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               Hitler's
Willing Historiographers
            

            In "Goldhagen's Willing
Executioners," his review of my A Nation on Trial [hereafter
ANOT ], Adam Shatz suggests that I am a mirror image of Daniel Goldhagen.
My essay is "equally biased and inflammatory," he writes, and whereas Goldhagen
delivered a fierce attack on the Germans, my own essay is effectively an
"apologia" for them.

            Before turning to Shatz's
specific criticisms, I want to remind readers of the approach I adopted in my
analysis of Goldhagen's book. Throughout, I simply juxtapose Goldhagen's claims
against the sources he cites or compare his claims to the standard, mainstream
scholarly findings. Until Shatz's review, no one disputed my account of the
scholarly record. Indeed, his vehement criticisms of my essay notwithstanding,
Goldhagen himself does not accuse me of misrepresenting current scholarly
wisdom. Thus Shatz's altogether novel critique merits close scrutiny.

            Shatz reports that
"Finkelstein acknowledges the Nazi state was a brutal dictatorship, but he
glosses over its disturbingly popular character."

            What can
Shatz possibly mean? Goldhagen claims that the Nazi regime "was, on the whole
consensual," and that Germans generally "accepted the system and Hitler's
authority as desirable and legitimate." I report that, according to Goldhagen's
own main authority, Robert Gellately, fear was "prevalent among the German
people," and that to pretend otherwise is "foolish" ( ANOT : 37). Clearly
the principal question, however, is how central was anti-Semitism to what Shatz
calls the "disturbingly popular character" of the Nazi state? I quote this
typical passage from Goldhagen's main source, Ian Kershaw:

            Anti-Semitism, despite its
pivotal place in Hitler's "world view," was of only secondary importance in
cementing the bonds between Fuhrer and people which provided the Third Reich
with its popular legitimation and basis of plebiscitary acclamation. At the
same time, the principle of excluding the Jews from German society was itself
widely and increasingly popular, and Hitler's hatred of the Jews--baleful in
its threats but linked to the condoning of lawful, "rational" action, not the
unpopular crude violence and brutality of the Party's "gutter" elements--was
certainly an acceptable component of his popular image, even if it was an
element "taken on board" rather than forming a centrally motivating factor for
most Germans.

            I add that, according to
Kershaw, "during the 1930s ... when his popularity was soaring to dizzy
heights," Hitler "was extremely careful to avoid public association with the
generally unpopular pogrom-type anti-Semitic outrages" ( ANOT : 31).

            Shatz is surely within his
right to question these findings. But he ought to have directed his ire not at
me but at the leading authorities on the subject: Gellately, who was just
appointed to the Holocaust chair at Clark University, and Kershaw, author of
the forthcoming two-volume biography of Hitler.

            Shatz alleges that
"anti-Semitism permeated Nazi ideology, and Finkelstein is deaf to its
nuances." Thus he proposes that anti-Semitism was crucial to Hitler's rise to
power. Citing a raft of scholarly studies, I report the consensus that
anti-Semitism did not figure centrally in Hitler's electoral successes in 1930
and thereafter ( ANOT : 31-2). I also note the scholarly consensus that,
beginning in the 1930s--to quote Saul Friedlander in his authoritative
study , Nazi Germany and the Jews --"the Jewish theme did become less
frequent in [Hitler's] rhetoric." Finally, I report that a careful review of
Max Domarus' standard collection of Hitler's public pronouncements and speeches
shows that, during these years, the main negative theme was anti-Marxism and
anti-Social Democracy ( ANOT : 29, 32). Shatz seems to believe that he has
"scooped" all the experts in the field with his clever insight that "the Nazis
perceived Social Democracy as a Jewish party and Marxism as a Jewish creed."
The scholarly question, however, is why did Hitler tone down the explicitly
"Jewish theme," if not because it didn't resonate well with the German public?
Shatz doesn't answer this question; indeed, he can't even comprehend it. To
Goldhagen's credit, he never gainsays this commonplace of the scholarly
literature. Unlike Shatz, he is familiar enough with the discipline to know
that it would be preposterous to do so.

