2. "Hunting Bin Ladin," PBS Frontline broadcast, May 1998 (online at
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ shows/binladen/who/interview.html).
3. Usama Bin Ladin, "Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of
the Two Holy Places," Aug. 23, 1996 (trans., online at
www.terrorismfiles.org/individuals/declaration_of_jihad1.html). 4." Hunting Bin
Ladin," PBS Frontline broadcast, May 1998.
5. Ibid.
6. For a classic passage conveying the nostalgic view of Islam's spread, see Henri
Pirenne, A History of Europe, trans. Bernard Miall (University Books, 1956), pp.
25-26.
7. See Martin Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds., Fundamentalism Observed, vol. 1
(Univ. of Chicago Press, 1994).
8. See Emmanuel Sivan, Radical Islam: MedievalTheology and Modern Politics, enlarged
ed.(Yale Univ. Press, 1990).
9. From the perspective of Islamic, not Arab, history, the Baghdad Caliphate's
destruction by the Mongols in 1292 marks the end not of Islamic greatness but of
Arab dominance of the Muslim world. Moghul India, Safavid Persia, and, above all,
the Ottoman Empire were great Islamic powers that arose long after the Baghdad
Caliphate fell.
10. Bin Ladin, "Declaration of War,"Aug. 23, 1996.
11. The Muslim Brotherhood, which arose in Egypt in 1928 as a Sunni
religious/nationalist opposition to the British-backed Egyptian monarchy, spread
throughout the Arab world in the mid-twentieth century. In some countries, its
oppositional role is nonviolent; in others, especially Egypt, it has alternated
between violent and nonviolent struggle with the regime.
12. Sayyid Qutb, Milestones (AmericanTrust Publications, 1990). Qutb found sin
everywhere, even in rural midwestern churches. Qutb's views were best set out in
Sayyid Qutb, "The America I Have Seen" (1949), reprinted in Kamal Abdel-Malek, ed.,
America in an Arab Mirror: Images of America in ArabicTravel Literature: An
Anthology (Palgrave, 2000).
13. For a good introduction to Qutb, see National Public Radio broadcast, "Sayyid
Qutb's America," May 6, 2003 (online at
www.npr.org/display_pages/features/feature_1253796.html). 14. "Bin Laden's 'Letter
to America,'" Observer Worldview, Nov. 24, 2002 (trans., online at
http://observer.guardian.co.uk/worldview/story/0,11581,845725,00.html). The al Qaeda
letter was released in conjunction with the release of an audio message from Bin
Ladin himself.
15. Ibid.
16. See Arab Human Development Report 2003 (United Nations, 2003), a report prepared
by Arabs that examines not only standard statistical data but also more sensitive
social indicators recently identified by the Nobel Prize-winning economist Amartya
Sen. It says little, however, about the political dimensions of economic and social
trends. See Mark Le Vine, "The UN Arab Human Development Report: A Critique," Middle
East Report, July 26, 2002 (online at www.merip.org/mero/mer0072602.html).
17. President Bush, remarks at roundtable with Arab- and Muslim-American leaders,
Sept. 10, 2002 (online at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020910-7.html).
18. See, e.g., Intelligence report, interrogation of Zubaydah, Oct. 29, 2002; CIA
analytic report, "Bin Ladin's Terrorist Operations: Meticulous and Adaptable," CTC
00-40017CSH, Nov. 2, 2000. 19." Open resistance flared so quickly that only two
months after the invasion . . . almost the entire population of Kabul climbed on
their rooftops and chanted with one voice,'God is great.'This open defiance of the
Russian generals who could physically destroy their city was matched throughout the
countryside." General (Ret.) Mohammed Yahya Nawwroz and Lester W. Grau,"The Soviet
War in Afghanistan; History and Harbinger of Future War?" Military Review (Fort
Leavenworth Foreign Military Studies Office), Sept./Oct. 1995, p. 2.
20. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network ofTerror (Columbia Univ. Press,
2002), pp.16-23. Regarding UBL's access to his family's fortune, see Rick Newcomb
interview (Feb. 4, 2004); William Wechsler interview (Jan. 7, 2004).
21. Government's Evidentiary Proffer Supporting the Admissibility of Co-Conspirator
Statements, United States v. Enaam Arnaout, No. 02-CR-892 (N.D. Ill. filed Jan. 6,
2003).
22. Intelligence report, Terrorism: Usama Bin Ladin's Historical Links to 'Abdallah
Azzam, Apr. 18, 1997. By most accounts, Bin Ladin initially viewed Azzam as a
mentor, and became in effect his partner by providing financial backing for the MAK.
23. In his memoir, Ayman al Zawahiri contemptuously rejects the claim that the Arab
mujahideen were financed (even "one penny") or trained by the United States. See
Zawahiri,"Knights Under the Prophet's Banner," Al Sharq al Awsat, Dec.2,2001. CIA
officials involved in aiding the Afghan resistance regard Bin Ladin and his "Arab
Afghans" as having been militarily insignificant in the war and recall having little
to do with him. Gary Schroen interview (Mar. 3, 2003).
24. See Abdullah Azzam, "Al Qaeda al Sulbah" (The solid foundation), Al Jihad, Apr.
1988, p. 46.
25. A wealth of information on al Qaeda's evolution and history has been obtained
from materials seized in recent years, including files labeled "Tareekh Usama"
(Usama's history) and "Tareekh al Musadat" (History of the Services Bureau). For
descriptions of and substantial excerpts from these files, see Government's
Evidentiary Proffer Supporting the Admissibility of Co-Conspirator Statements,
United States v. Arnaout, Jan. 6, 2003. See also Intelligence report, Terrorism:
Historical Background of the Islamic Army and bin Ladin's Move from Afghanistan to
Sudan, Nov. 26, 1996; DOD document, "Al-Qaeda," AFGP-2002-000080 (translated). For a
particularly useful insight into the evolution of al Qaeda-written by an early Bin
Ladin associate, Adel Batterjee, under a pseudonym- see Basil Muhammad, Al Ansar al
Arab fi Afghanistan (The Arab volunteers in Afghanistan) (Benevolence International
Foundation (BIF) and World Association of Muslim Youth, 1991).
26. Government's Evidentiary Proffer Supporting the Admissibility of Co-Conspirator
Statements, United States v. Arnaout, Jan. 6, 2003.
27. See FBI report of investigation, interview of Jamal al Fadl, Nov. 10, 1996;
Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, p. 23.
28. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of SacredTerror (Random House, 2002),
pp. 6-7, 57-63, 83-85; United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 104-105, 123-124 (2d
Cir. Aug. 16, 1996).
29. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, pp. 25-27; DOD document, "Union Agreement between
Jama'at Qaedat Ansar Allah (The Base Group of Allah Supporters) and Jama'at Al-Jihad
(Jihad Group)," AFGP-2002-000081, undated; Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror,
p. 103.
30. Trial testimony of Jamal al Fadl, United States v. Usama bin Laden, No. S(7) 98
Cr. 1023 (S.D. N.Y.), Feb. 6, 2001 (transcript pp. 218-219, 233); Feb. 13, 2001
(transcript pp. 514-516); Feb. 20, 2001 (transcript p. 890). Fadl says this
invitation was delivered by a Sudanese delegation that visited Bin Ladin in
Afghanistan. See also CIA analytic report, "Al-Qa'ida in Sudan, 1992-1996: Old
School Ties Lead Down Dangerous Paths," CTC 2003- 40028CHX, Mar. 10, 2003.
31. See Intelligence report, Terrorism: Historical Background of the Islamic Army and
bin Ladin's Move from Afghanistan to Sudan, Nov. 26, 1996.
32. Trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 6, 2001 (transcript pp.
220-224).
33. For Bin Ladin's confrontation with the Saudi regime, see, e.g., Peter L. Bergen,
Holy War Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Ladin (Touchstone, 2001), pp.
80-82. On aid provided by a dissident member of the royal family, see Intelligence
report, interrogation of KSM, Sept. 27, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of
Khallad, Sept. 26, 2003. See also FBI report of investigation, interview of Fadl,
Nov. 10, 1996.
34. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, p. 34.
35. Intelligence report, Bin Ladin's business activities in 1992, Mar. 31, 1994;
Intelligence report, Terrorism: Historical Background of the Islamic Army and bin
Ladin's Move from Afghanistan to Sudan, Nov. 26, 1996; CIA analytic report, "Old
School Ties,"Mar. 10, 2003.
36. Trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 6, 2001 (transcript pp.
301-302, 305-306, 315-317, 367-368); Intelligence report, Terrorism: Historical
Background of the Islamic Army and bin Ladin's Move from Afghanistan to Sudan, Nov.
26, 1996; CIA analytic report, "Old School Ties,"Mar. 10, 2003.
37. See Intelligence report, Bin Ladin's business activities in 1992, Mar. 31, 1994;
Intelligence report, Shipment of Arms and Boats to Yemen for Use by an Islamic
Extremist, Aug. 9, 1996; Intelligence report, Terrorism: Responsibilities and
Background of Islamic Army Shura Council, Dec. 19, 1996; CIA analytic report, "Old
School Ties," Mar. 10, 2003; FBI reports of investigation, interviews of Fadl, Nov.
10, 1996; Nov. 12, 1996; CIA analytic report, "Usama Bin Ladin: Al-Qa'ida's Business
and Financial Links in Southeast Asia,"CTC 2002-40066CH, June 6, 2002. For Bin
Ladin's involvement in the Bosnian conflicts, see Evan F. Kohlmann, Al-Qaida's Jihad
in Europe: The Afghan- Bosnian Network (Berg, 2004).
38. Trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 7, 2001 (transcript p.
354); FBI reports of investigation, interviews of Fadl, Nov. 10, 1996; Dec. 21,
1998;"RP Cops Aware of Long-Term Rightwing Muslim Connection," Manila Times, Apr.
26, 2002.
39. Trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 7, 2001 (transcript pp.
354-355); FBI report of investigation, interview of Fadl, Feb. 4, 1998. See also
Republic of Singapore, Ministry of Home Affairs, Report to Parliament, "The Jemaah
Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism," Jan. 7, 2003.
40. Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, pp. 100, 235.
41. See CIA analytic report, "Arizona: Long-Term Nexus For Islamic Extremists," CTC
2002-30037H, May 15, 2002; Steven Emerson, American Jihad (Free Press, 2002), pp.
129-137. 468 NOTES TO CHAPTER 2
42. Intelligence report, Fatwa to attack U.S. interests in Saudi Arabia and movement
of explosives to Saudi Arabia, Jan. 8 1997; trial testimony of Fadl, United States
v. bin Laden, Feb. 6, 2001 (transcript pp. 265-266); trial testimony of L'Houssaine
Kherchtou, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 21, 2001 (transcript p. 1163); FBI
reports of investigation, interviews of Fadl, Nov. 10, 1996; Nov. 12, 1996; FBI
report of investigation, interview of confidential source, Sept. 16, 1999.
43. On Wali Khan's relationship with Bin Ladin, see Intelligence report, Usama Bin
Ladin's Historical Links to 'Abdallah Azzam, Apr. 18, 1997; FBI report of
investigation, interview of Fadl, Nov. 10, 1996; Muhammad, Al Ansar al Arab fi
Afghanistan. On the Blind Sheikh, Bin Ladin eventually spoke publicly of his
admiration. See ABC News interview, "To Terror's Source," May 28, 1998. In late
1992, Abu Zubaydah confided to his diary that he was getting ready to go to one of
al Qaeda's military camps:"Perhaps later I will tell you about the Qa'ida and Bin
Ladin group." Intelligence report, translation of Abu Zubaydah's diary, June 9,
2002. Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed masterminded the 1995 Manila air plot,
and KSM helped fund Yousef 's attempt to blow up the World Trade Center in 1993.
Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan. 9,2004. The Blind Sheikh was linked
to Yousef and the 1993 World Trade Center attack, while Wali Khan was convicted
together with Yousef for the Manila air conspiracy.
44. Intelligence report, Usama Bin Ladin Links to a Southern Yemeni Group, Mar. 5,
1997; FBI report of investigation, interview of Fadl, Nov. 10, 1996; CIA analytic
report, "Old School Ties,"Mar. 10, 2003, p. 4. 45.U.S. intelligence did not learn of
al Qaeda's role in Somalia until 1996. Intelligence report, Bin Ladin's Activities
in Somalia and Sudanese NIF Support, Apr. 30, 1997.
46. Intelligence report, Bin Ladin's Activities in Eritrea, Mar. 10, 1997; FBI report
of investigation, interview of confidential source, Sept. 16, 1999; FBI report of
investigation, interview of Essam Mohamed al Ridi, Dec. 7, 1999; trial testimony of
Essam Mohamed al Ridi, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 14, 2001 (transcript pp.
578-593); trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 6, 2001
(transcript pp. 279-285). In June 1998, Bin Ladin was indicted on charges arising
out of the Somalia attack in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York.
47. For background about the attack on the training facility, see, e.g., Benjamin and
Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, pp. 132, 242. On the proposed attack in Saudi Arabia,
see Intelligence report, Fatwa to attack U.S. interests in Saudi Arabia and movement
of explosives to Saudi Arabia, Jan. 8, 1997; FBI reports of investigation,
interviews of Fadl, Nov. 12, 1996; Feb. 13, 1998. On associates taking credit, see
Intelligence report made available to the Commission.
48. CIA analytic report, "Khobar Bombing: Saudi Shia, Iran, and Usama Bin Ladin All
Suspects," CTC 96- 30015, July 5, 1996; DIA analytic report, Defense
IntelligenceThreat Review 96-007, July 1996; Intelligence report made available to
the Commission. See also Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, pp. 224-225,
300-302.
49. Intelligence report, Usama Bin Ladin's Attempts to Acquire Uranium, Mar. 18,
1997; CIA analytic report, "Usama Bin Ladin Trying to Develop WMD Capability?" CTC
97-30002, Jan. 6, 1997; trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 7,
2001 (transcript pp. 357-366); Feb. 13, 2001 (transcript pp. 528-529); Feb. 20, 2001
(transcript pp. 982-985).
50. Trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 13, 2001 (transcript p.
528).
51. CIA analytic report, "Old School Ties,"Mar. 10, 2003.
52. Intelligence report, Establishment of a Tripartite Agreement Among Usama Bin
Ladin, Iran, and the NIF, Jan. 31, 1997; Intelligence report, Cooperation Among
Usama Bin Ladin's Islamic Army, Iran, and the NIF, Jan. 31 1997; FBI report of
investigation, interview of Fadl, Nov. 10, 1996; trial testimony of Fadl, United
States v. bin Laden, Feb. 6, 2001 (transcript pp. 290-293); FBI report of
investigation, interview of confidential source, Sept. 16, 1999.
53. CIA analytic report, "Ansar al-Islam: Al Qa'ida's Ally in Northeastern Iraq," CTC
2003-40011CX, Feb. 1, 2003.
54. Ibid.; Intelligence report, al Qaeda and Iraq, Aug. 1, 1997.
55. Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee, May 22, 2003; May 24, 2003. At
least one of these reports dates the meeting to 1994, but other evidence indicates
the meeting may have occurred in February 1995. Greg interview (June 25, 2004).
Two CIA memoranda of information from a foreign government report that the chief of
Iraq's intelligence service and a military expert in bomb making met with Bin Ladin
at his farm outside Khartoum on July 30, 1996. The source claimed that Bin Ladin
asked for and received assistance from the bomb-making expert, who remained there
giving training until September 1996, which is when the information was passed to
the United States. See Intelligence reports made available to the Commission. The
information is puzzling, since Bin Ladin left Sudan for Afghanistan in May 1996, and
there is no evidence he ventured back there (or anywhere else) for a visit. In
examining the source material, the reports note that the information was received
"third hand," passed from the foreign government service that "does not meet
directly with the ultimate source of the information, but obtains the information
from him through two unidentified intermediaries, one of whom merely delivers the
information to the Service." The same source claims that the bomb-making expert had
been seen in the area of Bin Ladin's Sudan farm in December 1995.
