1. Though KSM and Bin Ladin knew each other from the anti-Soviet campaign of the
1980s, KSM apparently did not begin working with al Qaeda until after the 1998 East
Africa embassy bombings. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Nov. 21, 2003;
Jan. 9, 2004; Feb. 19, 2004.
2. Those detainees are Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Abu Zubaydah, Riduan Isamuddin (also
known as Hambali), Abd al Rahim al Nashiri, Tawfiq bin Attash (also known as
Khallad), Ramzi Binalshibh, Mohamed al Kahtani, Ahmad Khalil Ibrahim Samir al Ani,
Ali Abd al Rahman al Faqasi al Ghamdi (also known as Abu Bakr al Azdi), and Hassan
Ghul.
3. On KSM's relationship to Yousef and his ethnicity, see CIA analytic report, Khalid
Sheik Muhammad's Nephews, CTC 2003-300013, Jan. 31, 2003. On KSM's biography, see
Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 12,2003; FBI electronic
communication, requests for information on KSM colleges/universities, June 10, 2002.
4. In an uncorroborated post-capture claim that may be mere bravado, KSM has stated
that he considered assassinating Rabbi Meir Kahane when Kahane lectured in
Greensboro at some point between 1984 and 1986. Intelligence report, interrogation
of KSM, July 12, 2003. On KSM's connection to Sayyaf, see Intelligence reports,
interrogations of KSM, July 3, 2003; July 12, 2003; FBI electronic communication,
"Summary of Information . . . with regard to . . . KSM,"July 8,1999. On KSM's battle
experience and his electronics work, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of
KSM, July 3, 2003; July 12, 2003. On KSM's anti-Soviet activities, see Intelligence
report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 17, 2004 (in which KSM says he apparently met Bin
Ladin for the first time when the Sayyaf group and Bin Ladin's Arab mujahideen group
were next to each other along the front line).
5. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 12, 2003 (in which KSM also notes
that his group continued fighting in the Jalalabad area, and his brother Abid was
killed there). KSM claims that Ramzi Yousef visited the NGO's establishment in
Jalalabad while Yousef was undergoing training. KSM adds that between 1993 and 1996,
he traveled to China, the Philippines, Pakistan, Bosnia (a second time), Brazil,
Sudan, and Malaysia. Most, if not all, of this travel appears to have been related
to his abiding interest in carrying out terrorist operations. Although KSM claims
that Sheikh Abdallah was not a member, financier, or supporter of al Qaeda, he
admits that Abdallah underwrote a 1995 trip KSM took to join the Bosnia jihad.
Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 23, 2003.
6. On KSM's learning of Yousef 's plans, see Intelligence report, interrogation of
KSM, Jan. 9, 2004 (in which KSM also contends that Yousef never divulged to him the
intended target of the attack). On KSM/Yousef phone conversations, see Intelligence
report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 17, 2004 (in which KSM also says that most of his
phone conversations with Yousef were social in nature, but that Yousef did discuss
mixing explosives ingredients once or twice and that on one occasion, Yousef asked
him to send the passport Yousef had in his true name, Abdul Basit). On KSM's money
transfer, see FBI report, Tradebom investigation, Mar. 20, 1993.
7. Evidence gathered at the time of Yousef 's February 1995 arrest included dolls
wearing clothes containing nitrocellulose. FBI evidence, Manila air investigation.
On KSM's rationale for attacking the United States, see Intelligence report,
interrogation of KSM, Sept. 5, 2003 (in this regard, KSM's statements echo those of
Yousef, who delivered an extensive polemic against U.S. foreign policy at his
January 1998 sentencing). On the Manila air plot, see Intelligence reports,
interrogations of KSM, Apr. 17, 2003; July 12, 2003 (in which KSM also says bojinka
is not Serbo-Croatian for "big bang," as has been widely reported, but rather a
nonsense word he adopted after hearing it on the front lines in Afghanistan).
According to KSM, the plot was to receive financing from a variety of sources,
including associates of co-conspirator Wali Khan and KSM's own funds. Intelligence
reports, interrogations of KSM, Nov. 26, 2003; Jan. 9, 2004; Feb. 19, 2004. On
activities during the summer of 1994, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of
KSM, May 3, 2003; July 12, 2003; Nov. 10, 2003; Feb. 21, 2004; Feb. 24, 2004.
8. On recruiting Wali Khan in Karachi, see FBI report of investigation, interview of
Abdul Hakim Murad, Apr. 13, 1995; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July
12, 2003 (in which KSM recounts how he knew Wali Khan from Afghanistan). On the
testing of the timer, see Brief for the United States of America, United States v.
Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, No. 98-1041(L) (2d Cir. filed Aug. 25, 2000), pp. 85-86, 88-91.
The latter explosion caused the death of a passenger and extensive damage to the
aircraft, which was forced to make an emergency landing in Okinawa. In 1996, Yousef
was convicted on charges arising out of the Bojinka plot, including the bombing of
the Philippine Airlines flight. See ibid., p. 8. On KSM's travels, see generally
Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 12, 2003. Yousef managed to escape
to Pakistan, but his accomplice, Murad-whom KSM claims to have sent to Yousef with
$3,000 to help fund the operation-was arrested and disclosed details of the plot
while under interrogation. Contrary to Murad's confession, in which he described his
intended role as one of the five operatives who would plant bombs on board the
targeted aircraft, KSM has said that Murad's role was limited to carrying the $3,000
from Dubai to Manila. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Feb. 19, 2004;
(two reports); Feb. 24, 2004; Apr. 2, 2004. This aspect of KSM's account is not
credible, as it conflicts not just with Murad's confession but also with physical
evidence tying Murad to the very core of the plot, and with KSM's own statements
elsewhere that Murad was involved in planning and executing the operation.
Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Aug. 18, 2003; Jan. 9, 2004; Feb. 24,
2004 (in which KSM also claims that while he was in Qatar in February 1995, he and
Yousef consulted by telephone regarding the cargo carrier plan, and Yousef proceeded
with the operation despite KSM's advice that he hide instead). We have uncovered no
evidence that KSM was present at the guesthouse in Islamabad where Yousef 's arrest
took place, as has been suggested in the press.
9. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 12, 2003. KSM's presence in Bosnia
coincided with a police station bombing in Zagreb where the timing device of the
bomb (a modified Casio watch) resembled those manufactured by KSM and Yousef in the
Philippines for the Manila air operation. FBI report, Manila air investigation, May
23, 1999. On the Sudanese trip and Afghanistan, see Intelligence report,
interrogation of SM, July 12, 2003 (in which KSM also claims to have encountered
Sayf al Adl while in Yemen; apparently KSM has not divulged the substance of this
meeting).
10. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan. 9, 2004. In another interrogation
report, however, KSM downplays the significance of his relationship to Yousef in
enabling him to meet with Bin Ladin. Specifically, KSM notes that Yousef was not a
member of al Qaeda and that Yousef never met Bin Ladin. Intelligence report,
interrogation of KSM, Feb. 19, 2004.
11. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, July 12, 2003; Jan. 9, 2004; Feb.
19,2004. With respect to KSM's additional proposal to bomb cargo planes by shipping
jackets containing nitrocellulose, KSM states that Bin Ladin expressed interest in
changing the operation so that it would involve a suicide operative. Intelligence
report, interrogation of KSM, Nov. 10, 2003.
12. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 19, 2004.
13. Probably inflating his own role, KSM says he and a small group of colleagues,
including Yousef and Wali Khan, were among the earliest advocates of attacking the
United States. KSM asserts that Bin Ladin and some of the other jihadist leaders
concentrated on overthrowing Arab regimes and argued for limiting confrontation with
the United States to places like Somalia. On KSM's description of Bin Ladin's
agenda, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Nov. 13, 2003. As discussed
in chapter 2, we do not agree with this assessment. On Bin Ladin's reactions to
KSM's proposal, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, July 12, 2003; Jan.
9, 2004; Feb. 19, 2004. On KSM's intent to target the United States and Bin Ladin's
interest in Somalia, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Nov. 13, 2003.
14. On KSM's independence, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan. 9,
2004. Even after he began working with Bin Ladin and al Qaeda, KSM concealed from
them his ongoing relationship with Sayyaf. Intelligence report, interrogation of
KSM, July 30, 2003. Although KSM says he would have accepted the support of another
organization to stage a 9/11-type operation, there is no evidence he ever peddled
this idea to any other group. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 19,
2004. On his travels after meeting Bin Ladin, see Intelligence report, interrogation
of KSM, July 12, 2003. Hambali also was one of the founders of Konsojaya, a
Malaysian company run by a close associate of Wali Khan. FBI report, Manila air
investigation, May 23, 1999. Hambali claims he was asked to serve on the company's
board of directors as a formality and insists that he did not recognize the
"Arabs"who were to run the company or play any role in its operations. Intelligence
report, interrogation of Hambali, Nov. 19, 2003.
15. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, July 12, 2003; Feb. 19, 2004 (two
reports). KSM maintains that he provided similar services for other mujahideen
groups at this time, including the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and a group headed
by Abu Zubaydah. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 19, 2004.
16. On KSM's understanding of Bin Ladin's commitment, see Intelligence report,
interrogation of KSM, Feb. 19, 2004. On KSM's assistance to al Qaeda, see
Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, July 12, 2003 (two reports). On Bin
Ladin's decision to approve 9/11 operation, see Intelligence report, interrogation
of KSM, Jan. 9, 2004. KSM has observed that the East Africa bombings and the
subsequent bombing of the USS Cole yielded a recruiting bonanza for al Qaeda, as
increasing numbers of Arab youth became enamored of the idea of waging jihad against
the United States. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Sept. 5, 2003.
17. On KSM's decision to move to Kandahar, see Intelligence report, interrogation of
KSM, Jan. 9, 2004. On the media committee, see Intelligence report, interrogation of
KSM, July 12, 2003 (in which KSM also says that as head of the media committee, he
would take charge of producing the propaganda video al Qaeda issued following the
bombing of the USS Cole). On the oath, see Intelligence report, interrogation of
KSM, Nov. 13, 2003 (in which KSM also claims his reluctance stemmed from a concern
that he would lose the ability to persevere with the 9/11 operation should Bin Ladin
subsequently decide to cancel it).
18. On a possible Southeast Asian operation, see Intelligence report, interrogation
of Hambali, Sept. 4, 2003. On a possible U.S. operation, see Intelligence reports,
interrogations of KSM, June 27, 2003; July 14, 2003. On a possible Israeli
operation, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, June 30, 2003. On other
possible targets discussed with Atef, see Intelligence report, interrogation of
Hambali, Sept. 4, 2003 (Thailand); Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Apr.
4, 2004 (Singapore, Indonesia, Maldives).
19. For an example of KSM's popularity, see Intelligence report, interrogation of al
Qaeda facilitator, Oct. 11, 2002. See also Intelligence report, interrogation of Abu
Zubaydah, Nov. 7, 2002; Intelligence report, interrogation of Nashiri, Feb. 10,
2003.
20. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Hambali, Jan. 14, 2003; Mar. 5, 2004.
21. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (Columbia Univ. Press,
2002), pp. 187, 199.
22. On the trip to Karachi, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Hambali, Sept.
12, 2003. On Hambali's relationship with Atef and receipt of al Qaeda funds, see
Intelligence report, interrogation of Hambali, Mar. 5, 2004. Al Qaeda began
providing funds to JI for terrorist operations as early as 1999. Intelligence
report, interrogation of detainee, Mar. 3, 2004.
23. On Hambali's role as coordinator, see Intelligence report, interrogation of
detainee, Mar. 4,2004. On Sufaat, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,
Apr. 12, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Apr. 30, 2003. In
1987, Sufaat received a bachelor's degree in biological sciences, with a minor in
chemistry, from California State University, Sacramento. Sufaat did not start on the
al Qaeda biological weapons program until after JI's December 2000 church bombings
in Indonesia, in which he was involved. Intelligence report, interrogation of
Hambali, Sept. 8, 2003. On Sufaat's schooling, see Intelligence report,
interrogation of detainee, Dec. 14, 2001.
24. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, June 9, 2003. KSM also maintains that
he persuaded Hambali to focus on "soft" targets in Singapore, such as oil tankers,
the U.S. and Israeli embassies, and Western airlines. Intelligence report,
interrogation of KSM, June 24, 2003.
25. As discussed in greater detail in section 5.2, Khallad was sent by Bin Ladin to
Kuala Lumpur to case U.S. airline flights in the Far East for possible future
attacks there, whereas Hazmi and Mihdhar were on the first leg of their travel from
Karachi to Los Angeles, where they would arrive on January 15, 2000. Intelligence
report, interrogation of KSM, July 31, 2003. On Hambali's assistance at KSM's
request, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 31, 2003; Intelligence
report, interrogation of Khallad, Aug. 8, 2003. On assistance to Moussaoui, see
Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Mar. 24, 2003; Intelligence report,
interrogation of detainee, Apr.9, 2002. According to statements attributed to
Hambali and Sufaat, in each of these instances the al Qaeda guests were lodged at
Sufaat's condominium, an apartment on the outskirts of Kuala Lumpur. Intelligence
report, interrogation of detainee, Jan. 22, 2002; Intelligence reports,
interrogations of Hambali, Sept. 8, 2003; Sept. 12, 2003.
26. On Hambali's relationship with Bin Ladin, see Intelligence reports,
interrogations of Hambali, Aug.29, 2003; Sept. 5, 2003 (in which Hambali also
explains his relationship with al Qaeda as follows: he received his marching orders
from JI, but al Qaeda would lead any joint operation involving members of both
organizations). On Hambali's objections, see Intelligence report, interrogation of
KSM, July 8, 2003. On KSM's coordination with Hambali, see Intelligence report,
interrogation of KSM, Apr. 17, 2003. On KSM's recognition of Hambali's domain, see
Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Aug. 18, 2003. According to KSM, his
close relationship with Hambali prompted criticism from Bashir, the JI leader, who
thought Hambali should focus more directly on Indonesia and Malaysia instead of
involving himself in al Qaeda's broader terrorist program. Indeed, KSM describes
Hambali as an al Qaeda member working in Malaysia. Intelligence report,
interrogation of KSM, Aug.18,2003. Nashiri observes that al Qaeda's standard
security practice dictated that no senior member could manage terrorist activities
in a location where another senior member was operating. Intelligence report,
interrogation of Nashiri, Jan. 14, 2003. Yet al Qaeda's deference to Hambali's turf
apparently had limits. Khallad says he and Hambali never discussed the intended
Southeast Asia portion of the original 9/11 plan. Intelligence report, interrogation
of Khallad, Apr. 27, 2004.
27. On Nashiri's recruitment, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Nasser
Ahmad Naser al Bahri, a.k.a. Abu Jandal, Sept. 17-Oct. 2, 2001. On Nashiri's refusal
to swear allegiance, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Nov. 21, 2003.
On Nashiri's idea for his first terrorist operation and his travels, see
Intelligence reports, interrogations of Nashiri, Nov. 21, 2002; Dec. 26, 2002.
28. Intelligence report, interrogation of Nashiri, Dec. 26, 2002. Although Nashiri's
account of this episode dates his return to Afghanistan in 1996, the 1997 date is
likely more accurate. On Nashiri's involvement in the missilesmuggling and
embassy-bombing plots, see Intelligence report, seizure of antitank missiles in
Saudi Arabia, June 14, 1998; FBI report of investigation, interview of Mohammad
Rashed Daoud al Owahli, Sept. 9, 1998, p. 6.
29. For Nashiri's version, which may not be true, see Intelligence report,
interrogation of Nashiri, Dec. 26, 2002. On communication between Nashiri and Bin
Ladin about attacking U.S.vessels, see Intelligence report, interrogation of
Nashiri, Nov. 21, 2002. The reporting of Nashiri's statements on this subject is
somewhat inconsistent, especially as to the exact timing of the original proposal.
Some corroboration does exist, however, for Nashiri's claim that the original
proposal was his. A detainee says that 9/11 hijacker Khalid al Mihdhar told him
about the maritime operation sometime in late 1999 and credited Nashiri as its
originator. Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Dec. 2, 2001.
30. Intelligence report, interrogation of Nashiri, Jan. 27, 2003. Nashiri claims not
to have had any telephone or email contact with Bin Ladin while planning the Cole
operation; rather, whenever Bin Ladin wanted to meet, he would have an al Qaeda
member travel to Pakistan to summon Nashiri by telephone. Ibid.
31. As an example of Nashiri's status, see FBI report of investigation, interview of
Abu Jandal, Sept. 17-Oct. 2, 2001 (in which Nashiri is described as widely known to
be one of al Qaeda's most committed terrorists and, according to one of his
mujahideen colleagues, so extreme in his ferocity in waging jihad that he "would
commit a terrorist act 'in Mecca inside the Ka'aba itself ' [the holiest site in
Islam] if he believed there was a need to do so"). On Nashiri's role on the Arabian
Peninsula, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Jan. 14, 2004. Nashiri
also enjoyed a reputation as a productive recruiter for al Qaeda. See Intelligence
report, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, Aug. 29, 2002. On Nashiri's discretion, see,
e.g., Intelligence report, interrogation of Nashiri, Nov. 20, 2002. On Nashiri
seeking Bin Ladin's approval, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan.
14, 2004. On the Limburg operation, see Intelligence report, interrogation of
Nashiri, May 21, 2003. On Nashiri's security concerns, see Intelligence report,
interrogation of Nashiri, Feb. 20, 2003.
32. See Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, July 1, 2003; Sept. 5, 2003.
33. For KSM's learning from the first World Trade Center bombing and his interest in
a more novel form of attack, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 1,
2003. For KSM's interest in aircraft as weapons and speculation about striking the
World Trade Center and CIA, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 19,
2004. KSM has stated that he and Yousef at this time never advanced the notion of
using aircraft as weapons past the idea stage. Intelligence report, interrogation of
KSM, Apr. 2, 2004. After 9/11, some Philippine government officials claimed that
while in Philippine custody in February 1995, KSM's Manila air plot co-conspirator
Abdul Hakim Murad had confessed having discussed with Yousef the idea of attacking
targets, including the World Trade Center, with hijacked commercial airliners flown
by U.S.-trained Middle Eastern pilots. See Peter Lance, 1000 Years for Revenge:
International Terrorism and the FBI-the Untold Story (HarperCollins, 2003), pp.
278-280. In Murad's initial taped confession, he referred to an idea of crashing a
plane into CIA headquarters. Lance gave us his copy of an apparent 1995 Philippine
National Police document on an interrogation of Murad. That document reports Murad
describing his idea of crashing a plane into CIA headquarters, but in this report
Murad claims he was thinking of hijacking a commercial aircraft to do it, saying the
idea had come up in a casual conversation with Yousef with no specific plan for its
execution. We have seen no pre-9/11 evidence that Murad referred in interrogations
to the training of other pilots, or referred in this casual conversation to targets
other than the CIA. According to Lance, the Philippine police officer, who after
9/11 offered the much more elaborate account of Murad's statements reported in
Lance's book, claims to have passed this added information to U.S. officials. But
Lance states the Philippine officer declined to identify these officials. Peter
Lance interview (Mar. 15, 2004). If such information was provided to a U.S.
official, we have seen no indication that it was written down or disseminated within
the U.S. government. Incidentally, KSM says he never discussed his idea for the
planes operation with Murad, a person KSM regarded as a minor figure. Intelligence
report, interrogation of KSM, Apr. 2, 2004.
34. Intelligence report, 1996 Atef study on airplane hijacking operations, Sept. 26,
2001.
35. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, July 12,2003; Nov. 6,2003. Abu
Zubaydah, who worked closely with the al Qaeda leadership, has stated that KSM
originally presented Bin Ladin with a scaled-down version of the 9/11 plan, and that
Bin Ladin urged KSM to expand the operation with the comment, "Why do you use an axe
when you can use a bulldozer?" Intelligence report, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah,
May 16, 2003. The only possible corroboration we have found for Abu Zubaydah's
statement is Khallad's suggestion that Bin Ladin may have expanded KSM's original
idea for an attack using planes. Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Apr.
22, 2004. Neither Abu Zubaydah nor Khallad claims to have been present when KSM says
he first pitched his proposal to Bin Ladin in 1996.
36. For the scheme's lukewarm reception, see Intelligence report, interrogation of
KSM, Nov. 6, 2003. For Bin Ladin's response, see Intelligence reports,
interrogations of KSM, Aug. 18, 2003; Feb. 19, 2004. 492 NOTES TO CHAPTER 5
37. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 19, 2004.
38. For KSM's joining al Qaeda, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Nov.
13, 2003. KSM has provided inconsistent information about whether Bin Ladin first
approved his proposal for what became the 9/11 attacks in late 1998 or in early
1999. Compare Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Aug. 18, 2003; Jan. 9,
2004; Feb. 19, 2004; Apr. 3, 2004. For KSM's antipathy to the United States, see
Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 19, 2004. For Atef 's role, see
Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan. 9, 2004. For Atef 's death, see DOS
report, "Comprehensive List of Terrorists and Groups Identified Under Executive
Order 13224,"Dec. 31, 2001.
39. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Aug. 18, 2003.
40. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Aug. 18, 2003; Feb. 20, 2004; Apr.
30, 2004. An earlier KSM interrogation report, however, states that Bin Ladin
preferred the Capitol over the White House as a target. Intelligence report,
interrogation of KSM, Apr. 17, 2003. KSM has admitted that his statement in a
post-9/11 interview with Al Jazeera reporter Yosri Fouda-that an al Qaeda
"reconnaissance committee" had identified 30 potential targets in the United States
during the late 1990s-was a lie designed to inflate the perceived scale of the 9/11
operation. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 23, 2004. For the
specific targets, see Intelligence report, selection of 9/11 targets, Aug. 13, 2003
(citing KSM interrogation).
41. For the four individuals, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Aug. 18,
2003. Abu Bara al Yemeni is also known by the names Abu al Bara al Taizi, Suhail
Shurabi, and Barakat. Ibid. KSM has also stated that he did not learn of the
selection of Hazmi and Mihdhar for the planes operation until November 1999.
Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Apr. 2, 2004. For Mihdhar's and Hazmi's
eagerness, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Jan. 9, 2004; Feb. 20,
2004 . For Bin Ladin's instruction, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,
Feb. 20, 2004. Hazmi obtained a B-1/B-2 multiple-entry visa issued at Jiddah, Saudi
Arabia, on April 3, 1999; Mihdhar obtained the same type of visa at the same
location on April 7, 1999. DOS records, NIV applicant details for Hazmi and Mihdhar,
Nov. 8, 2001. Hazmi and Mihdhar both obtained new passports shortly before they
applied for visas. FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Jan. 31, 2003,
p. 9.
42. For Hazmi and Mihdhar's city of birth, see CIA analytic report, "11 September:
The Plot and the Plotters," CTC 2003-40044HC, June 1, 2003, pp. 49-50. For their
travel to Bosnia, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Saudi al Qaeda member,
Oct. 3, 2001. For their visits to Afghanistan, see Intelligence reports,
interrogations of detainee, Feb. 5, 2002; Feb. 11, 2002; Intelligence reports,
interrogations of Saudi al Qaeda member, Oct. 2, 2001; Oct. 18, 2001.
43. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Khallad, June 25, 2003; Sept. 5, 2003.
44. For Khallad's visa application under a false name and its rejection, see DOS
record, visa application of Salah Saeed Mohammed bin Yousaf (alias for Khallad),
Apr. 3, 1999; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Aug. 20, 2003.
Khallad's visa denial was based not on terrorism concerns but apparently on his
failure to submit sufficient documentation in support of his application. See DOS
record, NIV applicant detail, Mar. 31, 2004. For Khallad's 1999 mission to Yemen,
see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Aug. 20, 2003. For the U.S. point
of contact, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Aug. 22, 2003.
Khallad claims he cannot remember his U.S. contact's full name but says it sounded
like "Barzan." According to the CIA,"Barzan" is possibly identifiable with Sarbarz
Mohammed, the person who resided at the address in Bothell, Washington, that Khallad
listed on his visa application as his final destination. Ibid. For his contacts with
"Barzan" and his arrest, see ibid.; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad,
Aug. 20, 2003. Nashiri has confirmed that Khallad had been assigned to help procure
explosives for the ship-bombing plot, and that his arrest caused work on the
operation to stop temporarily. Intelligence report, interrogation of Nashiri, Feb.
21, 2004.
45. For the interventions, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Aug.
20, 2003. Khallad has provided inconsistent information as to his release date.
Ibid. (June 1999); Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Jan. 6, 2004
(August 1999). Khallad's brother reportedly has confirmed that Khallad was released
from custody only after negotiations with the Yemeni director for political security
in which a deal was struck prohibiting Khallad and his associates from conducting
operations in Yemen. Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Oct. 1, 2002.
For his giving up on a visa and his return to Afghanistan, see Intelligence reports,
interrogations of Khallad, July 31, 2003; Aug. 22, 2003.
46. For KSM's realization of visa complications, see Intelligence report,
interrogation of KSM, Aug. 18, 2003. According to both KSM and Khallad, Abu Bara
never applied for a U.S. visa. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 20,
2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Feb. 17, 2004. KSM has noted
that Ramzi Binalshibh, another Yemeni slated early on to participate in the 9/11
attacks, likewise would prove unable to acquire a U.S. visa the following year.
Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan. 7, 2004. For KSM's desire to keep
Khallad and Abu Bara involved, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Aug.
18, 2003. For Saudis being chosen for the planes operation, see Intelligence
reports, interrogations of KSM, Jan. 7, 2004; Jan. 23, 2004. For KSM's splitting the
operation into two parts, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Aug. 18,
2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Apr. 27, 2004.
47. For the second part of the operation, see Intelligence report, interrogation of
KSM, Aug. 18. 2003. For the alternate scenario, see Intelligence report,
interrogation of KSM, Apr. 30, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad,
Apr. 21,2004. Khallad has provided contradictory statements about the number of
planes to be destroyed in East Asia. Intelligence reports, interrogations of
Khallad, Aug. 13, 2003; Apr. 5, 2004. According to Khallad, Thailand, South Korea,
Hong Kong, and Malaysia were likely origins of the flights because Yemenis did not
need visas to enter them. Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Aug. 13,
2003. For the importance of simultaneity, see Intelligence report, interrogation of
KSM, Aug. 18, 2003.
48. For the four operatives' training, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,
Aug. 18, 2003. For the elite nature of the course and Nibras's participation, see
Intelligence reports, interrogations of Khallad, Sept. 8, 2003; Sept. 11, 2003;
Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 15, 2003. For KSM's view, see ibid.;
Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Aug. 18, 2003. For KSM's visit, see
Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004.
49. For a description of the camp and the commando course, see Intelligence report,
interrogation of KSM, July 15, 2003. For Bin Ladin's interest and the decision on
the number of trainees, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Sept. 8,
2003.
50. For the nature of the commando course, see Intelligence report, interrogation of
Khallad, Sept. 8, 2003. KSM claims that the course proved so rigorous that Mihdhar
quit after a week and returned to his family in Yemen. Intelligence report,
interrogation of KSM, Aug.18,2003. However, two of Mihdhar's al Qaeda colleagues who
were present during the training have provided different accounts. Khallad
apparently has stated both that Bin Ladin pulled Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi out of
the course early and that Mihdhar actually completed the course. See Intelligence
reports, interrogations of Khallad, Sept. 1, 2003; May 21, 2004. See also FBI report
of investigation, interview of Abu Jandal, Oct. 2, 2001 (indicating that Mihdhar
completed the course).
51. For instruction on Western culture and travel, see Intelligence reports,
interrogations of KSM, Mar. 24, 2003; June 15, 2004; Intelligence report,
interrogation of Khallad, Aug. 21, 2003. For KSM's mid-1999 activity and Bin Ladin's
payment, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004. According to
KSM, he received a total of $10,000 from Bin Ladin for 9/11-related expenses.
Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Apr. 5, 2004.
52. For Khallad, Abu Bara, and Hazmi's travels, see Intelligence report,
interrogation of KSM, May 30, 2003. Khallad has provided a second version, namely
that all three traveled together to Karachi. Intelligence report, interrogation of
Khallad, July 31, 2003. For Hazmi and Atta's simultaneous presence in Quetta, see
Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004; Mar. 31, 2004. KSM
maintains it was a coincidence. Ibid.
53. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Mar. 31,2004. In his initial
post-capture statements, KSM claimed that Mihdhar did not have to attend the
training because he had previously received similar training from KSM. Intelligence
report, interrogation of KSM, Mar. 24, 2003. KSM subsequently expressed uncertainty
about why Bin Ladin and Atef excused Mihdhar from the training. Intelligence report,
interrogation of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004.
54. For the varying accounts of the course's length, see Intelligence reports,
interrogations of KSM, Aug. 18, 2003; Feb. 20, 2004; Intelligence reports,
interrogations of Khallad, Nov. 6, 2003; July 31, 2003. For KSM's description, see
Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Mar. 24, 2003; Aug. 18, 2003; Feb. 20,
2004. For Khallad's description, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad,
Apr. 5, 2004. KSM says that he permitted the trainees to view Hollywood films about
hijackings only after he edited the films to cover the female characters.
Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Nov. 10, 2003. For the use of game
software and discussions of casing flights, see Intelligence report, interrogation
of Khallad, Nov. 6, 2003. For KSM's instructions regarding casing, see Intelligence
report, interrogation of Khallad, July 31, 2003. For visits to travel agencies, see
Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Aug. 13, 2003.
55. For the travels of Khallad, Abu Bara, and Hazmi via Karachi, see Intelligence
report, interrogation of KSM, Aug. 18, 2003. For Mihdhar's travel from Yemen, see
FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline,"Nov. 14, 2003 (citing 265ANY- 280350, serial
24808).
56. For the operatives'knowledge, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Aug.
18, 2003. For Hazmi and Mihdhar being sent to Malaysia, see Intelligence report,
interrogation of KSM, July 29, 2003. For passport doctoring, see Intelligence
report, interrogation of KSM, Aug. 18, 2003. For casing, see Intelligence report,
interrogation of KSM, July 29, 2003. For Khallad and Abu Bara's departure, as well
as Hazmi's travel, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 31, 2003.
Khallad maintains that Abu Bara did not participate in the casing operation and
simply traveled to Kuala Lumpur as Khallad's companion. Intelligence report,
interrogation of Khallad, May 30, 2003.
57. For the trip's original purpose and Bin Ladin's suggestion, see Intelligence
report, interrogation of Khallad, July 31, 2003. On Malaysia, Endolite, and the
financing of Khallad's trip, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Aug.
22, 2003.
58. On informing Hambali, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Aug. 18,
2003. For Hambali's assistance, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad,
July 31, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of Hambali, Sept. 4, 2003. For the
colleague who spoke Arabic, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, May
30, 2003.
59. For the dates of Khallad's travel, his mistake in seating, and his other efforts
to case flights, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of Khallad, July 31, 2003;
Aug. 21, 2003. Khallad says he put the box cutter alongside tubes of toothpaste and
shaving cream with metallic exteriors, so that if the metal detector at the airport
was triggered, the inspector would attribute the alarm to the other items. He also
carried art supplies, which he hoped would explain the presence of a box cutter if
anyone asked. Ibid.
60. For Khallad's return to Kuala Lumpur, see Intelligence report, interrogation of
Khallad, May 30, 2003. For Hazmi's arrival and stay at the clinic, see Intelligence
report, interrogation of Khallad, July 31, 2003. For Mihdhar's arrival, see FBI
report, "Hijackers Timeline,"Nov. 14, 2003 (citing 265A-NY-280350, serial 24808).
For their stay at Sufaat's apartment, see CIA analytic report,"The Plot and the
Plotters," June 1, 2003, p. 11; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Aug.
22, 2003. For Khallad's discussions with Hazmi and Khallad's knowledge of the
operation, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, July 31, 2003.
61. For the Bangkok meeting, see CIA analytic report, "The Plot and the Plotters,"
June 1, 2003, pp. 49-50. For relocation of the meeting to Bangkok, see Intelligence
reports, interrogations of Khallad, Aug. 18, 2003; Jan. 7, 2004. Fahd al Quso, a
close friend of Khallad's, accompanied Nibras on the trip to Bangkok to take money
to Khallad. Quso claims that the amount was $36,000. FBI report of investigation,
interview of Quso, Jan. 31, 2001. Khallad claims that it was only $10,000 to
$12,000. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Khallad, May 30, 2003; Aug. 18,
2003. Khallad has identified contradictory purposes for the money: a donation to
charities benefiting amputees, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad,
Aug.8,2003; and to advance the ship-bombing operation, see Intelligence report,
interrogation of Khallad, Jan. 7, 2004. Khallad has explicitly denied giving any of
the money he received from Nibras and Quso to Hazmi and Mihdhar. Intelligence
reports, interrogations of Khallad, Aug.8, 2003; Jan. 7, 2004. Given the separate
reporting from KSM that he gave Hazmi and Mihdhar $8,000 each before they traveled
to the United States, we have insufficient evidence to conclude that the Nibras/Quso
money helped finance the planes operation. Intelligence report, interrogation of
KSM, June 15, 2004. For Hazmi and Mihdhar's interest in traveling to Bangkok, see
Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Jan. 7, 2004. For Hambali's
assistance, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Aug. 8, 2003. For Abu
Bara's return to Yemen, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, May 30,
2003.
62. For the hotel arrangements, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad,
Jan. 7,2004. For the two groups not meeting with each other, see Intelligence
report, interrogation of Khallad, Aug. 18, 2003. For Khallad's subsequent actions,
see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, July 31, 2003.
63. For Bin Ladin's cancellation of the East Asian operation, see Intelligence
report, interrogation of KSM, Aug. 18, 2003. For Hazmi and Mihdhar's departure, see
Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Aug. 8, 2003. For their arrival in
Los Angeles, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Nov. 14, 2003 (citing
265A-NY-280350-CG, serial 4062; 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 7134).
64. On Atta's family background, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Nov. 14, 2003
(citing FBI electronic communication from Cairo dated Sept. 13, 2001); CIA analytic
report,"The Plot and the Plotters," June 1, 2003, p. 23. For details on his study in
Germany, see German Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) report, investigative summary re Atta,
June 24, 2002; Federal Prosecutor General (Germany), response to Commission letter,
June 25, 2004, pp. 3-4. Atta's host family in Hamburg soon asked him to move out.
Between 1993 and 1998, Atta shared a onebedroom apartment in Hamburg with a fellow
student, who moved out after having problems with Atta and was succeeded by another
roommate. See German BKA report, investigative summary re Atta, June 24, 2002. On
Atta's character, see German BKA investigation of Said Bahaji, summary of
interrogation of Shahid Nickels on Oct. 30, 2001.
65. On the Muslim student association in Hamburg, see Intelligence report,
interrogation of Ramzi Binalshibh, Oct. 2, 2002. On the Muslim-Christian working
group and Atta, see German BKA investigation of Bahaji, summary of interrogation of
Michael Krause on Oct. 11, 2001; German BKA investigation of Bahaji, summary of
interrogation of Nickels on Oct. 30, 2001. Much of the information about Atta and
his friends in Hamburg comes from Nickels, a German national who converted to Islam
while in high school and spent considerable time with Atta's circle between 1997 and
1999. Nickels testified at the trials in Germany of Mounir el Motassadeq and
Abdelghani Mzoudi on 9/11-related charges.
66. German BKA investigation of Bahaji, summary of interrogation of Nickels on Oct.
30, 2001, pp. 8, 15; federal prosecutor's closing argument, Motassadeq trial, Feb.
5,2003. On Atta's fundamentalism, see FBI electronic communication, " Khaled A.
Shoukry," June 17, 2002.
67. German BKA report, investigative summary re Binalshibh, July 4, 2002; Federal
Prosecutor General (Germany), response to Commission letter, June 25, 2004, pp. 3-4;
FBI report of investigation, interview of Fuad Omar Bazarah, Apr.9,2004;
Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Sept. 24,2002. Binalshibh used
various names, such as Ramzi Omar and Ramzi al Sheiba. In May 1998, months before he
was expelled from school, German authorities had issued a warrant to arrest and
deport "Ramzi Omar." German BKA report, investigative summary re Binalshibh, July 4,
2002. But Binalshibh was no longer using this alias, so the German authorities did
not discover that he and Ramzi Omar were the same person until after the attacks of
September 11. Ibid.
68. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Oct. 2, 2002; German BKA
investigation of Bahaji, summary of interrogation of Nickels on Oct. 30, 2001;
German BKA report, investigative summary re Binalshibh, July 4, 2002.
69. German BKA report, investigative summary re Binalshibh, July 4, 2002.
70. CIA analytic report, "The Plot and the Plotters," June 1, 2003, p. 23; German BKA
report, investigative summary re Shehhi, July 9, 2002.
71. German BKA report, investigative summary re Shehhi, July 9,2002; Federal
Prosecutor General (Germany), response to Commission letter, June 25, 2004, pp. 3-4;
FBI electronic communication, summary of testimony of Mohamed Abdulla Mohamed Awady
on Oct. 24, 2003, at the Mzoudi trial, Dec. 5, 2003.
72. German BKA report, investigative summary re Shehhi, July 9, 2002.
73. Ibid.
74. FBI electronic communication, summary of testimony of Mohamed Abdulla Mohamed
Awady on Oct. 24, 2003, at the Mzoudi trial, Dec. 5, 2003.
75. Federal prosecutor's closing argument, Motassadeq trial, Feb. 5, 2003.
76. German BKA report, investigative summary re Jarrah, July 18,2002; Federal
Prosecutor General (Germany), response to Commission letter, June 25, 2004, pp. 3-4.
In 1999, Jarrah and Senguen allegedly married in an Islamic ceremony not recognized
under German law. Senguen has only acknowledged that she and Jarrah were engaged.
German BKA report, investigative summary re Jarrah, July 18, 2002.
77. German BKA report, investigative summary re Jarrah, July 18, 2002.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid.
80. On Jarrah's accommodations in Hamburg and his meeting with Binalshibh, see ibid.
On Jarrah and Zammar, see German BKA investigation of Bahaji, summary of
interrogation of Nickels on Oct. 30, 2001; see generally Intelligence report,
interrogation of Binalshibh, Nov. 6, 2003; Intelligence report, "Terrorism:
Background Information on Usama Bin Ladin Associate Muhammad Haydar Zammar," Jan.
14, 2002. For Zammar encouraging jihad, see Intelligence report, interrogation of
detainee, Jan. 14, 2002.
81. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Nov. 6, 2003; German BKA
investigation of Bahaji, summary of interrogation of Nickels on Oct. 30,2001. On one
occasion, German authorities intercepted a call in which such a gathering was
mentioned. An individual phoning Zammar's house on February 17, 1999, was told that
he was away on a trip to a distant, "bad" region, but that "people" at 54
Marienstrasse knew where he was. The same conversation revealed that these "people"
included "Said, Mohamed Amir, [and] Omar," likely a reference to the apartment's
original occupants, Said Bahaji, Atta, and Binalshibh. Federal Prosecutor General
(Germany), response to Commission letter, June 25, 2004, p. 9. Shehhi also appears
to have lived there briefly, in November 1998 and again in the summer of 1999.
German BKA report, investigative summary re Shehhi, July 9, 2002. The Marienstrasse
apartment remained an important location for the group even after Binalshibh, Atta,
and Shehhi all moved out, as some of their closest associates, including Zakariya
Essabar and Abdelghani Mzoudi, moved in. See German BKA report, investigative
summary re Binalshibh, July 4, 2002.
82. German BKA report, investigative summary re Bahaji, Mar. 6, 2002. A document
containing a biography of Bin Ladin-seized from the residence of Said Bahaji, a
member of Atta's circle-also contains the phrase "Dar el Ansar," which refers to the
name of a guesthouse Bin Ladin established in Afghanistan for mujahideen recruits.
Ibid.
83. German BKA investigation of Bahaji, summary of interrogation of Nickels on Nov.
7, 2001; German BKA report, investigative summary re Bahaji, Mar. 6, 2002; federal
prosecutor's closing argument, Motassadeq trial, Feb. 5, 2003. The diskettes seized
from Bahaji's residence also contained bomb-making instructions. Federal Prosecutor
General (Germany), response to Commission letter, June 25, 2004, p. 10. A videotape
of Bahaji's October 9, 1999, wedding at the Quds mosque, recovered by German
authorities after the September 11 attacks, depicts Binalshibh giving a speech
denouncing Jews as a problem for all Muslims. On the videotape, Binalshibh also
reads a Palestinian war poem, and Shehhi and Mzoudi sing a jihad song. Also shown
attending the wedding are Jarrah and Zammar. FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline,"Nov.
14, 2003 (citing 265A-NY-280350-BN-415).
84. German BKA report, investigative summary re Essabar; CIA report, interrogation of
Binalshibh, May 27, 2003; federal prosecutor's closing argument, Motassadeq trial,
Feb. 5, 2003. After arriving in Afghanistan in 2001, he became a member of al
Qaeda's media committee. Intelligence report, interrogations of KSM and Binalshibh,
May 27, 2003.
85. German BKA report, investigative summary re Motassadeq, Oct. 22, 2001.
86. German BKA report, investigative summary re Mzoudi, Jan. 13, 2003; German BKA
report, investigative summary re Motassadeq, Oct. 22, 2001. Mzoudi and Motassadeq
were both tried in Germany on charges related to the 9/11 attacks. Mzoudi was
acquitted in February 2004, in part because Binalshibh was not produced as a
witness. Motassadeq was convicted in 2003 for being an accessory to the attacks and
received a 15-year prison sentence, but his conviction was reversed. See Richard
Bernstein, "Germans Free Moroccan Convicted of a 9/11 Role," New York Times, Apr. 8,
2004, p. A18.
