net_wbio == net_wbio)433return 1;434435if (!port_update_poll_desc(port, net_wbio, /*for_write=*/1))436return 0;437438OSSL_LIST_FOREACH(ch, ch, &port->channel_list)439ossl_qtx_set_bio(ch->qtx, net_wbio);440441port->net_wbio = net_wbio;442port_update_addressing_mode(port);443return 1;444}445446SSL_CTX *ossl_quic_port_get_channel_ctx(QUIC_PORT *port)447{448return port->channel_ctx;449}450451/*452* QUIC Port: Channel Lifecycle453* ============================454*/455456static SSL *port_new_handshake_layer(QUIC_PORT *port, QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)457{458SSL *tls = NULL;459SSL_CONNECTION *tls_conn = NULL;460SSL *user_ssl = NULL;461QUIC_CONNECTION *qc = NULL;462QUIC_LISTENER *ql = NULL;463464/*465* It only makes sense to call this function if we know how to associate466* the handshake layer we are about to create with some user_ssl object.467*/468if (!ossl_assert(port->get_conn_user_ssl != NULL))469return NULL;470user_ssl = port->get_conn_user_ssl(ch, port->user_ssl_arg);471if (user_ssl == NULL)472return NULL;473qc = (QUIC_CONNECTION *)user_ssl;474ql = (QUIC_LISTENER *)port->user_ssl_arg;475476/*477* We expect the user_ssl to be newly created so it must not have an478* existing qc->tls479*/480if (!ossl_assert(qc->tls == NULL)) {481SSL_free(user_ssl);482return NULL;483}484485tls = ossl_ssl_connection_new_int(port->channel_ctx, user_ssl, TLS_method());486qc->tls = tls;487if (tls == NULL || (tls_conn = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(tls)) == NULL) {488SSL_free(user_ssl);489return NULL;490}491492if (ql != NULL && ql->obj.ssl.ctx->new_pending_conn_cb != NULL)493if (!ql->obj.ssl.ctx->new_pending_conn_cb(ql->obj.ssl.ctx, user_ssl,494ql->obj.ssl.ctx->new_pending_conn_arg)) {495SSL_free(user_ssl);496return NULL;497}498499/* Override the user_ssl of the inner connection. */500tls_conn->s3.flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_QUIC | TLS1_FLAGS_QUIC_INTERNAL;501502/* Restrict options derived from the SSL_CTX. */503tls_conn->options &= OSSL_QUIC_PERMITTED_OPTIONS_CONN;504tls_conn->pha_enabled = 0;505return tls;506}507508static QUIC_CHANNEL *port_make_channel(QUIC_PORT *port, SSL *tls, OSSL_QRX *qrx,509int is_server, int is_tserver)510{511QUIC_CHANNEL_ARGS args = { 0 };512QUIC_CHANNEL *ch;513514args.port = port;515args.is_server = is_server;516args.lcidm = port->lcidm;517args.srtm = port->srtm;518args.qrx = qrx;519args.is_tserver_ch = is_tserver;520521/*522* Creating a a new channel is made a bit tricky here as there is a523* bit of a circular dependency. Initializing a channel requires that524* the ch->tls and optionally the qlog_title be configured prior to525* initialization, but we need the channel at least partially configured526* to create the new handshake layer, so we have to do this in a few steps.527*/528529/*530* start by allocation and provisioning as much of the channel as we can531*/532ch = ossl_quic_channel_alloc(&args);533if (ch == NULL)534return NULL;535536/*537* Fixup the channel tls connection here before we init the channel538*/539ch->tls = (tls != NULL) ? tls : port_new_handshake_layer(port, ch);540541if (ch->tls == NULL) {542OPENSSL_free(ch);543return NULL;544}545546#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QLOG547/*548* If we're using qlog, make sure the tls get further configured properly549*/550ch->use_qlog = 1;551if (ch->tls->ctx->qlog_title != NULL) {552if ((ch->qlog_title = OPENSSL_strdup(ch->tls->ctx->qlog_title)) == NULL) {553OPENSSL_free(ch);554return NULL;555}556}557#endif558559/*560* And finally init the channel struct561*/562if (!ossl_quic_channel_init(ch)) {563OPENSSL_free(ch);564return NULL;565}566567ossl_qtx_set_bio(ch->qtx, port->net_wbio);568return ch;569}570571QUIC_CHANNEL *ossl_quic_port_create_outgoing(QUIC_PORT *port, SSL *tls)572{573return port_make_channel(port, tls, NULL, /* is_server= */ 0,574/* is_tserver= */ 0);575}576577QUIC_CHANNEL *ossl_quic_port_create_incoming(QUIC_PORT *port, SSL *tls)578{579QUIC_CHANNEL *ch;580581assert(port->tserver_ch == NULL);582583/*584* pass -1 for qrx to indicate port will create qrx585* later in port_default_packet_handler() when calling port_bind_channel().586*/587ch = port_make_channel(port, tls, NULL, /* is_server= */ 1,588/* is_tserver_ch */ 1);589port->tserver_ch = ch;590port->allow_incoming = 1;591return ch;592}593594QUIC_CHANNEL *ossl_quic_port_pop_incoming(QUIC_PORT *port)595{596QUIC_CHANNEL *ch;597598ch = ossl_list_incoming_ch_head(&port->incoming_channel_list);599if (ch == NULL)600return NULL;601602ossl_list_incoming_ch_remove(&port->incoming_channel_list, ch);603return ch;604}605606int ossl_quic_port_have_incoming(QUIC_PORT *port)607{608return ossl_list_incoming_ch_head(&port->incoming_channel_list) != NULL;609}610611void ossl_quic_port_drop_incoming(QUIC_PORT *port)612{613QUIC_CHANNEL *ch;614SSL *tls;615SSL *user_ssl;616SSL_CONNECTION *sc;617618for (;;) {619ch = ossl_quic_port_pop_incoming(port);620if (ch == NULL)621break;622623tls = ossl_quic_channel_get0_tls(ch);624/*625* The user ssl may or may not have been created via the626* get_conn_user_ssl callback in the QUIC stack. The627* differentiation being if the user_ssl pointer and tls pointer628* are