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No one--at least, no one in
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elite policy-wonk circles--is a bigger fan of incarcerating known, adjudicated
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adult and juvenile criminals than me. No one has written more over the years
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about the cost-effectiveness of incarceration as measured both in terms of its
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crime-reduction value and in terms of doing justice. Still, when it comes to
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the search for rational, workable crime policies, it's time to admit that the
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brain-dead law-and-order right is no better than the soft-in-the-head
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anti-incarceration left. More and more conservatives now favor abolishing
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parole, sharply curtailing probation, imprisoning every adult felon for his or
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her entire term, and warehousing juvenile offenders in adult jails. The prudent
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response, however, is not to abolish probation and parole, but to reinvent
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them.
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First,
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let's get crystal clear on the grim facts about crime, prisons, probation, and
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parole. Be giddy about recent drops in national crime rates if you wish, but
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each year Americans still suffer some 40 million criminal victimizations; about
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a quarter of these are violent crimes. Only about one in 100 crimes actually
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results in anyone getting caught, convicted, and sentenced to prison. Most
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felony defendants are repeat offenders; yet, most felony defendants are
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sentenced not to prison but to probation.
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Likewise, a half-dozen recent studies prove beyond a
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reasonable doubt what every veteran policeman knows: Most prisoners are
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not petty, nonviolent thieves or mere first-time, low-level drug
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offenders. Yet, most of these hardened criminals are still paroled well before
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they have served out their latest sentence behind bars. On any given day in
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America, there are three convicted adult criminals out on probation or parole
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for every one in prison--and many of these are indistinguishable (in terms of
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their violent and repeat criminal histories) from those who remain in prison.
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As for juvenile offenders, between 1989 and 1993, the number of adjudicated
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juvenile cases that resulted in probation rose by 17 percent. The number of
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probation cases involving a "person offense"--such as homicide, rape, robbery,
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or assault--soared by 45 percent.
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Literally
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dozens of careful studies document that probation and parole are, to put it
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mildly, failing to protect the public. Nearly half of all state prisoners in
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1991 had committed their latest crimes while out on probation or parole. While
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formally "under supervision" in the community, their "violations" included more
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than 13,000 murders, some 39,000 robberies, and tens of thousands of other
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crimes. More than a quarter of all felons charged with gun crimes in 1992 were
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out on probation and parole. Here, too, what's true for the revolving-door
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adult system is even more true for the no-fault juvenile system. In many
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cities, for example, most cases involving violent older teen thugs who get
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referred to adult court result in probation. Kids plea bargain, too.
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Why are the adult and juvenile probation
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systems so poor, and what, realistically, can be done to improve
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them--soon?
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A big part of the answer is
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that we spend next to nothing on the systems, and get about what we pay for.
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Take adult probation. Joan R. Petersilia, former director of RAND's
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criminal-justice-research program, has calculated that we currently spend about
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$200 per year per probationer for supervision. "It is no wonder," she notes,
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"that recidivism rates are so high." Likewise, Patrick A. Langan, a
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statistician with the U.S. Justice Department, has found that more than 90
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percent of probationers are supposed to get substance-abuse counseling, pay
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victim restitution, or meet other requirements. But about half do not comply
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with the terms of their probation. Probation sanctions, he concludes, "are not
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rigorously enforced."
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But how
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could they be properly supervised by overworked, underpaid probation officers
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with scores of cases to manage? As Petersilia argues, even probationers who are
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categorized as high-risk offenders receive little direct, face-to-face
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oversight. If "probationers are growing in number and are increasingly more
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serious offenders," she advises, "then they are in need of more supervision,
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not less. But less is exactly what they have been getting over the past
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decade."
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Ditto for juvenile probation. Over half of street-level
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juvenile probation officers earn less than $30,000 a year. In big cities, the
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probation caseload of serious and violent juvenile cases has increased rapidly.
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In a national survey, probation officers admitted that their average urban
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caseloads were at least 25 percent higher than they should be.