56. Intelligence report, Possible Islamic Army Foreknowledge of an "Egyptian
Operation" and Logistical and Security Assistance Provided for the Attackers, Feb.
13, 1997; FBI report of investigation, interview of Fadl, Nov. 4, 1997.
57. Tim Carney interview (Dec. 4, 2003).
58. Trial testimony of L'Houssaine Kherchtou, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 21,
2001 (transcript pp. 1280-1282).
59. On the Sudanese economy, see, e.g., Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, pp.
114-115, 132-133. For details about Saudi pressure on the Bin Ladin family, see,
e.g., Frank G. interview (Mar. 2, 2004). Regarding management of Bin Ladin's
finances, see CIA analytic report, "Usama Bin Ladin: Al-Qa'ida's Financial
Facilitators,"OTI IA 2001-134-HXC, Oct. 18, 2001; CIA analytic report,"Shaykh Sa'id:
Al-Qa'ida's Loyal Senior Accountant,"CTC 2003-30072H, July 2, 2003; Intelligence
reports, interrogations of detainee, Sept. 17, 1998; Aug. 4, 1999. On the financial
crisis in al Qaeda at this time, see trial testimony of L'Houssaine Kherchtou,
United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 21, 2001 (transcript pp. 1282-1284).
60. Trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 6, 2001 (transcript pp.
165-174, 190-205, 255-258); Feb. 7, 2001 (transcript pp. 382-391); trial testimony
of L'Houssaine Kherchtou, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 21, 2001 (transcript pp.
1282-1284).
61. Because the U.S. embassy in Khartoum had been closed in response to terrorist
threats, the U.S. Ambassador to Sudan was working out of the embassy in Nairobi. The
Sudanese regime notified him there by fax. See Tim Carney interview (Dec. 4, 2003);
Donald Petterson interview (Sept. 30, 2003); DOS cable, Nairobi 7020, "Sudan:
Foreign Minister on Developments re Terrorism and Peace," May 21, 1996. On the
attempted assassination of Bin Ladin, see FBI report of investigation, interview of
L'Houssaine Kherchtou, Oct. 15, 2000; FBI report of investigation, interview of
confidential source, Sept. 16, 1999.
62. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 23, 2003.
63. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia
(Yale Univ. Press, 2000), p. 133; Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the
CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001
(Penguin, 2004), p. 9; Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, July 12, 2003;
Sept. 27, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Sept. 27, 2003. The
current Afghan Foreign Minister told us that one of Bin Ladin's planes landed in
Islamabad for refueling. See Abdullah Abdullah interview (Oct. 23, 2003).
64. Rashid, Taliban, pp. 88-90.
65. See Owen Bennet Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm (Yale Univ. Press, 2002);
Raffat Pasha interview (Oct. 25, 2003); Rashid, Taliban; Waleed Ziad, "How the Holy
Warriors Learned to Hate," New York Times, June 18, 2004, p. A31.
66. See, e.g., Marvin Weinbaum interview (Aug. 12, 2003); William Milam interview
(Dec. 29, 2003). Milam described "strategic depth" as Pakistan's need for a
friendly, pliable neighbor on the west due to its hostile relationship with India on
the east.
67. On Pakistan's consent, see Ahmed Rashid interview (Oct. 27, 2003); see also
Rashid, Taliban, p. 139; Intelligence report, Terrorism: Activities of Bin Ladin's
in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India, July 14, 1997; FBI investigation, interview of
former al Qaeda associate, Mar. 19, 2001, p. 26. On the
Afghanistan-Pakistan-centered network of guesthouses and training camps, see CIA
analytic report, "Sketch of a South Asia-Based Terrorist Training and Logistic
Network,"DI TR 95-12, Dec. 1995; CIA analytic report,"The Rise of UBL and Al-Qa'ida
and the Intelligence Community Response," Mar. 19, 2004 (draft), p. 11.
68. On Bin Ladin's money problems, see trial testimony of L'Houssaine Kherchtou,
United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 21, 2003 (transcript pp. 1282-1286); Frank G. and
Mary S. briefing (July 15, 2003); DOS cable, Nairobi 11468, "Sudan: Major Usama Bin
Ladin Asset Deregistered,"Aug. 6, 1996; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,
July 30, 2003. See also Robert Block,"In War on Terrorism, Sudan Struck a Blow by
Fleecing Bin Laden," Wall Street Journal, Dec. 3, 2001, p. A1.
69. FBI report of investigation, interview of confidential source, Sept. 16, 1999;
trial testimony of Ashif Juma, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 15, 2001 (transcript
pp. 626-627); trial testimony of L'Houssaine Kherchtou, United States v. bin Laden,
Feb. 22, 2001 (transcript pp. 1264-1267); FBI report of investigation, interview of
L'Houssaine Kherchtou, Aug. 28, 2000. See also Intelligence report, interrogation of
Khallad, Sept. 27, 2003.
70. See trial testimony of L'Houssaine Kherchtou, United States v. bin Laden, Feb.
22, 2001 (transcript pp. 1282-1286).
71. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 12, 2003; Gunaratna, Inside Al
Qaeda, p. 41; Rashid, Taliban, pp. 19-21, 133.
72. For Bin Ladin's 1996 fatwa, see Bin Ladin, "Declaration of War,"Aug. 23, 1996. On
constraints from the Sudanese, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb.
20, 2004. On warnings from the Saudi monarchy, see Intelligence report, Timeline of
events from 1993 bombing of World Trade Center through 9/11 (citing cables from Apr.
1997).
73. On Bin Ladin's promise to Taliban leaders, see government exhibit no. 1559-T,
United States v. bin Laden. For the Bin Ladin interview, see CNN broadcast,
interview of Bin Ladin by Peter Arnett on Mar. 20, 1997, May 9, 1997 (available
online at http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/binladen/binladenintvw-cnn.pdf).
According to KSM, Bin Ladin moved to Kandahar "by order of Emir Al-Mouminin," that
is, Mullah Omar. See Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 12, 2003. On
the Taliban's invitation to UBL, see Mike briefing (Dec. 12, 2003); Rashid, Taliban,
p. 129. Rashid has also described the move as part of Bin Ladin's plan to solidify
his relationship with, and eventually gain control over, the Taliban. Ahmed Rashid
interview (Oct. 27, 2003).
74. Intelligence report, unsuccessful Bin Ladin probes for contact with Iraq, July
24, 1998; Intelligence report, Saddam Hussein's efforts to repair relations with
Saudi government, 2001.
75. Intelligence report, Iraq approach to Bin Ladin, Mar. 16, 1999.
76. CIA analytic report, "Ansar al-Islam: Al Qa'ida's Ally in Northeastern Iraq," CTC
2003-40011CX, Feb. 1, 2003. See also DIA analytic report,"Special Analysis: Iraq's
Inconclusive Ties to Al-Qaida," July 31, 2002; CIA analytic report,"Old School
Ties," Mar. 10, 2003. We have seen other intelligence reports at the CIA about 1999
contacts. They are consistent with the conclusions we provide in the text, and their
reliability is uncertain. Although there have been suggestions of contacts between
Iraq and al Qaeda regarding chemical weapons and explosives training, the most
detailed information alleging such ties came from an al Qaeda operative who recanted
much of his original information. Intelligence report, interrogation of al Qaeda
operative, Feb. 14,2004. Two senior Bin Ladin associates have adamantly denied that
any such ties existed between al Qaeda and Iraq. Intelligence reports,
interrogations of KSM and Zubaydah, 2003 (cited in CIA letter, response to Douglas
Feith memorandum,"Requested Modifications to 'Summary of Body of Intelligence
Reporting on Iraq-al Qaida Contacts (1990-2003),'" Dec. 10, 2003, p. 5).
77. On Gulf-based donors to Bin Ladin, see Frank G. and Mary S. briefing (July 15,
2003); CIA analytic report, "Saudi-Based Financial Support for Terrorist
Organizations," CTC 2002-40117CH, Nov. 14, 2002. On the relationship between Bin
Ladin and Omar, see Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Feb. 20, 2002.
On relations between the Arabs in Afghanistan and the Taliban, see ibid. On
financial relations, see CIA analytic report, "Ariana Afghan Airlines: Assets and
Activities,"OTI IR 1999-170CX, July 29, 1999; CIA, NID,"Near East: UAE: Imposition
of Sanctions Could Disrupt Bin Ladin's Finances," June 9, 1999.
78. CIA analytic report, "Afghanistan: An Incubator for International Terrorism," CTC
01-40004, Mar. 27, 2001; CIA analytic report, "Al-Qa'ida Still Well Positioned to
Recruit Terrorists," July 1, 2002, p. 1.
79. The number of actual al Qaeda members seems to have been relatively small during
the period before 9/11, although estimates vary considerably, from the low hundreds
to as many as 5,000. For the low hundreds, see Intelligence report, interrogation of
KSM, Dec. 3, 2003. For 5,000, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad,
Nov. 26, 2003. Khallad added that because pledging bayat was secret, the number of
al Qaeda members can only be speculative. On al Qaeda's training and indoctrination,
see minutes from the August 1988 meeting leading to the official formation of al
Qaeda, cited in Government's Evidentiary Proffer Supporting the Admissibility of
Coconspirator Statements, United States v. Arnaout, Jan. 6, 2003, p. 36.
80. By 1996, al Qaeda apparently had established cooperative relationships with at
least 20 Sunni Islamic extremist groups in the Middle East, South Asia, Africa, and
East Asia, as well as with elements of the Saudi opposition. See CIA analytic
report, "Old School Ties," Mar. 10, 2003, p. 3. On ties with Southeast Asia and the
Malaysian- Indonesian JI, see, e.g., Intelligence report, interrogation of Hambali,
Sept. 5, 2003. On Pakistani militant ties to Bin Ladin, see CIA analytic
report,"Terrorism: Extremists Planning Attacks Against US Interests in Pakistan,"
Nov. 29, 2001, p. 1 and appendix B; see also Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, pp.
169-171, 199; Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, pp. 286-287. On Europe, see,
e.g., trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 6, 2001 (transcript
pp.301,315-316), Feb. 7, 2001 (transcript p. 368). On London, see, e.g.,
Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Sept. 17, 1997. On Balkans, see
Government's Evidentiary Proffer Supporting the Admissibility of Co-Conspirator
Statements, United States v. Arnaout, Jan. 6, 2003; Kohlmann, Al-Qaida's Jihad in
Europe.
81. See, e.g., "Tareekh Usama" and "Tareekh al Musadat" (described in note 25). See
also FBI report of investigation, interviews of Mohammad Rashed Daoud al 'Owhali,
Aug. 22-25, 1998; FBI report of investigation, interview of Nasser Ahmad Nasser al
Bahri, Oct. 3, 2001, p. 8.
82. The merger was de facto complete by February 1998, although the formal "contract"
would not be signed until June 2001. See Intelligence report, Incorporation of
Zawahiri's Organization into Bin Ladin's Al-Qa'ida, and Recent [1998] Activities of
Egyptian Associates of Al-Qa'ida, Sept. 22, 1998; see also Intelligence report,
interrogation of detainee, Feb. 8, 2002.
83. FBI report of investigation, interview of confidential source, Sept. 16, 1999;
FBI report of investigation, interview of L'Houssaine Kherchtou, Aug. 28, 2000;
Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, pp. 123-124.
84. On the group's surveillance and photography activities, see trial testimony of
L'Houssaine Kherchtou, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 21, 2001 (transcript pp.
1499-1500); FBI reports of investigation, interviews of L'Houssaine Kherchtou, Aug.
18, 2000; Oct. 18, 2000; see also FBI report of investigation, interview of
confidential source, Sept. 16, 1999. On Bin Ladin's use of technical equipment to
promote his intelligence/security capabilities, see Intelligence report, Terrorism:
Usama Bin Ladin's Intelligence Capabilities and Techniques, Dec. 5, 1996.
85. On the surveillance reports and the Hezbollah training camps, see FBI report of
investigation, interview of confidential source, Sept. 16, 1999; see also
Intelligence report, Al Qaeda Targeting Study of U.S. Embassy Nairobi, prepared 23
December 1993, Apr. 5, 1999; Intelligence report, Establishment of a Tripartite
Agreement Among Usama Bin Ladin, Iran, and the NIF, Jan. 31, 1997; Intelligence
report, Cooperation Among Usama Bin Ladin's Islamic Army, Iran, and the NIF, Jan. 31
1997; FBI report of investigation, interview of Fadl, Nov. 10, 1996. Bin Ladin told
his operatives he wanted them to study Hezbollah's 1983 truck bombing of U.S.
marines in Lebanon that killed 241 and led to the American pullout from Lebanon.
See, e.g., statement of Ali Mohamed in support of change of plea, United States v.
Ali Mohamed, No. S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (S.D. N.Y.), Oct. 20, 2000 (transcript p. 30);
trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 6, 2001 (transcript pp.
292-293); FBI report of investigation, interview of Fadl, Mar. 10, 1997; FBI report
of investigation, interview of confidential source, Sept. 16, 1999.
86. Hugh Davies, "Saudis Detain Member of Anti-American Terror Group," Daily
Telegraph (London), Aug. 2, 1997.
87. For general information on Hage, see Oriana Gill, "Hunting Bin Laden: A Portrait
of Wadih El Hage, Accused Terrorist," PBS Frontline broadcast, Sept. 12, 2001. On
returning to the United States, Hage was met at the airport by FBI agents,
interrogated, and called the next day before the federal grand jury then
investigating Bin Ladin. Because he lied to the grand jury about his association
with Bin Ladin and al Qaeda, he was arrested immediately after the embassy bombings
a year later. Testimony of Patrick Fitzgerald before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
Oct. 21, 2003, pp. 3-4. On Hage's phone taps, see introduction of stipulation
(government exhibit no. 36), United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 27, 2001 (transcript
pp. 1575-1576). For Harun's fax, see government exhibit no. 300A-T, United States v.
bin Laden.
88." World Islamic Front's Statement Urging Jihad," Al Quds al Arabi, Feb. 23, 1998;
closing statement by Asst. U.S. Attorney Ken Karas, United States v. bin Laden, May
1, 2001 (transcript pp. 5369, 5376-5377). On related activities in Kenya and
Tanzania, see FBI report of investigation, interviews of Mohamed Sadeeq Odeh, Aug.
15-28, 1998.
89. FBI report of investigation, interviews of Mohamed Sadeeq Odeh, Aug. 15-28, 1998;
closing statement by Asst.U.S. Attorney Ken Karas, United States v. bin Laden, May
1, 2001 (transcript pp. 5239, 5408, 5417).
90. For the Atef fax, see government exhibit no. 1636-T, United States v. bin Laden.
For the fatwa, see government exhibit no. 1602-T, United States v. bin Laden
(translation of "Clergymen in Afghanistan Issue a Fatwa calling for the Removal of
American Forces from the Gulf," Al Quds al Arabi, May 14, 1998). For the interview,
see ABC News interview,"To Terror's Source," May 28, 1998.
91. See closing statement by Asst. U.S. Attorney Ken Karas, United States v. bin
Laden, May 2, 2001 (transcript pp. 5426-5439); see also FBI report of investigation,
interviews of Mohammad Rashed Daoud al 'Owhali, Aug. 22-25, 1998, p. 9. Copies of
the declarations issued by "The Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places"
taking credit for the operation were recovered from a raid in Baku, Azerbaijan,
after the bombings in September 1998. See also government exhibit no. 1557C-T,
United States v. bin Laden ("The formation of the Islamic Army for the Liberation of
the Holy Places"); government exhibit no. 1557D-T, United States v. bin Laden
("Al-Aqsa Mosque operation"); government exhibit no. 1557E-T, United States v. bin
Laden ("The Holy Ka'ba operation").
92. Closing statement by Asst. U.S. Attorney Ken Karas, United States v. bin Laden,
May 2, 2001 (transcript p. 5445).