different. If they are, then the user_ssl needs freeing here629* which sends us through ossl_quic_free, which then drops the actual630* ch->tls ref and frees the channel631*/632sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(tls);633if (sc == NULL)634break;635636user_ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(sc);637if (user_ssl == tls) {638ossl_quic_channel_free(ch);639SSL_free(tls);640} else {641SSL_free(user_ssl);642}643}644}645646void ossl_quic_port_set_allow_incoming(QUIC_PORT *port, int allow_incoming)647{648port->allow_incoming = allow_incoming;649}650651/*652* QUIC Port: Ticker-Mutator653* =========================654*/655656/*657* Tick function for this port. This does everything related to network I/O for658* this port's network BIOs, and services child channels.659*/660void ossl_quic_port_subtick(QUIC_PORT *port, QUIC_TICK_RESULT *res,661uint32_t flags)662{663QUIC_CHANNEL *ch;664665res->net_read_desired = ossl_quic_port_is_running(port);666res->net_write_desired = 0;667res->notify_other_threads = 0;668res->tick_deadline = ossl_time_infinite();669670if (!port->engine->inhibit_tick) {671/* Handle any incoming data from network. */672if (ossl_quic_port_is_running(port))673port_rx_pre(port);674675/* Iterate through all channels and service them. */676OSSL_LIST_FOREACH(ch, ch, &port->channel_list)677{678QUIC_TICK_RESULT subr = { 0 };679680ossl_quic_channel_subtick(ch, &subr, flags);681ossl_quic_tick_result_merge_into(res, &subr);682}683}684}685686/* Process incoming datagrams, if any. */687static void port_rx_pre(QUIC_PORT *port)688{689int ret;690691/*692* Originally, this check (don't RX before we have sent anything if we are693* not a server, because there can't be anything) was just intended as a694* minor optimisation. However, it is actually required on Windows, and695* removing this check will cause Windows to break.696*697* The reason is that under Win32, recvfrom() does not work on a UDP socket698* which has not had bind() called (???). However, calling sendto() will699* automatically bind an unbound UDP socket. Therefore, if we call a Winsock700* recv-type function before calling a Winsock send-type function, that call701* will fail with WSAEINVAL, which we will regard as a permanent network702* error.703*704* Therefore, this check is essential as we do not require our API users to705* bind a socket first when using the API in client mode.706*/707if (!port->allow_incoming && !port->have_sent_any_pkt)708return;709710/*711* Get DEMUX to BIO_recvmmsg from the network and queue incoming datagrams712* to the appropriate QRX instances.713*/714ret = ossl_quic_demux_pump(port->demux);715if (ret == QUIC_DEMUX_PUMP_RES_PERMANENT_FAIL)716/*717* We don't care about transient failure, but permanent failure means we718* should tear down the port. All connections skip straight to the719* Terminated state as there is no point trying to send CONNECTION_CLOSE720* frames if the network BIO is not operating correctly.721*/722ossl_quic_port_raise_net_error(port, NULL);723}724725/*726* Handles an incoming connection request and potentially decides to make a727* connection from it. If a new connection is made, the new channel is written728* to *new_ch.729*/730static void port_bind_channel(QUIC_PORT *port, const BIO_ADDR *peer,731const QUIC_CONN_ID *scid, const QUIC_CONN_ID *dcid,732const QUIC_CONN_ID *odcid, OSSL_QRX *qrx,733QUIC_CHANNEL **new_ch)734{735QUIC_CHANNEL *ch;736737/*738* If we're running with a simulated tserver, it will already have739* a dummy channel created, use that instead740*/741if (port->tserver_ch != NULL) {742ch = port->tserver_ch;743port->tserver_ch = NULL;744ossl_quic_channel_bind_qrx(ch, qrx);745ossl_qrx_set_msg_callback(ch->qrx, ch->msg_callback,746ch->msg_callback_ssl);747ossl_qrx_set_msg_callback_arg(ch->qrx, ch->msg_callback_arg);748} else {749ch = port_make_channel(port, NULL, qrx, /* is_server= */ 1,750/* is_tserver */ 0);751}752753if (ch == NULL)754return;755756/*757* If we didn't provide a qrx here that means we need to set our initial758* secret here, since we just created a qrx759* Normally its not needed, as the initial secret gets added when we send760* our first server hello, but if we get a huge client hello, crossing761* multiple datagrams, we don't have a chance to do that, and datagrams762* after the first won't get decoded properly, for lack of secrets763*/764if (qrx == NULL)765if (!ossl_quic_provide_initial_secret(ch->port->engine->libctx,766ch->port->engine->propq,767dcid, /* is_server */ 1,768ch->qrx, NULL))769return;770771if (odcid->id_len != 0) {772/*773* If we have an odcid, then we went through server address validation774* and as such, this channel need not conform to the 3x validation cap775* See RFC 9000 s. 8.1776*/777ossl_quic_tx_packetiser_set_validated(ch->txp);778if (!ossl_quic_bind_channel(ch, peer, scid, dcid, odcid)) {779ossl_quic_channel_free(ch);780return;781}782} else {783/*784* No odcid means we didn't do server validation, so we need to785* generate a cid via ossl_quic_channel_on_new_conn786*/787if (!ossl_quic_channel_on_new_conn(ch, peer, scid, dcid)) {788ossl_quic_channel_free(ch);789return;790}791}792793ossl_list_incoming_ch_insert_tail(&port->incoming_channel_list, ch);794*new_ch = ch;795}796797static int port_try_handle_stateless_reset(QUIC_PORT *port, const QUIC_URXE *e)798{799size_t i;800const unsigned char *data = ossl_quic_urxe_data(e);801void *opaque = NULL;802803/*804* Perform some fast and cheap checks for a packet not being a stateless805* reset token. RFC 9000 s. 10.3 specifies this layout for stateless806* reset packets:807*808* Stateless Reset {809* Fixed Bits (2) = 1,810* Unpredictable Bits (38..),811* Stateless Reset Token (128),812* }813*814* It also specifies:815* However, endpoints MUST treat any packet ending in a valid816* stateless reset token as a Stateless Reset, as other QUIC817* versions might allow the use of a long header.818*819* We can rapidly check for the minimum length and that the first pair820* of bits in the first byte are 01 or 11.821*822* The function returns 1 if it is a stateless reset packet, 0 if it isn't823* and -1 if an error was encountered.824*/825if (e->data_len < QUIC_STATELESS_RESET_TOKEN_LEN + 5826|| (0100 & *data) != 0100)827return 0;828829for (i = 0;; ++i) {830if (!ossl_quic_srtm_lookup(port->srtm,831(QUIC_STATELESS_RESET_TOKEN *)(data + e->data_len832- sizeof(QUIC_STATELESS_RESET_TOKEN)),833i, &opaque, NULL))834break;835836assert(opaque != NULL);837ossl_quic_channel_on_stateless_reset((QUIC_CHANNEL *)opaque);838}839840return i > 0;841}842843static void cleanup_validation_token(QUIC_VALIDATION_TOKEN *token)844{845OPENSSL_free(token->remote_addr);846}847848/**849* @brief Generates a validation token for a RETRY/NEW_TOKEN packet.850*851*852* @param peer Address of the client peer receiving the packet.853* @param odcid DCID of the connection attempt.854* @param rscid Retry source connection ID of the connection attempt.855* @param token Address of token to fill data.856*857* @return 1 if validation token is filled successfully, 0 otherwise.858*/859static int generate_token(BIO_ADDR *peer, QUIC_CONN_ID odcid,860QUIC_CONN_ID rscid, QUIC_VALIDATION_TOKEN *token,861int is_retry)862{863token->is_retry = is_retry;864token->timestamp = ossl_time_now();865token->remote_addr = NULL;866token->odcid = odcid;867token->rscid = rscid;868869if (!BIO_ADDR_rawaddress(peer, NULL, &token->remote_addr_len)870|| token->remote_addr_len == 0871|| (token->remote_addr = OPENSSL_malloc(token->remote_addr_len)) == NULL872|| !BIO_ADDR_rawaddress(peer, token->remote_addr,873&token->remote_addr_len)) {874cleanup_validation_token(token);875return 0;876}877878return 1;879}880881/**882* @brief Marshals a validation token into a new buffer.883*884* |buffer| should already be allocated and at least MARSHALLED_TOKEN_MAX_LEN885* bytes long. Stores the length of data stored in |buffer| in |buffer_len|.886*887* @param token Validation token.888* @param buffer Address to store the marshalled token.889* @param buffer_len Size of data stored in |buffer|.890*/891static int marshal_validation_token(QUIC_VALIDATION_TOKEN *token,892unsigned char *buffer, size_t *buffer_len)893{894WPACKET wpkt = { 0 };895BUF_MEM *buf_mem = BUF_MEM_new();896897if (buffer == NULL || buf_mem == NULL898|| (token->is_retry != 0 && token->is_retry != 1)) {899BUF_MEM_free(buf_mem);900return 0;901}902903if (!WPACKET_init(&wpkt, buf_mem)904|| !WPACKET_memset(&wpkt, token->is_retry, 1)905|| !WPACKET_memcpy(&wpkt, &token->timestamp,906sizeof(token->timestamp))907|| (token->is_retry908&& (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&wpkt, &token->odcid.id,909token->odcid.id_len)910|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&wpkt, &token->rscid.id,911token->rscid.id_len)))912|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&wpkt, token->remote_addr, token->remote_addr_len)913|| !WPACKET_get_total_written(&wpkt, buffer_len)914|| *buffer_len > MARSHALLED_TOKEN_MAX_LEN915|| !WPACKET_finish(&wpkt)) {916WPACKET_cleanup(&wpkt);917BUF_MEM_free(buf_mem);918return 0;919}920921memcpy(buffer, buf_mem->data, *buffer_len);922BUF_MEM_free(buf_mem);923return 1;924}925926/**927* @brief Encrypts a validation token using AES-256-GCM928*929* @param port The QUIC port containing the encryption key930* @param plaintext The data to encrypt931* @param pt_len Length of the plaintext932* @param ciphertext Buffer to receive encrypted data. If NULL, ct_len will be933* set to the required buffer size and function returns934* immediately.935* @param ct_len Pointer to size_t that will receive the ciphertext length.936* This also includes bytes for QUIC_RETRY_INTEGRITY_TAG_LEN.937*938* @return 1 on success, 0 on failure939*940* The ciphertext format is:941* [EVP_GCM_IV_LEN bytes IV][encrypted data][EVP_GCM_TAG_LEN bytes tag]942*/943static int encrypt_validation_token(const QUIC_PORT *port,944const unsigned char *plaintext,945size_t pt_len,946unsigned char *ciphertext,947size_t *ct_len)948{949int iv_len, len, ret = 0;950size_t tag_len;951unsigned char *iv = ciphertext, *data, *tag;952953if ((tag_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_tag_length(port->token_ctx)) == 0954|| (iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(port->token_ctx)) <= 0)955goto err;956957*ct_len = iv_len + pt_len + tag_len + QUIC_RETRY_INTEGRITY_TAG_LEN;958if (ciphertext == NULL) {959ret = 1;960goto err;961}962963data = ciphertext + iv_len;964tag = data + pt_len;965966if (!RAND_bytes_ex(port->engine->libctx, ciphertext, iv_len, 0)967|| !