Book a Demo!
CoCalc Logo Icon
StoreFeaturesDocsShareSupportNewsAboutPoliciesSign UpSign In
Download
29547 views
1
2
3
4
5
6
Night Courts
7
8
It's a courtroom so secure
9
and austere it wouldn't look out of place in Mission: Impossible .
10
Located on the sixth floor of the Justice Department's headquarters in
11
Washington, D.C., its double doors swing shut and seal themselves to the wall
12
when a button nearby is depressed; an oddly textured ceiling looms overhead.
13
Outside its doors, the seals of intelligence agencies adorn the walls.
14
15
Its judge doesn't sit
16
behind the bench, raised above plaintiffs and defendants to symbolize his
17
authority. Instead, he joins the witnesses and lawyers from the intelligence
18
agencies and the Justice Department at a single conference table. No defense
19
attorneys ever join these proceedings.
20
21
It took
22
Congress more than 200 years to establish this secret court--the Foreign
23
Intelligence Surveillance Act Court--and less than 20 years to craft a second
24
in its mold. The new tribunal--a k a the "removal court"--was created in April
25
as part of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, with the
26
goal of easing the deportation of legal aliens whom the government suspects of
27
materially supporting terrorist groups, but who have committed no crimes.
28
29
The creation of this super-secret court (which is likely to
30
share FISA Court space) was largely ignored in the debate over the
31
counter-terrorism bill and underreported by the press. The government claims
32
that it needs the removal court to protect national security in sensitive
33
deportation cases against suspected alien terrorists. It argues that publicly
34
disclosing key evidence, as normal courts require, can expose and endanger its
35
intelligence sources, and that the unspeakable alternative is to allow
36
suspected terrorists to remain in the country.
37
38
These two covert courts
39
depart from America's open legal culture, and endow the judicial branch with a
40
level of secrecy more typical of the executive than the courts. Justice
41
officials bristle at the charge that the secret courts also carve out a de
42
facto national-security exemption to both the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of
43
warrantless surveillance and the Fifth Amendment's guarantees of due
44
process.
45
46
That's
47
why civil-liberties activists are crying foul at the new venue, saying that the
48
only thing the removal court will remove is constitutional protections for
49
aliens who engage in politically unpopular speech.
50
51
The mechanics of the new stealth court are simple:
52
Government attorneys will present classified evidence in secret to a
53
removal-court judge, one of five federal district judges serving on the court
54
at any one time. If convinced that a proposed deportee is a terrorist, the
55
judge will authorize the Justice Department to initiate deportation proceedings
56
against the alien in a district court, where it will introduce as much secret
57
evidence as it sees fit. The defendant will not know he has been targeted for
58
deportation during removal-court proceedings, and when the case reaches the
59
district court, he will see only a sketchy summary of the evidence against him.
60
The district court then will decide whether the alien should be deported.
61
62
The
63
Justice Department insists that removal-court procedures will be invoked only
64
in extreme cases where national security would be damaged by the public
65
disclosure of deportation evidence. But modifying judicial processes to
66
accommodate the executive branch risks upsetting the traditional role of the
67
courts as a check on executive power.
68
69
Civil libertarians worry that the trend toward secret
70
courts begs for abuse by intelligence agencies because judges seem incapable of
71
turning government requests down. Indeed, ever since the FISA Court was
72
established in 1978 to approve secret warrants for surveillance of suspected
73
spies, Justice has won approval for all its 8,827 surveillance requests. (FISA
74
hearings, to cite one example, approved the surveillance used in the Sheik Omar
75
Abdel Rahman investigation.) The appeals court, the FISA Court of Review, has
76
never even had to convene. Perhaps the cloak-and-dagger ambience and absence of
77
an advocate for the surveillance target persuade otherwise skeptical judges to
78
give credence to government security claims. (Whatever FISA's faults, it's
79
better than the previous federal wiretapping policy that permitted the attorney
80
general to authorize national-security wiretaps with no judicial review.)
81
82
Are the
83
secret courts constitutional? Probably. A host of legally significant
84
distinctions separates aliens from citizens and national-security
85
investigations from law-enforcement probes. The Supreme Court has never ruled
86
on FISA, and it did not overturn a McCarthy-era statute which, like the removal
87
court, was used to deport noncriminal aliens based on their political
88
affiliations.
89
90
But these legal arguments are pedantries to many Arabs and
91
Irish residing in the United States who fear they will be unjustly targeted
92
under the new statute. And they don't calm civil libertarians, who fear the
93
FISA Court is a mere rubber stamp for executive power.
94
95
"Government lawyers might
96
not lie about the facts," says Kate Martin of the Center for National Security
97
Studies. "But they draft the applications in a way to say that these facts meet
98
the requirements, and by the time the application reaches the court, it is
99
unlikely that the court really gets to notice deficiencies."
100
101
102
Officials at the Justice Department and FISA Court deny that the latter is a
103
rubber stamp, attributing Justice's winning percentage to rigorous internal
104
review that weeds out bad applications before they're filed. That's how
105
presiding FISA Judge Royce Lamberth feels. "There might be a concern that the
106
Justice Department has been too conservative in what they are presenting to the
107
court if we're approving every one," he says.
108
109
But the public doesn't have many independent guarantees
110
that the courts are applying tough scrutiny to the government's applications.
111
Secrecy prevents open investigation of the courts' methods and standards; there
112
is a paucity of serious journalistic coverage of the courts; and congressional
113
oversight of the courts is limited to the review (in closed session) of
114
classified reports. The only public indication that FISA plays fair comes from
115
federal courts. In their review of several FISA applications in the context of
116
criminal cases, they have yet to indicate that a FISA warrant was improperly
117
granted.
118
119
"I understand that it's
120
hard for people who don't see the process," Deputy Attorney General Jamie
121
Gorelick said of FISA in 1994. "We're not at liberty to make the kind of
122
disclosures that I agree would make the public more comfortable."
123
124
Secret courts require
125
great faith that the Justice Department--and future Justice Departments--will
126
act with integrity. In the absence of more openness, nobody outside the
127
national-security establishment will know how much freedom the secret court
128
structures really cost.
129
130
131
132
133
134