93. ABC News interview, "Terror Suspect: An Interview with Osama Bin Laden," Dec. 22,
1998 (conducted in Afghanistan by ABC News producer Rahimullah Yousafsai).
3 Counterterrorism Evolves
1. Brief of the United States, United States v. Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, Lead No. 98-1041
(2d Cir. filed Aug.25, 2000), pp. 42-43; John Miller and Michael Stone, with Chris
Mitchell, The Cell: Inside the 9/11 Plot, and Why the FBI and CIA Failed to Stop It
(Hyperion, 2002), pp. 95, 99.
2. On President Clinton's tasking the NSC, see Richard Clarke interview (Dec. 18,
2003). On the role of different U.S. government agencies, see Steve Coll, Ghost War:
The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion
to September 10, 2001 (Penguin, 2004), p. 251.
3. Trial testimony of Brian Parr, United States v. Yousef, No. S12 93 CR 180 (KTD)
(S.D. N.Y.), Oct. 22, 1997 (transcript p. 4694).
4. On the process of identification, see Joseph Malone interview (May 25, 2004).
5. United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 107-108 (2d Cir. 1998); Miller and Stone,
The Cell, pp. 104-105, 107,
109. Abouhalima had fled to the Middle East after the bombing, and was picked up by
Egyptian authorities and returned to the United States in late March 1993. Brief of
the United States, United States v. Mohammed A. Salameh, Lead No. 94-1312 (2d Cir.
filed Jan. 17, 1997), p. 64 and n. ***.
6. United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d at 107-108, n. 2; United States v. Yousef, 327
F.3d 56, 78-79 (2d Cir. 2003); Miller and Stone, The Cell, p. 119; Daniel Benjamin
and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (Random House, 2002), p. 12.
7. On Rahman's ties to the Farouq mosque, see Miller and Stone, The Cell, pp. 54-55.
On Rahman's message, see United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 104 (2d Cir. 1999);
Brief for the United States, United States v. Siddig Ibrahim Siddig Ali, Lead No.
96-1044 (2d Cir. filed July 3, 1997), pp. 10, 15. See also DOS Inspector General
report, "Review of the Visa-Issuance Process Phase I: Circumstances Surrounding the
Issuance of Visas to Sheikh Omar Ali Ahmed Abdel Rahman,"Mar.1994, pp.6,8, 36. On
the informant's reports, see United States v. Rahman,189 F.3d at 106-107. On the
landmarks plot, see United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d at 108-111, 123-127; Miller
and Stone, The Cell, p. 116.
8. These prosecutions also had the unintended consequence of alerting some al Qaeda
members to the U.S. government's interest in them. In February 1995, the government
filed a confidential court document listing Usama Bin Ladin and scores of other
people as possible co-conspirators in the New York City landmarks plot. Ali Mohamed,
who was on the list, obtained a copy and faxed it to a close Bin Ladin aide for
distribution. Statement of Ali Mohamed in support of change of plea, United States
v. Ali Mohamed, No. S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (S.D. N.Y.), Oct. 20, 2000 (transcript p. 29);
Statements of Prosecutor and Judge, United States v. Bin Laden, No. S(7) 98 Cr. 1023
(S.D. N.Y.), Mar. 26, 2001 (transcript pp. 3338-3339); Patrick Fitzgerald interview
(Jan. 28, 2004).
9. On Ajaj's travels to Khaldan and interactions with KSM, see United States v.
Salameh, 152 F.3d at 107-108. Ajaj had entered the United States on a B-2 tourist
visa at New York City on September 9, 1991. INS alien file, No. A72215823, Sept. 9,
1991.
10. On Yousef 's capture and the Manila air plot, see United States v. Yousef, 327
F.3d at 79-82. On KSM, see Joint Inquiry report (classified version), pp. 324-328;
CIA analytical report, "WTC 1993: The Solid Case for al-Qa'ida Involvement," CTC
2002-40084H, July 11, 2002; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, May 27, 2003;
James Risen and David Johnston,"Threats and Reponses: Counterterrorism; Qaeda Aide
Slipped Away Long Before Sept. 11 Attack," New York Times, Mar. 8, 2003, p. A12.
11. For a general history of the FBI, supporting the subsequent text (unless
otherwise noted), see Athan G. Theoharis, et al., The FBI: A Comprehensive Reference
Guide (Onyx Press, 1999); the FBI's authorized history, FBI report, "History of the
FBI" (online at www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/history/historymain.htm); the FBI's
history as told by the Federation of American Scientists, "History of the FBI,"
updated June 18, 2003 (online at www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fbi/fbi_hist.htm). For
discussion of field office autonomy, see FBI letter, Kalish to Wolf, responses to
questions posed by the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary of
the House Appropriations Committee, May 24, 2004, pp. 47-48.
12. See, e.g., Dan C. interview (Aug. 27, 2003); Ruben Garcia interview (Apr. 29,
2004); DOJ Inspector General interview of William Gore, Oct. 24, 2002.
13. The Washington Field Office was originally assigned the East Africa bombings case
because it generally has responsibility for investigating crimes overseas. When the
attack was determined to be al Qaeda-related, responsibility shifted to the New York
Field Office. See generally Kevin C. interview (Aug. 25, 2003). This created
significant friction between agents in the respective offices. Edward Curran and
Sidney Caspersen interview (Jan. 20, 2004). On the concept of the office of origin,
see FBI memo, Kalish to Wolf, responses to questions from the Subcommittee on
Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary of the House Appropriations Committee, pp.
47-48; testimony of Robert S. Mueller III before the Subcommittee on the Departments
of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies of the House
Appropriations Committee, June 18, 2003; FBI report, "Counterterrorism Program Since
September 2001,"Apr. 14, 2004, p. 20.
14. On the impact of Watergate, see generally Kathryn Olmsted, Challenging the Secret
Government: The Post- Watergate Investigations of the CIA and FBI (Univ. of North
Carolina Press, 1996).
15. David M. Alpern with Anthony Marro and Stephan Lesher, "This Is Your New FBI,"
Newsweek, Jan.5, 1976, p. 14.
16. On the Levi guidelines and the Smith modifications, see John T. Elliff,
"Symposium: National Security and Civil Liberties: The Attorney General's Guidelines
for FBI Investigations," Cornell Law Review, vol. 69 (Apr. 1984), p. 785. On the
line between church and state, see Floyd Abrams,"The First Amendment and the War
against Terrorism," University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law, vol. 5
(Oct. 2002).
17. On Pan Am bombing investigation, see Commission analysis of U.S. counterterrorism
strategy from 1968 to 1993; FBI report, "History of the FBI."
18. Louis Freeh interview (Jan. 6, 2004); Federation of American Scientists, "History
of the FBI;" DOJ Inspector General report,"Federal Bureau of Investigation Casework
and Human Resource Allocation," Sept. 2003, pp. iv, vi, viii, x, xiii.
19. For quote, see FBI report, "Congressional Budget Justification Book Fiscal Year
1995," undated, p. 6. On Freeh's efforts, see Howard M. Shapiro, "The FBI in the
21st Century," Cornell International Law Journal, vol. 28 (1995), pp. 219-228; Louis
Freeh interview (Jan. 6, 2004). On Freeh's budget request, see FBI
report,"Congressional Budget Justification Book Fiscal Year 1995," undated.
20. Janet Reno interview (Dec.16, 2003); Dale Watson interview (Feb. 5, 2004);
Stephen Colgate interview (May 19, 2004); OMB budget examiner interview (Apr. 27,
2004).
21. On the plan, see FBI report, "Strategic Plan: 1998-2003,'Keeping Tomorrow
Safe,'"May 8, 1998. For Watson's recollections, see Dale Watson interview (Jan. 6,
2004).
22. For the mid-1990s numbers, see FBI memo, Freeh to Reno, "Reorganization of FBI
Headquarters-Establishment of Counterterrorism Division and Investigative Services
Division," Apr. 22,1999. For the 1998-2001 numNOTES TO CHAPTER 3 473 bers, see DOJ
Inspector General report,"Review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
Counterterrorism Program: Threat Assessment, Strategic Planning, and Resource
Management," Sept. 2002, p. 67. For the failure to shift resources, see DOJ
Inspector General report,"FBI Casework and Human Resource Allocation," Sept. 2003,
pp. iv, vi, viii, x, xiii. For the comparison to drug agents, see testimony of Dick
Thornburgh before the Subcommittee on Commerce, State, Justice, the Judiciary, and
Related Agencies of the House Appropriations Committee, June 18, 2003, p. 20.
23. Dale Watson interview (Feb. 5, 2004); Virginia Bollinger interview (Feb. 2,
2004); Robert Bryant interview (Dec. 18, 2003).
24. On the state of information technology at FBI, see Virginia Bollinger interview
(Jan. 28, 2004); Mark Miller interview (Dec. 23, 2003). On the lack of an overall
assessment, see DOJ Inspector General report, "Review of the FBI's Counterterrorism
Program," Sept. 2002, pp. ii-iii.
25. For training statistics, see DOJ Inspector General report, "Review of the FBI's
Counterterrorism Program," Sept.2002, p. 74. For translation resources, see FBI
report,"FY 2002 Counterterrorism Division Program Plan Summary," undated, p. 4.
Since 9/11, the FBI has recruited and processed more than 30,000 translator
applicants. This has resulted in the addition of nearly 700 new translators. FBI
report,"The FBI's Counterterrorism Program Since September 2001,"Apr. 14, 2004. The
FBI's hiring process includes language testing, a personnel security interview,
polygraph, and a full background investigation. The FBI must maintain rigorous
security and proficiency standards with respect to its permanent and contract
employees. Even as the FBI has increased its language services cadre, the demand for
translation services has also greatly increased. Thus, the FBI must not only
continue to bring on board more linguists, it must also continue to take advantage
of technology and best practices to prioritize its workflow, enhance its
capabilities, and ensure compliance with its quality control program. FBI linguists
interviews (July 31,2003-May 10, 2004); Margaret Gulotta interview (May 10, 2004).
See DOJ Inspector General report,"A Review of the FBI's Actions in Connection with
Allegations Raised by Contract Linguist Sibel Edmonds," July 1, 2004; Sibel Edmonds
interview (Feb. 11, 2004).
26. Wilson Lowery interview (Jan. 28, 2004); Janet Reno testimony, Apr. 13, 2004;
Helen S. interview (Dec. 29, 2003); Stephen Colgate interview (May 19, 2004); Robert
Dies interview (Feb. 4, 2004).
27. FBI report, "Director's Report on Counterterrorism," Sept. 1, 2001, pp. I-1-I-14.
On FBI reorganization, see FBI memo, Freeh to Reno,"Reorganization of FBI
Headquarters-Establishment of Counterterrorism Division and Investigative Services
Division,"Apr. 22, 1999. On Watson's observation, see Dale Watson interview (Feb. 4,
2004). On MAXCAP 05, see FBI memo, description of MAXCAP 05, undated (draft likely
prepared after Aug. 31, 2001, for incoming Director Mueller). On field executives'
views, see FBI report, Counterterrorism Division, International Terrorism
Program,"Strategic Program Plan, FY 2001-06," undated, p. 30.
28. International terrorism intelligence cases were designated as 199 matters;
international terrorism criminal cases were designated as 265 matters. In 2003,
these designations were eliminated; all international terrorism matters now receive
the same designation, 315.
29. For historical information on FISA, see Americo R. Cinquegrana, "The Walls (and
Wires) have Ears: The Background and First Ten Years of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978," University of Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 137 (1989),
pp. 793, 802-805. For the statute, see 50 U.S.C. �� 1801 et seq. As enacted in 1978,
FISA permitted orders authorizing electronic surveillance. It did not refer to
physical searches. In 1994, the statute was amended to permit orders authorizing
physical searches. See Pub. L. No. 103-359, 108 Stat. 3423, 3443 (Oct. 14, 1994); 50
U.S.C. �� 1821-1829. See generally, William C. Banks and M. E. Bowman, "Executive
Authority for National Security Surveillance," American University Law Review, vol.
50 (2000), pp. 1-130.
30. On the history of courts applying the primary purpose standard, see In re Sealed
Case, 310 F.3d 717,725-726 (FISC Ct. Rev. 2002), in which the FISC Court of Review
concluded that these courts had ruled in error. See also DOJ report, "Final Report
of the Attorney General's Review Team on the Handling of the Los Alamos National
Laboratory Investigation" (hereinafter "Bellows Report"), May 2000, appendix D. On
DOJ interpretation of FISA, see DOJ memo, Dellinger to Vatis,"Standards for
Searchers Under Foreign Intelligence Act," Feb. 14, 1995; Royce Lamberth interview
(Mar. 26, 2004); Bellows Report, pp. 711-712; DOJ Inspector General interview of
Marion Bowman, May 28, 2003.
31. Bellows Report, pp. 711-712; DOJ Inspector General interview of Marion Bowman,
May 28, 2003.
32. Bellows Report, pp. 712-714, n. 947, appendix D tabs 2, 3; Richard Scruggs
interview (May 26, 2004); Larry Parkinson interview (Feb. 24, 2004). Because OIPR
had ultimate authority to decide what was presented to the FISA Court, it wielded
extraordinary power in the FISA process.
33. The group included representatives from the FBI, OIPR, and the Criminal Division.
In addition, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York was given an
opportunity to comment on the procedures. The procedures that were eventually issued
were agreed to by all involved in the drafting process. As a member of the
Commission, Gorelick has recused herself from participation in this aspect of our
work.
34. On Reno's July 1995 memo, see DOJ Inspector General report, "A Review of the
FBI's Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks,"
July 2004, pp. 27-34; Bellows Report, p. 709, appendix D tab 23. Some barriers were
proposed by OIPR in the FISA applications and subsequently adopted by the FISC;
others, less formally recorded, were believed by the FBI to be equally applicable.
35. On the misapplication of the procedures and the role of OIPR, see Bellows Report,
pp. 721-722; Marion Bowman interview (Mar. 6, 2004); Fran Fragos Townsend meeting
(Feb. 13, 2004). On the OIPR as gatekeeper, see Michael Vatis interview (Jan. 21,
2004); Larry Parkinson interview (Feb. 24, 2004). On OIPR's stated defense, see
David Kris interview (May 19, 2004); Richard Scruggs interview (May 26, 2004). On
OIPR's threat, see Larry Parkinson interview (Feb. 24, 2004); Thomas A. interview
(Mar. 16, 2004). On the lack of information flow, see Bellows Report, pp. 722,
724-725, 729-731.
36. For Bryant's comment, see David Kris interview (Jan. 15,2004); Bellows Report,
p.714. On barriers between agents on same squads, see Larry Parkinson interview
(Feb. 24, 2004); Michael Vatis interview (Jan. 21, 2004); DOJ Inspector General
interview of Thomas A., May 28, 2003. On incorrect interpretation by field agents,
see Joint Inquiry report, pp. 363, 367-368; Larry Parkinson interview (Feb. 24,
2004); Michael Vatis interview (Jan. 21, 2004); DOJ Inspector General interview of
Thomas A., May 28, 2003; DOJ Inspector General interview of Jane, Nov. 4, 2002.
37. For an example of the barriers between agents, see DOJ emails, Jane to Steve B.,
interpreting the wall to apply to non-FISA information, Aug. 29, 2001; David Kris
interview (Jan. 15, 2004). On the NSA barriers, see DOJ Inspector General interview
of Jane, Nov. 4, 2002. These barriers were reinforced by caveats NSA began placing
on all of its Bin Ladin-related reports and later on all of its
counterterrorism-related reports-whether or not the information was subject to the
attorney general's order-which required approval before the report's contents could
be shared with criminal investigators. Ibid. On the several reviews of the process,
see Bellows Report, pp. 709, 722; DOJ Inspector General report, "The Handling of FBI
Intelligence Information Related to the Justice Department's Campaign Finance
Investigation," July 1999, pp. 15-16, 255, 256, 328-330, 340, 344; GAO report, "FBI
Intelligence Investigations: Coordination Within Justice on Counterintelligence
Criminal Matters Is Limited," July 2001, pp. 3-5.