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(port->token_ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv)968|| !EVP_EncryptUpdate(port->token_ctx, data, &len, plaintext, pt_len)969|| !EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(port->token_ctx, data + pt_len, &len)970|| !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(port->token_ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG, tag_len, tag))971goto err;972973ret = 1;974err:975return ret;976}977978/**979* @brief Decrypts a validation token using AES-256-GCM980*981* @param port The QUIC port containing the decryption key982* @param ciphertext The encrypted data (including IV and tag)983* @param ct_len Length of the ciphertext984* @param plaintext Buffer to receive decrypted data. If NULL, pt_len will be985* set to the required buffer size.986* @param pt_len Pointer to size_t that will receive the plaintext length987*988* @return 1 on success, 0 on failure989*990* Expected ciphertext format:991* [EVP_GCM_IV_LEN bytes IV][encrypted data][EVP_GCM_TAG_LEN bytes tag]992*/993static int decrypt_validation_token(const QUIC_PORT *port,994const unsigned char *ciphertext,995size_t ct_len,996unsigned char *plaintext,997size_t *pt_len)998{999int iv_len, len = 0, ret = 0;1000size_t tag_len;1001const unsigned char *iv = ciphertext, *data, *tag;10021003if ((tag_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_tag_length(port->token_ctx)) == 01004|| (iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(port->token_ctx)) <= 0)1005goto err;10061007/* Prevent decryption of a buffer that is not within reasonable bounds */1008if (ct_len < (iv_len + tag_len) || ct_len > ENCRYPTED_TOKEN_MAX_LEN)1009goto err;10101011*pt_len = ct_len - iv_len - tag_len;1012if (plaintext == NULL) {1013ret = 1;1014goto err;1015}10161017data = ciphertext + iv_len;1018tag = ciphertext + ct_len - tag_len;10191020if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(port->token_ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv)1021|| !EVP_DecryptUpdate(port->token_ctx, plaintext, &len, data,1022ct_len - iv_len - tag_len)1023|| !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(port->token_ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, tag_len,1024(void *)tag)1025|| !EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(port->token_ctx, plaintext + len, &len))1026goto err;10271028ret = 1;10291030err:1031return ret;1032}10331034/**1035* @brief Parses contents of a buffer into a validation token.1036*1037* VALIDATION_TOKEN should already be initialized. Does some basic sanity checks.1038*1039* @param token Validation token to fill data in.1040* @param buf Buffer of previously marshaled validation token.1041* @param buf_len Length of |buf|.1042*/1043static int parse_validation_token(QUIC_VALIDATION_TOKEN *token,1044const unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len)1045{1046PACKET pkt, subpkt;10471048if (buf == NULL || token == NULL)1049return 0;10501051token->remote_addr = NULL;10521053if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, buf_len)1054|| !PACKET_copy_bytes(&pkt, &token->is_retry, sizeof(token->is_retry))1055|| !(token->is_retry == 0 || token->is_retry == 1)1056|| !PACKET_copy_bytes(&pkt, (unsigned char *)&token->timestamp,1057sizeof(token->timestamp))1058|| (token->is_retry1059&& (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &subpkt)1060|| (token->odcid.id_len = (unsigned char)PACKET_remaining(&subpkt))1061> QUIC_MAX_CONN_ID_LEN1062|| !PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt,1063(unsigned char *)&token->odcid.id,1064token->odcid.id_len)1065|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &subpkt)1066|| (token->rscid.id_len = (unsigned char)PACKET_remaining(&subpkt))1067> QUIC_MAX_CONN_ID_LEN1068|| !PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt, (unsigned char *)&token->rscid.id,1069token->rscid.id_len)))1070|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &subpkt)1071|| (token->remote_addr_len = PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) == 01072|| (token->remote_addr = OPENSSL_malloc(token->remote_addr_len)) == NULL1073|| !PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt, token->remote_addr, token->remote_addr_len)1074|| PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 0) {1075cleanup_validation_token(token);1076return 0;1077}10781079return 1;1080}10811082/**1083* @brief Sends a QUIC Retry packet to a client.1084*1085* This function constructs and sends a Retry packet to the specified client1086* using the provided connection header information. The Retry packet1087* includes a generated validation token and a new connection ID, following1088* the QUIC protocol specifications for connection establishment.1089*1090* @param port Pointer to the QUIC port from which to send the packet.1091* @param peer Address of the client peer receiving the packet.1092* @param client_hdr Header of the client's initial packet, containing1093* connection IDs and other relevant information.1094*1095* This