87. Summary of Judgment and Sentencing Order by Hanseatic Regional High Court,
Motassadeq trial, Feb. 19, 2003; German BKA investigation of Bahaji, summary of
interrogation of Nickels on Oct. 30, 2001. According to Nickels, who was distancing
himself from the group by this time, "Atta was just too strange." Ibid. 496 NOTES TO
CHAPTER 5
88. Shehhi and other members of the group used to frequent a library in Hamburg to
use the Internet. According to one of the librarians, in 1999 Shehhi, unprompted,
inveighed against America, and boasted that "something was going to happen" and that
"there would be thousands of dead people." FBI electronic communication, summary of
testimony of Angela Duile on Aug. 28, 2003, at Mzoudi trial, Oct. 27, 2003. Another
witness who lived in the same dormitory as Motassadeq testified that in late 1998 or
early 1999, he overheard a conversation in which Motassadeq told someone that "we
will do something bad again" and that "we will dance on their graves." The
conversation also contained a reference to the "burning of people." FBI electronic
communication, summary of testimony of Holger Liszkowski on Sept. 9, 2003, at Mzoudi
trial, Nov. 17, 2003. On another occasion, according to the same witness, Motassadeq
apparently identified Atta as "our pilot." Another witness recalled Atta ominously
observing in 1999 that the United States was not omnipotent and that "something can
be done." German BKA investigation of Bahaji, summary of interrogation of Nickels on
Nov. 20, 2001.
89. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Oct. 7, 2002; May 20, 2003.
90. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, May 20, 2003. A detainee has
confirmed Binalshibh's account about being advised to go to Afghanistan rather than
trying to travel directly to Chechnya. The detainee dates the Slahi meeting to
October 1999. Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Oct.17,2003. The
detainee, however, also suggests that Slahi and Binalshibh may have met earlier in
1999 in Frankfurt, through a mutual acquaintance. Intelligence report, interrogation
of detainee, Oct. 27, 2003. The acquaintance apparently tells a different story,
claiming that Slahi introduced him to Binalshibh and Jarrah at Slahi's home in 1997
or 1998, and that he later lived with them in Hamburg. Intelligence report,
interrogation of detainee, July 2, 2003.
91. FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, p. 8;
Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Sept. 24, 2002; Mar. 4, 2003;
May 20, 2003.
92. On meetings with Atef and Bin Ladin, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of
Binalshibh, Dec. 10, 2002; Mar. 4, 2003; Mar. 31, 2003; Intelligence report,
interrogation of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004. Atta reportedly had between two and five
meetings with Bin Ladin before leaving Kandahar and was the only 9/11 hijacker who
knew the entire scope of the operation from the outset. Intelligence report,
comments of Binalshibh on Atta, Apr. 21, 2003.
93. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Dec. 10, 2002. According to
KSM, Bin Ladin designated Hazmi to be Atta's second in command. Intelligence report,
interrogation of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004.
94. In addition, Atta obtained a new passport in June 1998, even though his current
one was still valid for nearly a year, a sign that he may have been following the al
Qaeda practice of concealing travel to Pakistan. Federal Prosecutor General
(Germany), response to Commission letter, June 25, 2004, p. 11.
95. German BKA report, investigative summary re Motassadeq, Oct. 22, 2001; Summary of
Judgment and Sentencing Order by Hanseatic Regional High Court, Motassadeq trial,
Feb. 19, 2003. Motassadeq continued to handle some of Shehhi's affairs even after
Shehhi returned to Hamburg. Most importantly, in March 2000, Motassadeq paid
Shehhi's semester fees at the university, to ensure Shehhi's continued receipt of
scholarship payments from the UAE. Ibid.
96. German BKA report, investigative summary re Motassadeq, Oct. 22, 2001. After
9/11, Motassadeq admitted to German authorities that Shehhi had asked him to handle
matters in a way that would conceal Shehhi's absence. Motassadeq also would claim
later that he did not know why his friends had gone to Afghanistan, saying he
thought they were planning to go fight in Chechnya. For assistance provided by both
Motassadeq and Bahaji, see Federal Prosecutor General (Germany), response to
Commission letter, June 25, 2004, pp. 13-14.
97. Jarrah encountered a minor problem during his return trip to Hamburg. On January
30, 2000, while transiting Dubai on his way from Karachi to Germany, Jarrah drew
questioning from UAE authorities about an overlay of the Qu'ran that appeared on one
page of his passport. The officials also noticed the religious tapes and books
Jarrah had in his possession, but released him after he pointed out that he had
lived in Hamburg for a number of years and was studying aircraft construction there.
FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation,"Feb. 29, 2004, p. 13.
98. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Sep. 24, 2002; FBI report,
"Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, pp. 11, 13. According to a KSM
interrogation report, Shehhi may have been present for at least some of the training
that Atta and Binalshibh received in Karachi. Intelligence report, interrogation of
KSM, Mar. 31, 2004.
99. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Nov. 6, 2003. Binalshibh and
the others kept their distance from Zammar even before visiting Afghanistan and
getting their instructions from Bin Ladin and Atef. Ibid.
100. On Atta, see FBI analytic report, "The 11 September Hijacker Cell Model," Feb.
2003, p. 28. On Jarrah, see German BKA report, investigative summary re Jarrah, July
18, 2002. Note that although Jarrah's attitude was now much more congenial, he told
Senguen nothing about being in Afghanistan. On Shehhi's wedding celebration, see
German BKA report, investigative summary re Shehhi, July 9, 2002; on his changed
appearance and behavior, see FBI electronic communication, summary of testimony of
Mohamed Abdulla Mohamed Awady on Oct. 24, 2003, at the Mzoudi trial, Dec. 5, 2003.
101. German BKA report, investigative summary re Jarrah, July 18, 2002.
102. On Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, also known as Ammar al Baluchi, see FBI report, "Summary
of Penttbom InvestiNOTES TO CHAPTER 5 497 gation," Feb. 29, 2004, p. 78. Ali, in
turn, would ship these materials to his uncle, KSM, in Karachi. Intelligence report,
interrogation of Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, Feb. 11, 2004. On Jarrah, see German BKA
report, investigative summary re Jarrah, July 18, 2002. Following his sudden
decision to study aircraft engineering in Hamburg, Jarrah had expressed interest in
becoming a pilot around the end of 1998, well before he traveled to Afghanistan.
According to Senguen, Jarrah told her about friends of his who had interrupted their
studies to join the Germany army so that they could become pilots. Jarrah's
pre-Afghanistan interest in aviation also is confirmed by a January 22, 1999, email
recovered after the September 11,2001, attacks, in which Jarrah told a friend from
Beirut that he might "come next year and . . . have something to tell about
airplanes." Ibid. On Binalshibh, see Intelligence report, interrogation of
Binalshibh, Sept. 24, 2002.
103. Summary of Judgment and Sentencing Order by Hanseatic Regional High Court,
Motassadeq trial, Feb. 19,2003, pp.10-11. Zacarias Moussaoui later would benefit
from the results of all this research. Following his August 2001 arrest, the FBI
discovered among his possessions a fax copy of an advertisement for U.S. flight
schools. According to Binalshibh, notes in the margin of the advertisement were
written by Atta. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Dec. 19, 2002.
104. DOS record, NIV applicant detail, Marwan al Shehhi, Mohamed Atta, Ziad Jarrah,
Nov. 8, 2001. The visa applications were destroyed by the State Department according
to routine document handling practices before their significance was known.
105. DOS records, visa applications of Ramzi Binalshibh, May 17, 2000; June 15, 2000;
Oct. 25 2000. CIA analytic report, "The Plot and the Plotters," June 1, 2003, pp.
9-10; German BKA report, investigative summary re Binalshibh, July 4, 2002. Atta had
twice explored the possibility of obtaining a U.S. green card shortly before his
November 1999 trip to Afghanistan. FBI report,"Summary of Penttbom Investigation,"
Feb. 29, 2004, p. 8. Both Binalshibh and Jarrah listed the same person as a point of
contact in the United States, an Indonesian national who had previously lived in
Hamburg. Although this individual knew some members of the Hamburg cell, including
Mohamed Atta and Razmi Binalshibh, there is no indication that any of the hijackers
actually contacted him while they were in the United States. See German BKA report,
investigative summary re Jarrah, July 18, 2002. Binalshibh had applied for a visa
years earlier along with Fuad Bazarah, a co-worker in Yemen whose father contacted
the U.S. embassy on Binalshibh's behalf. Bazarah obtained a visa application and
moved to Los Angeles, but Binalshibh's application was denied. Bazarah would later
live in Los Angeles with Ramez Noaman, an individual who knew Nawaf al Hazmi in San
Diego. FBI electronic communication,"Penttbom," Oct. 23, 2001.
106. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Sept. 9, 2003; CIA analytic report,
Al Qaeda travel issues, Jan. 2004, p. 1. On the role of KSM, see, e.g., Intelligence
report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Oct. 11, 2002. On the role of Abu Zubaydah,
see, e.g., Intelligence report, biographical information on Abu Zubayda, Feb. 25,
2002. Al Qaeda also relied on outside travel facilitators, including fraudulent
document vendors, corrupt officials, travel agencies, and smugglers, to help move
operatives around the world by obtaining fraudulent documents, arranging visas (real
or fake), making airline reservations, etc. See CIA analytic report, "Clandestine
Travel Facilitators: Key Enablers of Terrorism,"Dec. 31, 2002; CIA analytic report,
Al Qaeda travel issues, Jan. 2004.
107. On passport collection schemes, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,
Sept. 9, 2003. On recycled passports, see Intelligence report, Collection of
passports June 7, 2002.
108. See Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Nov. 12, 2003; May 25, 2004;
CIA analytic report, Al Qaeda travel issues, Jan. 2004, pp.1,3, 19. A detainee has
admitted attending several security and specialized courses, including ones in
counterfeiting and seal removal. Intelligence report, interrogation of al Qaeda
associates, Apr. 11, 2002. Atta reportedly learned alteration techniques in
Afghanistan, cleaning Ramzi Binalshibh's passport of its Pakistani visa and travel
cachets. CIA analytic report, Al Qaeda travel issues, Jan. 2004, p. 1.
109. Intelligence report, Information on Mujahideen Travel, Mar. 13, 2002.
110. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 25, 2003. A small amount of the
plot's backing came from Shehhi's own funds. He received a salary from the UAE
military, which was sponsoring his studies in Germany, through December 23, 2000.
Binalshibh apparently used some of this money to wire just over $10,000 to Shehhi in
the United States and pay some of his own plot-related expenses. Adam Drucker
interview (Jan. 12, 2004); FBI Report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29,
2004, pp. 20-22.
111. CIA analytic report, "Terrorism: Amount of Money It Takes to Keep al-Qa'ida
Functioning,"Aug.7, 2002; CIA analytic report,"Terrorism: Al-Qa'ida Operating on a
Shoestring," undated (post-9/11); Frank G. interview (Mar. 2, 2004).
112. In the wake of the East Africa embassy bombings, the NSC led trips to Saudi
Arabia in 1999 and 2000 to meet with Saudi officials on terrorist financing. These
meetings, and subsequent interviews of Bin Ladin family members in the United
States, helped the U.S. government revise its understanding of Bin Ladin's wealth.
Rick Newcomb interview (Feb. 4, 2004); William Wechsler interview (Jan. 7, 2004).
113. See William Wechsler interview (Jan. 7, 2004); Rick Newcomb interview (Feb. 4,
2004); Frank G. interview (Mar. 2, 2004); Frank G. and Mary S. briefing (July 15,
2003). See also DOS cable, State 035243, "January 2000 Meeting Regarding UBL
Finances," Feb. 27, 2000; DOS cable, Riyadh 000475, "The Saudi Binladin Group:
Builders to the King,"Feb. 16,1999; Treasury memo, Office of Foreign Asset Control
to DOS, Draft Cable on Meeting with Two of UBL's Brothers, May 19, 2000; Youssef M.
Ibrahim,"Saudis Strip Citizenship from Backers of Militants," New York Times, Apr.
10, 1994, p. 15;"Saudi Family Disassociates Itself from 'Terrorist'
Member,"Associated Press, Feb. 19, 1994.
114. Frank G. and Mary S. briefing (July 15, 2003); Frank G. interview (Mar.2, 2004);
Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 30, 2003; Robert Block, "In War on
Terrorism, Sudan Struck a Blow by Fleecing Bin Laden," Wall Street Journal, Dec. 3,
2001, p. A1. Despite substantial evidence to the contrary and his own assertion that
Bin Ladin arrived in Afghanistan with no money, KSM has told his interrogators that
he believes the bulk of the money (85-95 percent) for the planes operation came from
Bin Ladin's personal fortune. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, July 30,
2003; Apr. 5, 2004; June 15, 2004.
115. Frank G. interview (Mar.2, 2004); CIA analytic report, Financial Support
forTerrorist Organizations, CTC 2002-40117CH, Nov. 14, 2002. The United States was
not a primary source of al Qaeda funding, although some funds raised in the United
States may have made their way to al Qaeda or its affiliated groups. Frank G. and
Mary S. briefing (July 15, 2003).
116. Frank G. interview (Mar. 2, 2004); CIA analytic report, "Identifying al-Qa'ida's
Donors and Fundraisers: A Status Report," CTC 2002-40029CH, Feb. 27, 2002.
117. CIA analytic report, "Identifying al-Qa'ida's Donors and Fundraisers: A Status
Report,"Feb. 27, 2002; CIA analytic report, spectrum of al Qaeda donors, CTC
2003-30199HC, Oct. 30, 2003; Frank G. interview (Mar. 2, 2004).
118. CIA analytic report, "How Bin Ladin Commands a Global Terrorist Network," CTC
99-40003, Jan. 27, 1999; CIA analytic report, "Gauging the War against al-Qa'ida's
Finances," CTC 2002-30078CH, Aug. 8, 2002; CIA analytic report, paper on
Al-Haramain, CTC 2002-30014C, Mar. 22, 2002.
119. CIA analytic report, "Al Qa'ida's Financial Ties to Islamic Youth Programs," CTC
2002-40132HCX, Jan. 17, 2003; CIA analytic report, Al Qaeda Financial Network, CTC
2002-40094H, Aug. 7, 2002.
120. Frank G. interview (Mar.2, 2004); CIA analytic report, Financial Links of Al
Qaeda Operative, CTC 2002- 30060CH, June 27, 2002.
121. Frank G. and Mary S. briefing (July 15, 2003). The Taliban's support was limited
to the period immediately following Bin Ladin's arrival in Afghanistan, before he
reinvigorated fund-raising efforts. By 9/11, al Qaeda was returning the favor,
providing substantial financial support to the Taliban.
122. David Aufhauser interview (Feb. 12, 2004). We have found no evidence that Saudi
Princess Haifa al Faisal provided any funds to the conspiracy, either directly or
indirectly. See Adam Drucker interview (May 19, 2004).
123. On limited Saudi oversight, see Bob Jordan interview (Jan. 14, 2004). In Saudi
Arabia, zakat is broader and more pervasive than Western ideas of charity, in that
it functions not only as charity but also as social welfare, educational assistance,
foreign aid, a form of income tax, and a source of political influence.
124. A hawala, at least in the "pure" form, transfers value without the use of a
negotiable instrument or other commonly recognized method for the exchange of money.
For example, a U.S. resident who wanted to send money to a person in another
country, such as Pakistan, would give her money, in dollars, to a U.S.-based
hawaladar. The U.S. hawaladar would then contact his counterpart in Pakistan, giving
the Pakistani hawaladar the particulars of the transaction, such as the amount of
money, the code, and perhaps the identity of the recipient. The ultimate recipient
in Pakistan would then go to the Pakistani hawaladar and receive his money, in
rupees, from whatever money the Pakistani hawaladar has on hand. As far as the
sender and ultimate recipient are concerned, the transaction is then complete. The
two hawaladars would have a variety of mechanisms to settle their debt, either
through offsetting transactions (e.g., someone in Pakistan sending money to the
United States using the same two hawaladars), a periodic settling wire transfer from
the U.S. hawaladar's bank to the Pakistani hawaladar's bank, or a commercial
transaction, such as the U.S. hawaladar paying a debt or an invoice, in dollars,
that the Pakistani hawaladar owes in the United States. Hawalas typically do not
have a large central control office for settling transactions, maintaining instead a
loose association with other hawaladars to transfer value, generally without any
formal or legally binding agreements. See Treasury report,"A Report to Congress in
Accordance with Section 359 of the [USA PATRIOT Act]"Nov. 2002; Treasury
report,"Hawala: The Hawala Alternate Remittance System and its Role in Money
Laundering," undated (prepared by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network in
cooperation with INTERPOL, probably in 1996).
125. Frank G. and Mary S. briefing (July 15, 2003); CIA analytic report Al-Qa'ida
Financiers, CTC 2002- 30138H, Jan. 3, 2003. Moreover, because al Qaeda initially was
living hand to mouth, there was no need to store funds.
126. CIA analytic report, "Pursuing the Bin Ladin Financial Target," CTC 01-40003HCS,
Apr. 12, 2001; CIA analytic report,"Couriers, Hawaladars Key to Moving Al-Qa'ida
Money," CTC 2003-40063CH, May 16, 2003.
127. For al Qaeda spending, see Frank G. and Mary S. briefing (July 15, 2003). The
1998 U.S. embassy bombings in East Africa cost approximately $10,000. CIA analytic
report, "Gauging the War on Terrorism: Most 11 September Practices Still Viable,"
Jan. 30, 2002; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, June 3, 2003. Although
there is evidence that al Qaeda experienced funding shortfalls as part of the
cyclical fund-raising process (with more money coming during the holy month of
Ramadan), we are not aware of any intelligence indicating that terrorNOTES TO
CHAPTER 5 499 ist acts were interrupted as a result. For al Qaeda expenditures, see,
e.g., CIA analytic report,"Usama Bin Ladin's Finances: Some Estimates of Wealth,
Income, and Expenditures," CTC IR 98-40006, Nov. 17, 1998. For payments to
theTaliban, see Frank G.and Mary S. briefing (July 15, 2003); CIA analytic
report,"Terrorism: Amount of Money It Takes to Keep al-Qa'ida Functioning,"
PWR080702-05, Aug. 7, 2002. On start-up funds, see Frank G. interview (Mar. 2,
2004).
128. Doug Wankel interview (Mar. 15, 2004); Frank G. and Mary S. briefing (July 15,
2003). Although some reporting alleges that Bin Ladin may have been an investor, or
even had an operational role, in drug trafficking before 9/11, this intelligence
cannot be substantiated. Ibid. Frank G. interview (Mar. 2, 2004). No evidence
indicates any such involvement in drug trafficking, and none of the detained al
Qaeda operatives has indicated that this was a method of fund-raising.
129. "Conflict diamonds" refers to rough diamonds that finance armed conflict in
Africa. The international community has tried to restrict trade in such gems. FBI
report, "Allegations of Al Qaeda Trafficking in Conflict Diamonds," July 18, 2003;
CIA analytic report,"Terrorism: Assessing al-Qa'ida and Hizballah Ties to Conflict
Diamonds," CTC 2002-40121CH, Jan. 13, 2003; CIA analytic report,"Couriers,
Hawaladars Key to Moving Al-Qa'ida Money," CTC 2003-40063CH, May 16, 2003; DOS
cable, Brussels 05994,"WP Reporter Claims More Witnesses to 2001 Al-Qaida/Conflict
Diamonds Link," Dec. 12, 2002; DOS cable, Brussels 001054, terrorism and conflict
diamonds, Mar. 1, 2002. Greg R. interviews (Oct. 3, 2003; July 6, 2004); Alan White
interview (June 23, 2004); FBI situation reports and supporting documents from the
Sierra Leone trip, Feb. 2004.
130. Highly publicized allegations of insider trading in advance of 9/11 generally
rest on reports of unusual pre-9/11 trading activity in companies whose stock
plummeted after the attacks. Some unusual trading did in fact occur, but each such
trade proved to have an innocuous explanation. For example, the volume of put
options- investments that pay off only when a stock drops in price-surged in the
parent companies of United Airlines on September 6 and American Airlines on
September 10-highly suspicious trading on its face. Yet, further investigation has
revealed that the trading had no connection with 9/11. A single U.S.-based
institutional investor with no conceivable ties to al Qaeda purchased 95 percent of
the UAL puts on September 6 as part of a trading strategy that also included buying
115,000 shares of American on September 10. Similarly, much of the seemingly
suspicious trading in American on September 10 was traced to a specific U.S.-based
options trading newsletter, faxed to its subscribers on Sunday, September 9, which
recommended these trades. These examples typify the evidence examined by the
investigation. The SEC and the FBI, aided by other agencies and the securities
industry, devoted enormous resources to investigating this issue, including securing
the cooperation of many foreign governments. These investigators have found that the
apparently suspicious consistently proved innocuous. Joseph Cella interview (Sept.
16, 2003; May 7, 2004; May 10-11, 2004); FBI briefing (Aug. 15, 2003); SEC memo,
Division of Enforcement to SEC Chair and Commissioners, "Pre-September 11, 2001
Trading Review," May 15, 2002; Ken Breen interview (Apr. 23, 2004); Ed G. interview
(Feb. 3, 2004).