            According to Shatz,
"Finkelstein deduces from some Germans' disgust at the destruction of Jewish
lives and property during Nazi-sponsored pogroms such as Kristallnacht that
'Germans overwhelmingly condemned the Nazi anti-Semitic atrocities.' If they
did, they gave new meaning to the term 'silent majority.' "

            Of all Shatz's distortions,
this is the most outrageous. Where does he get his reading of Kristallnacht?
Here's where mine comes from. In assessing the popular German reaction to Nazi
violence generally and Kristallnacht in particular, I quoted Goldhagen's
authoritative scholarly source, Israeli historian David Bankier, as well as
Kershaw:

            During the first years of
Nazi anti-Semitic incitement [says Bankier], most Germans ("large sectors,"
"the bulk," "sizable parts") found "the form of persecution abhorrent,"
expressed "misgivings about the brutal methods employed," "remained on the
sidelines," "severely condemned the persecution," etc. With the revival of Nazi
anti-Semitic terror in 1935, "large sections of the population were repelled by
the Sturmer methods and refused to comply with demands to take action against
the Jews." Indeed, the "vast majority of the population approved the Nuremberg
laws" not only because they "identified with the racialist policy" but
"especially" because "a permanent framework of discrimination had been created
that would end the reign of terror and set precise limits to antisemitic
activities." "Sturmer methods and the violence" in the years 1936-37 "met with
the same disapproval as in the past." "The overwhelming majority approved
social segregation and economic destruction of the Jews" on the eve of
Kristallnacht in 1938 "but not the outbursts of brute force. ... [I]t was not
Jew-hatred in the Nazi sense." "All sections of the population," Bankier
further reports, "reacted with shock" to Kristallnacht. "There were few
occasions, if any, in the Third Reich," Kershaw similarly recalls, "which
produced such a widespread wave of revulsion," reaching "deep into the ranks"
of the Nazi party itself. The motives behind these outpourings of popular
disgust, to be sure, were not unalloyed. Some Germans evinced moral outrage.
Some recoiled from the sheer brutality of the violence (which also defaced
Germany's image). Some opposed the destruction only because it squandered
material resources ( ANOT : 44).

            The opinions Shatz ascribes
to me are simply the scholarly consensus. Significantly, he adduces not a jot
of counterevidence for his novel claim that only "some Germans" opposed
Kristallnacht. Alas, there is none. Shatz also violently dissents from the
scholarly consensus on civilian German attitudes toward Jews during World War
II. Yet again, however, he cites precisely zero evidence to support his
objections.

            To
sustain his claim that my essay is effectively an "apologia," Shatz substitutes
appeals to popular prejudice for scholarship. Shatz calls me Goldhagen's
"doppelganger." It would seem that this honorific more properly belongs to
him.

            -- Norman G.
Finkelstein Brooklyn, N.Y.

            
               Adam
Shatz replies:
            

            In his reply, Norman
Finkelstein's modus operandi is to cite authority, and where he cannot hide
behind authority, he distorts the points I made in my review. He insinuates
that I'm a friend of Daniel Goldhagen, even though I made my hostility to
Goldhagen's views amply clear elsewhere in the review. But Finkelstein's
attempt to tar me with the brush of Goldhagenism is telling. To Finkelstein,
anyone who views German anti-Semitism as in any way significant to the history
of National Socialism is an accomplice of Goldhagen.

            1) Nowhere in my review do I argue that
anti-Semitism was "crucial to Hitler's rise to power." Rather, I argue that it
cannot be blithely discounted, as is Finkelstein's wont. In wooing German
voters, the Nazis did tone down their anti-Semitism, emphasizing instead their
nationalist and anti-Bolshevik credentials. But unlike Finkelstein, I see a
change in degree, not in kind. Anti-Semitism remained a constant theme of Nazi
ideology, which associated Jews with the ills of modern capitalism,
internationalism, socialism, and the Versailles Treaty. While it's true that
Germans were often alienated by violent expressions of anti-Semitism, enough of
them were willing to look past Nazi rhetoric about the Jewish problem to make
the Nazis Germany's most significant mass party. As Ian Kershaw writes in the
passage cited by Finkelstein, anti-Semitism was "an acceptable component of
[Hitler's] popular image." In recent years, a similar development has occurred
in France, where Jean-Marie Le Pen of the National Front has softened his
anti-Arab racism in order to attract more votes. Employing Finkelstein's logic,
one would have to argue racism hasn't really figured in Le Pen's surge in
popularity. But it's a distinction without a difference--more and more voters
are backing a party known for its racist program. It's a wonder that
Finkelstein doesn't see how damning this is. But then, Finkelstein finds
reassurance in Goldhagen's observation that 19 of 51 anti-Semitic ideologues
advocated the annihilation of the Jews. "One would perhaps also want to note
that an overwhelming majority did not," Finkelstein writes.