function performs the following steps:1096* - Generates a validation token for the client.1097* - Sets the destination and source connection IDs.1098* - Calculates the integrity tag and sets the token length.1099* - Encodes and sends the packet via the BIO network interface.1100*1101* Error handling is included for failures in CID generation, encoding, and1102* network transmiss1103*/1104static void port_send_retry(QUIC_PORT *port,1105BIO_ADDR *peer,1106QUIC_PKT_HDR *client_hdr)1107{1108BIO_MSG msg[1];1109/*1110* Buffer is used for both marshalling the token as well as for the RETRY1111* packet. The size of buffer should not be less than1112* MARSHALLED_TOKEN_MAX_LEN.1113*/1114unsigned char buffer[512];1115unsigned char ct_buf[ENCRYPTED_TOKEN_MAX_LEN];1116WPACKET wpkt;1117size_t written, token_buf_len, ct_len;1118QUIC_PKT_HDR hdr = { 0 };1119QUIC_VALIDATION_TOKEN token = { 0 };1120int ok;11211122if (!ossl_assert(sizeof(buffer) >= MARSHALLED_TOKEN_MAX_LEN))1123return;1124/*1125* 17.2.5.1 Sending a Retry packet1126* dst ConnId is src ConnId we got from client1127* src ConnId comes from local conn ID manager1128*/1129memset(&hdr, 0, sizeof(QUIC_PKT_HDR));1130hdr.dst_conn_id = client_hdr->src_conn_id;1131/*1132* this is the random connection ID, we expect client is1133* going to send the ID with next INITIAL packet which1134* will also come with token we generate here.1135*/1136ok = ossl_quic_lcidm_get_unused_cid(port->lcidm, &hdr.src_conn_id);1137if (ok == 0)1138goto err;11391140memset(&token, 0, sizeof(QUIC_VALIDATION_TOKEN));11411142/* Generate retry validation token */1143if (!generate_token(peer, client_hdr->dst_conn_id,1144hdr.src_conn_id, &token, 1)1145|| !marshal_validation_token(&token, buffer, &token_buf_len)1146|| !encrypt_validation_token(port, buffer, token_buf_len, NULL,1147&ct_len)1148|| ct_len > ENCRYPTED_TOKEN_MAX_LEN1149|| !encrypt_validation_token(port, buffer, token_buf_len, ct_buf,1150&ct_len)1151|| !ossl_assert(ct_len >= QUIC_RETRY_INTEGRITY_TAG_LEN))1152goto err;11531154hdr.dst_conn_id = client_hdr->src_conn_id;1155hdr.type = QUIC_PKT_TYPE_RETRY;1156hdr.fixed = 1;1157hdr.version = 1;1158hdr.len = ct_len;1159hdr.data = ct_buf;1160ok = ossl_quic_calculate_retry_integrity_tag(port->engine->libctx,1161port->engine->propq, &hdr,1162&client_hdr->dst_conn_id,1163ct_buf + ct_len1164- QUIC_RETRY_INTEGRITY_TAG_LEN);1165if (ok == 0)1166goto err;11671168hdr.token = hdr.data;1169hdr.token_len = hdr.len;11701171msg[0].data = buffer;1172msg[0].peer = peer;1173msg[0].local = NULL;1174msg[0].flags = 0;11751176ok = WPACKET_init_static_len(&wpkt, buffer, sizeof(buffer), 0);1177if (ok == 0)1178goto err;11791180ok = ossl_quic_wire_encode_pkt_hdr(&wpkt, client_hdr->dst_conn_id.id_len,1181&hdr, NULL);1182if (ok == 0)1183goto err;11841185ok = WPACKET_get_total_written(&wpkt, &msg[0].data_len);1186if (ok == 0)1187goto err;11881189ok = WPACKET_finish(&wpkt);1190if (ok == 0)1191goto err;11921193/*1194* TODO(QUIC FUTURE) need to retry this in the event it return EAGAIN1195* on a non-blocking BIO1196*/1197if (!BIO_sendmmsg(port->net_wbio, msg, sizeof(BIO_MSG), 1, 0, &written))1198ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_QUIC_NETWORK_ERROR,1199"port retry send failed due to network BIO I/O error");12001201err:1202cleanup_validation_token(&token);1203}12041205/**1206* @brief Sends a QUIC Version Negotiation packet to the specified peer.1207*1208* This function constructs and sends a Version Negotiation packet using1209* the connection IDs from the client's initial packet header. The1210* Version Negotiation packet indicates support for QUIC version 1.1211*1212* @param port Pointer to the QUIC_PORT structure representing the port1213* context used for network communication.1214* @param peer Pointer to the BIO_ADDR structure specifying the address1215* of the peer to which the Version Negotiation packet1216* will be sent.1217* @param client_hdr Pointer to the QUIC_PKT_HDR structure containing the1218* client's packet header used to extract connection IDs.1219*1220* @note The function will raise an error if sending the message fails.1221*/1222static void port_send_version_negotiation(QUIC_PORT *port, BIO_ADDR *peer,1223QUIC_PKT_HDR *client_hdr)1224{1225BIO_MSG msg[1];1226unsigned char buffer[1024];1227QUIC_PKT_HDR hdr;1228WPACKET wpkt;1229uint32_t supported_versions[1];1230size_t written;1231size_t i;12321233memset(&hdr, 0, sizeof(QUIC_PKT_HDR));1234/*1235* Reverse the source and dst conn ids1236*/1237hdr.dst_conn_id = client_hdr->src_conn_id;1238hdr.src_conn_id = client_hdr->dst_conn_id;12391240/*1241* This is our list of supported protocol versions1242* Currently only QUIC_VERSION_11243*/1244supported_versions[0] = QUIC_VERSION_1;12451246/*1247* Fill out the header fields1248* Note: Version negotiation packets, must, unlike1249* other packet types have a version of 01250*/1251hdr.type = QUIC_PKT_TYPE_VERSION_NEG;1252hdr.version = 0;1253hdr.token = 0;1254hdr.token_len = 0;1255hdr.len = sizeof(supported_versions);1256hdr.data = (unsigned char *)supported_versions;12571258msg[0].data = buffer;1259msg[0].peer = peer;1260msg[0].local = NULL;1261msg[0].flags = 0;12621263if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&wpkt, buffer, sizeof(buffer), 