38. In December 1999, NSA began placing caveats on all of its Bin Ladin reports that
precluded sharing of any of the reports' contents with criminal prosecutors or FBI
agents investigating criminal matters without first obtaining OIPR's permission.
These caveats were initially created at the direction of Attorney General Reno and
applied solely to reports of information gathered from three specific surveillances
she had authorized. Because NSA decided it was administratively too difficult to
determine whether particular reports derived from the specific surveillances
authorized by the attorney general, NSA decided to place this caveat on all its
terrorism-related reports. In November 2000, in response to direction from the FISA
Court, NSA modified these caveats to require that consent for sharing the
information with prosecutors or criminal agents be obtained from NSA's Customer
Needs and Delivery Services group. See DOJ memo, Reno to Freeh, E.O. 12333
authorized surveillance of a suspected al Qaeda operative, Dec. 24, 1999; NSA email,
William L. to Brian C., "dissemination of terrorism reporting," Dec. 29, 1999; NSA
memo, Ann D. to others,"Reporting Guidance,"Dec. 30. 1999; Intelligence report, Nov.
6, 2000. See also discussion of the history of the NSA caveats in the notes to
Chapter 8.
39. See DEA report, "DEA Staffing & Budget" (figures for 1972 to 2003)
(online at www.usdoj.gov/dea/agency/staffing.htm). For USMS staffing, see DOJ
information provided to the Commission.
40. On the number of agents, see INS newsletter, "INS Commissioner Meissner Announces
Departure," Jan. 2001; INS news release,"INS to Hire More than 800 Immigration
Inspectors Nationwide," Jan. 12, 2001; Gregory Bednarz prepared statement, Oct. 9,
2003, p. 5. On the INS's main challenges, see, e.g., Eric Holder interview (Jan. 28,
2004); Jamie Gorelick interview (Jan. 13, 2004); Doris Meissner interview (Nov. 25,
2003). On the White House views, see, e.g., White House press release,"Fact Sheet on
Immigration Enforcement Act,"May 3, 1995. On DOJ's concerns, see INS newsletter,
Remarks of Attorney General Reno on Oct. 24, 2000, Jan. 2001, pp. 16, 26. To assess
congressional views, we reviewed all conference and committee reports relating to
congressional action on INS budget requests for fiscal years 1995 through 2001 and
all Senate and House immigration hearings from 1993 to 2001. On outdated technology,
see Gus de la Vina interview (Nov. 19, 2003); Doris Meissner interview (Nov. 25,
2003).
41. On Meissner's response, see Doris Meissner interview (Nov. 25, 2003). On the
lookout unit, see Tim G. interview (Oct. 1, 2002). On the number of denials of
entry, see Majority Staff Report, Hearing on "Foreign Terrorists in America: Five
Years after the World Trade Center" before the Subcommittee on Technology,
Terrorism, and Government Information of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Feb. 24,
1998, p. 145.
42. Majority Staff Report, Hearing on "Foreign Terrorists in America: Five Years
after the World Trade Center," Feb. 24, 1998, p. 152; 8 U.S.C. � 1534(e)(1)(A). On
the low level of removals, see Daniel Cadman interview (Oct. 9, 2003); Rocky
Concepcion interview (June 15, 2004).
43. On the 1986 plan, see INS report, Investigations Division, "Alien Terrorists and
Undesirables: A Contingency Plan," May 1986; Daniel Cadman interview (Oct. 17,
2003). On the 1995 plan, see INS memo, Bramhall to Bednarz and Hurst,"Draft
Counter-Terrorism Strategy Outline,"Aug. 11, 1995. On the 1997 plan, see INS email,
Cadman to others,"EAC briefing document,"Dec. 5, 1997 (attachment titled
"Counterterrorism/National SecuNOTES TO CHAPTER 3 475 rity Strategy and Casework
Oversight"). On the work of the National Security Unit and the Intelligence Unit,
see Daniel Cadman interview (Oct. 17, 2003); Cliff Landesman interview (Oct. 27,
2003).
44. For number of agents on Canadian border, the Canadian situation generally, and
the inspector general's recommendations, see INS report, "Northern Border Strategy,"
Jan. 9, 2001; DOJ Inspector General report,"Followup Review of the Border Patrol
Efforts Along the Northern Border," Apr. 2000 (inspection plan). On terrorists
entering the United States via Canada, see, e.g., INS record, Record of Deportable
Alien, Abu Mezer, June 24, 1996. Mezer was able to stay in the United States despite
apprehensions for his illegal entries along the northern border.
45. The inspectors' views are drawn from our interviews with 26 border inspectors who
had contact with the 9/11 hijackers. On the incomplete INS projects, see Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat.
3009 (1996), �� 110, 641.
46. For the 1996 law, see 8 U.S.C. � 1357 (1996). On unauthorized immigration, see
Migration Policy Institute report, "Immigration Facts: Unauthorized Immigration to
the United States," Oct. 2003 (online at
www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/two_unauthorized_immigration_us.pdf). On the initiation
of city noncooperation, see New York Mayor Ed Koch's 1987 order prohibiting city
line workers, but not police or the Department of Corrections, from transmitting
information respecting any alien to federal immigration authorities. On backlogs,
see testimony of Dr. Demetrios G. Papademetriou before the Subcommittee on
Immigration, Border Security and Claims of the House Judiciary Committee, Mar. 11,
2004. On the overwhelmed INS, see James Ziglar testimony, Jan. 26, 2004.
47. On the relationship between the FBI and state and local police forces, see
William Bratton et al. interview (Nov. 20, 2003); David Cohen interview (Feb. 4,
2004). On the New York JTTF, see Mary Jo White, "Prosecuting Terrorism in New York,"
Middle East Quarterly, spring 2001 (online at www.meforum.org/article/25). On the
pre- 9/11 number of JTTFs, see Louis Freeh prepared statement for the Joint Inquiry,
Oct. 8, 2002, p. 18. On the effectiveness of JTTFs, see Washington Field Office
agent interview (Aug.4, 2003); Phoenix JTTF member interview (Oct. 20, 2003);
Phoenix Field Office agent interview (Oct. 21, 2003); Art C. interview (Dec. 4,
2003).
48. Treasury report, "1995 Highlights of The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms," undated (online at www.atf.gov/pub/gen_pub/annualrpt/1995/index.htm); ATF
report, "ATF Snapshot," Jan. 30, 1998 (online at www.atf.gov/about/snap1998.htm).
49. Dale Watson interview (Feb. 4, 2004); Frank P. interview (Aug. 26, 2003); Dan C.
interview (Aug. 27, 2003); Louis Freeh interview (Jan. 8. 2004).
50. See Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act, Pub.L. No. 104-264,110 Stat. 3213
(1996), codified at 49 U.S.C. � 40101; Federal Aviation Authorization Act, H.R. Rep.
No. 104-848, 104th Cong., 2d sess. (1996) (notes on conference substitute for �
401). On responsibility for protection, see 49 U.S.C. � 44903(b). On sabotage, see
FAA report, Aviation Security Advisory Committee, "Domestic Security Baseline Final
Report," Dec. 12, 1996; FAA report,"Civil Aviation Security: Objectives and
Priorities,"Mar. 18, 1999 (staff working paper). See also Jane Garvey prepared
statement, May 22, 2003; Report of the President's Commission on Aviation Security
and Terrorism (Pan Am/Lockerbie Commission), May 15, 1990, pp. 113-114; Final Report
of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security (Gore Commission),
Feb. 12, 1997. While the sabotage of commercial aircraft, including Pan Am 103 in
1998, had claimed many lives, hijackings had also been deadly, including the 1985
hijacking of an Egypt Air flight in which 60 people were killed and 35 injured; the
1986 hijacking of Pan Am 73 in which 22 people were killed and 125 injured; and the
1996 hijacking of an Ethiopian Airlines flight in which 123 people were killed. See
FAA report,"Civil Aviation Security Reference Handbook,"May 1999. Commissioners
Ben-Veniste, Gorelick, and Thompson have recused themselves from our work on
aviation security matters.
51. See GAO report, "Aviation Security: Additional Actions Needed to Meet Domestic
and International Challenges," Jan. 27, 1994; GAO report,"Aviation Security: Urgent
Issues Need to Be Addressed," Sept. 11, 1996; GAO report,"Aviation Security: Slow
Progress in Addressing Long-Standing Screener Performance Problems," Mar. 16, 2000;
GAO report,"Aviation Security: Long-Standing Problems Impair Airport Screeners'
Performance," June 28, 2000; testimony of Kenneth M. Mead, DOT Inspector General,
Joint Hearing on Actions Needed to Improve Aviation Security before the Subcommittee
on Oversight of Government Management, Restructuring and the District of Columbia of
the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Sept. 25, 2001. On rules regulating
access to security sensitive areas of commercial airports, see FAA
regulations,"Airport Security,"14 C.F.R.� 107; FAA report, "Air Carrier Standard
Security Program," May 2001.
52. The FAA maintained formal agreements with the CIA, FBI, Department of State,
Department of Defense, and NSA to receive data of interest as outlined in the
agreement. In addition, the FAA posted liaisons with the CIA, FBI, and Department of
State to facilitate the flow of intelligence and threat information. See Claudio
Manno interview (Oct. 1, 2003); Matt K. interview (Feb. 13, 2004). FAA civil
aviation security officials reported that the agency's intelligence watch received
about 200 pieces of intelligence per day. See Claudio Manno interview (Oct. 1,
2003). The analysis regarding the passage of FBI information was based on a review
of the FAA's Intelligence Case Files. The FBI analyst who worked on the 1998 tasking
indicated that the information was shared with the FAA liaison to the Bureau, but
the liaison did not recall having seen it. Cathal Flynn interview (Sept. 9, 2003);
Matt K. interview (Feb. 13, 2004).
53. Regarding intelligence reports, the Daily Intelligence Summary (DIS) prepared by
the FAA's Office of Civil Aviation Intelligence was reviewed first by an assistant
to Acting Deputy Administrator Belger, who would inform him of any information that
she felt merited his attention. Belger in turn would determine whether the
information needed to be raised with Administrator Garvey. Garvey told us that she
maintained an open door policy and counted on her security staff to keep her
informed on any pressing issues. Jane Garvey interview (Oct. 21, 2003); Monte Belger
interview (Nov. 24, 2003); Cathal Flynn interview (Sept. 9, 2003); Shirley Miller
interview (Mar. 30, 2004); Claudio Manno interview (Oct. 1, 2003). Regarding the
intelligence unit, see Nicholas Grant interview (May 26, 2004); Claudio Manno
interview (Oct. 1, 2003); Mike Canavan interview (Nov. 4, 2003); Alexander T. Wells,
Commercial Aviation Safety (McGraw-Hill, 2001), p. 308.
54. On the threat to civil aviation, see Lee Longmire interview (Oct. 28, 2003). On
CAPPS, also known as CAPS (Computer Assisted Profiling System), see FAA security
directive, "Threat to Air Carriers," SD 97-01, Oct. 27, 1997. The profile was
derived from information on the Passenger Name Record and did not include factors
such as race, creed, color, or national origin. In addition to those chosen by the
algorithm, a number of other passengers were selected at random, both to address
concerns about discrimination and to deter terrorists from figuring out the
algorithm and gaming the system. On no-fly lists, see FAA security directive,
"Threat to U.S. Air Carriers," SD 95, Apr. 24, 2000. Some of the individuals on the
no-fly list were in U.S. custody as of 9/11. See Kevin G. Hall, Alfonso Chardy, and
Juan O. Tamayo,"Mix-Up Almost Permitted Deportation of Men Suspected of Terrorist
Activities," Miami Herald, Sept. 19, 2001; FAA security directive,"Threat to U.S.
Aircraft Operators," SD 108-1, Aug. 28, 2001. On the Gore Commission, see Final
Report of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, Feb. 12, 1997,
p. 28. On the TIPOFF database (used to screen visa applicants and persons seeking
permission to enter the United States against the names of known or suspected
terrorists), see DOS cable, State 182167, "Fighting Terrorism: Visas Viper
Procedures,"Oct. 19, 2001. Finally, on the watchlist, officials told us that large
lists were difficult to implement, particularly when they weren't accompanied by
numeric data such as date of birth that would enable an air carrier to distinguish
the terrorist from others around the world who had his or her name. In addition, the
U.S. intelligence community was required to approve the "no-fly" listing of an
individual in order to protect sources and methods. Matt Kormann interview (Feb. 13,
2004).
55. On selectees, see James Padgett interview (Oct. 7, 2003). Their bags were either
screened for explosives or held off their flight until they were confirmed to be
aboard. See FAA security directive, "Threat to Air Carriers," SD 97-01 Oct. 27,
1997. Under the previous noncomputerized profiling system, selectees were subject to
secondary screening of their carry-on belongings, and checked baggage. See FAA
security directive,"Threat to Air Carriers," SD 96-05, Aug. 19, 1996.
56. FAA report, "Air Carrier Standard Security Program," May 2001; FAA
regulations,"Screening of Passengers and Property," 14 C.F.R. � 108.9 (1999); Leo
Boivin interview (Sept. 17, 2003). 57." Knives with blades under 4 inches, such as
Swiss Army Knives, scout knives, pocket utility knives, etc. may be allowed to enter
the sterile area. However, some knives with blades under 4 inches could be
considered by a reasonable person to be a 'menacing knife' and/or may be illegal
under local law and should not be allowed to enter the sterile area." See FAA
regulations, Air Carriers Checkpoint Operations Guide, Aug. 1999; see also Air
Transport Association Regional Airlines Association report,"Checkpoint Operations
Guide,"Aug. 1999; Cathal Flynn interview (Sept. 9, 2003); Lee Longmire interview
(Oct. 28, 2003); Leo Boivin interview (Sept. 17, 2003). A 1994 FAA assessment of the
threat to civil aviation in the United States stated that "system vulnerabilities
also exist with respect to hijackings . . . aircraft can be hijacked with either
fake weapons or hoax explosive devices. Cabin crew or passengers can also be
threatened with objects such as short blade knives, which are allowable on board
aircraft." See FAA report,"The Threat to U.S. Civil Aviation in the United States,"
Sept. 1994.
58. On random and continuous screening, see Janet Riffe interview (Feb. 26, 2004);
FAA report, "Air Carrier Standard Security Program," May 2001. On the 9/11
hijackers, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Ramzi Binalshibh, Oct. 1, 2002;
FAA records, Intelligence Case File 98-96.
59. Courtney Tucker interview (June 3, 2004); Kenneth Mead prepared statement, May
22, 2003. Some air carrier officials, however, enjoyed a strong reputation for
leadership in aviation security, including United Airlines' Ed Soliday. Bruce
Butterworth interview (Sept. 29, 2003); Cathal Flynn interview (Sept. 9, 2003);
Steven Jenkins interview (Feb. 24, 2004).
60. Mike Morse interview (Sept. 15, 2003). Regarding training, see FAA report, "Air
Carrier Standard Security Program," May 2001.
61. On a hardened cockpit door making little difference, see Tim Ahern interview
(Oct. 8, 2004). For regulations governing the doors, see FAA regulations,
"Miscellaneous Equipment" (emergency exit), 14 C.F.R.� 121.313 (2001); FAA
regulations,"Closing and locking of flight crew compartment door," 14 C.F.R.�
121.587 (2001). Also compromising cockpit security was the use of common locks (one
key fit the cockpits of all Boeing aircraft) and the absence of procedures to
properly manage and safeguard cockpit keys. Michael Woodward interview (Jan. 25,
2004). For the quote on reinforced cockpit doors, see Byron Okada,"Air Rage Prompts
Call for Safety Measures: The FAA Is Expected to Release a Report Today," Fort Worth
Star-Telegram, Jan. 10, 2001, p. 1.