131. The hijackers spent more than $270,000 in the United States, and the costs
associated with Moussaoui were at least $50,000. The additional expenses included
travel to obtain passports and visas, travel to the United States, expenses incurred
by the plot leaders and facilitators, and the expenses incurred by the people
selected to be hijackers who ultimately did not participate. For many of these
expenses, we have only fragmentary evidence and/or unconfirmed detainee reports, and
can make only a rough estimate of costs. The $400,000 to $500,000 estimate does not
include the cost of running training camps in Afghanistan, where the hijackers were
recruited and trained, or the marginal cost of the training itself. Finally, the
architect of the plot, KSM, put the total cost at approximately $400,000, apparently
excluding Moussaoui's expenses. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, June 3,
2003; Apr. 5, 2004. Our investigation has uncovered no evidence that the 9/11
conspirators employed hawala as a means to move the money that funded the operation.
Indeed, the surviving plot participants have either not mentioned hawala or have
explicitly denied using it to send money to the United States. Adam Drucker
interview (Jan. 12, 2004); Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, April 5, 2004;
Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Apr. 2, 2004; Intelligence report,
interrogation of Ramzi Binalshibh, Apr. 7, 2004. On domestic U.S. and foreign
government funding, see, e.g., Adam Drucker interviews (Jan. 12, 2004; May 19,
2004); Dennis Lormel interview (Jan. 16, 2004); FBI response to Commission question
for the record, July 13, 2004. As discussed in chapter 7, we have examined three
transactions involving individuals in San Diego. Based on all of the evidence, we
have concluded that none of these transactions involved a net transfer of funds to
the hijackers.
132. Shehhi received a salary from the UAE military, which was sponsoring his studies
in Germany. Adam Drucker interview (Jan. 12, 2004). For funds received by
facilitators, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Apr. 5, 2004;
Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Apr. 9, 2004. Notwithstanding
persistent press reports to the contrary, there is no convincing evidence that the
Spanish al Qaeda cell, led by Imad Barkat Yarkas and al Qaeda European financier
Mohammed Galeb Kalaje Zouaydi, provided any funding to support the 9/11 attacks or
the Hamburg participants. Zouaydi may have provided funds to Hamburg associate
Mamoun Darkazanli-see, e.g., FBI letterhead memorandum, Yarkas and Spanish Cell
investigation, Jan. 8,2003-but there is no evidence that Zouaydi provided money to
the plot participants or that any of his funds were used to support the plot. Adam
Drucker interview (Jan. 12, 2004); Ed G. interview (Feb. 3, 2004). 6 From Threat to
Threat
1. President Clinton was a voracious reader of intelligence. He received the
President's Daily Brief (PDB), Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB), and the
State Department's intelligence updates daily, as well as other products
episodically. Berger, Clarke, and Chief of Staff John Podesta received daily Bin
Ladin "Situation Reports" from the CIA detailing Bin Ladin's reported location and
movements. Berger told us he would tell President Clinton if there was anything in
these reports that he needed to know. Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004).
Information on distribution of Bin Ladin Situation Reports provided to the
Commission by CIA.
2. President Clinton spoke of terrorism in numerous public statements. In his August
5,1996, remarks at George Washington University, he called terrorism "the enemy of
our generation." He usually spoke of terrorism in two related contexts: new
technologies and the greater openness engendered by post-Cold War globalization; and
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially-and increasingly over time-the threat
from biological and chemical weapons. President Clinton repeatedly linked terrorist
groups and WMD as transnational threats for the new global era. See, e.g., President
Clinton remarks,"On Keeping America Secure for the 21st Century," Jan. 22, 1999 (at
the National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C.), in which he spoke directly to
these topics.
3. President Clinton spoke of the Y2K computer problem in his January 19, 1999, State
of the Union address. On Y2K concerns, see John Podesta interview (Jan. 15, 2004).
On concerns about extremist groups exploiting millennial opportunities, see, e.g.,
CIA briefing materials, CTC for the DCI, "Millennium Threat,"Dec. 16, 1999.
4. Judith Miller, "Holy Warriors: Dissecting aTerror Plot from Boston to Amman," New
York Times, Jan. 15, 2001, p. A1; CIA analytic report,"Bin Ladin's Terrorist
Operations: Meticulous and Adaptable," CTC 00-400117, Nov. 2, 2000 (appendix B:"Bin
Ladin's Role in the Anti-U.S.'Millennial' Plots").
5. Ibid. On Hoshar and Hijazi, see Jason Burke, Al Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror
(I. B. Tauris, 2003), p. 188. Khaldan and Derunta were terrorist training camps in
Afghanistan controlled by Abu Zubaydah. While the camps were not al Qaeda
facilities, Abu Zubaydah had an agreement with Bin Ladin to conduct reciprocal
recruiting efforts whereby promising trainees at the camps could be invited to join
al Qaeda. See Intelligence report, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, July 10, 2002.
6. Miller, "Holy Warriors," Jan. 15, 2001; CIA analytic report,"Bin Ladin's Terrorist
Operations," Nov. 2, 2000 (appendix B).
7. CIA analytic report, "Bin Ladin's Terrorist Operations," Nov. 2, 2000 (appendix
B).
8. FBI electronic communication, "Ahmed Ressam; Usama bin Ladin; Sbih Benyamin; Lucia
Garofalo; Bouabide Chamchi,"Dec. 29, 1999; Miller,"Holy Warriors," Jan. 15, 2001.
The Encyclopedia is a multivolume instruction manual containing lessons on weapons
handling, tactics, covert operations, bomb making, and other topics. The manual was
originally created in the late 1980s by Afghanistan-based extremists, who considered
it essential for waging terrorist operations and guerrilla warfare in the jihad
against the Soviets. For more on the origins of the Encyclopedia, see Intelligence
report, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, June 24, 2003. Although Deek's precise role
within the extremist community is unknown, his name appears variously as a staff
member, instructor, and technical guru for the Khaldan and Derunta terrorist
training camps in Afghanistan. Intelligence has revealed no extant links to the al
Qaeda inner circle. For more on Deek, see FBI electronic communication,"Usama Bin
Laden; Penttbomb; Taliban," May 25, 2002.
9. Testimony of Dale Watson before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Feb.
9, 2000, p. 4; Miller, "Holy Warriors," Jan. 15, 2001.
10. Testimony of Dale Watson before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Feb.
9, 2000, pp. 3-4; FBI electronic communication, "Ahmed Ressam; Usama bin Ladin; Sbih
Benyamin; Lucia Garofalo; Bouabide Ghamchi," Dec. 29, 1999; Miller,"Holy Warriors,"
Jan. 15, 2001. On the fate of Hoshar and Hijazi's accomplices, see DOS cable, Amman
05158,"Security Court Convicts UBL Suspects of Plotting," Sept. 18, 2000.
11. NSC note, Clarke to Berger, Dec. 4, 1999; Richard Clarke interview (Jan. 12,
2004). In the margin next to Clarke's suggestion to attack al Qaeda facilities in
the week before January 1, 2000, Berger wrote "no."
12. NSC memo, Berger to President Clinton, Dec. 9, 1999.
13. NSC email, Clarke to Berger, Dec. 14, 1999. The State Department, through the
U.S. embassy in Riyadh, also asked the Saudis to relay the same threat to the
Taliban. The diplomat said the United States was delivering "a strong and
unmistakable message to the Taliban that should such attacks occur, they and Bin
Ladin will be subject to swift and serious response." See DOS cable, Riyadh
003900,"Saudis on USG Warning to Taliban Concerning UBLThreats,"Dec. 14,1999. Berger
wrote President Clinton that the State Department's warning seemed to barely
register with the Taliban. See NSC memo, Berger to President Clinton, terrorist
threat at the millennium, Dec. 18, 1999.
14. See NSC memo, talking points for Zinni, Dec. 20, 1999; Anthony Zinni interview
(Jan. 19, 2004); NSC email, Clarke to Berger, Dec. 22, 1999 (in which Clarke writes
that "the Milam mission has largely failed"); NSC memo, Riedel re Milam call
(attached to the Clarke email).
15. George Tenet interview (Jan. 22, 2004); George Tenet prepared statement, Mar. 24,
2004, p. 22.
16. Randy Moss interview (Feb. 6, 2004). In sending the draft MON to the CIA, the
NSC's senior director for intelligence programs, Mary McCarthy, cited only the
August 1998 and July 1999 MONs as relevant preceNOTES TO CHAPTER 6 501
dents-indicating that these new authorities were limited to using the capture and
rendition approach. There was no indication that this MON authorized kill authority,
although lethal force could be used in self-defense. See NSC memo, McCarthy to CIA,
Dec. 1999.
17. CIA cable, "DCI message and update on Millennium threat,"Dec. 20, 1999; NSC
email, Cressey to Berger's office and others, Dec. 23, 1999.
18. Trial testimony of Ahmed Ressam, United States v. Mokhtar Haouari, No. S4 00 Cr.
15 (S.D. N.Y.), July 3, 2001 (transcript pp. 536-569); July 5, 2001 (transcript p.
624); FBI report of investigation, interviews of Ahmed Ressam, May 10, 2001; May 24,
2001. Ressam's recruitment by Abderraouf Hannachi (a Khaldan alumnus) is noted in
Deposition of Ahmed Ressam, In re: Letters Rogatory, August 1, 2001 (S.D. N.Y.),
Jan. 23, 2002 (transcript pp. 32-33). See also PBS Frontline broadcast, "Trail of a
Terrorist,"Oct. 25, 2001 (online at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/ frontline/shows/trail).
19. Trial testimony of Ressam, United States v. Haouari, July 3, 2001 (transcript pp.
570-584); FBI report of investigation, interview of Ressam, Aug. 7, 2001.
20. FBI report of investigation, interview of Ressam, May 10, 2001; Hal Bernton, Mike
Carter, David Heath, and James Neff, "The Terrorist Within: The Story Behind One
Man's Holy War Against America," Seattle Times, June 23-July 7, 2002 (part 11,"The
Ticking Bomb").
21. Trial testimony of Ressam, United States v. Haouari, July 5, 2001 (transcript p.
605); Deposition of Ressam, In re: Letters Rogatory (S.D. N.Y.), Jan. 23, 2002
(transcript p. 23).
22. Trial testimony of Ressam, United States v. Haouari, July 3, 2001; Bernton,
Carter, Heath, and Neff, "The Terrorist Within," June 23-July 7, 2002 (part 6, "It
Takes a Thief "). A friend of Ressam's, Fateh Kamel, would pay Ressam for stolen
passports, credit cards and other identity documents. Kamel is now serving eight
years in prison in France for activities related to association with terrorist
enterprises. Bruce Crumley,"FightingTerrorism: Lessons from France," Time, Sept. 24,
2001 (online at www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,176139,00.html). Ressam
testified that he also sold stolen documents to Mohktar Haouari. See trial testimony
of Ressam, United States v. Haouari, July 5, 2001 (transcript pp. 631-632).
23. PBS Frontline broadcast, "Trail of a Terrorist." Leo Nkounga was the document
broker and an illegal alien in Canada from Cameroon who failed to surrender himself
for deportation in 1993. Canadian deportation order, Adjudication file no.
AOT93-0077, Sept. 15,1993. He said he obtained two genuine Canadian passports for
Ressam by submitting fake baptismal certificates to Canadian authorities. CBC News
broadcast, Disclosure,"Target Terrorism," Mar. 26,2002 (online at
www.cbc.ca/disclosure/archives/020326_leo/resources.html). Ressam told border
officials that he did not have a visa for Pakistan because he was only transiting on
his way to India. FBI report of investigation, interview of Ressam, May 15, 2001, p.
7.
24. FBI case profile (part of materials provided to Dale Watson), "Abdelghani
Meskini," Feb. 8, 2000. Meskini, who spoke English, was to drive Ressam and to give
him money, but Ressam never showed since he was arrested at the border. Meskini was
arrested on Dec. 30, 1999, and charged with material support and interstate fraud.
See Testimony of Dale Watson before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
Feb. 9, 2000, pp. 11-12. On passports and visas provided by Haouari, see United
States v. Haouari, 319 F. 3d 88, 91 (2d Cir. 2002).
25. INS alien file, No. A73603119, Abdel Hakim Tizegha. There is no record of
Tizegha's entry into the United States.
26. Trial testimony of Ressam, United States v. Haouari, July 5, 2001 (transcript pp.
605-607, 613); FBI report of investigation, interview of Ressam, May 10, 2001;
Opening Statement, United States v. Ahmed Ressam, No. CR99- 666C JCC (W.D. Wash.),
Mar. 13, 2001 (transcript p. 33).
27. Trial testimony of Diana Dean and Mark Johnson, United States v. Ressam, Mar. 13,
2001 (transcript pp. 116, 165). On the unraveling of the Ressam case, see Bernton,
Carter, Heath and Neff, "The Terrorist Within," June 23-July 7, 2002 (part
15,"Puzzle Pieces").
28. Trial testimony of Mark Johnson, United States v. Ressam, Mar. 13, 2001
(transcript p. 124).
29. NSC memo, Berger to President Clinton, terrorism threat at the millennium, Dec.
9, 1999.
30. NSC email, Clarke to Berger, Dec. 11, 1999.
31. Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004); George Tenet interview (Jan. 22, 2004).
32. NSC memo, Berger to President Clinton, terrorist threat at the millennium, Dec.
18, 1999.
33. NSC email, Clarke to Berger, roadmap for Small Group, Dec. 22, 1999; NSC email,
Cressey to Berger and others, Dec. 23, 1999.
34. NSC memo, "The Millennium Terrorist Alert-Next Steps," undated (attached to NSC
draft memo, "Review of Terrorism Alert and Lessons Learned," Jan. 3, 2000). In the
original document, the quotation is underlined, not italicized. See also NSC
memo,"Principals Meeting: Millennium Terrorism," undated (likely Dec. 1999); NSC
email, Clarke to Berger, roadmap for Small Group, Dec. 22, 1999.
35. NSC email, Clarke to Berger, roadmap for Small Group, Dec. 22, 1999.
36. Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004). See also Richard Clarke interview (Jan.
12, 2004); Roger Cressey interview (Dec. 15, 2003).
37. Trial testimony of Diana Dean, United States v. Ressam, Mar. 13, 2001 (transcript
p. 124). 502 NOTES TO CHAPTER 6
38. Vanderbilt University, Television News Archive, Dec. 22, 1999-Jan. 4, 2000.
39. On the FBI's standard operating procedure, see Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14,
2004); John Podesta interview (Jan. 15, 2004); James Steinberg interview (Dec. 4,
2003); Richard Clarke interviews (Dec. 18, 2004; Jan. 12, 2004); Paul Kurtz
interview (Dec. 16, 2003).
40. See James Steinberg interview (Dec. 4, 2003). According to Steinberg, the
millennium crisis was the only time that the FBI effectively shared information with
the NSC. Before that, White House officials complained, they got nothing from the
FBI-and were told that they were being deliberately kept out of the loop on grounds
of propriety. See also Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004); Richard Clarke
interview (Jan. 12, 2004); Roger Cressey interview (Dec. 15, 2003). In fact, it was
completely appropriate for the NSC to be briefed by the FBI on its national security
investigations. Moreover, the legal bar to sharing information was often
exaggerated. Only information actually presented to the grand jury could not be
disclosed. See Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
establishes rules for grand jury secrecy.
41. Intelligence report, Activities of Bin Ladin associates, Dec. 29, 1999;
Intelligence report, review of 9/11 hijackers' activities, Sept. 23, 2002; CIA
cable, "Activities of Bin Ladin Associate Khalid Revealed," Jan. 4, 2000.
42. Intelligence report, meetings between Khallad and perpetrators of the 9/11
attacks, May 30, 2003.
43. Intelligence report, Activities of Bin Ladin associates, Jan. 2, 2000; CIA cable,
"Activities of Bin Ladin Associate Khalid Revealed," Jan. 4, 2000; CIA email, CTC to
NSA, Another UBL related report, Jan. 3, 2000.
44. CIA cable, "Activities of Bin Ladin Associate Khalid Revealed," Jan. 4, 2000. His
Saudi passport-which contained a visa for travel to the United States-was
photocopied and forwarded to CIA headquarters. This information was not shared with
FBI headquarters until August 2001. An FBI agent detailed to the Bin Ladin unit at
CIA attempted to share this information with colleagues at FBI headquarters. A CIA
desk officer instructed him not to send the cable with this information. Several
hours later, this same desk officer drafted a cable distributed solely within CIA
alleging that the visa documents had been shared with the FBI. She admitted she did
not personally share the information and cannot identify who told her they had been
shared. We were unable to locate anyone who claimed to have shared the information.
Contemporaneous documents contradict the claim that they were shared. DOJ Inspector
General interview of Doug M., Feb. 12, 2004; DOJ Inspector General interview of
Michael, Oct. 31, 2002; CIA cable, Jan. 5, 2000; DOJ Inspector General report,"A
Review of the FBI's Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the 9/11
Attacks," July 2, 2004, p. 282.
45. CIA cables, "Identification of UBL Associate Khalid Transiting Dubai," Jan. 4,
2000;"UBL Associate Travel to Malaysia-Khalid Bin Muhammad bin 'Abdallah
al-Mihdhar," Jan. 5, 2000;"Arrival of UBL Associate Khalid Bin Muhammad bin
'Abdallah al-Mihdhar," Jan. 6, 2000.
46. CIA cable, "UBL Associates Travel to Malaysia and Beyond-Khalid Bin Muhammad bin
'Abdallah al- Midhar," Jan. 6, 2000.
47. CIA cable, "UBL Associates Depart Malaysia," Jan. 8, 2000.
48. CIA cable, "UBL Associates: Flight Manifest," Jan. 9, 2000. None of the CIA
personnel at CIA headquarters or in the field had checked NSA databases or asked NSA
to do so. If this had been done, on the basis of other unreported intelligence
associated with the same sources, analysts would have been able to quickly learn
"Nawaf " was likely Nawaf al Hazmi. Such analysis was not conducted until after
9/11. After 9/11 it also was determined that Salahsae was part of a name being used
by Tawfiq bin Attash, also known as Khallad. One reason he was traveling around East
Asia at this time is that he was helping to plan possible hijackings on aircraft in
connection with an early idea for what would become the 9/11 plot.
49. CIA cable, "Efforts to Locate al-Midhar," Jan. 13, 2000. We now know that two
other al Qaeda operatives flew to Bangkok to meet Khallad to pass him money. See
chapter 8. That was not known at the time. Mihdhar was met at the Kuala Lumpur
airport by Ahmad Hikmat Shakir, an Iraqi national. Reports that he was a lieutenant
colonel in the Iraqi Fedayeen have turned out to be incorrect. They were based on a
confusion of Shakir's identity with that of an Iraqi Fedayeen colonel with a similar
name, who was later (in September 2001) in Iraq at the same time Shakir was in
police custody in Qatar. See CIA briefing by CTC specialists (June 22, 2004); Walter
Pincus and Dan Eggen,"Al Qaeda Link to Iraq May Be Confusion over Names," Washington
Post, June 22, 2004, p. A13.
50. Richard interview (Dec. 11, 2003); CIA briefing materials, UBL unit briefing
slides, Jan. 3-Jan. 14, 2000; Intelligence reports, "UBL Situation Report," Jan. 5,
10, 12, 2000; CIA email, Rob to John and others,"Malaysia- for the record," Jan. 6,
2000.
51. CIA cable, "Efforts to Locate al-Midhar," Jan. 13, 2000.
52. CIA cable, "UBL Associates: Identification of Possible UBL Associates," Feb. 11,
2000.
53. CIA cable, "UBL Associates: Identification of Possible UBL Associates,"Mar.5,
2000. Presumably the departure information was obtained back in January, on the days
that these individuals made their departures. Because these names were watchlisted
with the Thai authorities, we cannot yet explain the delay in reporting the news.
But since nothing was done with this information even in March, we do not attribute
much significance to this failure alone.
54. See, e.g., Joint Inquiry testimony of GeorgeTenet, Oct.17,2002, pp.110-112; DOJ
Inspector General interview of John, Nov. 1, 2002.
55. CIA briefing, CTC Update, "Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat," Jan. 5, 7, 2000;
George Tenet interview (Jan. 22, 2004). Tenet described the millennium alert as
probably the most difficult operational environment the CIA had ever faced.
56. NSC memo, Clarke to Berger, "Post-Millennium Soul Searching," Jan. 11, 2000.
57. NSC memo, "Review of Terrorism Alert and Lessons Learned," Jan. 3, 2000 (draft).
This paper is part of a packet Clarke sent to Deputy Attorney General Thompson,
copying White House officials, on Sept. 17, 2001.
58. NSC memo, McCarthy to Berger, need for new strategy, Jan. 5, 2000.
59. NSC memo, Kurtz to Berger, roadmap for March 10 PC meeting, Mar. 8, 2000.
60. NSC memo, Cressey to Berger, Summary of Conclusions for March 10, 2000, PC on
Millennium After- Action Review, Apr. 3, 2000; Samuel Berger letter to the
Commission, "Comments on Staff Statements 5-8,"May 13, 2004, p. 9.
