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For Viewers Like You
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In the early '70s, even a
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novice channel surfer could tell when he had landed on PBS. There'd be a
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cheerful chef butchering a Cornish hen, Muppets singing songs about friendship,
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two professors and a moderator seated in a bare-bones studio discussing race
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relations, a helmeted fat lady singing, a Third Worlder criticizing the First
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World in a documentary, and the lions of the Serengeti stalking an impala
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herd.
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But after
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the many-tendriled beast of cable TV conquered the American home, the mélange
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of chefs, Muppets, TV talk, and prowling lions came to define not PBS but the
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act of channel surfing itself. Of course, video vaudeville wasn't the goal of
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PBS's early architects, the culture shapers at the Carnegie Commission and Ford
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Foundation who dreamed that an infusion of federal funding would make the "vast
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wasteland" of television bloom. How their dream cracked up, resulting in the
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pablum of today's PBS, and how PBS became Washington's most politically
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skittish organization, is the subject of James Ledbetter's brief history,
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Made Possible By ...:
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The Death of Public Broadcasting in the United
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States .
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Public TV was the runt of the post-World War II
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telecommunications litter. But it was planned that way. Commercial broadcasters
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backed the Federal Communications Commission set-aside of 80 coveted VHF
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licenses and 162 UHF licenses nationwide for public-TV broadcasters, but they
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did so out of self-interest. Each frequency assigned to a noncommercial owner
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meant one less competitor selling advertising. For the same reasons, CBS
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pledged a $1-million grant for PBS's debut season, but the industry blocked at
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every turn the British model of a full-fledged public network financed with a
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hefty tax on televisions.
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Ledbetter
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argues that public broadcasting's independence was tainted from the get-go by
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the "military-communications complex." Military-industrial types, he reports,
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had been loitering in the vicinity of educational broadcasting years before the
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Johnson administration decided to fund a government-supported system: Officials
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from GE, IBM, and the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission sat on the board of
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National Education Television, the Ford Foundation-sponsored PBS precursor.
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Defense contractors were recruited to explore the then-novel idea of networking
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the new system with satellites. And the executives who midwifed PBS included
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Vietnam War escalator McGeorge Bundy and former Army Secretary and General
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Dynamics CEO Frank Pace Jr.
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While I'd love to be able to tell you that PBS
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was born in a Seven Days in May -type coup, and that Julia Child, Mister
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Rogers, and Jim Lehrer have been slipping us subliminal military propaganda
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since the beginning, Ledbetter doesn't develop his idea that the Cold Warriors
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co-opted PBS. When the government starts any new enterprise, it always taps the
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made guys--not the students of Herbert Marcuse. In fact, had the establishment
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not been present at PBS's creation in 1967, President Johnson--a commercial
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broadcaster himself (Lady Bird owned broadcast stations in Texas)--would never
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have green-lighted it.
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PBS took
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the public broadcasting handoff from the Ford Foundation, which, along with the
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Carnegie Commission, had long exhorted the United States to start a public
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system. The Ford Foundation seeded the public-TV idea with $300 million worth
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of grants between 1951 and 1976 in the hope that the feds would completely
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underwrite it thereafter (just as cities routinely assume responsibility for
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museums and libraries once philanthropists found them). In the expansionist
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days of the Great Society, the idea of a government-financed TV network devoted
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to education, culture, and politics wasn't that wild. Looking back, one
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imagines that PBS could have evolved into an American BBC and secured the sort
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of government funding that didn't require the scrutiny of annual congressional
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appropriations. All this would have required was that its founding bureaucrats
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1) make the product seem as innocuous as a museum exhibit and 2) block the
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election of Richard Nixon as president in 1968. They failed on both counts.
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Instead, in the early years of the public-TV experiment,
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PBS (which launched in 1969) and NET (which received no federal funds) aired
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the provocative programming they thought was their mission. These unflinching
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documentaries of the Vietnam War, shows devoted to militant black politics, and
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Naderesque consumer programs (Nader even hosted a show) sealed public TV's
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reputation as "left-dominated, elitist, minority-radical," as Ledbetter puts
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it. Nothing PBS has aired since comes close to the daring stuff of the first
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years.