62. James Underwood interview (Sept. 17, 2004); Mike Canavan interview (Nov. 4,
2003).
63. Jane Garvey interview (Oct. 21, 2003).
64. As defined by statute, covert action "means an activity or activities of the
United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions
abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not
be apparent or acknowledged publicly, but does not include-(1) activities the
primary purpose of which is to acquire intelligence[.]" 50 U.S.C. � 413b(e).
Executive Order 12333, titled "United States Intelligence Activities," terms covert
action "special activities," defined as "activities conducted in support of national
foreign policy objectives abroad which are planned and executed so that the role of
the United States Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly, and functions
in support of such activities[.]" E.O. 12333 � 3.4(h). Pursuant to that order, the
CIA has primary responsibility for covert action; another nonmilitary agency may
conduct covert action only if the president determines that it "is more likely to
achieve a particular objective." Ibid. � 1.8(e).
65. See 50 U.S.C. � 401a(4).
66. DCI report, "National Foreign Intelligence Program Historical Data FY 1985 to FY
2003," Feb. 11, 2004.
67. For quote, see Joint Inquiry testimony of Michael Hayden, June 18, 2002; see also
Michael Hayden interview (Dec. 10, 2003).
68. Michael Hayden interview (Dec. 10, 2003).
69. For the CIA's early years, see John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of
the CIA (Simon & Schuster, 1986). For the Agency's more recent history, see
Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents
and How They Won the Cold War (Simon & Schuster, 1996).
70. Regarding the dissolution of the OSS and creation of the CIG, see Michael Warner,
Central Intelligence: Origin and Evolution (Center for the Study of Intelligence,
2001); Executive Order 9621, "Termination of the Office of Strategic Services and
Disposition of its Functions," Sept. 20, 1945;"Presidential Directive on
Coordination of Foreign Intelligence Activities," Jan. 22, 1946 (11 Fed. Reg. 1337,
1339).
71. Regarding fears of creating a U.S. Gestapo, see Amy Zegart, Flawed by Design: The
Evolution of the CIA, JCS and NSC (Stanford Univ. Press, 1999), p. 268, n. 6.
72. National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, � 102(d)(3), codified at 50
U.S.C. � 403-3(d)(1).
73. On plausible deniability, see, e.g., Ranelagh, The Agency, pp. 341-345; Evan
Thomas, The Very Best Men: Four Who Dared: The Early Years of the CIA (Simon
& Schuster, 1995), pp. 230-235.
74. James Pavitt interview (Jan. 8, 2004).
75. Steve Kappes interview (May 7, 2004); James Pavitt interview (Jan. 8, 2004).
76. Jami Miscik interview (Aug. 29, 2003).
77. Mary McCarthy, Fritz Ermarth, and Charles Allen briefing (Aug. 14, 2003).
78. See Tom Mangold, Cold Warrior: James Jesus Angleton, the CIA's Master Spy Hunter
(Simon & Schuster, 1991).
79. Ruth David interview (June 10, 2003).
80. "According to the 2002 Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System statistics,
American colleges granted only six degrees in Arabic in the survey year." Joint
Inquiry report (unclassified version), p. 344.
81. Leo Hazelwood interview (Aug. 25, 2003); Duane Clarridge interview (Sept. 16,
2003).
82. Charles Allen interview (Sept. 22, 2003); Duane Clarridge interview (Sept. 16,
2003); David Carey interview (Oct. 31, 2003); Leo Hazelwood interview (Aug. 25,
2003); John Helgerson interview (Sept. 5, 2003); Robert Vickers interview (Sept. 17,
2003); CIA Inspector General report, "The Agency's Counterterrorism Effort," Oct.
1994.
83. Cofer Black testimony, Apr. 13, 2004.
84. James Pavitt interview (Jan. 8, 2004).
85. George Tenet testimony, Mar. 24, 2004; George Tenet testimony, Apr. 14, 2004.
86. Richard Armitage interview (Jan. 12, 2004).
87. See Dana Priest, The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America's
Military (W.W. Norton, 2003).
88. Michael Sheehan interview (Dec. 16, 2003).
89. See DOS report, Bureau of Consular Affairs, "1990 Report of the Visa Office,"Oct.
1991; DOS Inspector General report,"Review of the Visa-Issuing Process; Phase I:
Circumstances Surrounding the Issuance of Visas to Sheik Omar Ahmed Ali Abdel
Rahman," Mar. 1994; Mary Ryan interviews (Sept. 29, 2003; Oct. 9, 2003); DOS
briefing materials, presentation on consular systems delivered to the Information
Resources Management Program Board, Apr. 26, 1995; DOS report, "History of the
Department of State During the Clinton Presidency (1993-2001),"undated (online at
www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/c6059.htm); Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Pub. L.
No. 103-236 (1994), � 140(a).
90. See Gordon N. Lederman, Reorganizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The
Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 (Greenwood, 1999).
91. William Cohen interview (Feb. 5, 2004); John Hamre interview (Dec. 9, 2003); Hugh
Shelton interview (Dec. 5, 2004); Cohen Group meeting (Dec. 12, 2003).
92. See Monterey Institute of International Studies report, "Nunn-Lugar-Domenici
Domestic Preparedness and WMD Civil Support Teams," Oct. 2001 (online at
http://cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/120city.htm); National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1997, Pub.L. No. 104-201, 110 Stat. 2422 (1996); DOD
report,"Domestic Preparedness Program in the Defense Against Weapons of Mass
Destruction," May 1, 1997 (online at www.defenselink.mil/pubs/domestic/toc.html).
93. John Hamre interview (Dec.9, 2003); Henry Allen Holmes interview (Nov. 10, 2003);
Brian Sheridan interview (Feb. 25, 2004).
94. Charles Allen interview (Jan. 27, 2004).
95. Commission analysis of U.S. counterterrorism strategy from 1968 to 1993.
96. President Reagan, "Remarks at the Annual Convention of the American Bar
Association," July 8, 1985 (online at
www.reagan.utexas.edu/resource/speeches/1985/70885a.htm).
97. See Report of the President's Special Review Board (Tower Commission) (GPO,
1987); Theodore Draper, A Very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Affairs (Simon &
Schuster, 1991).
98. James Pavitt interview (Jan. 8, 2004).
99. President Clinton, "Address to the Nation on the Strike on Iraqi Intelligence
Headquarters," June 26, 1993.
100. President Clinton, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State
of the Union," Jan. 24, 1995; President Clinton,"Message to the Congress
Transmitting Proposed Legislation To Combat Terrorism," Feb. 9, 1995; President
Clinton, "Message to the Congress Transmitting Proposed Legislation To Combat
Terrorism," May 3, 1995.
101. Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-39, "U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism," June
21, 1995.
102. President Clinton, "Remarks by the President in a Congressional Meeting," July
29, 1996.
103. President Clinton, "Remarks Announcing the Second Term National Security Team
and an Exchange With Reporters," Dec. 5, 1996.
104. Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-62, "Protection Against Unconventional
Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas," May 22, 1998; Presidential Decision
Directive/NSC-63,"Critical Infrastructure Protection," May 22, 1998.
105. President Clinton, "Commencement Address at the United States Naval Academy in
Annapolis, Maryland," May 22, 1998.
106. See Ernest R. May, "Intelligence: Backing into the Future," Foreign Affairs,
Summer 1992.
107. For Congress's domestic orientation, see Lee H. Hamilton, How Congress Works and
Why You Should Care (Indiana Univ. Press, 2004), pp.18-19. For presidential focus
prior to 9/11, see President Clinton, "Commencement Address at the United States
Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland,"May 22,1998; President Clinton,"Keeping
America Secure for the 21st Century," Jan. 22, 1999.
108. Hamilton, How Congress Works, p. 17. Our review of the classified schedules of
authorization from 1995 to 2001 found that Congress generally supported the top line
requests made by the administration for intelligence, never reducing it by more than
2 or 3 percent; however, the congressional oversight committees did reallocate the
administration's requests significantly, sometimes increasing programs like
counterterrorism that they believed were being underfunded. On the intelligence
budget, see George Tenet prepared statement, Mar. 24, 2004, pp. 23-26. The DCI added
that frustrations with getting additional funding requests arose mainly from the
administration. See ibid.
109. Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, Final Report, Dec.
1993;"Contract with America," 1994; Statement of Rep. Saxby Chambliss, Hearing on
Intelligence Gaps in Counterterrorism before the Special Oversight Panel on
Terrorism of the House Armed Services Committee, Sept. 5, 2002.
110. Hamilton, How Congress Works, p. 106; Richard Durbin interview (Apr. 27, 2004);
Dianne Feinstein interview (June 1, 2004); Peter Hoekstra interview (June 2, 2004);
Chris Shays interview (June 2, 2004); Dana Priest, "Congressional Oversight of
Intelligence Criticized," Washington Post, Apr. 27, 2004, p. A1. For Tenet quote,
see George Tenet testimony, Mar. 24, 2004.
111. For neglect of airline security, see Commission analysis of the Congressional
Daily Digest and the Congressional Record using the search term "aviation security."
See also FAA briefing materials, "FAA Hearing/Briefing Activity Prior to September
11, 2001," undated. For the focus on the Southwest border, see Commission analysis
of the hearing records of the subcommittees on immigration of the House and Senate
Judiciary committees from 1993 through 2001. On restricting the FBI's
appropriations, see Robert Dies interview (Feb.4, 2004); Stephen Colgate interview
(May 19, 2004). On sanctions on Pakistan, see Strobe Talbott interview (Jan. 15,
2004); Karl Inderfurth interview (Feb. 18, 2004); Christina Rocca interview (Jan.
29, 2004). On the lack of time for oversight, see Hamilton, How Congress Works,
p.112; see also Center for Strategic and International Studies meeting (July 23,
2003); Jay Rockefeller meeting (Oct. 16, 2003). On the Senate Appropriations
Committee, the long-serving Chair (Ted Stevens) and Ranking Minority Member (Daniel
Inouye) of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee conduct at least weekly oversight
sessions of the intelligence community, always behind closed doors, the
effectiveness of which we cannot judge.
112. Although some members of the House sought the creation of a Select Committee on
Terrorism in the beginning of 2001, the Speaker asked the intelligence ccommittee to
set up a terrorism working group instead. Under Rep. Saxby Chambliss and Rep. Jane
Harman, it held several briefings before 9/11 and became a subcommittee of the
Intelligence Committee immediately afterward.
113. Rep. Christopher Shays of Connecticut, chairman of the National Security
Subcommittee of the Government Reform Committee, held 12 wide-ranging hearings on
terrorism between 1999 and July 2001, with special attention on domestic
preparedness and response to terrorist attack. Though the intelligence oversight
panels' work was largely secret, the intelligence community's annual worldwide
threat testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence was public
testimony (typically followed by a closed session). From 1997 through 2001, the
threat of terrorism rose on the priority list from third (1997-1998) to second
(1999-2000) to first in 2001. See Commission analysis of congressional hearings on
terrorism.
114. Congress created three commissions in 1998. One, chaired jointly by former
senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman, examined national security challenges for the
twenty-first century. This commission included stark warnings about possible
domestic terrorist attacks and recommended a new institution devoted to identifying
and defending vulnerabilities in homeland security. See Phase III Report of the U.S.
Commission on National Security/ 21st Century, "Road Map for National Security:
Imperative for Change," Feb. 15, 2001. A second, chaired by former governor James G.
Gilmore of Virginia, studied domestic preparedness to cope with attacks using
weapons of mass destruction and presented five reports. See, e.g., Fifth Annual
Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic
Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction," Forging
America's New Normalcy: Securing our Homeland, Preserving our Liberty,"Dec. 15,2003.
The third, chaired by L. Paul Bremer, the former State Department counterterrorism
coordinator, with vice chair Maurice Sonnenberg, a member of the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board, focused specifically on terrorist threats and what
could be done to prepare for them. See Report of the National Commission
onTerrorism,"Countering the Threat of International Terrorism," June 2000.
4 Responses to Al Qaeda's Initial Assaults
1. On financing of Egyptian terrorists, see Intelligence report, Sudanese links to
Egypt's Gama'at al-Islamiya and training of Egyptians, July 14, 1993; Intelligence
report, funding by Bin Ladin of Gama'at al-Islamiya by Bin Ladin and composition of
its Sudanese wing, July 22, 1993. On aid to Yemeni terrorists, see DOS memo,
attached to Bin Ladin "Viper" file, Aug. 28, 1993. CTC documents describing Bin
Ladin as an "extremist financier" include Intelligence report, Bin Ladin links to
materials related to WMD, Mar. 20, 1997; Intelligence report, Bin Ladin's financial
support to Egyptian, Algerian, and Libyan extremists, June 17, 1997.
2. Richard Clarke interview (Dec. 18. 2003). Of the 200 people at the Center, the new
Bin Ladin unit had about 12. Mike interview (Dec. 11, 2003). Staffing of the UBL
unit had risen to 40-50 employees by Sept. 11, 2001, out of about 390 CTC employees.
Richard interview (Dec. 11, 2003); CIA response to Commission questions for the
record, Jan. 21, 2004.
3. On Fadl, see, e.g., Intelligence reports on historical background of Bin Ladin's
army (Nov. 26, 1996; Apr. 18, 1997); on the structure of al Qaeda and leadership
composition (Dec. 18, 1996; Dec. 19, 1996; Dec. 19, 1996); on roles and
responsibilities of the organizational component (Dec. 19, 1996); on objectives and
direction (Jan.8, 1997; Jan. 27, 1997); on the financial infrastructure and networks
(Dec. 30, 1996; Jan. 3, 1997); on connections and collaboration with other terrorist
groups and supporters (Jan 8, 1997; Jan. 31, 1997; Jan 31, 1997; Feb. 7, 1997); on
activities in Somalia (Apr. 30, 1997); on Bin Ladin's efforts to acquire WMD
materials (Mar. 18, 1997). On the other walk-in source, see CIA cable, Jan. 3, 1997.
Material from the Nairobi cell was introduced into evidence during the testimony of
FBI Special Agent Daniel Coleman, United States v. Usama Bin Laden, No. S(7) 98 Cr.
1023 (S.D.N.Y.), Feb. 21, 2001 (transcript pp. 1078-1088, 1096-1102).
4. Mike interview (Dec. 11, 2003).
5. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of SacredTerror (Random House, 2002),
pp.269-270; Mike interview (Dec. 11, 2003); Richard Clarke interview (Dec. 18,
2003); George Tenet interview (Jan. 22, 2004).
6. On Sudanese discussions with Saudi officials, see Frank interview (Mar. 18, 2004);
Ron interview (Mar. 18, 2004). Timothy Carney believed the Saudis told Sudan that
they did not want Bin Ladin. Timothy Carney interview (Dec. 4, 2003).
7. The CIA official who held one-on-one discussions with Erwa said that Erwa never
offered to expel Bin Ladin to the United States or render him to another country.
Mark interview (May 12, 2004). For Carney's instructions and the lack of a U.S.
indictment, see Timothy Carney interview (Dec. 4, 2003). On the indictment issue and
the supposed Sudanese offer to give up Bin Ladin, see Samuel Berger interview (Jan.
14, 2004). In early May 1996, the CIA received intelligence that Bin Ladin might be
leaving Sudan. Though this reporting was described as "very spotty," it would have
been passed along to the DCI's office because of high concern about Bin Ladin at the
time. But it did not lead to plans for a U.S. operation to snatch Bin Ladin, because
there was no indictment against him. Ron interview (Mar. 18, 2004); Frank interview
(Mar. 18, 2004). It appears, however, that if another country had been willing to
imprison Bin Ladin, the CIA might have tried to work out a scenario for apprehending
him. CIA cable, May 8, 1996. The Sudanese government did not notify the United
States that Bin Ladin had left the country until about two days after his departure.
DOS cable, Nairobi 07020,"Sudan: Foreign Minister on Developments," May 21, 1996.