61. NSC memo, "The Millennium Terrorist Alert-Next Steps," undated.
62. DOS memo, Sheehan and Inderfurth to Albright, "Pakistan Trip Report-A
Counterterrorism Perspective," Jan. 26, 2000; DOS cable, Islamabad 00396,"Inderfurth
Delegation Meeting with General Musharraf," Jan. 24, 2000.
63. In February 2000, the CIA began receiving information about a possible Bin
Ladin-associated plot to attack Air Force One with Stinger missiles if President
Clinton visited Pakistan; this information was deemed credible by early March. The
CIA also reviewed reported threats to the President in Bangladesh and India. CIA
briefing, "Reported Plan To Attack U.S. Presidential Plane If He Visits
Pakistan,"Feb. 18, 2000; NSC email, Clarke to Berger, terrorism update, Feb. 29,
2000; CIA briefing, chief of CTC for the President,"Threats to the President's Visit
to Asia," Mar. 2, 2000; NSC memo, Kurtz,"Summary of Conclusions of March 14, 2000
Meeting on Clinton Trip to South Asia;" NSC email, Kurtz to Berger, two new threats
to assassinate the President in Bangladesh, Mar. 16, 2000. Berger told us that the
Secret Service was vehemently opposed to a presidential visit to Islamabad; it took
the extraordinary step of meeting twice with the President and offering very serious
warnings. Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004).
64. President Clinton meeting (Apr. 8, 2004). President Clinton told us he offered
Musharraf aid and help in improving U.S.-Pakistani relations. A conversation that
day between the two leaders in the presence of several close advisers is described
in DOS cable, State 073803, "Memorandum of the President's Conversation with Pervez
Musharraf on March 25, 2000," Apr. 19, 2000. A third meeting was apparently held in
front of additional aides. Berger told that President Clinton did not want to press
the Bin Ladin issue too heavily at the main meeting because ISID (Inter-Services
Intelligence Directorate) members were present. Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14,
2004).
65. NSC email, Camp for Berger, "Musharraf 's Proposed Afghanistan Trip,"May 8, 2000.
Clarke wrote Berger that Musharraf seemed to have "said the right things to Omar."
NSC email, Clarke to Berger, May 11, 2000.
66. DOS cable, Islamabad 002902, "Summary of May 26, 2000 Meeting Between Pickering
and Musharraf," May 29, 2000.
67. DOS cable, Islamabad 79983, "DCI Meets with Chief Executive General Musharraf,"
June 21, 2000. Musharraf agreed to create a counterterrorism working group to
coordinate efforts between Pakistani agencies and the CIA. Tenet noted that he was
not asking the Pakistanis to deliver Bin Ladin next Tuesday; the DCI said he was
"ambitious, but not crazy."
68. DOS cable, State 185645, "Concern that Pakistan is Stepping up Support to
Taliban's Military Campaign in Afghanistan," Sept. 26, 2000.
69. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1333, Dec. 19, 2000. UNSCR 1333 also
called for countries to withdraw their officials and agents from the Taliban-held
part of Afghanistan. Sheehan said that the new UN sanctions were aimed at the
Taliban's primary supporters: Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
Michael Sheehan interview (Dec. 16, 2003).
70. Madeleine Albright prepared statement, Mar. 23, 2004, p. 11; Madeleine Albright
interview (Jan. 7, 2004).
71. Michael Sheehan interview (Dec. 16, 2003).
72. The CIA appears to have briefed President Clinton on its "Next Steps and New
Initiatives" in February 2000, noting the need to hire and train the right officers
with the necessary skills and deploy them to the right places, as well as to work
with foreign liaison. The CIA noted in its briefing that the President should press
foreign leaders to maintain pressure on terrorists. See CIA briefing
materials,"Targeting the Terrorists: Next Steps and New Initiatives," Feb. 1, 2000
(for the President); NSC email, Cressey to Berger,"CT Briefing for Clinton," Feb. 8,
2000.
73. For the CTC's perspective, see CIA briefing materials, "Talking Points for the
DCI for the Principals Committee meeting on Terrorism: The Millennium Alert-After
Action Review," Mar. 9, 2000. Deputy Chief of CTC Ben Bonk noted in the talking
points that the CTC had obligated 50 percent of its fiscal year 2000 budget by Jan.
31, 2000, spending about 15 percent of its budget directly on the millennium surge.
He stated that without a supplemental, it would be impossible for the CTC to
continue at its current pace, let alone increase the operational tempo. On Tenet
meeting with Berger, see George Tenet interview (Jan. 28, 2004).
74. Joan Dempsey interview (Nov. 12, 2003); George Tenet interview (Jan. 22, 2004).
Tenet called the supplemental appropriation "a lifesaver." See, for example, the
request for supplemental appropriations in CIA briefing materials,"Targeting the
Terrorists: Next Steps and New Initiatives," Feb. 1, 2000 (for the President).
75. Richard Clarke interview (Feb. 3, 2004).
76. James Pavitt interview (Jan. 8, 2004).
77. Richard Clarke interviews (Dec. 18, 2003; Feb. 3, 2004).
78. CIA memos, summary of weekly Berger/Tenet meeting, Apr. 5, 12, 2000; NSC memo,
"April 19, 2000 Agenda for Deputies Committee Meeting on CT: The MillenniumThreat
FY00 and FY01 Budget Review;"NSC memo,"Summary of Conclusions of April 18, 2000 CSG
Meeting,"Apr. 26, 2000. On May 2, 2000, Berger was updated on budget issues relating
to the CIA and other agencies; there was agreement on the most critical items to be
funded, but not on the source of that funding. In CIA's case, it had already
reprogrammed over $90 million, but Tenet wanted to use most of this money on
non-counterterrorism programs. NSC memo, Kurtz to Berger, "Budget Issues," May 2,
2000. On June 29, 2000, the President authorized raising the CIA's covert action
funding ceiling. NSC memo, McCarthy to CSG, "DCI Wants to Raise Funding Ceiling,"
May 8, 2000; NSC memo, McCarthy to others July 7, 2000 (appendix on authorities).
But funding issues in other agencies remained unresolved. Clarke complained that
neither Treasury nor Justice would identify offsets. Clarke encouraged OMB to tell
both departments that if they would not identify offsets then OMB would. NSC email,
Clarke to Rudman and Mitchell, May 9, 2000. On August 1, 2000, Clarke wrote Berger
that one of five goals by the end of the Clinton administration was to secure
appropriations for cybersecurity and millennium after-action review projects. NSC
memo, Clarke to Berger,"Goals and Wildcards,"Aug.1,2000. As late as September 2000,
Clarke was advising Berger that unfunded counterterrorism requests continued to be
his number one priority. NSC note, Clarke to Berger, Sept. 9, 2000.
79. Executive Order 13099 (Aug. 20, 1998); Rick Newcomb interview (Feb. 4, 2004);
Robert McBride interview (Nov. 19-20, 2003); NSC memo, Kurtz to Berger, June 28,
2000. OFAC did freeze accounts belonging to Salah Idris, the owner of the al Shifa
facility bombed in response to the East Africa embassy bombings. Idris filed suit
against his bank and OFAC. OFAC subsequently authorized the unfreezing of those
accounts. James Risen, "To Bomb Sudan Plant, or Not: A Year Later, Debates Rankle,"
New York Times, Oct. 27, 1999, p. A1. The inability to freeze funds is attributed in
part to a lack of intelligence on the location of Bin Ladin's money, OFAC's
reluctance or inability to rely on what classified information there may have been,
and Bin Ladin's transfer of assets into the hands of trusted third parties or out of
the formal financial system by 1998. Even if OFAC had received better intelligence
from the intelligence community, it would have been powerless to stop the bulk of
the problem. Al Qaeda money flows depended on an informal network of hawalas and
Islamic institutions moving money from Gulf supporters to Afghanistan. These funds
would not therefore have touched the U.S. formal financial system. OFAC's
authorities are only against U.S. persons, financial institutions, and businesses.
Frank G. and Mary S. briefing (July 15, 2003); Rick Newcomb interview (Feb. 4,
2003).
80. Executive Order 13129; Treasury memo, Newcomb to Johnson, "Blocking of
Taliban-Controlled Assets," undated (probably Oct. 18, 1999).
81. DOS cable, State 184471, Sept. 30, 1999; 18 U.S.C. � 2339B.
82. The Financial Action Task Force, a multilateral government organization dedicated
to standard setting, focused on money laundering, particularly as it related to
crimes such as drug trafficking and large-scale fraud that involved vast amounts of
illegally procured money. Although the UN General Assembly adopted the International
Convention for the Suppression of Financing Terrorism in December 1999, the
convention did not enter into force until April 2002.
83. Doug M. interview (Dec. 16, 2003); Frank G. interview (Mar. 2, 2004). See also
Mike interview (Dec. 11, 2003), setting forth the goals of the UBL station; none
relate specifically to terrorist financing. Another witness recalled that the UBL
station made some effort to gather intelligence on al Qaeda financing, but it proved
to be too hard a target, the CIA had too few sources and, as a result, little
quality intelligence was produced. Ed G. interview (Feb. 3, 2004). Some attributed
the problem to the CIA's separation of terrorist-financing analysis from other
counterterrorism activities. Within the Directorate of Intelligence, a group was
devoted to the analysis of all financial issues, including terrorist financing.
Called the Office of Transnational Issues (OTI), Illicit Transaction Groups (ITG),
it dealt with an array of issues besides terrorist financing, including drug
trafficking, drug money laundering, alien smuggling, sanctions, and corruption. ITG
was not part of the CTC, although it rotated a single analyst to CTC. Moreover, OTI
analysts were separated from the operational side of terrorist financing at CTC,
which planned operations against banks and financial facilitators. William Wechsler
interview (Jan. 7, 2004); Frank G. and Mary S. briefing (July 15, 2003).
84. CIA analytic report, "Funding Islamic Extremist Movements: The Role of Islamic
Financial Institutions," OTI 97-10035CX, Dec. 1997.
85. Mike interview (Dec. 11, 2003).
86. CIA analytic reports, "Usama Bin Ladin: Some Saudi Financial Ties Probably
Intact,"OTI IR 99-005CX, Jan. 11, 1999;"How Bin Ladin Commands a Global Terrorist
Network," CTC 99-40003, Jan. 27, 1999; "Islamic Terrorists: Using Nongovernmental
Organizations Extensively," CTC 99-40007, Apr. 9, 1999.
87. See NSC memo, Kurtz to Berger, June 28, 2000; NSC document, TNT to Berger, Nov.
3, 1998, roadmap for Small Group, undated. The problem continued until 9/11.
Intelligence reporting was so limited that one CIA intelligence analyst told us
that, unassisted, he could read and digest the universe of intelligence reporting on
al Qaeda financial issues in the three years prior to the 9/11 attacks. Frank G. and
Mary S. briefing (July 15, 2003).
88. Richard Clarke interview (Feb. 3, 2004); see, e.g., NSC memo, Clarke to CSG,
"Concept of Operations for Task Force Test of the Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking
Center," Nov. 1, 2000; Treasury memo, Romey to Sloan, "FTAT SCIF," May 17, 2001;
Treasury memo, Newcomb to Sloan,"Response to Romey Memo," May 23, 2001. Despite
post-9/11 declarations to the contrary, on the eve of 9/11 FTAT had funds
appropriated, but no people hired, no security clearances, and no space to work.
Treasury memo, Newcomb to Dam,"Establishing the Foreign Asset Tracking Center,"Aug.
3, 2001. One Treasury official described CIA's posture as "benign neglect" toward
the Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center (FTATC), and characterized the CIA as
believing that financial tracking had limited utility. Treasury memo, Mat Burrows to
O'Neill,"Your PC on Counterterrorism on 4 September," Sept. 4, 2001. National
Security Advisor Rice told us she and her staff had determined by spring 2001 that
terrorist financing proposals were a good option, so Treasury continued to plan to
establish an office for 24 financing analysts. Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7,
2004). In fact, as noted above, Treasury failed to follow through on the
establishment of the FTATC until after 9/11.
89. This assessment is based on an extensive review of FBI files and interviews with
agents and supervisors at FBI Headquarters and various field offices.
90. Although there was an increased focus on money laundering, several significant
legislative and regulatory initiatives designed to close vulnerabilities in the U.S.
financial system failed to gain traction. Some of these, such as a move to control
foreign banks with accounts in the United States, died as a result of banking
industry pressure. Others, such as the regulation of money remitters within the
United States, were mired in bureaucratic inertia and a general antiregulatory
environment. In any event, it is an open question whether such legislative or
regulatory initiatives would have significantly harmed al Qaeda, which generally
made little use of the U.S. financial system to move or store its money.
91. Treasury report, "The 2001 National Money Laundering Strategy," Sept. 2001.
92. NSC email, Berger's office to executive secretaries, "Millennium Alert After
Action Review," Mar. 9, 2000.
93. PDD-62, "Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans
Overseas," May 22, 1998, pp. 8-9; NSC email, Berger's office to executive
secretaries, "Millennium Alert After Action Review," Mar. 9, 2000.
94. PDD-62, May 22, 1998; PDD-39, "U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism," June 21, 1995,
p. 2.
95. NSC email, Berger's office to executive secretaries, "Millennium Alert After
Action Review," Mar. 9, 2000.
96. PDD-62, May 22, 1998, p. 9. Congress had authorized the Alien Terrorist Removal
Court at the request of the Justice Department in 1996, and it was established in
1997. Clarke noted the court had not been "highly useful." NSC email, Berger's
office to executive secretaries,"Millennium Alert After Action Review," Mar. 9,
2000. Indeed, it had not been used at all.
97. PDD-62, May 22, 1998, p. 8; NSC memo, Clarke, "Summary of Conclusions for March
31, 2000 Millennium Alert Immigration Review Meeting,"Apr. 13, 2000. One provision
from PDD-62 not updated and reiterated in 2000 was a directive to CIA to ensure that
names (and aliases) of terrorists were collected and disseminated to State, INS, and
the FBI in a timely way, so that the border agencies could place them on a watchlist
and the FBI could identify them in the United States.
98. NSC email, Berger's office to executive secretaries, "Millennium Alert After
Action Review," Mar. 9, 2000.
99. Richard Clarke interview (Feb.3, 2004); Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004);
Scott Fry interview (Dec. 29, 2003); Scott Gration interview (March 3, 2004); NSC
email, Clarke to Berger, Mar. 2, 2000. Clarke apparently took the comment as a
presidential instruction to take another look at what additional actions could be
taken against Bin Ladin. Given diplomatic failures to directly pressure the Taliban
through Pakistan, the NSC staff saw increased support to the Northern Alliance and
Uzbeks as alternative options. NSC memo, "The MillenniumTerrorist Alert- Next
Steps," undated.
100. A good account of the episode is found in Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret
History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to
September 10, 2001 (Penguin, 2004), pp. 487-491; see also ibid., pp. 495-496,
502-503, 517-519; Richard interview (Dec. 11, 2003). "Richard" told us the attack
had already occurred when CIA headquarters heard about it;"within this building,
they were breathless," he remarked. The CIA concern was apparently over possible
casualties and whether, by sharing intelligence with Massoud on Bin Ladin's possible
location, the CIA might have violated the assassination ban. Tenet did not recall
the incident, saying it was no doubt just "a blip" on his screen within the context
of the millennium alerts. George Tenet interview (Jan. 22, 2004). The incident was,
however, noticed by the NSC counterterrorism staff, which pointedly asked to be kept
in the loop in the future. NSC memo,"Review of Terrorism Alert and Lessons Learned,"
Jan. 3, 2000 (draft).
101. See, e.g., CIA officers' visits to Tashkent noted in CIA briefing materials, DCI
Update, "Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat," Feb. 18, 2000; CIA briefing materials,
EXDIR Update, Visit to Tashkent, Apr. 5, 2000. CTC teams were deployed to
Afghanistan to meet with Massoud on March 13-21, 2000, and possibly on April 24-28,
2000. CIA briefing materials, EXDIR Update,"Islamic
ExtremistTerroristThreat,"Mar.6,2000; CIA briefing materials, "CTC PowerPoint," Apr.
3, 2000. Massoud's representatives also met with Clarke, the State Department's
Michael Sheehan, and CIA senior managers in Washington. CIA briefing materials,"DDO
Update,"May 22, 2000.
102. On Black and Clarke's positions, see Cofer Black interview (Dec. 9, 2003); Roger
Cressey interview (Dec. 15, 2003). On reasons for caution, see, e.g., Strobe Talbott
interview (Jan. 15, 2004).
103. See, e.g., CIA briefing materials, CTC Update for the DDCI, July 7, 2000
("Direct engagement with Massoud will enhance our ability to report on UBL and
increase retaliation options if . . .we are attacked by UBL").
104. The deputy chief for operations of CTC, "Henry," told us that going into the
Afghanistan sanctuary was essential. He and Black proposed direct engagement with
Massoud to the CIA's senior management, but the idea was rejected because of what
"Henry" called "a question of resources"-the CIA did not have effective means to get
personnel in or out of Afghanistan. When he proposed sending a CIA team into
northern Afghanistan to meet with Massoud in August 2000, the idea was turned down;
local helicopters were not deemed airworthy, and land access was too risky. Henry
interview (Nov. 18, 2003); Henry briefing (Apr. 22, 2004).
105. The alleged attempt was reported on August 10, 2000; see CIA memo, Bonk to
McCarthy and Clarke, "Attempted Interdiction of Suspect Bin Ladin's Convoy,"Aug. 11,
2000. For doubts as to whether the tribals made this attempt, see Cofer Black
interview (Dec. 9, 2003); Richard interview (Dec. 11, 2003).
106. The Joint Chiefs of Staff Warning Order of July 6, 1999, was still in effect.
See DOD memo, "Military Response Options," Oct. 23, 2000.
107. The 13 options included B-2 bombers, missiles, AC-130 gunships, the armed UAV,
and raids to capture and destroy al Qaeda leaders and targets. DOD briefing
materials, Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Operation Infinite Resolve Brief," June 2000.
108. Scott Gration interview (Mar. 3, 2004). See also Scott Fry interview (Dec. 29,
2003).
109. This quotation is taken from Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of
SacredTerror (Random House, 2002), p. 318. President Clinton confirmed that he made
this statement. President Clinton meeting (Apr. 8, 2004).
110. President Clinton meeting (Apr. 8, 2004); Hugh Shelton interview (Feb. 5, 2004);
William Cohen interview (Feb. 5, 2004).
111. Scott Gration interview (Mar. 3, 2004); Scott Fry interview (Dec. 29, 2003).
112. NSC memo, Clarke to CSG members, "Follow-Up to bin Ladin Review," Apr. 25, 2000.
See also CIA briefing materials,"DDCI Update," Apr. 21, 2000 (J-39 "has decided to
do everything possible to support CIA's UBL efforts"). This reportedly included
J-39's belief that it would be able to pay for all costs-though, as it turned out,
that would not be the case. CIA managers were reluctant to go ahead with either the
telescope or the Predator options. Executive Director David Carey told us they saw
the projects as a "distraction" that would pull personnel and resources away from
other, high-priority activities, such as worldwide disruptions. The telescope
program, for instance, was considered too challenging and risky for the CIA's Afghan
assets; development continued through the summer, but the idea was eventually
dropped. David Carey interview (Oct. 31, 2003); Scott Fry interview (Dec. 29, 2003);
Scott Gration interview (Mar. 3, 2004).
113. According to Charles Allen, the CIA's senior management, especially within the
Directorate of Operations, was originally averse to the Predator program mostly
because of the expense-approximately $3 million, which the directorate claimed it
did not have. Charles Allen interview (Jan. 27, 2004). The argument between CIA and
DOD over who would pay for proposed operations continued for months. On the CIA side
see, for example, CIA briefing materials, "DDO Update,"May 22, 26, 2000 (at which
the DCI was told that unless funding was identified within the next 10 days, the
military advised that the Predator could not be deployed that fiscal year; the
military was waiting for an NSC request that it fund the projects). See also NSC
memo, Clarke to Tenet, June 25, 2000 ("The other CSG agencies are unanimous that the
Predator project is our highest near-term priority and that funding should be
shifted to it"). Clarke noted that the CSG plan was to use DOD money to jump-start
the program. On the cost-sharing agreement, see NSC memo, Kurtz to Berger, June 28,
2000; NSC memo, "Small Group agenda," June 29, 2000. Eventually,"after some
pushing," the CIA found $2 million from its funds to pay for two months of trial
flights. DOD agreed to fund $2.4 million. NSC memo, Kurtz to Berger, June 28, 2000.
114. NSC memo, Kurtz to Berger, June 28, 2000. On UAV tests, see CIA briefing
materials, "DCI Update," July 14, 2000. On modifications, see NSC memo, Clarke to
Berger, update, July 18, 2000.
115. NSC memo, Clarke to Berger, "Predator,"Aug. 11, 2000.
116. NSC memo, Cressey to Berger, Aug.18, 2000 (underlining in the original); NSC
memo, Cressey to Berger, Aug. 21, 2000 (attaching informational memo to President
Clinton).
