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More on the AOL-Time Warner Deal
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Some further notes on this AOL-Time Warner blockbuster (multiple
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conflict-of-interest note: I write for Fortune , which is owned by Time
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Warner; I actually owned shares of AOL until around lunchtime, when I sold
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them; and I'm writing this column for Microsoft, which is probably affected by
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this deal in some way):
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1) There's no doubt that acquiring Time Warner will immediately solve many
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of AOL's current and future dilemmas. It will strengthen AOL's ability to
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provide content to its subscribers, which isn't insignificant insofar as AOL is
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still in part a proprietary service. It will speed the convergence of the
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Internet and television. The deal creates really interesting possibilities in
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terms of the delivery of downloadable music and video over the Net, because of
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the size of Time Warner's catalogs. And, perhaps most importantly, it appears
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to eliminate a lot of the concerns about AOL's ability to make a transition
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into the world of broadband access. AOL will now be one of the country's key
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cable providers, which means that it can position itself as a dominant player
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in the high-speed-cable-modem world.
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What's interesting, though, is that it's not clear AOL needed actually to
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buy Time Warner in order to make any of these solutions work. Content,
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especially Internet content, is eminently licensable, and as far as the
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music/video business goes, it's really easy to imagine a deal in which AOL
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would have given Time Warner access to its users in exchange for a cut of the
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business. Even when it comes to broadband, AOL's strategy seemed to be working
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well. It had cut deals with key telcos to have access to DSL customers, a deal
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with AT&T (once its exclusive arrangement with Excite@Home expired) felt
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like a foregone conclusion, and again cutting a deal with Time Warner could not
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have been that hard a proposition. And when you consider that Steve Case said
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today he's committed to open access over Time Warner's wires--that is, people
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who get high-speed Internet access from Time Warner cable will be able to use
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ISPs other than AOL--actually owning the wires doesn't seem to add that much to
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the value of AOL.
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The point is that most of the business components of the deal seem to make
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perfect sense. It's just that acquiring all of Time Warner to get them,
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especially at such a high price, doesn't automatically follow. The odd thing is
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that at this moment when markets are replacing hierarchies all across the
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American business landscape, you also have all these companies--like AOL, like
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Viacom/CBS, like DaimlerChrysler, like AT&T--doing the exact opposite,
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making deals on the assumption that you need to have everything under one roof
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to really reap all the benefits.
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2) At today's press conference, Time Warner CEO Gerald Levin explained that
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he thought it made more sense to buy an Internet presence rather than try to
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build one organically. Which would be an interesting thing to think about,
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if he were buying an Internet presence . Instead, of course, AOL
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is buying an offline/cable presence . And if you turn Levin's statement
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around, that leads you to an interesting conclusion about AOL's wisdom in doing
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this deal.
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3) The great beneficiaries of the deal, of course, are the people who owned
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Time Warner shares on Friday. It's interesting, though, that even after today's
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close there was a significant gap--almost 20 percent--between the price of Time
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Warner's shares and the price that AOL will pay for them when the deal closes.
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In other words, if the deal were a sure thing, there's a rather nice risk-free
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return just sitting there waiting to be picked up. What that means is that
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arbitrageurs think the deal is not a sure thing.
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(It's also unclear whether there's a collar on the deal. Time Warner
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shareholders are going to get 1.5 shares for every AOL share. But that means
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that if the value of AOL's shares falls, so too will the value of the deal for
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Time Warner shareholders. A collar would essentially put a floor on that value,
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so that if AOL's share price fell below a certain point, Time Warner
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shareholders would get more shares.)
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4) Despite the scope of the deal, though, antitrust concerns don't really
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seem to be much of a factor here. Because the two companies' businesses are
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complementary rather than competitive (that is, Time Warner doesn't offer
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regular Internet access, AOL isn't in TV or magazines or music), the deal will
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probably go through without much of a hitch. It would be interesting, though,
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if the Justice Department or the FCC were to embrace a broader definition of
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"competition" and to see Time Warner and AOL as essentially competitors in this
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amorphous thing we call "media." In that case, the conglomeration of so many
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different kinds of assets might be seen as anti-competitive. But it's a
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stretch.
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5) I'm a Time Warner cable customer, living in Brooklyn, whose cable system
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is still so antiquated that I can't even get Turner Classic Movies (which Time
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Warner actually owns), let alone high-speed Internet access. If this deal will
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get me TCM and true broadband access, then all I can say is: "Good going,
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guys!"
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