President Clinton, in a February 2002 speech to the Long Island Association, said
that the United States did not accept a Sudanese offer and take Bin Ladin because
there was no indictment. President Clinton speech to the Long Island Association,
Feb. 15, 2002 (videotape of speech). But the President told us that he had
"misspoken" and was, wrongly, recounting a number of press stories he had read.
After reviewing this matter in preparation for his Commission meeting, President
Clinton told us that Sudan never offered to turn Bin Ladin over to the United
States. President Clinton meeting (Apr.8, 2004). Berger told us that he saw no
chance that Sudan would have handed Bin Ladin over and also noted that in 1996, the
U.S. government still did not know of any al Qaeda attacks on U.S. citizens. Samuel
Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004).
Alleged Sudanese offers to cooperate on counterterrorism have been the subject of
much recent controversy. After repeatedly demanding that Sudan stop supporting
terrorist groups, in 1993 the U.S. government designated the country a state sponsor
of terrorism. Diplomatic discussions continued but had little impact on Sudanese
support for terrorism or on other issues, such as human rights. In the fall of 1995,
the United States conducted a Sudan policy review and, supported by a vocal segment
of Congress, the White House sought to pressure and isolate the Sudanese. Susan Rice
interview (Jan. 9, 2004).
After Bin Ladin left Sudan in May 1996, some State Department officials, including
Ambassador Carney, criticized the NSC's hard-line policy, which he felt provided no
"carrots" for Sudanese moderates to cooperate on counterterrorism. He also faulted
the NSC for not reopening the U.S. embassy in Khartoum (closed in early 1996) when
security concerns there were reevaluated. State's Sudan desk officer agreed, noting
that the embassy was an excellent vehicle for gathering information on terrorists.
According to one State official, NSC policymakers' views were too firmly set to
engage and test the Sudanese on counterterrorism. Timothy Carney interview (Dec.4,
2003); David Shinn interview (Aug. 29, 2003); Stephen Schwartz interview (Dec. 30,
2003). But supporters of the tough line, such as the NSC's Susan Rice, argued that
any conciliatory statements from Khartoum belied its unhelpful actions. For example,
she noted, though Sudan did eventually expel Bin Ladin, his al Qaeda network
retained a presence in the country. Susan Rice interview (Jan. 9, 2004). In
addition, the CIA's Africa Division, whose operatives had engaged the Sudanese on
counterterrorism in early 1996, would conclude that "there is no indication that
Sudanese involvement with terrorism has decreased in the past year." They saw the
Sudanese gestures toward cooperating as "tactical retreats" aimed at deceiving
Washington in hopes of having sanctions removed. CIA memo, Walter to Acting
DCI,"Africa Division's Recommendations Regarding Sudan," Dec. 17, 1996. The CIA
official who ran the Sudanese portfolio and met with the Sudanese on numerous
occasions told us the Sudanese were not going to deliver, and the perceived
moderates "were just flat-out lying." Mark interview (May 12, 2004).
In February 1997, the Sudanese sent letters to President Clinton and Secretary of
State Albright, extending an invitation for a U.S. counterterrorism inspection
mission to visit Sudan. The Sudanese also used private U.S. citizens to pass along
offers to cooperate. Mansoor Ijaz interview (May 7, 2004); Janet McElligot interview
(Oct. 20, 2003). But these offers were dismissed because the NSC viewed Sudan as all
talk and little action. U.S. officials also feared that the Sudanese would exploit
any positive American responses, including trips to the region by U.S. officials,
for their own political purposes. See Joint Inquiry interview of David Williams,
June 26, 2002. Today, Sudan is still listed as a state sponsor of terrorism.
8. Mike interview (Dec. 11, 2003). On local contacts, see Gary Schroen interview
(Mar. 3, 2004). On "Jeff 's" views, see CIA memo,"DCI Talking Points Regarding
Operations Against Usama Bin Ladin,"Aug. 25, 1997.
9. See Joint Inquiry briefing by Mike, Sept. 12,2002. For briefings to the NSC, see
NSC email, Clarke to Berger, "Threat Warning: Usama bin Ladin," Mar. 7, 1998; Mary
McCarthy interview (Dec. 8, 2003); CIA memos, summary of weekly Berger/Tenet
meeting, May 1, 1998.
10. CIA memos, summary of weekly Berger/Tenet meeting, May 1, 1998.
11. Karl Inderfurth interview (Feb. 18, 2004).
12. Peter Tomsen interview (Oct. 8, 2003).
13. For State Department officials' views, see Strobe Talbott interview (Jan. 15,
2004); Karl Inderfurth interview (Feb. 18, 2004).
14. On the civil war and UNOCAL, see Karl Inderfurth interview (Feb. 18, 2004); Robin
Raphel interview (Dec.8, 2003). The former UNOCAL chief for the pipeline project,
Marty Miller, denied working exclusively with the Taliban and told us that his
company sought to work with all Afghan factions to bring about the necessary
stability to proceed with the project. Marty Miller interview (Nov. 7, 2003). UNOCAL
hired, among others, Robert Oakley, the former ambassador to Pakistan. Oakley told
us that he counseled the company about the internal dynamics of Afghanistan and
Pakistan but never lobbied the State Department on UNOCAL's behalf. Robert Oakley
interview (Sept. 7, 2003); see also "Advisory Consulting Agreement"between UNOCAL
and Oakley, Oct.1996. On giving the Taliban a chance, see Marvin Weinbaum interview
(Aug. 12, 2003).
15. See Madeleine Albright, speech at Nashir Bagh refugee camp in western Pakistan,
Nov. 18, 1997. For a description of the Richardson mission, see Bill Richardson
interview (Dec. 15, 2003); Karl Inderfurth interview (Feb. 18, 2004).
16. Marvin Weinbaum interview (Aug. 12, 2003). See also Strobe Talbott interview
(Jan. 15, 2004). For Zinni's view, see Anthony Zinni interview (Jan. 29, 2004).
17. Gary Schroen interview (Mar. 3, 2004). For more details, see Steve Coll, Ghost
Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet
Invasion to September 10, 2001 (Penguin, 2004), p. 379.
18. Coll, Ghost Wars, pp. 343, 391; Gary Schroen interview (Mar. 3, 2004); Joint
Inquiry briefing by Mike, Sept. 12, 2002.
19. For a description of the plan, the content of briefing papers, and the
Berger-Tenet meeting, see CIA memo, Jeff to Tenet, "Information Paper on Usama Bin
Ladin,"Feb. 12, 1998 (with attached paper for Tenet's meeting with Berger on Feb.
13, 1998,"Next Steps Against Usama Bin Ladin"). The paper also briefly noted other
options the CIA could be pursuing against Bin Ladin: paramilitary or sabotage
attacks-possibly lethal-against Bin Ladin's facilities in Kandahar and Sudan, or
even intelligence support for U.S. military strikes. On the Kansi operation, see
Coll, Ghost Wars, p. 373.
20. NSC note, Simon to Berger, update on Feb. 24 meeting, Feb. 27, 1998.
21. Joint Inquiry briefing by Mike, Sept. 12, 2002; NSC email, Clarke to Berger,
"Threat Warning: Usama Bin Ladin,"Mar. 7, 1998.
22. Mike interview (Jan. 6, 2004); CIA email, Schroen to Mike, "Capture Op," May 5,
1998; CIA cable,"Comments on [Tribals'] Planning for UBL Rendition," May 6, 1998.
For the modification of the plan, see CIA memo, "Tentative Timeline for the Bin
Ladin Capture Operation," May 19, 1998. For details on some CIA officers' concerns,
see Coll, Ghost Wars, pp. 393-394.
23. CIA cable, "19 May 98 Briefing for JSOC,"May 27,1998; CIA cable,"Developments in
the [Tribals'] Operation at the HQs End," May 26, 1998; Joint Inquiry interview of
Michael Canavan, Sept. 3, 2002.
24. CIA memos, summary of weekly Berger/Tenet meeting, May 1, 1998.
25. CIA memo, summary of Covert Action Planning Group meeting, May 18, 1998; CIA
memo, "Tentative Timeline for the Bin Ladin Capture Operation," May 19, 1998. The
summary of the meeting notes that the initiative was not an assassination, despite
the inaccurate comments of some in the NSC.
26. Mike interviews (Dec. 11, 2003; Jan. 6, 2004); Jeff interview (Dec. 17, 2003);
Mary Jo White interview (May 17, 2004).
27. CIA cable, "20-24 May 98 Full Mission Profile of the U.S. Side of the Bin Ladin
Capture Operation," May 27, 1998; CIA cable,"Developments in the [Tribals']
Operation at the HQs End," May 26, 1998.
28. CIA memo, summary of weekly Berger/Tenet meeting, May 20, 1998. It is unclear if
a decision had been made at this point on where to bring Bin Ladin.
29. Mike interview (Dec. 11, 2003); CIA cable, "The [Tribals] Operations," May 29,
1998.
30. Richard Clarke interview (Dec. 18, 2003), in which he also noted that Tenet did
not approve of the plan. For Clarke's comments to the NSC, see CIA cable, "Info from
State on Status of Political Approvals for [Tribals]," May 29, 1998. See Jeff
interview (Dec. 17, 2003); James Pavitt interview (Jan. 8, 2004); George Tenet
interview (Jan. 22, 2004), in which he also said he did not tell the Principals
Committee his reasons for canceling the operation because there was no reason for
the principals to hear details of an unsound plan. See also Samuel Berger interview
(Jan. 14, 2004).
31. CIA memo, DDO to Berger, "Timing of the UBL Rendition Operation," June 15, 1998;
for Schroen, see CIA cable,"Comments on [Tribals'] Planning for UBL Rendition,"May
6, 1998.
32. See, e.g., Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004).
33. On Saudi disruptions generally, see CIA report, "Additional Background on the
Saudi discovery of an UBL Network in Saudi Arabia," undated (appears to be May
1998). On the DCI's visits to Saudi Arabia, see Intelligence reports made available
to the Commission.
34. See Intelligence reports made available to the Commission.
35. Coll, Ghost Wars, pp. 400-402.
36. CIA note, Pillar to Wentworth/Ramanujam, summary of Aug. 5, 1998, CSG meeting on
Bin Ladin, Aug. 6, 1998.
37. See, e.g., CIA briefing materials, "Bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam-An
Update,"Aug. 14, 1998.
38. DOD memo, "Chronology of Planning,"Dec. 14, 1998.
39. Richard Clarke interview (Dec. 18, 2003).
40. NSC email, Clarke to Berger, Aug. 8, 1998; Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14,
2004); CIA memo, "Khowst and the Meeting of Islamic Extremist Leaders on 20
Aug.,"Aug. 17, 1998.
41. NSC notes, checklist re military strikes, Aug. 14, 1998 (author appears to be
Clarke). On the military plans, see DOD memo, "Chronology of Planning,"Dec. 14,
1998.
42. President Clinton meeting (Apr. 8, 2004); Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14,
2004).
43. NSC emails, Simon to Kerrick, Aug. 5, 1998. For the report of Bin Ladin's
comment, see, e.g., NSC email, Clarke to Berger, July 15, 1998. EMPTA stands for
O-ethyl methylphosphonothioic acid.
44. NSC memo, McCarthy to Berger, re Shifa, Aug. 11, 1998; Samuel Berger interview
(Jan. 14, 2004).
45. For a timeline of the decisionmaking events, see NSC memo to Steinberg et al.,
Aug. 17, 1999. The list of concurrences is drawn from talking points prepared for
Berger's use with the main four leaders of the House and Senate; the list explicitly
mentions the Attorney General. NSC email, Clarke to Berger, Aug. 19, 1998. Reno told
us she did not mention her concerns to the President but discussed them with Berger,
Tenet, White House Counsel Charles Ruff, and DOJ staff. Janet Reno interview (Dec.
16, 2003).
46. NSC email, Clarke to Kerrick, "Timeline,"Aug. 19, 1998; Samuel Berger interview
(Jan. 14, 2004). We did not find documentation on the after-action review mentioned
by Berger. On Vice Chairman Joseph Ralston's mission in Pakistan, see William Cohen
interview (Feb. 5, 2004). For speculation on tipping off the Taliban, see, e.g.,
Richard Clarke interview (Dec. 18, 2003).
47. NSC email, Clarke to Kerrick, "Timeline,"Aug. 19, 1998.
48. For initial support by Gingrich and Lott, see, e.g., StevenThomma and Richard
Parker, "U.S. Strikes Afghan, Sudan Sites, Retaliating for Embassy Attacks,"
Philadelphia Inquirer, Aug. 21, 1998, p. A1. For a reaction to the later criticism
by Gingrich's office, see NSC email, Simon to Berger, Sept. 10, 1998.
49. Editorial, "Punish and Be Damned," Economist, Aug. 29, 1998, p. 16. For a summary
of skeptical public reaction, see Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, pp.
354-363.
50. See NSC memo, McCarthy and Clarke to Berger, Apr. 17, 2000, reporting that on
balance, they think the CIA claim was valid. See also President Clinton meeting
(Apr.8, 2004); Vice President Gore meeting (Apr.9, 2004); Samuel Berger interview
(Jan. 14, 2004); George Tenet interview (Jan. 22, 2004); Richard Clarke interview
(Dec. 19, 2003).
51. Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 22, 2004). President Clinton told us that he had
directed his national security team to focus exclusively on responding to the
embassy bombings. President Clinton meeting (Apr. 8, 2004). See also William Cohen
testimony, Mar. 23, 2004. When "wag the dog" allegations were again raised during
the December 1998 Desert Fox campaign over Iraq, Defense Secretary Cohen, formerly a
Republican senator, told members of Congress that he would have resigned if he
believed the President was using the military for any purpose other than national
security. William Cohen interview (Feb. 5, 2004).
52. Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 22, 2004).
53. CIA analytic report, "Foreign Terrorist Threat in the U.S.: Revisiting our 1995
Estimate,"Apr. 1997.
54. Daniel Benjamin interview (Dec. 4, 2003).
55. On the Balkan crises, see Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction
of Yugoslavia (Yale Univ. Press, 2000).
56. On Clarke's obsession with terrorism and Bin Ladin, see Richard Clarke interview
(Feb. 3, 2004); Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on
Terror (Free Press, 2004), p. 234. On the CSG and the Small Group, see Samuel Berger
interview (Jan. 11, 2004).
57. NSC memo, "Political Military Plan DELENDA," Sept. 1998 (attached to NSC memo,
Clarke to Rice, Jan. 25, 2001).
58. Ibid. See also NSC memo, Clarke to Berger, Sept. 7, 1998.
59. Handwritten note from Steinberg on NSC memo, Clarke to Berger, Apr. 14, 2000. For
the views of Small Group members, see William Cohen interview (Feb. 5, 2004); Hugh
Shelton interview (Feb. 5, 2004); President Clinton meeting (Apr. 8, 2004); Samuel
Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004); Madeleine Albright interview (Jan. 7, 2004); James
Steinberg interview (Dec. 5, 2003).
60. Richard Clarke interview (Jan. 12, 2004); DOD memo, Slocombe to Cohen, Aug. 27,
1998.
61. DOD memo, "Towards a More Aggressive Counterterrorism Posture," undated, pp. 1,
7. The principal author of this paper was Thomas Kuster, a career civil servant and
former special forces officer. He told us that this paper was drafted in September
1998. On this episode, see Thomas Kuster interviews (Dec. 9, 2003; Mar. 5, 2004);
Allen Holmes interview (Mar. 10, 2004); Jan Lodal interview (Mar. 5, 2004).
62. DOS cable, Islamabad 06863, "Afghanistan: Demarche toTaliban on New Bin
LadinThreat,"Sept. 14, 1998. See also NSC memo, Clarke to principals,"Possible New
Attacks on US by UBL Network," Sept. 12, 1998, which suggested language for the
demarche, including a warning that future attacks would bring "severe consequences."
NSC email, Clarke to Berger, Sept. 19, 1998, indicates that the State Department
used both its embassy in Islamabad and a direct call to Mullah Omar's office to
deliver the warning.
