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Putting on Heirs
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Metaphors, like magic
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tricks, may dazzle through deceit. Take, for example, the recurring metaphor of
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society as an extended family (a particular favorite among those who aspire to
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be the head of the household). The accompanying patter goes like this: Families
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do not allow one member to prosper while another struggles; ergo , we
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need something like a bigger welfare system or a more progressive tax code.
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Note the
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rhetorical sleight of hand. While you were still pondering whether society is
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really like a family, I slipped in the wholly invented "fact" that families
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take from the rich and give to the poor. The truth, at least as it is revealed
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by last wills and testaments, is otherwise. Apparently, among the children,
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even when some children are much wealthier than others. A bequest is a final
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opportunity to redistribute income among those you love the most; if most
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parents reject that opportunity, then it's pretty hard to see anything
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"familial" in using the tax system to redistribute income among strangers.
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But bequests aren't the only economic transactions within
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families. Does the family function as a welfare state in other ways? What about
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schooling? Let's think about that. Who would you rather send to college: your
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smart kid, who can make the most of an education, or your dumb kid, who needs
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all the help he can get? The answer--even if you have an egalitarian impulse to
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pour resources into the dumb kid--is to send the smart kid to college and make
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it up to the dumb kid through bequests (or other cash gifts). That strategy
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maximizes total family income, which allows you to do more good for both
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your children. So, even if parents really wanted to equalize their children's
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incomes, they .
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If not
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schooling, then what about time and attention? At least in large families, the
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big winners in the time-and-attention sweepstakes are the firstborns and the
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lastborns--those who get to spend a few years as an only child. The middle
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siblings perform significantly worse on sixth-grade . This suggests that time
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and attention are valuable in much the same way that schooling is, and that
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they are, therefore, equally unsuitable as a medium for redistribution. So, the
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general rule is that if people wanted to redistribute among offspring, they'd
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do it through bequests.
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An exception might be poor families, where
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bequests are insubstantial. In those circumstances, lavishing the less-skilled
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children with schooling, time, and attention might be the only way to transfer
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income in their direction. This exception, incidentally, could explain why
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programs like Head Start are disappointingly ineffective: When little Johnny is
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accepted into the Head Start program, his parents compensate Johnny's brothers
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and sisters by spending more time with them and less with Johnny. There's a
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nice irony here. By and large, the folks who want to argue that most people are
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instinctively redistributionist are the same folks who want to argue for the
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efficacy of programs like Head Start. But the stronger the redistributionist
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instincts of Johnny's parents, the less he'll gain from the Head Start
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program.
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Returning to the general
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rule, the best way to redistribute income is through bequests. But parents
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don't use bequests to redistribute income. We are entitled to conclude that
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parents don't consider redistributing income to be terribly important. That
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leads to a natural follow-up question: What do parents consider terribly
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important? How do they decide what to leave to whom?
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I like
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the theory that parents believe there is something intrinsically fair
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about giving equal amounts to everyone. But to test that theory, we'd need to
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know more about the distribution of parental gifts--like schooling, time, and
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attention--during the parents' lifetime. I don't know whether my pet theory
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would survive that test.
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An alternative theory is that a bequest is a mistake.
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According to this theory, parents would prefer to spend everything they've got
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before they go. The only reason there's anything left over is that death
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arrives unexpectedly. But if this alternative were correct, we'd see old people
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using all their savings to purchase annuities that pay them a guaranteed income
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for life. The limited market for such annuities suggests that people prefer to
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leave something behind.
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Yet
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another theory is that parents are governed by a "strategic bequest motive,"
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using their estates to purchase attention from their grown children. The threat
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of disinheritance keeps those children in line; when the threat is effective,
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nobody is actually disinherited. If this theory were true, you'd expect parents
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with a lot of bequeathable wealth (stocks, bonds, etc.) to get far more visits
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from their children than parents with an equal amount of nonbequeathable wealth
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(such as pensions). That prediction and found accurate, which is one good
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reason to believe the theory.
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Parallel to the strategic bequest motive, we
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can hypothesize a "strategic gift motive" that operates while the parents are
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still alive. Those children who are struggling, and hence more likely to burden
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their parents (say, by returning to live with them), get extra help in the hope
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that they (the children) will become self-sufficient. (As a variation on this
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theme, one can imagine a "strategic schooling motive," whereby the
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least-accomplished children get extra schooling, in the hope that they will
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become more interesting to converse with.) At bequest time, the strategic gift
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motive would evaporate, and the favored child would be favored no longer.
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Bequest motives interact
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with economic policy in surprising ways. The effects of a deficit-financed tax
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cut can depend on whether most parents are altruistic or strategic. Altruistic
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parents would save the money from their tax cuts and leave it to the children,
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who must pay off all that government debt someday; that saving would hold
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interest rates down. Strategic parents might spend a large portion of their tax
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cuts, causing interest rates to rise.
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It's that
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interaction with fiscal policy that has drawn economists' attention to bequest
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motives in recent years. But a deeper reason for investigating bequests is that
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they reveal something about people's instinctive sense of justice. That
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instinctive sense is the best guide we have to economic policy in every
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sphere.
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