NATO Expansion
By
Karenna Gore
NATO is on the verge of
offering membership to three former members of the Soviet bloc: Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic (half of what used to be Czechoslovakia). The
offer will probably come at a summit in Madrid in July. But it is
controversial. So is the whole purpose of NATO, now that the Cold War is
over.
The
North Atlantic Treaty Organization was founded in 1949. Its
purpose , in the words of its first secretary-general, Lord Ismay, was
"to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down." In other
words, Western European nations, devastated by World War II, wanted the United
States to help defend them against Soviet aggression, and wanted German
militarism to be merged into joint security arrangements.
The key to NATO is Article 5 of the
North Atlantic Treaty: "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or
more of them in Europe or North America will be considered an attack against
them all." In exchange for the security blanket of U.S. nuclear and
conventional forces, member nations have recognized U.S. leadership in
both policy and operations. (The treaty specifies that the commander in chief
of NATO forces must be an American.)
The
Clinton administration favors expanding NATO, but has been criticized
for insufficient enthusiasm. During the last presidential campaign, ex-Sen.
Bob Dole said Clinton was dragging his feet. Henry Kissinger has
said that "ambivalence has produced an inconsistency between the
administration's statements of its objectives and the leisurely way it pursues
them." Others in the United States pushing for NATO expansion include a vocal
Eastern and Central European diaspora (symbolized now by Czech-born Secretary
of State Madeleine Albright); columnist William Safire; and Sens. Richard
Lugar, Barbara Mikulski, and Joe Lieberman.
The main arguments for expansion , from
the U.S. point of view, are: 1) This is an opportunity to consolidate the Cold
War victory by locking in the allegiance of newly democratic nations and
ensuring their stability; 2) This is an insurance policy against a potentially
resurgent Russia; and 3) This guarantees a continuing leadership role for the
United States in Europe, even as Europe creates and strengthens its own
institutions of unity. Since 1991, NATO has remade itself as a peacekeeping and
crisis-management organization--in Bosnia, for example--and supporters of
expansion believe this is a valuable role that expanded membership would
enhance.
But
others say the Clinton administration is "barreling" toward expansion, in
reckless disregard of the attendant risks and drawbacks . The opposition
is diverse and mounting. It includes an extreme right-wing Republican like
Patrick Buchanan , a moderate Democrat like former Sen. Sam Nunn, and the
editorial page of the
New York Times
. "Planning the future of
Europe with blueprints from the cold war is a mistake," says the
Times .
Anti-expansion arguments break down into
two main categories. One emphasizes that NATO is not a feel-good
organization--it is a military commitment. Is the United States really prepared
to go to war to defend the Czech Republic? With Russia in shambles and
communism no longer a threat, what threat to U.S. interests justifies such a
commitment? At present levels of military spending, can the United States
credibly make such a promise? And what would it cost to make the promise
credible? Rash treaty commitments to the feud-prone nations of central Europe
led to World War I--could it happen again? ("Putting a tripwire for war on
Poland's border," is how Buchanan put it in a Feb. 5 column.) Why can't Europe,
now prosperous, defend itself?
The
other category of arguments against NATO expansion concerns the impact on
Russia , the object of bitter opposition. George F. Kennan , father of
the Cold War policy of "containment" of which NATO was an expression, declared
in the Times Feb. 5 that "expanding NATO would be the most fateful error
of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era." It would "inflame the
nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion";
harm "the development of Russian democracy"; "restore the atmosphere of the
cold war"; and "impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our
liking."
Alesser, third category of arguments against
NATO expansion concerns its effect on Eastern European countries that are not
admitted to the club. Critics say expansion could be another Yalta (the
1945 meeting at which Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin agreed on spheres of
influence in postwar Europe)--imposing a line between East and West, and
leaving nonmembers subject to Russian bullying.
Eastern and Central
European nations, which historically have been invasion highways, see NATO
membership as the answer to their greatest fears: internal instability and
Russian resurgence. They also see it as easing their way toward economic
integration with Western Europe. What they have been offered so far is a sort
of junior membership, called Partnership for Peace . PFP provides for
military cooperation, but no defense guarantee. It has been mocked as a
meaningless gesture to stave off eager applicants and assuage the Russians. But
others praise it as a minor-league farm team for potential NATO members, and
celebrate its civilizing influence (some PFP members have settled long-standing
border disputes).
To allay Russian concerns,
NATO has offered not to deploy nuclear forces in Eastern Europe. Its central
offer is a "charter" with Russia that assures the Russians a voice in alliance
policy, without any of the rights of membership. But Russian Prime Minister
Victor Chernomyrdin warned Feb. 3 that unless NATO backs off, ultranationalists
will threaten the government and "tanks will be rolling out" in Moscow.