63. DOS memo, "Mullah Omar's 8/22 Contact with State Department,"Aug. 22, 1998.
64. DOS cable, Islamabad 007665, "High-Level Taliban Official Gives the Standard Line
on Bin Ladin with a Couple of Nuances," Oct. 12, 1998.
65. NSC memo, Sept. 24, 1998; Coll, Ghost Wars, p. 414.
66. The CIA in particular pressed the Saudis hard on intelligence sharing. DCI Tenet
met with Crown Prince Abdullah, Ambassador Bandar, the minister of defense and
aviation, and other senior officials repeatedly and pressed them on
counterterrorism. See, e.g., CIA memo, Tenet to Berger, Tenet's meeting with Crown
Prince Abdullah in Jeddah, June 7, 1998. As late as July 3, 2001, the DCI was
pressing Bandar, conveying the urgent need for information. CIA cable, DCI meeting
with Bandar, July 3, 2001.
67. See, e.g., Mike interview (Dec. 11, 2003). The Saudis, however, were reluctant to
provide details of incomplete investigations and highly sensitive to any information
related to Saudi nationals, particularly those in the Kingdom. See CIA memo, Saudi
CT Cooperation, June 18, 1998.
68. CIA talking points, Vice President's meeting with Crown Prince Abdullah, Sept.
24, 1998; NSC memo, Simon to Berger, "Talking Points for Lott-Gingrich Meeting,"
Sept. 24, 1998.
69. NSC memo, Wechsler, summary of conclusions of Nov. 16, 1998, meeting of Working
Group on UBL's Finances.
70. Rick Newcomb interview (Feb. 4, 2004); Treasury memo, Office of Foreign Asset
Control to DOS, "Draft Cable on Meeting with Two of UBL's Brothers,"May 19, 2000;
DOS cable, State 035243,"January 2000 Meeting Regarding UBL Finances," Feb. 27,
2000; Frank G. interview (Mar. 2, 2004). The U.S. government team learned that the
Bin Ladin family sold UBL's share of the inheritance and, at the direction of the
Saudi government, placed the money into a specified account then frozen by the Saudi
government in 1994.
71. NSC memo, Clarke to Berger, Roadmap, Nov. 3, 1998. According to Clarke, Tenet's
deputy, John Gordon, agreed that there was no senior CIA manager to answer these
questions and promised to fix that.
72. DOS memo, McKune to Albright, "State Sponsorship of Terrorism: Pakistan," Feb.
1998. For the rejection of the proposed designation, see handwritten notes on the
McKune memo.
73. Madeleine Albright interview (Jan. 7, 2004).
74. NSC memo, Simon to NSC officials, Oct. 6, 1998. Links between Pakistan's military
intelligence service and Harakat ul Ansar trainees at Bin Ladin camps near Khowst
were also discussed in DOS memo, Inderfurth to Talbott, "Pakistani Links to Kashmiri
Militants,"Aug. 23, 1998.
75. William Milam interview (Dec. 29, 2003).
76. By the fall of 1999, the Glenn, Pressler, and Symington amendments prohibited
most economic and military assistance to Pakistan. Clinton administration officials
told us that these sanctions made it impossible to offer "carrots" to Pakistan, and
that before 9/11, waiving sanctions was not feasible because of the Musharraf coup,
nonproliferation concerns, and Congress's pro-India orientation. Karl Inderfurth
interview (Feb. 18, 2004); Strobe Talbott interview (Feb. 8, 2004).
77. Strobe Talbott interview (Feb. 8, 2004). Berger agreed with Talbott that using
other sticks, such as blocking loans from international financial institutions,
would have risked a collapse of the Pakistani government and the rise of Islamists
to power in a nuclear-armed country. Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004).
78. DOS memo, Pickering to Albright, "Berger meeting on UBL,"Nov. 3, 1998.
79. White House reports made available to the Commission. President Clinton met with
Prime Minister Sharif on December 2, 1999, and called him on December 18, 1999.
80. NSC email, Clarke to Berger, Dec. 9, 1998. The event described in the
intelligence report was said to have occurred on November 17, 1998. Intelligence
officials now tell us that there are some doubts about the accuracy of the report.
81. Michael Sheehan interview (Dec. 16, 2003). For Sheehan's background, see
Madeleine Albright, with Bill Woodward, Madam Secretary (Miramax, 2003), pp.
369-370. For one of Sheehan's warnings, see DOS cable, Abu Dhabi 002212, "Messages
for the Taliban,"Apr. 9, 1999.
82. Michael Sheehan interviews (Dec. 16, 2003; March 2004). For Albright's views, see
Madeleine Albright interview (Jan. 7, 2004). NSC memo, Principals' Decision Paper,
Mar. 8, 1999. In May 1999, Albright approved a State Department diplomatic strategy
calling for increased high-level pressure on the Taliban and the three countries
that recognized it-and for unilateral sanctions if this failed. DOS memo,
Inderfurth, Indyk, and Sheehan to Albright, "A New Bin Ladin Strategy,"May 15, 1999.
83. NSC email, Riedel to Berger and Clarke, June 8, 1999.
84. See Karl Inderfurth interview (Feb. 18, 2004); DOS memo, Inderfurth to Albright,
May 6, 1999; Michael Sheehan interview (Dec. 16, 2003). Although Sheehan told us he
was initially skeptical about supporting the Northern Alliance, he eventually came
around in the fall of 2000.
85. For aid to the exile groups, see Karl Inderfurth interview (Feb. 18, 2004); Peter
Tomsen interview (July 14, 2004). The aid was later cut because of alleged
accounting deficiencies. For the diplomat's views, see Christina Rocca interview
(Jan. 29, 2004). But Peter Tomsen, the State Department's special envoy to the
Afghan resistance in the late 1980s, believed that neither administration did enough
to assemble an anti-Taliban ruling coalition inside and outside Afghanistan. Peter
Tomsen interview (Oct. 8, 2003); see also letter from Peter Tomsen to the
Commission, June 30, 2004.
86. NSC memo, Clarke to Berger, Roadmap, May 18, 1999.
87. DOS memo, Inderfurth to Albright, May 6, 1999; DOS memo, Oakley to Pickering,
"Designating the Taliban a FTO," Apr. 22, 1999; Executive Order 13129, July 4, 1999.
Since 1979, the secretary of state has had the authority to name "state sponsors of
terrorism," subjecting such countries to significant economic sanctions. Being
designated a "foreign terrorist organization" also brings sanctions and stigmatizes
a regime. While the U.S. government did not use either designation against
theTaliban, the sanctions under this executive order mimicked the sanctions that
would have been implemented under them.
88. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1267, Oct. 15, 1999. UNSCR 1267 demanded
that the Taliban render Bin Ladin to justice within 30 days; upon noncompliance, UN
member states were called on to restrict takeoff and landing rights of Taliban-owned
aircraft. The sanctions also required member states to freeze Taliban funds and
financial resources. But Taliban "charter flights" continued to fly between
Afghanistan and the UAE. Judy Pasternak and Stephen Braun, "Emirates Looked Other
Way While Al Qaeda Funds Flowed," Los Angeles Times, Jan. 20, 2002, p. A1. Enforcing
the financial restrictions also proved a challenge-especially in the Middle East.
Anthony Wayne interview (Jan. 14, 2004); Frank G. interview (Mar. 2, 2004); DOS
report,"Usama Bin Ladin Intelligence Update," Nov. 19, 1999.
89. NSC email, Clarke to Berger, Oct. 30, 1999.
90. Ibid.; NSC memo, Benjamin to CSG, Nov. 12, 1999. Earlier, Clarke had worried that
the expulsion of Bin Ladin might mean he would move to Somalia or Libya, where he
might be even harder to target. NSC email, Clarke to Berger, Oct. 8, 1998.
91. See Intelligence report, relations between al Qaeda and the Taliban, Feb. 20,
2002.
92. Intelligence report, March 2000.
93. UNSCR 1333, Dec. 19, 2000.
94. Edmund Hull interview (Oct. 18, 2003).
95. Ambassador Milam characterized UNSCR 1267 and UNSCR 1333 as "punchless." DOS
cable, Islamabad 000656, "Options for dealing with Afghan terrorism problem," Feb.
6, 2001. But Ambassador Sheehan indicated that even if UNSCR 1333 failed to stop the
arms flow from Pakistan to the Taliban, it had enormous symbolic importance. He also
noted that UNSCR 1333 must have stigmatized the Taliban because they "went ballistic
over the sanctions." Sheehan added that UNSCR 1333 made Saudi Arabia and the UAE
"very nervous" about their relationships with the Taliban. Michael Sheehan interview
(Dec. 16, 2003).
96. White House cable to U.S. Embassy, Islamabad, message to Prime Minister Sharif,
June 16, 1999; Madeleine Albright prepared statement, Mar. 24, 2004.
97. White House cable to U.S. Embassy, Islamabad, message to Prime Minister Sharif,
June 16, 1999; Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004); President Clinton meeting
(Apr. 8, 2004); NSC memo, Clarke and McCarthy to Berger, Aug. 2, 1999.
98. President Clinton meeting (Apr. 8, 2004); DOS memo, Sheehan to Albright, "S/CT
Update on Critical Issues," July 9, 1999.
99. Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004); President Clinton meeting (Apr. 8,
2004).
100. Thomas Pickering interview (Dec. 22, 2003).
101. See Executive Order 13099, Aug. 20, 1998.
102. CIA talking points, information on Bin Ladin for the DCI's Sept. 2, 1998,
briefing to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Sept. 2, 1998.
103. For the Tirana raid and resulting operations, see Benjamin and Simon, Age of
Sacred Terror, pp. 261, 264; Clarke, Against All Enemies, p. 183; CIA talking
points, "CIA Operation Results in Capture of Two Bin Ladin Operatives," July 7,
1998; CIA memo, Jeff to Tenet, "Biweekly Developments in CT Policy," July 15, 1998.
For other operations, see NSC memo, Benjamin to Berger, Oct. 9, 1998. For the arrest
of Abu Hajer, see CIA report,"Apprehension of Senior UBL Lieutenant in Germany,"
Sept. 22, 1998; NSC memo, Benjamin to Berger, Oct. 9, 1998; NSC email, Clarke to
Berger, Sept. 17, 1998. For an overview of the CIA's efforts to disrupt al Qaeda,
see Joint Inquiry testimony of George Tenet, Oct. 17, 2002. For Clarke's comment to
Berger, see NSC email, Clarke to Berger, Sept. 25, 1998.
104. For ambush attempts, see Joint Inquiry report (classified version), pp. 312-313;
CIA memo, "Status of the Bin Ladin Capture Operation,"Sept. 30, 1998 (part of
materials for Small Group meeting). For CIA officials' doubts, see James Pavitt
interview (Jan. 8, 2004); Jeff interview (Dec. 17, 2003). On the quality of the
tribals' reporting, see Charles Allen interview (Jan. 27, 2004). The tribals'
extensive reporting on Bin Ladin's location is reflected in near daily UBL Situation
Reports prepared for the DCI from December 1998 to January 2001.
105. See Martin Sieff, "Terrorist Is Driven by Hatred for U.S., Israel," Washington
Times, Aug. 21, 1998, p. 1. Regarding the leak, see Mary C. interview (Oct. 25,
2003); Richard Taylor interview (Dec. 10, 2003); Don Kerr interview (Sept. 9, 2003).
106. NSC memo, Clarke to Berger, Roadmap, Nov. 3, 1998; NSC talking points, Nov. 3,
1998. The quoted sentence is in boldface.
107. NSC memo, summary of conclusions of Oct. 26, 1998, CSG Meeting, Oct. 28, 1998;
NSC notes, CSG Agenda:"Bin Ladin Penetration of the United States,"Oct. 26, 1998.
For the threat against Washington, see NSC memo, Clarke to Berger, Weekly Report,
July 3, 1998; NSC email, Clarke to various NSC staff, Sept. 7, 1998; NSC memo,
Clarke to Berger, Roadmap, Nov. 3, 1998.
108. NSC memo, summary of conclusions of Oct. 26, 1998, CSG meeting, Oct. 28, 1998.
109. Indictment, United States v. Usama Bin Laden, No. 98 Cr. (S.D. N.Y. unsealed
Nov. 4, 1998), p. 3. For the reports concerning Derunta, see NSC memo, Clarke to
Berger, Roadmap, Nov. 3, 1998.
110. NSC email, Clarke to Berger, Nov. 4, 1998. Evidence on Iraqi ties to al Qaeda is
summarized in chapter 2.
111. Patrick Fitzgerald testimony, June 16, 2004.
112. The PDB was a summary of Intelligence report, planning by UBL to hijack U.S.
airplane, Dec. 4, 1998. For the immediate responses, see NSC memo, summary of
conclusions of Dec. 4, 1998, CSG meeting; FAA security directive, "Threat to Air
Carriers," SD 108-98, Dec. 8, 1998. We requested declassification of this document;
the declassified document was delivered on July 13, 2004.
113. On further information, see Intelligence report, possible arrest of persons
involved in hijacking plan, Dec. 18, 1998; Intelligence report, timeframe for
completion of hijacking operation, Dec. 24, 1998; Intelligence report, claim that
Bin Ladin postponed hijacking, Jan. 8, 1999; CIA analytic report, "Reporting on
Al-Qaida plans to Use Aircraft as Terrorist Weapons,"Aug. 26, 2002. After 9/11, the
U.S. government checked again with the foreign government to determine if there
could be any connection between the attacks and these 1998-1999 reports. The foreign
government had no intelligence of such links, but judged that the 1998 plan could
have influenced planning for the 9/11 operation. Ibid.
On the FBI followup in 1998-1999, see FBI memo, Jack S. to FAA ACI, "FBI
Investigative Efforts," Jan. 27, 1999; FAA records, information in FAA Intelligence
Case File 98-0199B. A Saudi who had just completed pilot training, boarding a flight
to return to Saudi Arabia, had been arrested at JFK Airport in late November 1998.
He had been carrying an inert hand grenade, which was detected by a checkpoint
screener. The terminal was evacuated, and police found miscellaneous gun parts,
pistol ammunition, and military paraphernalia in the man's checked bags. FAA record,
"Security Summary NY-99-007," undated. The man was released after a few days in jail
and, assisted by the local Saudi consulate, had returned to Saudi Arabia. The new
threat information caused the FBI and the CIA to look again at this case. FBI agents
found that the man's statements about his flight training were true and that his
firearms were legally registered. The Saudi investigators reported that the Saudi
had enjoyed shooting at a gun club in Texas, where he had completed his flight
training for a commercial pilot's license. The Saudis further indicated that the man
had no apparent political motive, and the results of a security investigation in the
Kingdom were negative. FAA memo, Matthew K. to Jack S. and Tom K., Saudi national,
Jan. 17, 1999; FBI memo, Jack S. to FAA ACI,"FBI Investigative Efforts," Jan. 27,
1999; Intelligence report (to FAA), Saudi information, Apr. 13, 1999. For the
expiration of the FAA security directive, see FAA security directive, SD 108-95; FAA
record,"SD/EA Status: 108 Security Directives," May 20, 2002.
114. NSC notes, Clarke briefing notes for Berger for Small Group, Dec. 17,1998; CIA
memo, "Bin Ladin Ready to Attack," Dec. 18, 1998.
115. NSC notes, Clarke briefing notes for Berger for Small Group, Dec. 17, 1998; NSC
memo, Benjamin to Berger, Dec. 18, 1998; DOD memo, "UBL Campaign: Talking Points for
Qandahar Attack," Jan. 11, 1999; Hugh Shelton interview (Feb. 5, 2004).
116. NSC memo, Benjamin to Berger, Dec. 18, 1998; DOD order, Execute Order (EXORD),
Dec. 18, 1998.
117. NSC memo, Benjamin to Berger, Dec. 18, 1998; Mike interview (Jan. 6, 2004); CIA
emails, Mike to Schroen, "Urgent re UBL," and Schroen's response, Dec. 20, 1998.