0))1264return;12651266if (!ossl_quic_wire_encode_pkt_hdr(&wpkt, client_hdr->dst_conn_id.id_len,1267&hdr, NULL))1268return;12691270/*1271* Add the array of supported versions to the end of the packet1272*/1273for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(supported_versions); i++) {1274if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(&wpkt, supported_versions[i]))1275return;1276}12771278if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(&wpkt, &msg[0].data_len))1279return;12801281if (!WPACKET_finish(&wpkt))1282return;12831284/*1285* Send it back to the client attempting to connect1286* TODO(QUIC FUTURE): Need to handle the EAGAIN case here, if the1287* BIO_sendmmsg call falls in a retryable manner1288*/1289if (!BIO_sendmmsg(port->net_wbio, msg, sizeof(BIO_MSG), 1, 0, &written))1290ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_QUIC_NETWORK_ERROR,1291"port version negotiation send failed");1292}12931294/**1295* @brief definitions of token lifetimes1296*1297* RETRY tokens are only valid for 10 seconds1298* NEW_TOKEN tokens have a lifetime of 3600 sec (1 hour)1299*/13001301#define RETRY_LIFETIME 101302#define NEW_TOKEN_LIFETIME 36001303/**1304* @brief Validates a received token in a QUIC packet header.1305*1306* This function checks the validity of a token contained in the provided1307* QUIC packet header (`QUIC_PKT_HDR *hdr`). The validation process involves1308* verifying that the token matches an expected format and value. If the1309* token is from a RETRY packet, the function extracts the original connection1310* ID (ODCID)/original source connection ID (SCID) and stores it in the provided1311* parameters. If the token is from a NEW_TOKEN packet, the values will be1312* derived instead.1313*1314* @param hdr Pointer to the QUIC packet header containing the token.1315* @param port Pointer to the QUIC port from which to send the packet.1316* @param peer Address of the client peer receiving the packet.1317* @param odcid Pointer to the connection ID structure to store the ODCID if the1318* token is valid.1319* @param scid Pointer to the connection ID structure to store the SCID if the1320* token is valid.1321*1322* @return 1 if the token is valid and ODCID/SCID are successfully set.1323* 0 otherwise.1324*1325* The function performs the following checks:1326* - Token length meets the required minimum.1327* - Buffer matches expected format.1328* - Peer address matches previous connection address.1329* - Token has not expired. Currently set to 10 seconds for tokens from RETRY1330* packets and 60 minutes for tokens from NEW_TOKEN packets. This may be1331* configurable in the future.1332*/1333static int port_validate_token(QUIC_PKT_HDR *hdr, QUIC_PORT *port,1334BIO_ADDR *peer, QUIC_CONN_ID *odcid,1335QUIC_CONN_ID *scid, uint8_t *gen_new_token)1336{1337int ret = 0;1338QUIC_VALIDATION_TOKEN token = { 0 };1339uint64_t time_diff;1340size_t remote_addr_len, dec_token_len;1341unsigned char *remote_addr = NULL, dec_token[MARSHALLED_TOKEN_MAX_LEN];1342OSSL_TIME now = ossl_time_now();13431344*gen_new_token = 0;13451346if (!decrypt_validation_token(port, hdr->token, hdr->token_len, NULL,1347&dec_token_len)1348|| dec_token_len > MARSHALLED_TOKEN_MAX_LEN1349|| !decrypt_validation_token(port, hdr->token, hdr->token_len,1350dec_token, &dec_token_len)1351|| !parse_validation_token(&token, dec_token, dec_token_len))1352goto err;13531354/*1355* Validate token timestamp. Current time should not be before the token1356* timestamp.1357*/1358if (ossl_time_compare(now, token.timestamp) < 0)1359goto err;1360time_diff = ossl_time2seconds(ossl_time_abs_difference(token.timestamp,1361now));1362if ((token.is_retry && time_diff > RETRY_LIFETIME)1363|| (!token.is_retry && time_diff > NEW_TOKEN_LIFETIME))1364goto err;13651366/* Validate remote address */1367if (!BIO_ADDR_rawaddress(peer, NULL, &remote_addr_len)1368|| remote_addr_len != token.remote_addr_len1369|| (remote_addr = OPENSSL_malloc(remote_addr_len)) == NULL1370|| !BIO_ADDR_rawaddress(peer, remote_addr, &remote_addr_len)1371|| memcmp(remote_addr, token.remote_addr, remote_addr_len) != 0)1372goto err;13731374/*1375* Set ODCID and SCID. If the token is from a RETRY packet, retrieve both1376* from the token. Otherwise, generate a new ODCID and use the header's1377* source connection ID for SCID.1378*/1379if (token.is_retry) {1380/*1381* We're parsing a packet header before its gone through AEAD validation1382* here, so there is a chance we are dealing with corrupted data. Make1383* Sure the dcid encoded in the token matches the headers dcid to1384* mitigate that.1385* TODO(QUIC FUTURE): Consider handling AEAD validation at the port1386* level rather than the QRX/channel level to eliminate the need for1387* this.1388*/1389if (token.rscid.id_len != hdr->dst_conn_id.id_len1390|| memcmp(&token.rscid.id, &hdr->dst_conn_id.id,1391token.rscid.id_len)1392!