Book a Demo!
CoCalc Logo Icon
StoreFeaturesDocsShareSupportNewsAboutPoliciesSign UpSign In
Download
29547 views
1
2
3
4
5
6
Maytag's Spin Cycle
7
8
9
If you weren't paying attention last week--and even if you
10
were--you might have missed the dramatic fall in the stock of washing-machine
11
maker Maytag, which began on Wednesday and continued through Friday. Although
12
Maytag has gained a lot of attention recently for its fantastic high-end
13
Neptune washer and its high-powered CEO, it's not exactly the kind of company
14
that makes your ears perk up. But the story of what happened to Maytag, or more
15
precisely the story of how Wall Street reacted to what happened to Maytag, is
16
such a clear illustration of the Street's conviction that there's nothing wrong
17
with inside information as to be almost a parody.
18
19
Maytag's stock was driven down because the company is
20
going to fall far short of earnings estimates in the next two quarters.
21
Unfortunately, Maytag investors didn't find that out until the company
22
announced the shortfall Friday morning, after two full days of massive selling
23
on no news at all. Well, no public news, that is. Clearly lots of
24
people knew something.
25
26
Now, Maytag insists that it didn't even know things were
27
going to be so bad until its sales numbers came in, and that it didn't tell any
28
of its big shareholders to get out before the bad news broke. Perhaps. But
29
trading volume on Wednesday was three times normal, and trading volume on
30
Thursday was six times normal. A lot of that, of course, was just momentum
31
selling, as people leapt out of the way of what quickly became a falling knife.
32
But the size of the trades was such that the whole situation looks decidedly
33
sketchy.
34
35
Here's the quirk in the whole story, though. Among the
36
people raising the possibility that large shareholders were informed in advance
37
are analysts at some of Wall Street's biggest investment banks and brokerage
38
houses. And among the people most annoyed by the company's late announcement
39
are those same analysts. Why? Because when they talked to Maytag Thursday
40
night, the company reassured them that nothing was wrong, and that there would
41
be no change in their earnings forecasts.
42
43
Let's get this straight. The analysts are annoyed because
44
Maytag didn't tell them that something was wrong before it told the
45
public that something was wrong. In other words, Maytag didn't give the
46
analysts the chance to tell their clients to sell before other investors
47
realized something was wrong.
48
49
Of course, this reaction was accepted as par for the
50
course on the Street, even though if Maytag had told analysts anything, it
51
would have been as blatant a case of selective disclosure as you can imagine.
52
And I'd say this was astonishing, except for the fact that selective disclosure
53
remains a painfully common practice. Non-institutional investors are excluded
54
from company conference calls and snubbed by investor-relations people.
55
Companies continue to disclose material information to analysts before issuing
56
press releases. And they spend far more time talking to large shareholders than
57
they do talking to the public.
58
59
The ironic thing, then, is that Maytag did the right thing
60
Thursday night, even if it looks as if someone at Maytag might have done the
61
wrong thing a couple of days before. When analysts call, looking for
62
information that will help their clients and only their clients, companies
63
should just say, "Buzz off. If we have something important to say, you'll find
64
out when everyone else does." Oh, I how long to be a fly on the wall for that
65
conversation. (Well, actually, I don't want to be a fly, since they have short
66
and miserable lives. But you get the point.)
67
68
69
70
71
72