118. John Maher III interview (Apr. 4, 2004). Maher said he found General Zinni's
figures to be "shockingly high." On the principals'decision against recommending an
attack, see NSC memo, Clarke to Berger, Jan. 12, 1999. See also George Tenet
interview (Jan. 22, 2004); Mike interview (Feb. 6, 2004).
119. CIA email, Mike to Schroen, "Your Note," Dec. 21, 1998; CIA email, Schroen to
Mike,"Re Urgent re UBL,"Dec. 20, 1998.
120. John Maher III interview (Apr. 22, 2004).
121. CIA report, "Further Options Available Against UBL," Nov. 18, 1998; CIA talking
points, "Options for Attacking the Usama Bin Ladin Problem,"Nov. 24, 1998. On the
MON, see Randy Moss interview (Feb. 6, 2004); James Baker interview (Feb. 4, 2004).
122. NSC note, Dec. 20, 1998. There is no indication as to who wrote this note or to
whom it was directed. It was cleared with Berger, Reno, Assistant Attorney General
Randy Moss, and CTC's "Jeff," and briefed in substance to Leon Fuerth, national
security adviser to Vice President Gore, and to Deputy DCI Gordon. See also attached
CIA memo, Gordon to Berger, Dec. 21, 1998; NSC memo, Berger to President Clinton,
Dec. 24, 1998.
123. NSC memo, Berger to President Clinton, Dec. 24,1998; Randy Moss interview
(Feb.6, 2004); James Baker interview (Feb. 4, 2004). Both Moss and Baker told us
they concluded that killing Bin Ladin did not violate the assassination ban
contained in Executive Order 12333.
124. NSC memo, Berger to President Clinton, Dec. 24, 1998; Janet Reno interview (Dec.
16, 2003). See also Randy Moss interview (Feb. 6, 2004). Tenent told us he does not
recall this episode.
125. CIA cable, message from the DCI, Dec. 26, 1998.
126. CIA cable, instructions passed to tribals and response, Dec. 27, 1998.
127. CIA cable, comments on tribals' response, Dec. 27, 1998. "Mike" noted that the
tribals' reaction had "attracted a good deal of attention" back at CIA headquarters.
CIA cable, comments from Schroen, Dec. 28, 1998. Schroen commented that the tribals'
response was an effort to appear statesmanlike and take the moral high ground.
128. See President Clinton meeting (Apr. 8, 2004); Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 1,
2004); Richard Clarke interview (Jan. 12, 2004). For a CIA senior intelligence
manager, operator, and lawyer's view, see GeorgeTenet interview (Jan. 22, 2004);
Gary Schroen interview (Jan. 6, 2004); Doug B. interview (Nov. 17, 2003); Mike
interview (Jan. 6, 2004).
129. James Baker interview (Feb. 4, 2004); President Clinton meeting (Apr. 8, 2004).
130. NSC memo, McCarthy to CIA, Dec. 1999.
131. NSC memo, Clarke to Berger, Jan. 12, 1999.
486 NOTES TO CHAPTER 4
132. NSC email, Ward to Clarke and others, Jan. 5, 1999.
133. NSC memo, Clarke to Berger, Jan. 12, 1999.
134. NSC email, Clarke to Kerrick, Feb. 10, 1999; Charles Allen interview (Jan. 27,
2004).
135. NSC email, Clarke to Berger, Feb. 11, 1999. The email in fact misspells "boogie"
as "boggie."
136. NSC email, Riedel to NSC front office, Feb. 16, 1999. The email does not provide
Riedel's source. For Berger's authorization, see NSC notes, TNT note, Feb. 12, 1999.
137. DOD memo, "Chronology of Planning,"Dec. 14, 1998.
138. DOS cable, Washington 157093, "Aug. 21 telephone conversation between POTUS and
Prime Minister Sharif,"Aug. 26, 1998. Sharif was cordial but disagreed with the U.S.
decision to strike.
139. Anthony Zinni interview (Jan. 29, 2004).
140. Ibid.
141. DOD memo, Headquarters SOC, "Planning Directive for Infinite Resolve," Dec. 23,
1998. On basing options, see DOD memo,"Summary of Conclusions: AC-130 Deployment
Decision Paper," Jan. 12, 1999.
142. NSC memo, Clarke to Berger and Steinberg, Roadmap for Feb. 2, 1999, Small Group
meeting, undated; John Maher III interview (Apr. 22, 2004); Anthony Zinni interview
(Jan. 29, 2004); Peter Schoomaker interview (Feb. 19, 2004).
143. Peter Schoomaker interview (Feb. 19, 2004); William Boykin interview (Nov. 7,
2003).
144. Hugh Shelton interview (Feb. 5, 2004).
145. President Clinton meeting (Apr. 8, 2004); William Cohen interview (Feb. 5,
2004).
146. Hugh Shelton interview (Feb. 5, 2004); William Boykin interview (Nov. 7, 2003).
147. General Zinni reminded us that in addition to severing military-to-military
relations with Pakistan after the 1998 nuclear test, the United States had not
shipped to Pakistan the F-16s Pakistan had bought prior to the test. Instead, the
United States kept the money Pakistan paid for the F-16s to fund storage of the
aircraft. Meanwhile, Pakistani pilots were crashing and dying." Guess how they
[felt] about the United States of America," Zinni said. Nevertheless, Zinni told us
that Musharraf was someone who would actually work with the United States if he was
given the chance to do so. Anthony Zinni interview (Jan. 29, 2004).
148. William Boykin interview (Nov. 7, 2003).
149. Richard Clarke interview (Jan. 12, 2004).
150. William Cohen testimony (Mar. 23, 2004).
151. CIA report, "UBL Situation Report," Feb. 2, 1999. Public sources include Coll,
Ghost Wars, pp. 447-449; Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, p. 281.
152. CIA cable, "Update on Location of an Activity at Sheikh Ali's Camps," Feb. 7,
1999.
153. DOD order, MOD 001 to CJCS warning order, Feb. 8, 1999.
154. CIA reports, "UBL Situation Report," Feb. 6-10, 1999.
155. CIA cable, "Support for Military Contingency Planning," Feb. 10, 1999.
156. NSC email, Clarke to Kerrick, Feb. 10, 1999.
157. CIA talking points, "CIA Operations Against UBL," Feb. 10, 1999.
158. CIA reports, "UBL Situation Reports," Feb. 11-12, 1999.
159. John Maher III interview (Apr. 22, 2004); Richard Clarke interview (Jan. 12,
2004); Gary Schroen interview (Mar. 3, 2004); Mike interview (Jan. 6, 2004).
160. Mike briefing (Mar. 11, 2004); John Maher III interview (Apr. 22, 2004).
161. NSC memo, Clarke, secure teleconference between UAE Chief of Staff Muhammad bin
Zayid and Clarke, Mar. 7, 1999.
162. Mike interview (Jan. 6, 2004). Maher told us he thinks it "almost impossible"
that the CIA cleared Clarke's call. John Maher III interview (Apr. 22, 2004).
163. Days before overhead imagery confirmed the location of the hunting camp, Clarke
had returned from a visit to the UAE, where he had been working on counterterrorism
cooperation and following up on a May 1998 UAE agreement to buy F-16 aircraft from
the United States. His visit included one-on-one meetings with Army Chief of Staff
bin Zayid, as well as talks with Sheikh Muhammad bin Rashid, the ruler of Dubai.
Both agreed to try to work with the United States in their efforts against Bin
Ladin. NSC memo, Clarke to Berger, Trip Report, Feb. 8, 1999; Theodore Kattouf
interview (Apr.21,2004). On February 10, as the United States considered striking
the camp, Clarke reported that during his visit bin Zayid had vehemently denied
rumors that high-level UAE officials were in Afghanistan. NSC email, Clarke to
Kerrick, UBL update, Feb. 10,1999. Subsequent reporting, however, suggested that
high-level UAE officials had indeed been at the desert camp. CIA memo, "Recent High
Level UAE Visits to Afghanistan,"Feb.19,1999. General Shelton also told us that his
UAE counterpart said he had been hunting at a desert camp in Afghanistan at about
this time. Hugh Shelton interview (Feb. 5, 2004).
164. Mike briefing (Mar. 3, 2004). Talking points for the DCI to use at a late March
Small Group meeting note that concurrently with the UAE being "tipped off " to the
CIA's knowledge of the camp, one of the tribal network's major subsources (within
Bin Ladin's Taliban security detail) was dispatched to the north, further
handicapping reporting efforts. CIA talking points,"Locating Bin Ladin," Mar. 29,
1999.
165. Theodore Kattouf interview (Apr. 21, 2004). Kattouf was the U.S. ambassador to
the UAE from 1999 to 2001. He indicated that high-level UAE officials would agree to
restrict Afghan flights but told him that the government had a difficult time
enforcing this. For communications with the UAE, see White House letter, President
Clinton to bin Zayid, July 23, 1999; DOS memo, Sheehan to Albright, "Signs of
Progress on our UBL strategy," Sept. 12, 1999.
166. DOS memo, Indyk and Sheehan to Albright, "UAE Gives Ultimatum to Taliban on Bin
Laden," July 16, 1999, and attached transcript of conversation between Hamdan bin
Zayid and Mullah Mutawakkil,"InformalTranslation of UAE Note," July 14, 1999; DOS
cable, Abu Dhabi 04644,"Taliban Refuse to Expel Bin Ladin Despite UAEG Ultimatum:
Need to Stiffen UAE Resolve to Take the Necessary Next Steps," July 19, 1999.
167. DOS memo, Indyk and Sheehan to Albright, "UAE Gives Ultimatum to Taliban on Bin
Laden," July 16, 1999.
168. Jeff interview (Dec. 17, 2003). Schroen, however, told us that the tribals'
reporting was 50-60 percent accurate. Gary Schroen interview (Mar. 3, 2004).
169. For discussion of the Taliban generally, see Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant
Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (Yale Univ. Press, 2000).
170. Ibid.; Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, pp. 338-399; George Tenet
interview (Jan. 22, 2004).
171. George Tenet interview (Jan. 22, 2004).
172. Richard interview (Dec. 12, 2003); Gary Schroen interview (Mar. 3, 2004).
173. John Maher III interview (Apr. 22, 2004). For an account of the reporting from
this period written by Mike, see CIA memo, Jeff to Tenet, "Tracking Usama Bin Ladin,
14-20 May 1999," May 21, 1999. Mike's account was also used to prepare the DCI for a
May 25,1999, Principals Committee meeting. CIA briefing materials,"Background
Information: Evaluating the Quality of Intelligence on Bin Ladin (UBL) in Qandahar,
13-20 May, 1999," undated (probably May 25, 1999).
174. CIA email, Mike to Schroen, "Re: Your Note," May 17, 1999.
175. John Maher III interview (Apr. 22, 2004).
176. George Tenet interview (Jan. 22, 2004); John Gordon interview (May 13, 2004).
177. Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004).
178. The May 1999 intelligence on Bin Ladin's location in Kandahar came as criticism
of the CIA over the recent bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade was at its
peak. The DCI later testified that this bombing was the result of a CIA mistake.
Testimony of George Tenet before the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, July 22, 1999. On Bin Ladin's whereabouts during the December 1998
episode, see John Maher III interview (Apr. 22, 2004).
179. Cruise missiles were readied for another possible strike in early July 1999. But
none of the officials we have interviewed recalled that an opportunity arose at that
time justifying the consideration of a strike. See, e.g., John Maher III interview
(Apr. 22, 2004).
180. Hugh Shelton interview (Feb. 5, 2004); DOD briefing materials, UBL JCS Focused
Campaign, undated.
181. NSC memo, Benjamin to Berger and Steinberg, Apr. 29, 1999; NSC email, Clarke to
Berger, May 26, 1999.
182. NSC memo, Clarke to Berger, June 24, 1999. For Clarke's request to Berger to
convene the Small Group, see NSC memo, Clarke to Berger, Analysis/Options re UBL,
Jun. 13, 1999. See also NSC email, Storey to Berger and Clarke, June 24, 1999.
183. Berger notes on NSC memo, Clarke to Berger, June 24, 1999.
184. NSC memo, Clarke to Berger, June 24, 1999.
185. NSC memo, Clarke to Berger, UBL review for Dec. 3, 1999, Small Group meeting,
Dec. 2, 1999.
186. NSC memo, CSG agenda, Sept. 24, 1999.
187. According to CTC talking points for the CSG in June 1999, more than 40 members
of al Qaeda had been imprisoned over the past year. CIA talking points, C/CTC
TPs/Backgrounder for CSG, June 7, 1999. Figures cited in the DCI's letter to
President Clinton in October, however, are slightly different: CTC had helped render
32 terrorists to justice since July 1998, more than half of whom were al Qaeda. CIA
letter, Tenet to President Clinton, "CIA's Counterterrorism Efforts,"Oct. 16, 1999.
188. See CIA cable, "Usama Bin Ladin: The Way Ahead,"Aug. 25, 1999, soliciting
comments from various stations on "possible new approaches to capturing UBL and
disrupting operations." The evolution of some of this thinking can be seen
throughout the summer of 1999. See, e.g., CIA briefing materials, CTC UBL
Update:"Must Do Some Fundamental Rethinking,"July 20, 1999 (Afghan assets are not
capable of mounting a UBL capture operation or ambush); CIA briefing materials, CTC
UBL Update:"Problems with Capturing UBL,"Aug. 3, 1999 (tribals are good reporters
but are unlikely to capture Bin Ladin because of the risks involved, so there is a
need to identify a new group to undertake a capture operation).
189. July 1999 Memorandum of Notification.
190. See James Baker interview (Feb. 4, 2004); Janet Reno interview (Dec. 16, 2003);
Randy Moss interview (Jan. 22, 2004); George Tenet interview (Jan. 22, 2004). On the
Pakistani and Uzbek capture teams, see CIA memo, "Outline of Program to Build
Pakistan Team to Seek the Capture and Rendition of Usama Bin Ladin and his
Lieutenants," July 27, 1999; CIA memo, CIA Outline of Program to Build Uzbek and
other teams to Seek the Capture and Rendition of Usama Bin Ladin and his
Lieutenants, July 27, 1999; CIA briefing materials, talking points for the DCI for
the Aug. 3 Small Group meeting, Aug. 3, 1999 (Other Pakistani Involvement in Efforts
to Capture UBL; Uzbek and other programs). On the Uzbeks' readiness, see CIA
briefing materials,"Executive Summary for UBL Conference," Sept. 16, 1999.
191. CIA briefing materials, "Executive Summary for UBL Conference," Sept. 16, 1999.
For its preface, the Plan quoted a memo Tenet had sent to the CIA's senior
management in December 1998: "We are at war with Usama bin Ladin."
192. Ibid. See also the following briefings of the Plan: CIA briefing materials,
CTC/NSC Briefing on the Plan, Sept. 29, 1999; CIA briefing materials, Executive
Summary: UBL Conference, prepared for Berger, Nov. 30, 1999; CIA briefing materials,
CTC briefing for the NSC Small Group, Dec. 2/3, 1999.
193. This figure increased through the fall of 1999, from less than 5 percent on
September 16 to less than 10 percent by November 30, and finally to less than 15
percent by early December. CIA briefing materials, "Executive Summary for UBL
Conference," Sept. 16, 1999; CIA briefing materials, Executive Summary: UBL
Conference, prepared for Berger, Nov. 30, 1999; CIA briefing materials, CTC briefing
for the NSC Small Group, Dec. 2/3, 1999. On Massoud, see also CIA briefing
materials,"DDCI UBL Update," Oct. 29, 1999; CIA briefing materials," DCI UBL
Update," Nov. 12, 1999.
194. CIA briefing materials, "Executive Summary for UBL Conference," Sept. 16, 1999.
For the JSOC estimate, see CIA briefing materials, Executive Summary: UBL
Conference, prepared for Berger, Nov. 30, 1999. 5 Al Qaeda Aims at the American
Homeland
