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Will Windows Crash?
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Friday
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evening, U.S. District Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson issued his findings of
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fact in the Microsoft antitrust case. He ruled that Microsoft is a monopoly,
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that it has abused its monopoly power, and that this abuse has harmed
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consumers. "For Microsoft's image, the damage is incalculable," said the
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Wall Street Journal . "It's hard to imagine how the findings … could have
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been worse news for Microsoft," added the Washington Post . The media,
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like the company itself, seem crippled by a failure of imagination. Things can
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get worse for Microsoft. Much worse.
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From
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the outset, Microsoft (which owns
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Slate
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) and the press corps have
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treated the case as a bipolar debate: Either Microsoft has engaged in illegal
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business practices, or it hasn't. Among other things, the Justice Department
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accused the company of stifling competition by requiring business partners to
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sign exclusionary contracts, colluding with Netscape to divide the browser
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market, and eventually bundling Internet Explorer with Windows to wrest control
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of that market. Microsoft could have conceded some of these issues--for
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example, that its contracts were unnecessarily exclusive--or it could have
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denied that any of its practices were illegal. The company chose the latter
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course.
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In a
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bipolar world, that calculation made sense: At best, Microsoft would get to run
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its business as usual, and at worst, rather than surrender prematurely, the
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company would be ordered by the judge to change some of its practices. What the
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company failed to grasp is that the two-sided clash in the courtroom left open
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a third possibility in the financial press and the stock market. Microsoft says
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none of its practices are illegal. The Justice Department says
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some of Microsoft's practices are illegal. But a third camp, led by
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Microsoft's competitors, says all the company's practices are
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illegal--and if that perception prevails, true or not, investors may conclude
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that Microsoft can't thrive once it is stripped of those practices by the
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courts or by a settlement. The Justice Department can only hurt Microsoft. The
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stock market can kill it.
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Until
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now, the notion that Microsoft owes all its success to ruthless marketing
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rather than technical ingenuity has been a fringe view. But that view gained
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momentum Friday with the judge's declaration that "it is Microsoft's corporate
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practice to pressure other firms to halt software development that either shows
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the potential to weaken the applications barrier to entry or competes directly
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with Microsoft's most cherished software products." Justice Department
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antitrust chief Joel Klein underscored that sentence in a press conference
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after the ruling. Nightline , the New York Times , and other media
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outlets followed suit. On Nightline , Klein called the case "a story of
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predation, of anti-competitive behavior, and monopolistic abuse. … It's a
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mighty powerful story about consumer harm and predatory practices."
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Discussing the ruling on television over the weekend, Klein repeatedly
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distinguished Microsoft's "predatory" practices from its "innovations," which
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he praised. But Microsoft's corporate enemies aren't interested in this
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distinction. They want to convince the public, politicians, and the financial
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markets that the "corporate practice" cited in the judge's opinion isn't just
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Microsoft's bad habit, but Microsoft's soul. They want to equate the "story" of
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the trial--predation--with the story of the company.
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Immediately after the opinion was released, Ed Black, a Microsoft antagonist
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who heads the Computer and Communications Industry Association, told reporters
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in front of the courthouse: "The behavior they [Microsoft] are accused of,
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which the judge seems to be finding in fact that they did, is not behavior off
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to the side of their business. It reflects a fundamental approach of the core
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business strategy of the company, which is to leverage and utilize their
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monopoly to expand into neighboring markets, and to use that monopoly as a
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critical tool of leverage with all of their business partners, customers, and
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competitors. Because it is so central to the way they do business … it will be
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very hard for this company to make slight adjustments to their behavior and in
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any way comply with the spirit of the antitrust law." Minutes later, Black told
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viewers of CNN's Crossfire that "Microsoft really was created" from "the
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old IBM monopoly" and that the company relied not on "innovation" but on
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illegal strong-arm tactics, like in The Godfather . Crossfire
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co-host David Corn joked that Microsoft even "stole the operating system from
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Apple."
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By
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itself, this account of Microsoft's livelihood is a mere insult. Combined with
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the antitrust case, however, it threatens mortal injury. The combined message
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to investors is that Microsoft will now be forced to fight fairly--and that it
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can't. Microsoft "will have to compete on the merits of their products," Corel
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Vice President Kevin McNeil told the Wall Street Journal . Microsoft is
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"not an innovator but a fast follower," anti-Microsoft futurist Paul Saffo told
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the Los Angeles Times . In a press release, Sun Microsystems argued,
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"Microsoft should be prohibited from buying the distribution channels of the
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future (e.g., cable and wireless) and from buying rather than inventing
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technologies"--a constraint designed to handcuff Microsoft in a high-tech
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economy driven by timely acquisitions.
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The
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image of Microsoft as a crippled and helpless giant is increasingly penetrating
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the mainstream media. "In Courtroom and Beyond, Software King Is at Risk,"
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warned the front page of Sunday's Washington Post . The Los Angeles
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Times published a virtual obituary of Microsoft: "Its strategy of buying up
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rivals to absorb their technology no longer works as well as it has in the
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past, in part because of the greater likelihood of firmer antitrust scrutiny of
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such deals. … Jackson's finding that Microsoft commanded a monopoly--and the
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implication that he will rule shortly that the company broke the law--may well
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hobble its efforts to meet [new] challenges. … [A]s much as [Bill] Gates is
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widely viewed as a business genius, his company is seen as technologically
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mediocre."
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Microsoft has understood all along that its business image is as important as
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its political image. At every opportunity, its spokesmen have reiterated their
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commitment to quality and innovation. But they have failed to foresee a
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collision between this message and their defiance in the antitrust case. By
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insisting that everything Microsoft has done is fair competition, they risk the
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possibility that the public, if it accepts the judge's finding to the contrary,
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will conclude that Microsoft doesn't know the difference. The ultimate danger
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is that investors will conclude that Microsoft, stripped of its ability to
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exploit its monopoly power, doesn't know how to "compete."
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Microsoft has stuck to this all-or-nothing strategy even in the wake of the
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judge's findings. "The American legal system ultimately will affirm that
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Microsoft's actions and innovations were fair and legal," Gates declared.
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Microsoft Senior Vice President Bill Neukom added, "We've always competed
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fairly, and we will continue to do that. … We think that Microsoft's actions
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have been entirely normal competitive behavior." At the end of a conference
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call with reporters, a Time correspondent asked, "Does Microsoft plan to
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change any of its practices based on this court's findings today?" Microsoft
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Chief Operating Officer Bob Herbold replied, "The answer to that question is
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no."
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Microsoft may be right in
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claiming that it has done nothing wrong. Even if it isn't, it may succeed in
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selling that argument to the public. But if it fails, the stakes are enormous.
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In the courtroom, the worst that can happen is an array of sanctions--possibly
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even a corporate breakup--designed to force Microsoft to compete "on the
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merits." In the stock market, however, the damage can get much worse. Investors
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can decide not only that Microsoft owes its success to the abuse of monopoly
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power, and not only that the courts will strip the company of this ability, but
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that Microsoft doesn't know any other way to survive.
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