117. NSC note, Clarke to Berger, Sept. 9, 2000.
118. John Maher III interview (Apr. 22, 2004). The CIA's Ben Bonk told us he could
not guarantee from analysis of the video feed that the man in the white robe was in
fact Bin Ladin, but he thinks Bin Ladin is the "highest probability person." (Bin
Ladin is unusually tall.) Ben Bonk briefing (Mar. 11, 2004). Intelligence analysts
seem to have determined this might have been Bin Ladin very soon after the September
28 sighting; two days later, Clarke wrote to Berger that there was a "very high
probability" Bin Ladin had been located. NSC note, Clarke to Berger, "Procedures for
Protecting Predator," Sept. 30, 2000.
119. NSC note, Clarke to Berger, "Procedures for Protecting Predator," Sept. 30,
2000. Clarke pointed to a silver lining: "The fact that its existence has become at
least partially known, may for a while change the al Qida movement patterns," he
wrote, but "it may also serve as a healthy reminder to al Qida and the Taliban that
they are not out of our thoughts or sight." Ibid.
120. Clarke wrote to Berger that "it might be a little gloomy sitting around the fire
with the al Qida leadership these days." NSC note, Clarke to Berger, Sept. 9, 2000.
121. For the number of dead and wounded, see Indictment, United States v. Jamal Ahmed
Mohammed Ali al- Badawi, No. S12 98 Cr. 1023 (KTD) (S.D. N.Y. filed May 15, 2003),
p. 16.
122. See Intelligence report, interrogation of Abd al Rahim al Nashiri, Feb. 21,
2004. For Khallad, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Aug. 20, 2003.
For Khamri and Nibras's full names, Quso's responsibility to film the attack, and
Nibras and Quso delivering money, see Indictment, United States v. al-Badawi, May
15, 2003, pp. 13-14. Badawi was supposed to film the attack but had to travel, so he
instructed Quso to do it instead. FBI notes, notes of Nov. 11 and 13 executive
conference call, Nov. 13, 2000, p. 2. For Quso's admission of delivering money, see
Al S. interviews (Aug. 26, 2003; Sept. 15, 2003).
123. For Bin Ladin's decision, Nashiri's trip to protest, and Nashiri's instructions,
see Intelligence report, interrogation of Nashiri, Feb. 21, 2004. For a report that
Nashiri did not instruct the operatives to attack, see Intelligence report,
interrogation of Nashiri, Nov. 21, 2002.
124. For the attack, see Indictment, United States v. al-Badawi, May 15, 2003, p. 16.
For Quso not filming the attack, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Fahd
Mohammed Ahmad al-Quso, Feb. 3, 2001, p. 8. Quso apparently fell asleep and missed
the attack. See FBI notes, notes of Nov. 11 and 13 executive conference call, Nov.
13, 2000, p. 2.
125. For Bin Ladin's order to evacuate and subsequent actions, see Intelligence
report, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, Dec. 13, 2003. For Bin Ladin's, Atef 's, and
Zawahiri's movements, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Sept. 27,
2003.
126. Intelligence report, Terrorism Activities, Oct. 1, 2001.
127. For the media committee, the video, and its effect, see Intelligence report,
autobiography of KSM, July 12, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Apr.
4, 2003. On the bombing of the Cole sparking jihadist recruitment, see Intelligence
report, interrogation of Khallad, Sept. 5, 2003.
128. See Barbara Bodine interview (Oct. 21, 2003); Al S. interviews (Aug. 26, 2003;
Sept. 15, 2003). On the problems with having Americans bring firearms into the
country, see also NSC email, Clarke to Berger, USS Cole- situation report for PC
meeting, Oct. 13, 2000. U.S. officials cannot travel to a country without the
clearance of the U.S. ambassador to that country.
129. For suspicion of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, see NSC memo, Berger to President
Clinton, update on Cole attack, Oct. 12, 2000. For McLaughlin's statement, see John
McLaughlin interview (Jan. 21, 2004). In this vein, the State Department advised the
investigation not to rush to judgment that al Qaeda was responsible. Barbara Bodine
interview (Oct. 21, 2003).
130. For Yemen barring the FBI, see Al S. interviews (Aug. 26, 2003; Sept. 15, 2003).
For the CIA's characterization, see CIA report, threat to U.S.personnel in Yemen,
Oct.18,2000. For the high-level interventions, see Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14,
2004); Kenneth Pollack interview (Sept. 24, 2003); CIA cable, CIA talking points for
Tenet's call to chief of Yemen intelligence, Oct. 26, 2000. On secondhand
information, see John McLaughlin interview (Jan. 21, 2004).
131. FBI notes, notes of Nov. 11 and 13 executive conference call, Nov. 13, 2000; FBI
electronic communication, " Summary of information from Yemen intelligence," Jan.
10, 2001.
132. For the FBI agent's role, see Al S. interviews (Aug. 26, 2003; Sept. 15, 2003).
For Yemen providing the photograph, see FBI electronic communication, "Summary of
information from Yemen intelligence," Jan. 10, 2001. For the source identifying the
photograph, see FBI electronic communication,"Source reporting on al Qaeda," Jan.
16, 2001.
133. For Khallad's involvement in the embassy bombings, see FBI report of
investigation, interview of Mohammad Rashed Daoud al Owhali, Sept. 9, 1998. For
Yemen identifying Nashiri, see FBI electronic communication, "Information provided
by Yemen intelligence," Dec. 17, 2000.
134. Richard Clarke interview (Feb. 3, 2004). Richard Miniter offers an account of
the Clinton administration's deliberations about the Cole in Richard Miniter, Losing
Bin Laden: How Bill Clinton's Failures Unleashed Global Terror (Regnery, 2003),
pp.222-227. Berger told us the account is "a crock." Samuel Berger interview (Jan.
14, 2004). Clarke was less critical. Richard Clarke interview (Feb. 3, 2004).
135. For the additional covert action authorities, see NSC memo, McCarthy to Berger,
new covert action authorities, Oct. 31, 2000. For Tenet developing options, see NSC
memo, Berger to President Clinton, update on Cole investigation, Nov. 25, 2000.
136. For Berger's authorization, see NSC memo, TNT to Berger, responding to Taliban's
September overture, Oct.20,2000. For Berger's statement, see NSC memo, Berger toTNT,
reply to Oct. 20,2000, memo. For the administration working with Russia, see NSC
memo, Berger to President Clinton, update on Cole investigation, Nov. 25, 2000.
137. President Clinton meeting (Apr. 8, 2004).
138. Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004).
139. In the first ten days after the bombing, between October 13 and 23, at least
three high-level briefing items discussed responsibility for the attack. The next
such briefing item we can find summarized the evidence for the new Bush
administration on January 25, 2001. On the guidance, and the presumed reasons for
it, see Barbara Bodine interview (Oct. 21, 2003); Pattie Kindsvater interview (Mar.
29, 2004); Ben Bonk statement during John McLaughlin interview (Jan. 21, 2004); see
also John McLaughlin interview (Jan. 21, 2004); Richard interview (Dec. 11, 2003).
140. For Clarke's statement, see NSC email, Clarke to Berger, Nov. 7, 2000. For the
November 10 briefing, see CIA briefing materials, preliminary findings regarding the
Cole attack for the Nov. 10, 2000, Small Group meeting, undated (appears to be Nov.
10, 2000). For Berger and Clarke's communication with the President, see NSC memo,
Berger to President Clinton, USS Cole investigation update, Nov. 25, 2000.
141. See Gregory Newbold interview (Sept. 29, 2003); William Cohen interview (Feb. 5,
2004). For Shelton tasking Franks, see DOD memo, Joint Chiefs of Staff tasking, Mod
005 to Joint Planning Directive to U.S. Central Command, Nov. 30, 2000. For Shelton
briefing Berger, see NSC memo, Berger to President Clinton, USS Cole investigation
update, Nov. 25,2000. For the 13 options, see also DOD briefing materials, Operation
Infinite Resolve Contingency Plan Brief, undated. For the briefing to Kerrick, see
DOD briefing materials, briefing to Lt. Gen. Kerrick, Dec. 20, 2000. For the
briefing of other DOD officials, see DOD briefing materials, "Evolution of Infinite
Resolve Planning, Summary of TLAM Availability (1998-2001), Evolution of the Armed
Predator Program," Mar. 19, 2004, p. 5.
142. NSC memo, Berger to President Clinton, USS Cole investigation update, Nov. 25,
2000.
143. Ibid. For Clarke's ideas, see NSC memo, Clarke to Sheehan and Hull, "Ultimatum
Strategy with the Taliban," Nov. 25, 2000.
144. CIA briefing materials, "Intelligence Assessment: The Attack on the USS Cole,"
Dec. 21, 2000.
145. Ibid.
146. President Clinton meeting (Apr. 8, 2004); Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14,
2004).
147. For Albright's advisers, see DOS memo, Inderfuth to Albright, Dec. 19, 2000; DOS
memo, Hull and Eastham to Albright, preparation for Principals Committee meeting,
Dec. 21, 2000. See also DOS briefing materials, talking points for Principals
Committee meeting, Dec. 21, 2000; William Cohen interview (Feb. 5, 2004); Hugh
Shelton interview (Feb. 5, 2004).
148. Richard Clarke interview (Feb. 3, 2004)
149. Richard Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror (Free Press,
2004), p. 224. Sheehan has not disavowed Clarke's quote.
150. George Tenet interview (Jan. 28, 2004).
151. Pattie Kindsvater interview (Mar. 29, 2004). For Clarke's awareness, see NSC
email, Clarke to Cressey, "Considerations," Oct. 25, 2000.
152. For the lack of meaningful targets, see Scott Fry interview (Dec. 29, 2003);
Walter Slocombe interview (Dec. 19, 2003).
153. CIA memo, Black to Clarke, "NSC Requests on Approaches for Dealing with Problems
in Afghanistan," Dec. 29, 2000.
154. See Samuel Berger letter to the Commission, "Comments on Staff Statements 5-8,"
May 13, 2004. For the Blue Sky memorandum's proposals being rolled into proposals
considered by the new administration, see George Tenet interview (Jan. 28, 2004);
John McLaughlin interview (Jan. 21, 2004). On the internal CIA draft of the Blue Sky
memorandum, Deputy Director for Operations James Pavitt added a handwritten note
that he posed no objection if the memorandum was for transition discussion purposes,
but "I do not believe a proposal of this magnitude should be on the table for
implementation" so late in the Clinton administration. He also questioned the
proposal for support to Massoud. CIA memo,"Options to Undermine Usama Bin Ladin and
al-Qa'ida,"Dec. 18, 2000.
155. NSC memo, "Strategy for Eliminating the Threat from the Jihadist Networks of al
Qida: Status and Prospects," undated (appears to be Dec. 29, 2001), attached to NSC
memo, Clarke to Rice, Jan. 25, 2001.
156. Ben Bonk interview (Jan. 21, 2004); John McLaughlin interview (Jan. 21, 2004).
157. Robert McNamara, Jr., interview (Apr. 19, 2004).
158. President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004); Condoleezza
Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004); James Pavitt interview (Jan. 8, 2004). Pavitt also
recalls telling the President-elect that killing Bin Ladin would not end the threat.
Vice President-elect Cheney, Rice, Hadley, and White House Chief of Staff-designate
Andrew Card also attended the briefing, which took place about a week before the
inauguration. The President noted that Tenet did not say he did not have authority
to kill Bin Ladin. Tenet told us he recalled the meeting with Bush but not what he
said to the President-elect. George Tenet interview (Jan. 28, 2004). He told us,
however, that if circumstances changed and he needed more authority, he would have
come back to either President Clinton or PresNOTES TO CHAPTER 6 509 ident Bush and
asked for the additional authority. See George Tenet testimony, Mar. 24, 2004. The
Blair House CIA briefing is recounted in some detail in Bob Woodward, Bush at War
(Simon & Schuster, 2002), pp. 34-35.
159. President Clinton meeting (Apr. 8, 2004).
160. President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004).
161. NSC briefing materials, "CT Briefing for Bush-Cheney Transition Team,
APNSA-Designate Rice,"Policy, Organization, Priorities," undated. Powell was briefed
by the full CSG, at his request.
162. Richard Clarke interview (Feb.3, 2004); Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004);
Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004); Roger Cressey interview (Dec. 15, 2003);
Paul Kurtz interviews (Dec. 16, 2003; Dec. 22, 2003).
163. Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004); Stephen Hadley meeting (Jan. 31, 2004).
Hadley told us that he was able to do less policy development than in a normal
two-month transition.
164. Public references by candidate and then President Bush about terrorism before
9/11 tended to reflect these priorities, focusing on state-sponsored terrorism and
WMD as a reason to mount a missile defense. See, e.g., President Bush remarks,
Warsaw University, June 15, 2001.
165. Rice and Zelikow had been colleagues on the NSC staff during the first Bush
administration and were coauthors of a book concerning German unification. See
Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study
in Statecraft (Harvard Univ. Press, 1995). As the Executive Director of the
Commission, Zelikow has recused himself from our work on the Clinton-Bush transition
at the National Security Council.
166. Philip Zelikow interview (Oct. 8, 2003).
167. Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004).
168. Ibid.
169. Richard Clarke interviews (Dec. 18, 2003; Feb. 3, 2004); Roger Cressey interview
(Dec. 15, 2003). As Clarke put it, "There goes our ability to get quick decisions."
Richard Clarke interview (Feb. 3, 2004). However, Paul Kurtz told the Commission
that even though Clarke complained about losing his seat on the Principals Committee
on terrorism issues, Kurtz saw no functional change in Clarke's status. Paul Kurtz
interviews (Dec. 16, 2003; Dec. 22, 2003).
170. President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004); GeorgeTenet
interview (Jan. 28, 2004).
171. President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004).
172. NSC memo, Clarke to Rice, al Qaeda review, Jan. 25, 2001 (italics and
underlining of the word urgently in original). Clarke's staff called on other
occasions for early Principals Committee decisions, including in a "
Day Plan" that called for cabinet-level decisions on the Northern Alliance,
Uzbekistan, Predator, and the Cole. See NSC memo, Fenzel to Rice, Feb. 16, 2001.
Other requests for early PCs are found in NSC email, Fenzel to Hadley, "Early PC
Meeting Priorities," Feb. 2, 2001; NSC email, Cressey to NSC Front Office,"TNT
Meeting Priorities," Feb. 7, 2001; NSC email, Cressey to Moran,"Aid to NA,"Feb. 12,
2001; NSC memo, Cressey to Rice, Mar. 2, 2001.
173. NSC memo, Clarke to Rice, al Qaeda review, Jan. 25, 2001.
174. The Bush administration held 32 Principals Committee meetings on subjects other
than al Qaeda before 9/11. Condoleezza Rice testimony, Apr. 8, 2004; White House
information provided to the Commission. Rice told us the Administration did not need
a principals meeting on al Qaeda because it knew that al Qaeda was a major threat.
Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004) Condoleezza Rice testimony, Apr. 8, 2004.
175. CNN broadcast, "CNN Ahead of the Curve,"Oct. 13, 2000. Vice presidential
candidate Dick Cheney also urged swift retaliation against those responsible for
bombing the destroyer, saying:"Any would-be terrorist out there needs to know that
if you're going to attack, you'll be hit very hard and very quick. It's not time for
diplomacy and debate. It's time for action." Associated Press,"Cheney: Swift
Retaliation Needed," Oct. 13, 2000.
176. George Tenet interview (Jan. 28, 2004).
177. NSC memo, Clarke to Rice, al Qaeda review, Jan. 25, 2001.
178. NSC memo, Clarke to Vice President Cheney, Feb. 15, 2001.
179. CIA briefing materials, "UBL Strategic Overview and USS COLE Attack Update,"
Mar. 27, 2001. These briefing slides appear to have been recycled from slides
prepared on Jan. 10, 2001.
180. In early March, Cressey wrote Rice and Hadley that at a belated wedding
reception at Tarnak Farms for one of Bin Ladin's sons, the al Qaeda leader had read
a new poem gloating about the attack on the Cole. NSC email, Cressey to Rice and
Hadley, "BIN LADIN on the USS COLE,"Mar. 2, 2001. A few weeks later, Cressey wrote
Hadley that while the law enforcement investigation went on,"we know all we need to
about who did the attack to make a policy decision." NSC email, Cressey to
Hadley,"Need for Terrorism DC Next Week," Mar. 22, 2001. Around this time, Clarke
wrote Rice and Hadley that the Yemeni prime minister had told State Department
counterterrorism chief Hull that while Yemen was not saying so publicly, Yemen was
99 percent certain that Bin Ladin was responsible for the Cole. NSC email, Clarke to
NSC Front Office,"Yemen's View on the USS Cole," Mar. 24, 2001. In June, Clarke
wrote Rice and Hadley that a new al Qaeda video claimed responsibility for the Cole.
NSC email, Clarke to Rice and Hadley, "Al Qida Video Claims Responsibility for Cole
Attack," June 21, 2001. Later that month, two Saudi jihadists arrested by Bahraini
authorities during the threat spike told their captors that their al Qaeda training
camps in Afghanistan had held celebratory parties over the Cole attack. NSC email,
Clarke to NSC Front Office and others,"Captured Al Qida Terrorist Met UBL Then Were
to Attack US in Saudi Arabia," June 29, 2001.
181. President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004).
182. Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb.7, 2004); Donald Rumsfeld meeting (Jan. 30, 2004);
Paul Wolfowitz interview (Jan. 20, 2004); Stephen Hadley meeting (Jan. 31, 2004).
183. See CIA memo, "History of Funding for CIA Counterterrorism," Aug. 12, 2002. One
of Clarke's concerns had been the level of funding for counterterrorism in the new
administration's first budget. See, e.g., NSC memo, Clarke to Vice President Cheney,
Feb. 15, 2001.
184. NSC note to Hadley, undated (attached to NSC memo, Cressey to Rice, aid to
Northern Alliance and Uzbekistan, Mar. 2, 2001).
185. Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004). Rice remembered President Bush using
this phrase in May 2001, when warnings of terrorist threats began to multiply.
However, speaking on background to the press in August 2002, Richard Clarke
described a directive from the President in March 2001 to "stop swatting at flies"
and "just solve this problem." A reporter then said to Clarke that he understood
Bush to have given that direction in May, and Clarke said:"No, it was March." Fox
News transcript,"Clarke Praises Bush Team in '02,"Mar. 24, 2004 (online at
www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_story/0,3566,115085,00.html).
186. Barton Gellman, "A Strategy's Cautious Evolution: Before Sept. 11, the Bush
Anti-Terror Effort Was Mostly Ambition," Washington Post, Jan. 20, 2001, p. A1.
187. President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004).
188. NSC notes, John Bellinger notes from March 7, 2001, meeting; NSC email, Cressey
to Rice and Hadley, "BIN LADIN on the USS COLE,"Mar. 2, 2001; CIA briefing
materials, Deputies Committee Briefing,"Countering the Threat from al-Qa'ida," Mar.
7, 2001.
189. Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004). On the Iraq PC, see Bob Woodward, Plan
of Attack (Simon & Schuster, 2004), p. 13. On the Sudan PC, see NSC memo,
"Summary of Conclusions for March 27, 2001 Principals Committee Meeting on
Sudan,"Apr. 10,2001; CIA notes, Houdek's notes on March 27,2001, Principals
Committee meeting. On others, see NSC document, list of meetings, Jan. 20 to Sept.
11, 2001, undated.
190. CIA briefing materials, "U.S. Policy Against Al Qa'ida" (for the Apr. 30, 2001,
Deputies Committee meeting). On the DC meeting, see also NSC email, Clarke to NSC
Front Office,"Request for DC on al Qida Terrorism," Apr. 16, 2001. DCI Tenet had
already talked with Rice and Hadley about Bin Ladin and al Qaeda, the Taliban, and
the Predator program. See, e.g., CIA memos, summary of weekly Rice/Tenet meeting,
Jan. 24, 2001; Feb. 7, 2001; Mar. 8, 2001 (when Rice received CIA assessments on the
possible impact of Taliban actions against al Qaeda and on the likely regional
impact of increased aid to anti-Taliban groups in Afghanistan). Both Secretary
Powell and Secretary Rumsfeld appear to have already been briefed on these topics by
the DCI as well. See, e.g., CIA briefing materials, talking points on the Predator
for DCI meeting with Rumsfeld, Feb.9, 2001; CIA briefing materials, talking points
on Bin Ladin, the Taliban and Afghanistan for DCI meetings with Powell, Feb. 13,
2001; Mar. 13, 2001.
191. NSC memo, Summary of Conclusions for Apr. 30, 2001, Deputies Committee meeting.
192. Ibid.
193. NSC memo, Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) Chairman's Summary Paper, "Key
Issues for Al-Qida Deputies Meeting,"Apr. 19, 2001.
194. For threats considered by the CSG, see NSC memo, agenda for March 19 CSG
videoconference, Mar. 19, 2001 (agenda item about UBL interest in targeting a
passenger plane at Chicago airport); NSC memo, agenda for CSG threat
videoconference, May 17, 2001 (agenda item, "UBL: Operation Planned in US"). For
Clarke's concern about an al Qaeda presence in the United States, see NSC briefing
materials, TNT to Rice, counterterrorism briefing for Bush/Cheney transition team,
undated, which noted that al Qaeda had "sleeper cells" in more than 40 countries,
including the United States; NSC memo, "Strategy for Eliminating the Threat from the
Jihadist Networks of al Qida: Status and Prospects," undated (appears to be Dec. 29,
2000), attached to NSC memo, Clarke to Rice, Jan. 25, 2001, discussing al Qaeda's
presence in the United States. For Clarke's concerns about an attack on the White
House, see NSC email, Clarke to Rice, briefing on Pennsylvania Ave, Mar. 23, 2001.