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Nixon
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hated PBS no more than he did the commercial networks, but his veto over PBS's
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funding and his power to appoint board members to the Corporation for Public
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Broadcasting (PBS's overseers) gave him a direct outlet for his hate. He
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defunded, jawboned, and intimidated the fledgling broadcaster, and had he not
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been distracted by Watergate, he surely would have dismembered it.
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Reduced by Washington politicians to a
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well-trained dog that sometimes chews on the furniture, PBS steered a moderate
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programming course into the '70s. But to remind its masters that it can still
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bite--and reinforce conservative prejudices that it's pink--PBS periodically
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aired blasphemous dramas ( Steambath , 1973), Mao-symp travelogues
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(Shirley MacLaine's The Other Half of the Sky: A China Memoir , 1975),
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politically provocative docudramas ( Death of a Princess , 1980), lefty
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attacks on agribiz ( Hungry for Profit , 1985), homoerotica ( Tongues
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Untied , 1991), and brazen assaults on logical thinking ( The Panama
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Deception , 1992).
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Public
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broadcasting's big transformation came in the mid-'70s, Ledbetter finds, when
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U.S. corporations stepped in to fill the financial gap for the underfunded
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network. (Yes, underfunded: $1.5 billion doesn't go very far on 350 public-TV
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stations.) Dumping their tax-deductible loot by the millions, the corporations
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(Archer Daniels Midland, GE, Mobil, Exxon, Chevron, Dupont, Metropolitan Life)
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encouraged the sort of shows only a member of the Business Roundtable could
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love: centrist news programs, conservative talk shows, Wall Street advice
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shows, lions-of-the-Serengeti documentaries, and historical dramas that set all
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human conflict in late-19 th -century England.
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No wonder, then, that right-wingers think of PBS as liberal
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and lefties regard it as a corporate/conservative tool. It's neither and both.
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Conflicted over what its true mission is, PBS simultaneously whores for
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corporate money and aggressively gathers data on how poor, uneducated, and
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blue-collar its audience is. It accepts its role as an elite medium and then
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panders for larger audiences with Yanni specials. ( Yanni specials? ) It
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runs advertisements for its supporters at the top of shows and strikes business
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deals with MCI, TCI, and Disney, but still insists it's not commercial. It
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shares hit shows like Bill Nye the Science Guy with commercial stations.
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And when it stumbles onto a good subject for a series, like Ken Burns' history
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of baseball, it turns the show into a seminar on racism and labor relations,
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not the hit-and-run and the spitball.
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At book's
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end, Ledbetter issues his clarion call for reform, demanding that the PBS clock
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be turned back to the '50s, when the philanthropoids first imagined American
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public broadcasting. His policy prescription includes reducing corporate
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influence, liberating the system from presidential control, democratizing local
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stations, serving minorities, decentralizing the Washington-centric service,
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and increasing accountability.
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What Ledbetter misses is that PBS's time--if it
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ever had one--has come and gone. The Internet facilitates the sort of
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communications and activism that the Fords and Carnegies prayed PBS would
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spark. Commercial channels pour programs down from the heavens that match or
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surpass the products of the public broadcasters, who are too cowed to produce
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anything as homo-proud as the new Ellen , as racy as Brooklyn
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South , or as culturally subversive as The Larry Sanders Show . I ask
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you, what PBS newsman out-wings the liberal Peter Jennings?
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Oddly, the Newt Gingrich-led
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sallies against public broadcasting, which consume many pages of Made
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Possible By , have only enhanced its chances of survival. PBS is now viewed
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as a federal public-works project, a dispenser of political and cultural pork
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to liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans. The Army Corps of Engineers,
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the Rural Electrification Administration, and Amtrak have lasted a lot longer
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with a lot less going for them.
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