Muslim Crosscurrents
The victory of Mohammed
Khatami in the Iranian presidential election suggests the country's
revolutionary zeal has been tempered. While little change is likely to Iran's
political structure or foreign policy, a more moderate line in social policy
may emerge. In contrast, Afghanistan's Sunni Muslim Taliban is still in a
revolutionary phase of development. Currently, its advance is generating the
greatest concern in the ex-Soviet states of Central Asia, but the movement may
yet resonate more strongly in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The net effect of
these contrasting trends on the attainment of U.S. objectives across the region
is not likely to be positive. Washington may come to regret its reported
support for the Taliban movement. And while a more moderate social policy may
emerge in Iran, the country's resistance to a U.S. military presence in the
Persian Gulf is unlikely to soften.
In Iran's
May 23 election, Khatami received almost 70 percent of votes cast, putting him
far ahead of his main rival, the conservative speaker of the Iranian
Parliament, Ali Akbar Nategh-Nuri. The result was a surprise, since Nategh-Nuri
enjoys the tacit support of Iran's spiritual leader, Ayatollah Sayyed Ali
Khamenei, and was viewed as the clerical establishment's candidate for
president.
Khatami's huge mandate is a clear sign of the Iranian
electorate's desire for change and may become a significant landmark in the
country's history. Offered a clear choice of candidates and policies for the
first time since the 1979 revolution, an overwhelming majority of Iranians
voted to overturn the social and cultural restrictions that have become
synonymous with the Islamic republic's revolutionary zeal.
Khatami's
reputation for supporting liberal policies during his tenure as minister for
culture and Islamic guidance was combined with a populist campaign message
stressing the importance of civil society, individual rights, a wider role for
women, and greater freedom of expression. This allowed him to appeal to a broad
range of constituencies that have eschewed electoral participation since the
revolution. In addition to the support of left-wing Islamic radicals, Khatami
received the overwhelming backing of the intelligentsia, the urban middle
class, and female and younger voters.
Nevertheless, and despite his reputation as a
moderate liberal, Khatami, the son of an ayatollah, remains a product of Iran's
Shiite Muslim clerical establishment. He has emphasized his commitment to the
principles of the Islamic republic, and will do nothing to fundamentally alter
the existing political system. Moreover, moves to introduce radical
social-reform legislation may founder in Parliament, where there is a
conservative majority.
Ultimately, the extent of any shift in domestic policy will depend on the
position adopted by Khamenei. If the spiritual leader views the election result
as a threat to his own authority, he could side with hard-line Islamists to
thwart reform initiatives. However, given the size of Khatami's mandate,
Khamenei may conclude that the desire for easing social and cultural
restrictions is compelling enough, and opt to assist the new president in
overcoming conservative opponents.
Similar transformations in foreign policy, particularly
toward the United States, are far less likely. Khatami's statements reflect a
recognition that foreign policy remains the domain of Khamenei. The ayatollah
has been dogmatic in opposing Washington's policies in the region, particularly
"dual containment," which he views as U.S. victimization of Iran. The
leadership is particularly unlikely to moderate its opposition to the U.S.
military presence in the Persian Gulf, which it perceives as detrimental to
Iran's security interests.
Both sides
believe that the other must make the first conciliatory move. There is debate
within the U.S. foreign-policy establishment regarding the efficacy of
Washington's approach, which is based on the perception of Iran as a rogue
state and a sponsor of international terror. However, social reform in Iran
will not by itself be enough to facilitate a dramatic shift in U.S. policy.
Set against the evidence of moderation in Iran,
the Taliban's advance in Afghanistan has generated alarm, particularly among
ex-Soviet Central Asian governments, who fear the spread of Islamic
fundamentalism northward. Since most Central Asians are Sunni Muslims, the
Taliban potentially may be a more inspiring model for local Islamic
revolutionaries than Shiah Iran. However, while there is a real danger that the
fighting could destabilize Central Asia's southern flank, the Taliban's
restricted ethnic base may limit its attractiveness. In contrast, this may not
be the case in Sunni-dominated Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Islamabad, Riyadh
and, by extension, Washington may yet come to regret their reported support for
a Sunni movement that apparently now exceeds Shiah Iran in its fundamentalist
zeal and potential appeal to discontented Sunni populations.
Although
the Taliban operates autonomously, its advance would not have been possible
without foreign backing. Pakistan has been the key supporter, but Saudi Arabia
and the United States--both keen to stem Iranian influence in the region--also
are believed to have supplied finance. All three countries have an interest in
stabilizing Afghanistan sufficiently to construct oil pipelines from Central
Asia through the country, as an alternative route to Iran.
The Taliban is both a product of and a reaction to the
civil war that has gripped Afghanistan since the demise of the Soviet-backed
regime in 1992. The movement developed out of refugee Koranic schools in
Pakistan. Taliban leaders declared a holy war against the various warlords who
carved up Afghanistan, and preached the role of strict Islamic rules as a
unifying force. This simple message found a ready audience among the largely
rural population of southern Afghanistan. Like the Taliban leadership, most
southerners are ethnic Pashtun Sunni Muslims who, though accounting for the
majority of the Afghan population, had not fared well in the civil war.
The
Taliban captured the southern city of Kandahar--where its reclusive leader,
Mullah Mohammed Omar, resides--in late 1994 and the capital, Kabul, last
September. In all conquered regions, the Taliban has immediately implemented
its own interpretation of Islamic law. Among other things, women are barred
from work and most education, and men may not trim their compulsory beards. In
southern rural areas, such strictures have been accepted, especially as the
Taliban has provided a stable environment for the cultivation of poppies.
Domestic drug use is severely punished, but heroin production for export is
permitted.
Taliban rule has not been popular with
non-Pashtun communities or the more sophisticated, liberal-minded residents of
the major cities, especially Kabul. This is unlikely to change. The recent
heavy defeat of the Taliban in the northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif highlights
both its failure to incorporate ethnic Tajiks, Uzbeks, or Shiah Hazaras into
its leadership, and its refusal to moderate its Islamic zeal. Even if the
Taliban succeeds in conquering the entire country, many areas will remain
subject to guerrilla warfare.