            2) Finkelstein's
interpretation of Kristallnacht is not "simply the scholarly consensus." While
evoking German outrage at such state-sponsored pogroms, the historians David
Bankier and Kershaw do not conclude that the "Germans overwhelmingly condemned
the Nazi anti-Semitic atrocities." Where does Finkelstein find evidence of such
condemnation? Were there such protests as later surrounded the euthanasia
programs for the retarded? Were Germans moved to speak out against the popular
legal restrictions on Jewish rights? In a study much cited by Finkelstein,
Hitler, Germans and the "Jewish Question," historian Sarah Gordon writes
that "Most Germans were apathetic to the persecution of the Jews and no study,
past or future, can ever change that fact." One does not have to accept
Goldhagen's views to see that the Germans' disgust at Kristallnacht seldom
resulted in action on behalf of their Jewish neighbors.

            3)
Finally, does Finkelstein suppose that a brutal dictatorship cannot also be a
popular one? As most historians have recognized, Hitler's triumphs in foreign
policy and the economy earned him the admiration of many, if not most Germans.
If the Nazi state had rested only on coercion, it's doubtful that Hitler could
have persuaded millions of Germans to remain loyal to him, and to fight
heroically to the end of the war. As Kershaw writes in the passage quoted by
Finkelstein, the Nazi state enjoyed a certain "popular legitimation and basis
of plebiscitary acclamation." Although anti-Semitism was less significant than
nationalism and anti-Bolshevism to the Nazis' mass appeal, Hitler and his peers
were able to execute the Final Solution because they could count on the
allegiance, and sometimes even the love, of the German people. To be sure,
Goldhagen's vision of a "consensual dictatorship" glosses over the repression
of the labor movement, the killing and imprisonment of Hitler's opponents. But
Finkelstein's view of a Nazi terror state forcing its programs on a helpless
people is equally one-sided. The Nazis were homegrown populists, even if their
wish to murder Jews was not widely shared by Germans, and the Germans must, in
turn, bear some of the responsibility for the horrors the Nazis inflicted.

            
               Editor's note:
"Goldhagen's
Willing Executioners" incorrectly stated that the Canadian Jewish Congress
is trying to have Ruth Bettina Birn, co-author of A Nation on Trial: The
Goldhagen Thesis and Historical Truth , removed from her job at the war
crimes division at the Canadian Department of Justice. The Canadian Jewish
Congress did contact the department with its concerns about Birn's involvement
in the book. But the CJC has lodged no formal complaint against Birn.
            

            
               Gross
Monica Product
            

            In
"Monica
and Me," Herbert Stein wrote:

            I wonder if the work of
these photographers [watching for Monica Lewinsky] is in the GDP. Of course, it
wouldn't be. They are an input. The output will be a shot on television of
Monica, and the value of that will be in the GDP.

            No, Mr. Stein. The shot on
television of Monica Lewinsky will not be in the GDP--at least, it will not be
in the GDP if the shot is on network television. You see, no one pays
for network television: No one spends money to see Lewinsky coming out of the
Watergate.

            Instead, businesses spend
money to show commercials on network television: The picture of Lewinsky is
just an input into the provision of advertising services that corporations are
willing to pay for.

            But wait! Advertising
services are not an output, but an input. Businesses pay for advertising
services as a way of moving their products. Advertising services are an input
to the cost of production of whatever is being advertised.

            The
photographer's work will make it into the GDP only when someone buys a bottle
of Tylenol, or a Buick, or whatever is advertised on the news show in which the
picture of Lewinsky is shown.

            -- Brad DeLong
            

            
               Herbert Stein replies:
Professor DeLong is right and I thank him for the correction. I also thank him
for leaving me a tiny out in those cases where Monica is seen on cable.
            

            
               Not Hip
to Skip
            

            Thanks
for your article on Henry Louis Gates Jr. ("Assessment," by
Franklin Foer). It was appreciated, although Gates' brazen efforts at
self-promotion on the basis of increasingly poor scholarship have been the talk
among African-American intellectuals for some time. My only regret is that the
article wasn't even more hard-hitting.

            -- Monroe H. Little
Jr .

            

               Completely Dead, Partially White Men
            

            The
list
(footnoted to the piece on Henry Louis Gates Jr.) of dead white men excluded from
The Dictionary of Global Culture includes one Alexandre Dumas, who was,
in fact, one-quarter African, which makes this snub of one of the most
productive and popular novelists of all time all the stranger. (Did that other
mixed-race Alexander, Pushkin, make the cut?) Dumas received the same sort of
accusation that Foer makes of Gates, of overusing the services of uncredited
collaborators and thus diluting the value of his name. His work appears to have
survived, despite his exclusion from the Dictionary .

            -- Charles R.L.
Power Columbia, Md.

            
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