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Texaco's Uncompensated Victims
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Suppose the management of a
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large corporation (call it Texaco) discriminates against blacks in hiring and
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promotion. Who are the victims of that discrimination? The most obvious
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candidates are the black workers who are denied suitable positions. But there's
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a second class of potential victims: the corporate stockholders, who are denied
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the services of those black workers.
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You might
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guess that when there is discrimination, stockholders suffer less than the
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black workers do. In fact, it's more likely to be the other way around, for
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reasons I will explain as I go along. In that light, boycotting Texaco products
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would be cruelly ironic. Boycotts lower corporate profits, which punishes not
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the discriminatory management but the innocent stockholders--that is, not the
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sinners, but their victims. There is even greater irony in the reports that
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management will atone for its sins with a $176 million payment to black
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employees--all of which will come directly from the pockets of those now doubly
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victimized stockholders.
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To see why the stockholders bear many of the costs of
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discrimination, let's think through a few alternative scenarios.
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Scenario 1: Suppose
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that jobs at Texaco are pretty much interchangeable with jobs at, say, Exxon,
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Mobil, and other competing companies; suppose also that discrimination is a
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problem only at Texaco. Then it's easy for Texaco's black employees to escape
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discrimination by taking jobs elsewhere. The positions vacated by Texaco's
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blacks will be filled by whites, presumably of about equal competence. (Because
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we've assumed that Texaco jobs are interchangeable with Exxon and Mobil jobs,
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there's a large pool of workers at those firms for Texaco to draw on.) In this
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scenario, Texaco ends up with an all-white work force, but no harm is done to
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anybody: Blacks who would have worked at Texaco end up in equally desirable
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jobs at Exxon; Texaco stockholders who would have profited from the wisdom of
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black executives end up profiting from the equal wisdom of white
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executives.
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Scenario 2: Suppose
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again that jobs at Texaco are interchangeable with jobs at Exxon and Mobil, but
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suppose this time that discrimination is rampant throughout the industry. Then
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Texaco can treat its own black employees badly, but no worse than the industry
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standard; if conditions at Texaco get worse than conditions at Exxon and Mobil,
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all Texaco's black employees will move to Exxon or Mobil. (Similarly, if there
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are comparable jobs available in other industries, the oil industry as a whole
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cannot treat its black employees any worse than the standard set by those other
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industries.) So, in this scenario, blacks can be harmed by discrimination in
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general--but they do not suffer any additional harm from Texaco's
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policies in particular.
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In this
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second scenario, it's the stockholders who suffer for the sins of the
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management. To see why, consider this example: Suppose that throughout the oil
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industry, white executives earn $100,000 while otherwise identical black
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executives earn $60,000 because of discrimination. Then Texaco could slash its
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payroll by firing all its white executives and hiring blacks to replace them
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at, say, $65,000 each. If the management is too blinded by discrimination to
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pursue that option, then the stockholders end up paying an unnecessary $35,000
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per executive per year.
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You might want to argue that paying blacks
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$65,000 to do a $100,000 job is itself a form of discrimination. I'd want to
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argue otherwise, because in the case I'm envisioning, the wage differential is
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driven not by racial preferences at Texaco but by profit opportunities created
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elsewhere in the market. But that is just a matter of definition, and we can at
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least agree on this: No matter how you define discrimination, hiring
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blacks at $65,000 is surely less discriminatory than refusing to hire
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blacks at $65,000. And, again, no matter how you define discrimination, the
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bottom line is this: If Texaco discriminates less than everyone else, it ends
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up with lots of black executives and a tidy profit for the stockholders; but if
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Texaco discriminates as much as, or more than, everyone else, that profit
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opportunity is thrown away. So when Texaco's management is highly
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discriminatory, Texaco's stockholders are the big losers.
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Scenario 3: Suppose that, contrary to the first and second scenarios,
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it's not true that a job at Exxon or Mobil is pretty much the same as a job at
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Texaco. Suppose, instead, that each job requires skills so specific that there
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is a single best person for each job and a single best job for each person. In
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this scenario, discrimination at Texaco is indeed costly to those black
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employees who are thereby excluded from their ideal jobs or forced to accept
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lower wages in order to remain in those jobs. But in this scenario,
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discrimination becomes even costlier to stockholders, who now own shares in a
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company that does not make the best possible use of its black talent--and even
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drives some of it away.
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To summarize: In Scenario 1, there are no victims; in
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Scenario 2, the stockholders are the only victims; and in Scenario 3, the black
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workers and the stockholders are victims. The truth is probably some
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combination of these three stylized scenarios. So, if Texaco has indeed
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discriminated against blacks (and it's worth noting that the evidence for that
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proposition is shaky, but I'll accept it for the sake of argument), it's quite
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likely that Texaco's stockholders have borne most of the cost.
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If Texaco executives had
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indulged their personal tastes for Van Gogh oil paintings at a
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multimillion-dollar cost to the stockholders, it would be self-evident that the
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stockholders had been plundered. If Texaco executives indulged their personal
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tastes for racial discrimination at a multimillion dollar cost to the
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stockholders, the same conclusion should be equally obvious.
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If there was enough
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discrimination at Texaco to merit a $176 million settlement with the employees,
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then there was enough discrimination to merit a commensurate payment to Texaco
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stockholders--not from corporate coffers, but from the personal assets of the
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corporate executives who bilked their investors by failing to hire the best
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bargains in the labor market.
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