= 0)1393goto err;1394*odcid = token.odcid;1395*scid = token.rscid;1396} else {1397if (!ossl_quic_lcidm_get_unused_cid(port->lcidm, odcid))1398goto err;1399*scid = hdr->src_conn_id;1400}14011402/*1403* Determine if we need to send a NEW_TOKEN frame1404* If we validated a retry token, we should always1405* send a NEW_TOKEN frame to the client1406*1407* If however, we validated a NEW_TOKEN, which may be1408* reused multiple times, only send a NEW_TOKEN frame1409* if the existing received token has less than 10% of its lifetime1410* remaining. This prevents us from constantly sending1411* NEW_TOKEN frames on every connection when not needed1412*/1413if (token.is_retry) {1414*gen_new_token = 1;1415} else {1416if (time_diff > ((NEW_TOKEN_LIFETIME * 9) / 10))1417*gen_new_token = 1;1418}14191420ret = 1;1421err:1422cleanup_validation_token(&token);1423OPENSSL_free(remote_addr);1424return ret;1425}14261427static void generate_new_token(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch, BIO_ADDR *peer)1428{1429QUIC_CONN_ID rscid = { 0 };1430QUIC_VALIDATION_TOKEN token;1431unsigned char buffer[ENCRYPTED_TOKEN_MAX_LEN];1432unsigned char *ct_buf;1433size_t ct_len;1434size_t token_buf_len = 0;14351436/* Clients never send a NEW_TOKEN */1437if (!ch->is_server)1438return;14391440ct_buf = OPENSSL_zalloc(ENCRYPTED_TOKEN_MAX_LEN);1441if (ct_buf == NULL)1442return;14431444/*1445* NEW_TOKEN tokens may be used for multiple subsequent connections1446* within their timeout period, so don't reserve an rscid here1447* like we do for retry tokens, instead, just fill it with random1448* data, as we won't use it anyway1449*/1450rscid.id_len = 8;1451if (!RAND_bytes_ex(ch->port->engine->libctx, rscid.id, 8, 0)) {1452OPENSSL_free(ct_buf);1453return;1454}14551456memset(&token, 0, sizeof(QUIC_VALIDATION_TOKEN));14571458if (!generate_token(peer, ch->init_dcid, rscid, &token, 0)1459|| !marshal_validation_token(&token, buffer, &token_buf_len)1460|| !encrypt_validation_token(ch->port, buffer, token_buf_len, NULL,1461&ct_len)1462|| ct_len > ENCRYPTED_TOKEN_MAX_LEN1463|| !encrypt_validation_token(ch->port, buffer, token_buf_len, ct_buf,1464&ct_len)1465|| !ossl_assert(ct_len >= QUIC_RETRY_INTEGRITY_TAG_LEN)) {1466OPENSSL_free(ct_buf);1467cleanup_validation_token(&token);1468return;1469}14701471ch->pending_new_token = ct_buf;1472ch->pending_new_token_len = ct_len;14731474cleanup_validation_token(&token);1475}14761477/*1478* This is called by the demux when we get a packet not destined for any known1479* DCID.1480*/1481static void port_default_packet_handler(QUIC_URXE *e, void *arg,1482const QUIC_CONN_ID *dcid)1483{1484QUIC_PORT *port = arg;1485PACKET pkt;1486QUIC_PKT_HDR hdr;1487QUIC_CHANNEL *ch = NULL, *new_ch = NULL;1488QUIC_CONN_ID odcid, scid;1489uint8_t gen_new_token = 0;1490OSSL_QRX *qrx = NULL;1491OSSL_QRX *qrx_src = NULL;1492OSSL_QRX_ARGS qrx_args = { 0 };1493uint64_t cause_flags = 0;1494OSSL_QRX_PKT *qrx_pkt = NULL;14951496/* Don't handle anything if we are no longer running. */1497if (!ossl_quic_port_is_running(port))1498goto undesirable;14991500if (port_try_handle_stateless_reset(port, e))1501goto undesirable;15021503if (dcid != NULL1504&& ossl_quic_lcidm_lookup(port->lcidm, dcid, NULL,1505(void **)&ch)) {1506assert(ch != NULL);1507ossl_quic_channel_inject(ch, e);1508return;1509}15101511/*1512* If we have an incoming packet which doesn't match any existing connection1513* we assume this is an attempt to make a new connection.1514*/1515if (!port->allow_incoming)1516goto undesirable;15171518/*1519* We have got a packet for an unknown DCID. This might be an attempt to1520* open a new connection.1521*/1522if (e->data_len < QUIC_MIN_INITIAL_DGRAM_LEN)1523goto undesirable;15241525if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, ossl_quic_urxe_data(e), e->data_len))1526goto undesirable;15271528/*1529* We set short_conn_id_len to SIZE_MAX here which will cause the decode1530* operation to fail if we get a 1-RTT packet. This is fine since we only1531* care about Initial packets.1532*/1533if (!ossl_quic_wire_decode_pkt_hdr(&pkt, SIZE_MAX, 1, 0, &hdr, NULL,1534&cause_flags)) {1535/*1536* If we fail due to a bad version, we know the packet up to the version1537* number was decoded, and we use it below to send a version1538* negotiation packet1539*/1540if ((cause_flags & QUIC_PKT_HDR_DECODE_BAD_VERSION) == 0)1541goto undesirable;1542}15431544switch (hdr.version) {1545case QUIC_VERSION_1:1546break;15471548case QUIC_VERSION_NONE:1549default:15501551/*1552* If we get here, then we have a bogus version, and might need1553* to send a version negotiation packet. According to1554* RFC 9000 s. 6 and 14.1, we only do so however, if the UDP datagram1555* is a minimum of 1200 bytes in size1556*/1557if (e->data_len < 1200)1558goto undesirable;15591560/*1561* If we don't get a supported version, respond with a ver1562* negotiation packet, and discard1563* TODO(QUIC FUTURE): Rate limit the reception of these1564*/1565port_send_version_negotiation(port, &e->peer, &hdr);1566goto undesirable;1567}15681569/*1570* We only care about Initial packets which might be trying to establish a1571* connection.1572*/1573if (hdr.type != QUIC_PKT_TYPE_INITIAL)1574goto undesirable;15751576odcid.id_len = 0;15771578/*1579* Create qrx now so we can check integrity of packet1580* which does not belong to any channel.1581*/1582qrx_args.libctx = port->engine->libctx;1583qrx_args.demux = port->demux;1584qrx_args.short_conn_id_len = dcid->id_len;1585qrx_args.max_deferred = 32;1586qrx = ossl_qrx_new(&qrx_args);1587if (qrx == NULL)1588goto undesirable;15891590/*1591* Derive secrets for qrx only.1592*/1593if (!ossl_quic_provide_initial_secret(port->engine->libctx,1594port->engine->propq,1595&hdr.dst_conn_id,1596/* is_server */ 1,1597qrx, NULL))1598goto undesirable;15991600if (ossl_qrx_validate_initial_packet(qrx, e, (const QUIC_CONN_ID *)dcid) == 0)1601goto undesirable;16021603if (port->validate_addr == 0) {1604/*1605* Forget qrx, because it becomes (almost) useless here. We must let1606* channel to create a new QRX for connection ID server chooses. The1607* validation keys for new DCID will be derived by1608* ossl_quic_channel_on_new_conn() when we will be creating channel.1609* See RFC 9000 section 7.2 negotiating connection id to better1610* understand what's going on here.1611*1612* Did we say qrx is almost useless? Why? Because qrx remembers packets1613* we just validated. Those packets must be injected to channel we are1614* going to create. We use qrx_src alias so we can read packets from1615* qrx and inject them to channel.1616*/1617qrx_src = qrx;1618qrx = NULL;1619}1620/*1621* TODO(QUIC FUTURE): there should be some logic similar to accounting half-open1622* states in TCP. If we reach certain threshold, then we want to1623* validate clients.1624*/1625if (port->validate_addr == 1 && hdr.token == NULL) {1626port_send_retry(port, &e->peer, &hdr);1627goto undesirable;1628}16291630/*1631* Note, even if we don't enforce the sending of retry frames for1632* server address validation, we may still get a token if we sent1633* a NEW_TOKEN frame during a prior connection, which we should still1634* validate here1635*/1636if (hdr.token != NULL1637&& port_validate_token(&hdr, port, &e->peer,1638&odcid, &scid,1639&gen_new_token)1640== 0) {1641/*1642* RFC 9000 s 8.1.31643* When a server receives an Initial packet with an address1644* validation token, it MUST attempt to validate the token,1645* unless it has already completed address validation.1646* If the token is invalid, then the server SHOULD proceed as1647* if the client did not have a validated address,1648* including potentially sending a Retry packet1649* Note: If address validation is disabled, just act like1650* the request is valid1651*/1652if (port->validate_addr == 1) {1653/*1654* Again: we should consider saving initial encryption level1655* secrets to token here to save some CPU cycles.1656*/1657port_send_retry(port, &e->peer, &hdr);1658goto undesirable;1659}16601661/*1662* client is under amplification limit, until it completes1663* handshake.1664*1665* forget qrx so channel can create a new one1666* with valid initial encryption level keys.1667*/1668qrx_src = qrx;1669qrx = NULL;1670}16711672port_bind_channel(port, &e->peer, &scid, &hdr.dst_conn_id,1673&odcid, qrx, &new_ch);16741675/*1676* if packet validates it gets moved to channel, we've just bound1677* to port.1678*/1679if (new_ch == NULL)1680goto undesirable;16811682/*1683* Generate a token for sending in a later NEW_TOKEN frame1684*/1685if (gen_new_token == 1)1686generate_new_token(new_ch, &e->peer);16871688if (qrx != NULL) {1689/*1690* The qrx belongs to channel now, so don't free it.1691*/1692qrx = NULL;1693} else {1694/*1695* We still need to salvage packets from almost forgotten qrx1696* and pass them to channel.1697*/1698while (ossl_qrx_read_pkt(qrx_src, &qrx_pkt) == 1)1699ossl_quic_channel_inject_pkt(new_ch, qrx_pkt);1700ossl_qrx_update_pn_space(qrx_src, new_ch->qrx);1701}17021703/*1704* If function reaches this place, then packet got validated in1705* ossl_qrx_validate_initial_packet(). Keep in mind the function1706* ossl_qrx_validate_initial_packet() decrypts the packet to validate it.1707* If packet validation was successful (and it was because we are here),1708* then the function puts the packet to qrx->rx_pending. We must not call1709* ossl_qrx_inject_urxe() here now, because we don't want to insert1710* the packet to qrx->urx_pending which keeps packet waiting for decryption.1711*1712* We are going to call ossl_quic_demux_release_urxe() to dispose buffer1713* which still holds encrypted data.1714*/17151716undesirable:1717ossl_qrx_free(qrx);1718ossl_qrx_free(qrx_src);1719ossl_quic_demux_release_urxe(port->demux, e);1720}17211722void ossl_quic_port_raise_net_error(QUIC_PORT *port,1723QUIC_CHANNEL *triggering_ch)1724{1725QUIC_CHANNEL *ch;17261727if (!ossl_quic_port_is_running(port))1728return;17291730/*1731* Immediately capture any triggering error on the error stack, with a1732* cover error.1733*/1734ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_QUIC_NETWORK_ERROR,1735"port failed due to network BIO I/O error");1736OSSL_ERR_STATE_save(port->err_state);17371738port_transition_failed(port);17391740/* Give the triggering channel (if any) the first notification. */1741if (triggering_ch != NULL)1742ossl_quic_channel_raise_net_error(triggering_ch);17431744OSSL_LIST_FOREACH(ch, ch, &port->channel_list)1745if (ch != triggering_ch)1746ossl_quic_channel_raise_net_error(ch);1747}17481749void ossl_quic_port_restore_err_state(const QUIC_PORT *port)1750{1751ERR_clear_error();1752OSSL_ERR_STATE_restore(port->err_state);1753}175417551756