195. For the President's announcement, see White House press release, "Statement by
the President, Domestic Preparedness Against Weapons of Mass Destruction,"May 8,
2001 (online at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 2001/05/print/02010508.html).
196. CIA memo, summary of weekly Rice/Tenet meeting, May 29, 2001.
197. Ibid.
198. Richard interview (Dec. 11, 2003).
199. CIA memo, summary of weekly Rice/Tenet meeting, May 29, 2001.
200. NSC memo, Hadley to Armitage, Wolfowitz, McLaughlin, and O'Keefe, "Next Steps on
al-Qida," June 7, 2001.
201. NSC memo, draft National Security Presidential Directive, undated; Condoleezza
Rice testimony, Apr. 8, 2004.
202. See, e.g., Condoleezza Rice testimony, Apr. 8, 2004; Richard Clarke interview
(Feb. 3, 2004).
203. Richard Clarke interview (Jan. 12, 2004).
204. Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004).
205. DOS cable, State 111711, "Demarche on Threat by Afghan-based Terrorists," June
27, 2001. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman knew of
Sheehan's severe demands and instructed Ambassador Milam to reiterate them to the
Taliban. Marc Grossman interview (Jan. 20, 2004).
206. In early July 2001, shortly before retiring, Ambassador Milam met one last time
with Taliban Deputy Foreign Minister Jalil in Islamabad. Milam tried to dispel any
confusion about where Bin Ladin fit into U.S.-Taliban relations-the Saudi terrorist
was the issue, and he had to be expelled. DOS cable, Islamabad 3628, "Taliban's
Mullah Jalil's July 2 Meeting With The Ambassador," July 3, 2001. The State
Department's South Asia bureau called for a less confrontational stance toward
theTaliban. It opposed a policy to overthrow theTaliban and was cautious about
aiding the Northern Alliance. DOS memo, Rocca to Grossman,"Your Participation in
Deputies Committee Meeting, Friday, June 29,2001,"June 28,2001; see DOS
memo,"Pakistan/Afghanistan DC-Covert Action Issue,"undated (appears to be mid-June
2001); Richard Armitage interview (Jan. 12, 2004).
207. For the Deputies Committee meeting, see NSC memo, Summary of Conclusions of June
29, 2001, Deputies Committee meeting, undated (attached to NSC memo, Biegun to
executive secretaries, July 6, 2001). For officials who were impatient with the pace
of the Deputies' Committee review, see, e.g., Richard Armitage interview (Jan. 12,
2004); John McLaughlin interview (Jan. 21, 2004). For Clarke's arguments, see NSC
memo, PCC Chairman's Summary Paper, "Key Issues for Al-Qida Deputies Meeting,"Apr.
19, 2001. See also Richard Armitage testimony, Mar. 24, 2004; Stephen Hadley meeting
(Jan. 31, 2004).
208. For Clarke and Black renewing their push, see, e.g., Cofer Black interview (Dec.
9, 2003). For Clarke's suggestion, see NSC email, Cressey to Moran, various matters
concerning al Qaeda, Feb. 12, 2001.
209. Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb.7, 2004); Stephen Hadley meeting (Jan. 31, 2004);
Zalmay Khalilzad interview (Nov. 21, 2003). For Clarke's view, see NSC memo, Clarke
to Rice, al Qaeda review, Jan. 25, 2001.
210. For the draft authorities, see CIA briefing materials, talking points for DCI
meeting with Rice on the draft Afghanistan counterterrorism finding and the draft
UBL Memorandum of Notification, Mar. 28, 2001. For the draft explicitly stating that
the goal was not to overthrow the Taliban, see Jonathan F. interview (Jan. 19,
2004).
211. See NSC email, Clarke to Khalilzad, Crawford, and Cressey, "Option for
integrated al Qida-Afghan- Pakistan paper," June 30, 2001. For State's view, see DOS
memo,"U.S. Engagement with the Taliban on Usama Bin Laden," undated (attached to NSC
memo, Biegun to executive secretaries, July 16, 2001).
212. For an outline of the policy, see NSC memo, "Afghanistan: A Comprehensive
Strategy," undated (attached to NSC memo, Biegun memo to executive secretaries,
Sept. 7, 2001). For the September 10 meeting, see NSC memo, Biegun to executive
secretaries, Summary of Conclusions for Sept. 10, 2001, Deputies Committee meeting
on Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan, Sept. 26, 2001.
213. For the September 10 meeting, see NSC memo, Biegun to executive secretaries,
Summary of Conclusions for Sept. 10, 2001, Deputies Committee meeting on
Afghanistan, India and Pakistan, Sept. 26, 2001. For Armitage's view, see Richard
Armitage interview (Jan. 12, 2004).
214. Colin Powell prepared statement, Mar. 23, 2004, p. 5.
215. For reviewing the possibility of more carrots, see DOS memo, Hull and Usrey to
Grossman, "Deputies Committee Meeting on Terrorism and al Qaida," Apr. 20, 2001. For
the possibility of lifting sanctions, see Colin Powell interview (Jan. 21, 2004);
Richard Armitage interview (Jan. 12, 2004); DOS memo,"Engagement with Pakistan: From
Negative to Positive," undated (appears to be May 29, 2001).
216. Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004).
217. For Rice's view on Sattar, see Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004). For
Sattar urging the United States to engage the Taliban, see DOS cable, State 109130,
"The Secretary's Lunch With Pakistani Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar," June 22, 2001.
For the deputies agreeing to review objectives, see NSC memo, Summary of Conclusions
of June 29, 2001, Deputies Committee meeting, undated (attached to NSC memo, Biegun
to executive secretaries, July 6, 2001). For Clarke urging Hadley, see NSC memo,
Clarke to Hadley,"DC on Pakistan," June 27, 2001.
218. See White House letter, President Bush to Musharraf, Aug. 4, 2001. For Rocca's
view, see DOS memo, "Engagement with Pakistan: From Negative to Positive," undated
(possibly May 29, 2001); Christina Rocca interview (Jan. 29, 2004). For Armitage's
comment, see Richard Armitage interview (Jan. 12, 2004).
219. For the Vice President's call, see CIA briefing materials, "Efforts to Counter
the Bin Ladin Threat," Sept. 12, 2001. For Powell's meetings, see DOS cable, State
041824,"Secretary's 26 February Meeting With Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah," Mar. 8,
2001; DOS cable, State 117132, "The Secretary's June 29 Meeting With Saudi Crown
Prince Abdullah," July 5, 2001.
220. Paul Wolfowitz interview (Jan. 20, 2004); Donald Rumsfeld interview (Jan. 30,
2004).
221. For Shelton's recollection, see Hugh Shelton interview (Feb. 5, 2004). For
Sheridan's departure, see Austin Yamada interview (Dec. 23, 2003); Brian Sheridan
interview (Feb. 24, 2004). 512 NOTES TO CHAPTER 6
222. Donald Rumsfeld interview (Jan. 30, 2004). Rumsfeld had been a member of the
Bremer-Sonnenberg Commission on Terrorism, created by Congress in 1998.
223. Tommy Franks interview (Apr. 9, 2004).
224. For Annex B, see NSC memo, draft National Security Presidential Directive,
undated (attached to NSC email, Biegun to executive secretaries, July 13, 2001). The
annex said that Pentagon planning was also to include options to eliminate weapons
of mass destruction that the al Qaeda network might acquire or make.
225. Stephen Hadley meeting (Jan. 31, 2004).
226. Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004).
227. President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004).
228. Ibid.
229. John Ashcroft interview (Dec. 17, 2003).
230. NSC email, Clarke to Rice and Hadley, "Courtesy call on AG," Feb. 22, 2001.
231. On the FBI strategy, see FBI report, Counterterrorism Division,
InternationalTerrorism Program, "Strategic Program Plan FY 2001-2006," undated
(appears to be from summer 2000). On Watson's recollections, see Dale Watson
interview (Jan. 6, 2004). On the FBI budget proposal, see statement of Attorney
General John Ashcroft, Hearing on U.S. Federal Efforts to Combat Terrorism before
the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related
Agencies of the Senate Appropriations Committee, May 9, 2001. See DOJ memo, Comments
on Staff Statement 12, Apr. 7, 2004.
232. Testimony of John Ashcroft, Hearing on U.S. Federal Efforts to Combat Terrorism
before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related
Agencies of the Senate Appropriations Committee, May 9, 2001. On DOJ's priorities,
see DOJ memo, Ashcroft to Heads of Department Components, "Guidance for Preparing FY
2003 Budgets," May 10, 2001. On Watson's reaction, see Dale Watson interview (Jan.
6, 2004).
233. DOJ letter, Ashcroft to Daniels, transmitting the Department of Justice FY 2003
budget request, Sept. 10, 2001; Thomas Pickard interview (Jan. 21, 2004). Pickard
told us that he approached Ashcroft and asked him to reconsider DOJ's denial of the
FBI's original counterterrorism budget request in light of the continuing threat. It
was not uncommon for FBI budget requests to be reduced by the attorney general or by
OMB before being submitted to Congress; this had occurred during the previous
administration.
234. In chapter 3, we discuss how this problem arose. By 2001, it had become worse.
During 2000, the FBI had erred in preparing some of its applications for FISA
surveillance, misstating how much information had been shared with criminal
prosecutors and the nature of the walls between the intelligence and law enforcement
functions within the FBI. In March 2001, Judge Royce Lamberth, chief judge of the
FISA Court, chastised the FBI, sending a letter to Ashcroft announcing he was
banning an offending supervisory agent from appearing before the court. Judge
Lamberth also met personally with Ashcroft and his acting deputy, Robert Mueller, to
complain about the performance of the FBI and the Office of Intelligence Policy and
Review (OIPR). Judge Lamberth letter to Ashcroft, Mar. 9, 2001; John Ashcroft
interview (Dec. 17, 2003). In May 2001, Ashcroft altered the FISA application
process to ensure greater accuracy. See DOJ memo, Ashcroft to Freeh, "The Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Process," May 18, 2001.
In July 2001, the General Accounting Office criticized the way the 1995 procedures
were being applied and criticized OIPR and FBI for not complying with the
information-sharing requirements of the 1995 procedures. This was the third report
in as many years by a government agency indicating that the procedures were not
working as planned. In October 2000, December 2000, and March 2001, proposals for
reform to the 1995 procedures were put forth by senior DOJ officials. None resulted
in reform. One impediment was that the respective DOJ components could not agree on
all the proposed reforms. A second impediment was a concern that such reforms would
require a challenge to the FISA Court's position on the matter. This was considered
risky because the FISA Court of Review had never convened, and one of the judges had
previously voiced skepticism regarding the constitutionality of the FISA statute.
Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson did ask the court to accept the modifications
described in the text, which were distributed as part of his August 2001 memorandum
reaffirming the 1995 procedures. See DOJ memo, Thompson to the Criminal Division,
the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, and the FBI, "Intelligence
Sharing,"Aug. 6, 2001.
235. This tasking may have occurred before Rice's March 15, 2001, meeting with Tenet.
See CIA memo, "Talking Points for DCI Meeting with Rice," Mar. 15, 2001. For Rice's
recollections, see Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004). Attorney General John
Ashcroft told us he told Rice on March 7, 2001, that his lawyers had determined that
the existing legal authorities for covert action against Bin Ladin were unclear and
insufficient, and that he suggested new, explicit kill authorities be developed.
John Ashcroft testimony, Apr. 13, 2004. On the CIA draft documents, see CIA
memo,"Talking Points for the DCI on the Draft Afghanistan Counterterrorism Finding
and the Draft UBL MON,"Mar. 27, 2001. For the description of the meeting, see CIA
memo, Moseman to Tenet, Mar. 28, 2001.
236. NSC memo, Sturtevant to Griffin, Levin, Krongard, Watson, and others, July 12,
2001.
237. See, e.g., NSC note, Clarke to Berger, Sept. 23, 2000; Richard Clarke interview
(Feb. 3, 2004).
238. CIA memo, Black to Clarke, Jan. 25, 2001. For a Joint Staff view, see, e.g.,
Scott Gration interview (Mar. 3, 2004). The mission commander for the Predator
flights, Air Force Major Mark A. Cooter, had registered his opposition to
redeploying the aircraft back in December 2000: "given the cost/benefit from these
continued missions it seems senseless." DOD letter, Cooter to Alec B.,"Continued
Flight Operations," Nov. 14, 2000 (attached to CIA memo, Black to DCI and others,
Predator Operation, Nov. 17, 2000).
239. See NSC memo, Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee meeting, Apr. 30,
2001. This document noted a consensus in favor of reconnaissance missions commencing
in July. But DDCI McLaughlin told us that he and Black believed that no such
decision had been made at the meeting. Hadley told us he believed that a decision
had been made at the meeting to fly such missions. See John McLaughlin interview
(Jan. 2, 2004). See also CIA briefing materials, "Summary of April 30, 2001 Deputies
Committee meeting," May 3, 2001; Stephen Hadley meeting (Jan. 31, 2004). For Rice's
perspective, see Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004).
240. Allen described the "quibbling" over financing the Predator program as
"ridiculous." Charles Allen interview (Jan. 27, 2004). For a CIA senior management
perspective, see, e.g., John McLaughlin interview (Jan. 21, 2004). The Defense
Department's view is suggested in CIA briefing materials,"Summary of April 30,2001
Deputies Committee meeting," May 3, 2001.
241. George Tenet interview (Jan. 28, 2004); Charles Allen interview (Jan. 27, 2004).
242. John Maher III interview (Apr. 22, 2004); Scott Gration interview (Mar. 3,
2004); John Jumper interview (Mar. 3, 2004).
243. On Hadley's efforts and directions, see NSC memo, Hadley to McLaughlin,
Wolfowitz, and Myers, "Re: Predator," July 11, 2001. On Rice's intervention, see
Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004).
244. On the Deputies Committee meeting, see NSC memo, Biegun to executive
secretaries, July 31, 2001; CIA memo, Campbell to McLaughlin, Pavitt, and others,
Aug. 2, 2001. The White House told us that it cannot find a formal Summary of
Conclusions for this meeting.
245. NSC memo, Hadley to Armitage, Wolfowitz, Myers, and McLaughlin, resolving
Predator issues, Aug. 3, 2001 (including McLaughlin's handwritten comment); NSC
email, Clarke to Rice and Hadley, "Need to place a call to Tenet,"Aug. 8, 2001.
246. John Maher III interview (Apr. 22, 2004); John Jumper interview (Mar. 3, 2004);
see also Scott Gration interview (Mar. 3, 2004).
247. NSC memo, Clarke to Rice, "Observations at the Principals Meeting on Al Qida,"
Sept. 4, 2001 (text italicized here is underlined in the original).
248. Ibid.
249. Ibid.
250. Condoleezza Rice testimony, Apr. 8, 2004.
251. CIA memo, Black to Tenet, Sept. 4, 2001.
252. Various interviews with participants, as well as the Maher memo (see note 255
below), make it clear that the meeting focused on Predator, not the presidential
directive.
253. Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004).
254. Ibid.; NSC memo, Cressey to Rice, September 4 PC on counterterrorism, Sept. 3,
2001.
255. CIA memo, Maher to limited group, "Principals Committee meeting, Sept. 4, 2001,"
Sept. 4, 2001. We have not found a formal summary of conclusions, which would
usually be prepared after a Principals Committee meeting.
256. Ibid.
257. Ibid.
258. Ibid.
259. NSC memo, Clarke to CSG members, Sept. 7, 2001.
260. On Massoud's assassination, see Coll, Ghost Wars, pp. 574-575. On the Sept. 10
meeting, see NSC memo, Biegun to executive secretaries, "Summary of Conclusions for
Sept. 10, 2001 Deputies Committee meeting on Afghanistan, India and Pakistan," Sept.
26, 2001. Note that the agenda for this meeting, distributed on September 7,2001,
listed its topics as "Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan"; the Summary of Conclusions,
written after 9/11, flipped the order of the topics.
261. NSC memo, Hadley to Tenet, Sept. 10, 2001.
7 The Attack Looms
1. FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004 (classified
version), p. 16.
2. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, May 19, 2003. Although KSM's stated
reasons for sending Hazmi and Mihdhar to California do not seem especially
compelling, we have uncovered no evidence tending to establish any more plausible
explanation for the California destination. The possibility that the two hijackers
were pursuing another al Qaeda mission on the West Coast, while certainly
conceivable-see, e.g., CIA analytic report, "Alternate View: Two 11 September
Hijackers Possibly Involved in Previous US Plot," CTC 2002-30064, July 5,
2002-conflicts with the organization's preference for having its 9/11 operatives
concentrate on that mission exclusively.
3. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, May 19, 2003; Aug. 14, 2003.
4. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Aug. 18, 2003. According to Hambali, in
late 1999 or early 2000 KSM sent an al Qaeda operative named Issa al Britani to
visit Hambali in Malaysia. At the end of the visit, Issa provided Hambali with two
addresses-one in the United States ("possibly in California") and one in South
Africa- and told Hambali he could contact "people in those locations" if he "needed
help." Hambali claims he never contacted anyone at either address or passed either
address to anyone else, and claims not to remember the addresses. Intelligence
report, interrogation of Hambali, Sept. 12, 2003. In an assessment of KSM's
reporting, the CIA concluded that protecting operatives in the United States
appeared to be a "major part" of KSM's resistance efforts. For example, in response
to questions about U.S. zip codes found in his notebooks, KSM provided the less than
satisfactory explanation that he was planning to use the zip codes to open new email
accounts. CIA report, Intelligence Community Terrorist Threat Assessment,"Khalid
Shaykh Muhammed's Threat Reporting-Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of
Lies,"Apr. 3, 2003, pp. 4-5.
5. Notably, as discussed in chapter 5, precisely such arrangements-in the form of
lodging and travel assistance provided by Hambali's minions-were in place when the
first contingent of operatives (including Hazmi and Mihdhar) journeyed to Kuala
Lumpur in late 1999 and early 2000.
6. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, May 19, 2003.
7. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, May 19, 2003; Aug. 14, 2003. KSM also
has stated that in addition to providing Hazmi and Mihdhar with a San Diego
telephone book, he gave them another directory "possibly covering Long Beach,
California." Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, June 15, 2004.
8. Although Hazmi and Mihdhar told immigration authorities on January 15, 2000, that
they would be staying at the Sheraton Hotel in Los Angeles, their names do not
appear in the hotel's registration records for the second half of January. FBI
searches of the records of other hotels near the airport and smaller establishments
in Culver City failed to locate the hijackers, as did our own investigation. See FBI
report, "Hijackers Timeline,"Nov. 14, 2003 (Apr. 3, 1999, entry, citing
265A-NY-280350-CG, serial 4062; 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 7134); Commission
investigation in Culver City; Vicki G. interview (Sept. 30, 2003).
9. For the FBI source's claims, see FBI letterhead memorandum, Penttbom
investigation, Oct. 8, 2002. For Abdullah's recollections, see FBI report of
investigation, interview of Mohdar Abdullah, Jan. 15, 2002. Other reporting
indicates that Hazmi and Mihdhar spent time at the King Fahd mosque. A scholar
lecturing at the mosque was reportedly approached by either Hazmi or Mihdhar about
performing a wedding ceremony. Khalil A. Khalil interview (Feb. 24, 2004). On
"Khallam," see FBI electronic communication, "Fahad Althumairy," Sept. 4, 2002; FBI
electronic communication,"Ziyat Kharfan,"Jan. 8, 2002 (giving description of visitor
with whom Hazmi and Mihdhar met at mosque). The Khallam story has never been
corroborated. The FBI considered the possibility that Khallam might be Khallad, the
al Qaeda member whose role in the 9/11 plot and the Cole attack we discussed in
chapter
5. This speculation was based on reporting that Khallad was in the United States in
June 2000 and was seen in the company of Fahad alThumairy, an imam at the mosque.
FBI electronic communication, investigation of Cole bombing, interview of witness,
Mar. 19, 2003; CIA cable, source reporting, Mar. 18, 2003. Neither we nor the FBI
have found any travel documentation establishing Khallad's presence in the United
States at any time. We doubt that the person allegedly seen with Thumairy actually
was Khallad.
10. Patrick J. McDonnell, "Saudi Envoy in L.A. Is Deported," Los Angeles Times, May
10, 2003, p. B1; Michael Isikoff and Daniel Klaidman, with Jamie Reno,"Failure to
Communicate," Newsweek, Aug. 4, 2003, p. 34. As of January 2000, Thumairy was
employed by the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Religious Endowments and
Religious Guidance, to act as the consulate's liaison to the mosque. FBI electronic
communication,"Fahad Al Thumairy," Sept. 4, 2002. Before 9/11, Saudi imams employed
by the ministry often were dispatched to help serve Muslim communities around the
world, sometimes-as in Thumairy's case-with diplomatic status in the host country.