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To
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reinvent probation, we will need to reinvest in it. More money, more agents,
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and closer supervision are just the first phase. Equally important is the type
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of creative and critical thinking represented by Boston's probation chief
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Ronald P. Corbett. Among other innovations, Corbett has teamed local probation
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officers with local police officers. Patrolling the streets together, they have
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cut crime. Corbett has also got probation officers to work with inner-city
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clergy on a wide range of crime control and prevention initiatives.
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In Philadelphia, the district attorney's office
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has developed a no-nonsense program in which volunteers from the neighborhoods
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where the juveniles committed their crimes hear the cases, set terms, and
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monitor compliance. Run for the district attorney's office by veteran probation
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officer Mike Cleary, the citywide program boasts an 80 percent success rate,
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costs little to administer, and holds kids (including hundreds of juvenile
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felony offenders) accountable.
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"The value of Philly's
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program," observes former New Jersey Superior Court Judge Daniel R. Coburn, "is
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that it separates the minnows from the sharks, then holds the minnows
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accountable and hence less likely to become sharks, let alone become the
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predatory Great Whites we must incarcerate." He should know. Coburn pioneered
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two major and highly successful programs in New Jersey. One is the state's
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Enforcement Court, which goes after people who remain on probation because they
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failed to pay fines and restitution, collects the money, restores the trust of
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crime victims, and brings literally millions of dollars into state coffers that
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can be used to beef up other justice programs. The other is the Sheriffs Labor
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Assistance Program (SLAP), which puts low-level criminals to work (for real!)
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cleaning up parks, painting public buildings, helping out in nursing homes, and
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more. "Fail to do exactly what you're required to do on SLAP," Coburn declares,
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"and you get slam--as in, see you in jail for sure."
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Admittedly, parole is a tougher reinvention nut to crack. In the late 1980s, I
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myself had expressed hopes that intensive-supervision parole programs could
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protect the public and its purse. But the best studies of intensive-supervision
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programs for high-risk parolees soon found that the programs cut neither
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recidivism nor costs. So for the last several years I have argued in favor of
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some types of "three strikes and you're out" laws. And I continue to strongly
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favor a no-parole policy for some categories of violent and chronic
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criminals.
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But the most interesting parole-reinvention idea I've
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encountered to date comes from Martin Horn, formerly head of New York State's
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parole authority and presently commissioner of prisons in Pennsylvania. As Horn
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argues, in most cases there is relatively little that parole agents can do to
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keep an offender who is determined to commit new crimes from committing them.
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The flip side is that parolees who want to go straight often can make it if
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they are literate, civil, and can stay off drugs, remain sober, and get a job.
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But parole agents often waste time chasing the bad guys rather than helping the
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good. And in many states, the laws perversely limit a parole agent's
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discretion. For example, I've heard many agents complain of having to revoke
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the parole of guys who failed a drug test but who were not, in the agent's best
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judgment, doing anything more than getting high. As one agent confided: "A
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parolee of mine is OK and is looking for a job. He pees in a bottle and comes
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up dirty, and I have to send him back inside. But a real predator I know is
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using, selling, and almost certainly doing other crimes. He stays on the
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streets unless I catch him red-handed--and I won't. It's insane."
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Horn's radical notion is to
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reinvent parole on the basis of a "personal responsibility" model. A released
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prisoner would be given the equivalent of a parole services voucher. For a
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fixed period of time--say two years--he can use the voucher to seek out
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education, job training, drug treatment, or other services from state-selected
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providers. If he wants to help himself, he can. If not, he's on his own. Do a
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new crime during this period--bite the hand that is offering you a way to help
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yourself--and you do the time for the crime, plus a year or two.
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It's time to get behind
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serious efforts to reinvent probation and parole, and time to debate fresh
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ideas. After all, we are not going to put every convicted adult and juvenile
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felon behind bars and keep him or her there--nor should we.
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