On Thumairy's leadership, see FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Mohammed
bin Suleiman al Muhanna, July 9, 2003; FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of
Mohamed Ibrahim Aliter, Dec. 2, 2002.
11. FBI electronic communication, "Abdulaziz Alroomi,"Apr. 2, 2003.
12. FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Khaled Charif, Dec. 4, 2002. After
9/11, arguments arose within the Saudi government over whether to allow reputedly
radical imams, including Thumairy, to work for the Saudi government in the United
States. FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Mohammed bin Suleiman al
Muhanna, July 9, 2003. In May 2003, the U.S. government settled the matter, at least
in Thumairy's case, by refusing to let him back into the country. DOS memo, Karl
Hoffman to the Commission, June 8, 2004, and the attached materials.
13. On Thumairy's religious views, see FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of
Mohamed Aliter, Dec. 2,2002; Fahad alThumairy interviews (Feb.23-25,2004). However,
two witnesses we interviewed who knewThumairy and used to hear him preach at the
King Fahd mosque deny that he promoted extremism. Sami A. Mekhemar interview (Apr.
21, 2004); Interview (Apr. 23, 2004). Despite the disparate views as to whether
Thumairy qualified as an extremist while he was in Los Angeles, it does appear that
both the Saudi Arabian government and the leadership of the mosque attempted to
discipline him in the summer of 2002 and early 2003 for espousing extremist views.
Thumairy denies incurring any such disciplinary measures. Fahad al Thumairy
interviews (Feb. 23-25, 2004); FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Mohammed
bin Suleiman al Muhanna, July 9, 2003. On Bayoumi, see Khalil A. Khalil interview
(Feb. 24, 2004). Bayoumi and Thumairy had numerous telephonic contacts between
December 1998 and December 2000. Specifically, Bayoumi called Thumairy's home
telephone 10 times during this period, and Thumairy called Bayoumi's cellular and
home phones 11 times between December 3 and December 20, 2000. FBI electronic
communication, "Fahad Al-Thumairy," Nov. 20, 2002. Bayoumi recalls consulting with
Thumairy, solely on religious matters, both by telephone and in person at the
mosque. Omar al Bayoumi interview (Oct. 16-17, 2003). As to Thumairy's contact with
Mohdar Abdullah, see FBI electronic communication," Fahad Althumairy," Oct. 25,
2002; FBI report of investigation, interview of Mohdar Abdullah, July 23, 2002.
According to one individual, Abdullah visited the mosque frequently and was "very
close" to radical followers of Thumairy. FBI electronic communication,"Fahad
Althumairy," Oct. 25, 2002.
14. We have checked, for example, the records for apartments where Thumairy is known
to have placed Saudi visitors during 2001. The most intriguing lead concerns an
Arabic-speaking taxicab driver, Qualid Benomrane, who was arrested on immigration
charges in early 2002. When asked to look at a series of photographs that included
the 19 hijackers involved in the 9/11 attacks, Benomrane responded ambiguously,
seeming first to pick out the photographs of Hazmi and Mihdhar but then denying that
he recognized them. Later in the interview, Benomrane told the FBI about driving
"two Saudis" around Los Angeles and to San Diego's Sea World after being introduced
to them by Thumairy at the King Fahd mosque before 9/11. According to Benomrane,
someone at the consulate had asked Thumairy to assist the two Saudis, who had
recently arrived in Los Angeles and had moved to an apartment near the mosque. FBI
electronic communication,"Fahad Althumairy," Sept. 4, 2002; Ashour E. interview (May
20, 2004); FBI reports of investigation, interviews of Qualid Moncef Benomrane, Mar.
7, 2002; Mar. 13, 2002; May 23, 2002. Working with agencies of the U.S. government,
we have attempted to locate and interview Benomrane overseas, since he was deported
in 2002. After checking many possible avenues of corroboration for this story, our
investigation has not substantiated the hypothesis that Benomrane's "two Saudis"
were Hazmi and Mihdhar. In fact, we have established that Benomrane did not obtain a
taxi license, or even a driver's license, until months after he could be supposed to
have chauffeured Hazmi and Mihdhar. Moreover, before his deportation, Benomrane
described the two Saudis as sons of a sick father who was seeking medical treatment
in Los Angeles. Ibid. We have found evidence corroborating this account.
15. FBI document made available to the Commission; Caysan Bin Don interview (Apr. 20,
2004); Omar al Bayoumi interview (Oct. 16-17, 2003); Interview (Apr. 23, 2004). In
Bin Don's presence, Bayoumi met with a stillunidentified consular employee whom
Bayoumi already knew and whom Bin Don says he saw in Anaheim as recently as November
2003. The employee provided Bayoumi with Qur'ans and other religious materials
during the February 1, 2000, meeting. Omar al Bayoumi interview (Oct. 16-17, 2003).
At the time of the February 1, 2000, restaurant encounter, Bin Don, a U.S. citizen,
went by the name Isamu Dyson.
16. Caysan Bin Don interview (Apr. 20, 2004); FBI report of investigation, interview
of Isamu Dyson, Oct. 8, 2001.
17. See Caysan Bin Don interview (Apr. 20, 2004); FBI report of investigation,
interview of Isamu Dyson, Oct. 8, 2001. Bin Don himself has been inconsistent about
visiting the mosque. In his initial interviews, he recalled praying with Bayoumi at
the consulate before lunch and visiting the mosque only once, after the meal; when
we interviewed him recently, however, he stated that both prayer sessions took place
at the mosque. For Bayoumi's visits to Los Angeles, see FBI report of investigation,
recovery of hotel records, Jan. 15, 2002. Although Bayoumi might deny visiting the
mosque on February 1 to conceal some contact he may have made there that day, we
have seen no evidence of such contact.
18. Saudi Civil Aviation Authority employment records for Bayoumi, Mar. 2000-Jan.
2002 (provided by the FBI); FBI report of investigation, "Connections of San Diego
PENTTBOMB Subjects to the Government of Saudi Arabia," undated; FBI letterhead
memorandum, investigation of Bayoumi, Apr. 15, 2002. While in San Diego, Bayoumi was
officially employed by Ercan, a subsidiary of a contractor for the Saudi Civil
Aviation Administration, although a fellow employee described Bayoumi as a "ghost
employee," noting that he was one of many Saudis on the payroll who was not required
to work. In April 2000, Bayoumi received a promotion and his status was also
adjusted from "single" to "married" (despite the fact that he was already married).
As a result, his salary was raised and his "other allowances" stipend increased
significantly, from approximately $465 to $3,925 a month, remaining at that level
until December 2000. In January 2001, the stipend was reduced to $3,427. It stayed
constant until August 2001, when Bayoumi left the United States. Saudi Civil
Aviation Authority employment records for Bayoumi, Mar. 2000-Jan. 2002 (provided by
the FBI); Richard L. Lambert prepared statement, June 26, 2003, pp. 7-9; FBI reports
of investigation, interviews of Samuel George Coombs, Apr. 8, 2002; July 24, 2002;
Aug. 26, 2002.
19. On Bayoumi's activities, see FBI electronic communication, interview of Bayoumi,
Sept. 17,2003. Although Bayoumi admits knowingThumairy, no telephone records
document any contact between the two just before Bayoumi's lunch with Hazmi and
Mihdhar in Los Angeles. Nor do individuals who regard Thumairy as an extremist place
Bayoumi in Thumairy's circle of associates. KSM has denied knowing Bayoumi.
Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Aug. 18, 2003.
Bayoumi was once the subject of an FBI counterterrorism investigation, prompted by
allegations about him that appear to have been groundless. On the closing of the
investigation, see FBI electronic communication, "Omar Ahmed Al Bayoumi," June 7,
1999. Another possible source of suspicion is his passport, which contains a cachet
that intelligence investigators associate with possible adherence to al Qaeda. It is
a marking that can be obtained by especially devout Muslims. Although we believe the
marking suggests the need for further inquiry, it is not the kind of fraudulent
manipulation that would conclusively link the document with a terrorist
organization. INS records, copy of Bayoumi passport; CIA analytic report,
Al-Qa'idaTravel Issues, CTC 2004-40002H, Nov. 14, 2003, pp. ii, 18.
20. On Abdullah's assistance to the hijackers, see FBI electronic communication,
Abdullah investigation, May 19, 2004. In a post-9/11 interview with law enforcement,
Abdullah claimed that Bayoumi specifically asked him "to be the individual to
acclimate the hijackers to the United States, particularly San Diego, California."
FBI report of investigation, interview of Mohdar Abdullah, July 23, 2002. Bayoumi,
however, denies even introducing Hazmi and Mihdhar to Abdullah, much less asking him
to assist them. Omar al Bayoumi interview (Oct. 16-17, 2003).
21. FBI report of investigation, interview of Mohdar Abdullah, July 23, 2002; FBI
electronic communication, "Osama Bassnan," Oct. 17, 2001; FBI report of
investigation, interview of Mohdar Abdullah, Sept. 22, 2001; FBI electronic
communication, "Shareef Abdulmuttaleb el Arbi," Feb. 4, 2003. For the possibility of
the notebook belonging to someone else, see FBI report, Behavioral Analysis
Activity, Oct. 4, 2001.
22. FBI electronic communication, interview of Charles Sabah Toma, May 18, 2004.
23. On Abdullah's claims of advance knowledge, see FBI electronic communication,
interview, May 17, 2004. On Abdullah's telephone use after August 25, 2001, and
acting strangely, see FBI report of investigation, interview, Sept. 24, 2001; FBI
report of investigation, interview of Mohdar Abdullah, July 23, 2002; Danny G.
interviews (Nov. 18, 2003; May 24, 2004).
24. The hijackers' mode of transportation and the exact date of their arrival in San
Diego are not known. On their locating Bayoumi on February 4 and his assistance, see
Richard L. Lambert prepared statement, June 26, 2003, pp. 6-7; Omar al Bayoumi
interview (Oct. 16-17, 2003); FBI report of investigation, interview of Omar al
Bayoumi, Aug. 4-5, 2003. The rental application states that Hazmi and Mihdhar
resided in Bayoumi's apartment from January 15 to February 2, 2000, but Bayoumi
denies it, and we have found no reason to dispute his denial. According to Bayoumi,
he was in such a hurry to complete the rental transaction that he signed the
application form without reading it. Bayoumi also denies receiving any money from
Hazmi or Mihdhar for helping them with the apartment. Omar al Bayoumi interview
(Oct. 16-17, 2003). On opening an account, see FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom
Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, p. 12.
Contrary to highly publicized allegations, we have found no evidence that Hazmi or
Mihdhar received money from another Saudi citizen, Osama Bassnan.
25. Omar al Bayoumi interview (Oct. 16-17, 2003). According to Bayoumi, he originally
intended to hold the party at his own apartment, but moved it to the hijackers'
apartment when one of the guests created an awkward social circumstance by bringing
his wife; Bayoumi solved the problem by having the friend's wife stay with his own
wife in Bayoumi's apartment and moving the party to the hijackers' residence.
Bayoumi maintains that a visiting sheikh was the party's principal honoree. Ibid.
Although Bin Don has recalled that the party was intended to welcome Hazmi and
Mihdhar to the community, this is belied by the hijackers' apparent decision to
sequester themselves in the back room, and by the account of another party attendee.
Caysan Bin Don interview (Apr. 20, 2004); Khalid Abdulrab al Yafai interview (Feb.
24, 2004). Of the two operatives, only Mihdhar appears briefly on the video shot by
Bin Don. Bayoumi videotape of party (provided by the FBI).
26. On the hijackers' efforts to relocate, see Omar al Bayoumi interview (Oct. 16-17,
2003); Interview (Apr. 23, 2004); FBI report, "San Diego Brief to 9/11 Commission,"
June 26, 2003, p. 17. Telephone records indicate that on February 9 and February 14,
2000, Bayoumi's cell phone was used to call the landlord of the operatives'
acquaintance, Hashim al Attas, who had decided to vacate his apartment. On February
15,2000, when the landlord returned a page from Bayoumi's cell phone, Hazmi answered
the phone. Steve O. interview (Nov. 17, 2003); FBI report of investigation,
interview of George Harb, Oct. 30, 2001. Hazmi and Mihdhar appear to have used
Bayoumi's cell phone until telephone service (subscribed in Hazmi's name) was
installed in their apartment.
27. FBI report of investigation, interview of George Harb, Sept. 16, 2001. The
hijackers may actually have lived in Attas's apartment for a short while. Bayoumi
has stated that he recalls hearing that Hazmi and Mihdhar moved into the apartment
for two weeks but then returned to their original apartment while Bayoumi was in
Washington, D.C. FBI report of investigation, interview of Omar al Bayoumi, Aug.
4-6, 2003. This account is confirmed by Attas's girlfriend, who recalls that Attas
met Mihdhar and Hazmi either through friends or at the mosque, and that the pair
moved into Attas's apartment for approximately two weeks before moving out and
taking Attas's furnishings with them. FBI report, "San Diego Brief to 9/11
Commission," June 26, 2003, p. 18.
28. Interview (Apr. 23, 2004). Hazmi and Mihdhar did not officially vacate their
first apartment until May 31, 2000. FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline,"Nov. 14, 2003
(citing 265A-NY-280350-SD, serial 1445). The exact details of the hijackers' move to
their final San Diego address are not altogether clear, as their landlord-who has
been interviewed many times by the FBI and once by us-has provided various accounts
of how he first met them. See also FBI electronic communication, Penttbom
investigation, Oct. 3, 2001. On Mihdhar's travels, see Interview (Apr. 23, 2004);
FBI report,"Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004 (classified version),
p. 46. On Hazmi's departure, see FBI report,"San Diego Brief to 9/11 Commission,"
June 26, 2003, p. 18.
29. On the purchase of the car, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Nov. 14, 2003
(citing Bank of America records). Law enforcement officials recovered the blue 1988
Toyota from the parking lot at Dulles International Airport on September 11. On the
wire transfer, see FBI report of investigation, interview, Sept. 17,2001. After
9/11, the mosque administrator came forward because he feared he had unwittingly
aided the hijackers. He recalled Hazmi and Mihdhar arriving at the mosque on their
own and describing themselves as clerks employed by the Saudi Arabian government.
The two said they needed help finding a school where they could study English, which
neither spoke well enough, in the administrator's opinion, to permit them to become
pilots. The administrator also suspected that Mihdhar might have been an
intelligence agent of the Saudi government. After first declining Hazmi's request
for a loan, the administrator agreed to permit him to use the administrator's bank
account to receive the $5,000 wire transfer. Claiming to have been suspicious of the
entire transaction, the administrator distanced himself from Hazmi and Mihdhar, but
not before they had received the assistance they needed. Ibid. We have no evidence
contradicting the administrator's account.
30. On visits to other mosques, see FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Ali
Ahmad Mesdaq, Jan. 28, 2002; FBI reports of investigation, interviews of Samir
Abdoun, Oct. 28, 2001; May 15, 2002. On Bayoumi's assistance, see Richard L. Lambert
prepared statement, June 26, 2003, p. 7; FBI electronic communication, "Jay Steven
Barlow," Sept. 24, 2002. On April 12, 2000, Hazmi registered for a one-month class
in conversational English. FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline,"Nov. 14, 2003 (Apr. 12,
2000, entry, citing Bank of America records).
31. Even before learning of Abdullah's alleged jailhouse conversations, we attempted
to interview him in November 2003, while he was incarcerated and awaiting
deportation. Through counsel, Abdullah refused to be interviewed unless he was
released from custody. The U.S. Department of Justice declined to obtain an order of
use immunity so that Abdullah's testimony could be compelled. See Commission letter
to Daniel Levin, DOJ, Dec. 31, 2003; DOJ letter, Daniel Levin to the Commission,
Jan. 5,2004. On Abdullah's deportation, see FBI electronic communication, Abdullah
investigation, July 1, 2004. Abdullah appears to be at liberty in Yemen, although he
claims Yemeni authorities are watching him. H. G. Reza, "Deported Friend of
Terrorists in Report," Los Angeles Times, June 17, 2004, p. A31.
32. On Awadallah, see FBI electronic communication, interview of Osama Awadallah,
June 6, 2002; FBI electronic communication, interview of Osama Awadallah, Feb. 4,
2003. On Bakarbashat, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Omar
Bakarbashat, Sept. 17, 2001; FBI electronic communication, Penttbom investigation,
Apr. 11, 2002. Another associate of Hazmi and Mihdhar allegedly referred to them
after the September 11 attacks as "more than heroes." FBI letterhead
memorandum,"Diah Thabet,"Oct. 25, 2002.
33. On Anwar Aulaqi, see Wade A. interview (Oct. 16, 2003). The FBI investigated
Aulaqi in 1999 and 2000 after learning that he may have been contacted by a possible
procurement agent for Bin Ladin. During this investigation, the FBI learned that
Aulaqi knew individuals from the Holy Land Foundation and others involved in raising
money for the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas. Sources alleged that Aulaqi had
other extremist connections. FBI electronic communication, background searches, Feb.
3, 2000; FBI report of investigation, interview, Sept. 24, 2001; FBI electronic
communication, interview, Oct. 8, 2002. None of this information was considered
strong enough to support a criminal prosecution. For evidence of possible early
contacts between Hazmi/Mihdhar and Aulaqi, see Steve O. interview (Nov. 17, 2003),
noting that four calls took place between Aulaqi's phone and Bayoumi's phone on
February 4, 2000, the day Bayoumi helped Hazmi and Mihdhar find an apartment and
perhaps lent them his phone.
One witness remembered meeting Hazmi through Aulaqi and Mohdar Abdullah, and later
meeting Mihdhar at Aulaqi's mosque. This same witness recalled seeing Hazmi and
Mihdhar in the guest room on the second floor of the mosque and, on one occasion,
leaving the room just after Aulaqi, at the conclusion of a meeting. FBI reports of
investigation, interviews of Samir Abdoun, Oct. 28, 2001; May 15, 2002; FBI report
of investigation, interview of Anwar Aulaqi, Sept. 25, 2001; FBI electronic
communication, Penttbom investigation, Sept. 15, 2002.
34. FBI reports of investigation, interviews of Anwar Aulaqi, Sept. 17, 2001; Sept.
19, 2001.
35. Aulaqi took a position at the Dar al Hijra mosque in early 2001. By the time we
sought to interview him in 2003, he had left the United States, reportedly returning
to Yemen. We attempted to locate and interview him in Yemen, working with U.S.
agencies and the Yemeni government, as well as other governments that might have
knowledge of his whereabouts. Those attempts were unsuccessful.
36. Whereas Hazmi managed to speak broken English, Mihdhar did not even have this
much command of the language, which he appeared uninterested in learning. Interview
(Apr. 23, 2004); FBI report of investigation, interview of Omar Bakarbashat, Sept.
17, 2001; FBI report of investigation, interview of Ramez Noaman, Oct. 1, 2001. On
April 4, 2000, Hazmi took his first flying lesson, a one-hour introductory session
at the National Air College in San Diego. Exactly one month later, Hazmi and Mihdhar
purchased flight equipment from an instructor at the Sorbi Flying Club in San Diego.
On May 5, both of them took a lesson at Sorbi, followed by a second lesson at the
same school five days later. FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb.
29, 2004, p. 18.
37. On the Sorbi Flying Club, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Khaled al
Kayed, Sept. 15, 2001. For other instructors' views, see FBI electronic
communication, Penttbomb investigation, Apr. 11, 2002.
38. On Mihdhar's phone calls, see, e.g., FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline,"Nov. 14,
2003 (Mar. 20, 2000, entry, citing 265A-NY-280350-19426). On Mihdhar's travels, see
FBI report,"Summary of Penttbom Investigation,"Feb. 29, 2004 (classified version),
p. 17. On KSM's views, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, May 19, 2003.
On Mihdhar's status, see INS record, NIIS record of Mihdhar, June 10, 2000.
39. On KSM's communication methods, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,
Oct. 15, 2003. Even here, the West Coast operatives' language limitation posed a
problem, as KSM had to send emails in Arabic using the English alphabet. Ibid. In
addition to having his nephew Ali Abdul Aziz Ali transmit funds to the operatives in
the United States, KSM used Ali as an intermediary for telephone messages.
Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Jan. 7, 2004. On Khallad's role, see
Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Oct. 15, 2003; Aug. 18, 2003;
Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Feb. 17, 2004. On KSM's annoyance
with and views on Mihdhar, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, June 15,
2004; May 19, 2003.
40. Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Feb. 17, 2004; FBI report of
investigation, interview, Sept. 24, 2001; FBI electronic communication, Penttbom
investigation, Sept. 15, 2001; FBI electronic communication, interview, July 26,
2002; Interview (Apr. 23, 2004); FBI electronic communication, Penttbom
investigation, Sept. 15, 2001. Both KSM and Khallad were aware of Hazmi's interest
in finding a bride, and KSM reportedly went so far as to promise Hazmi a monthly
stipend of $700 in the event he succeeded in marrying. Intelligence reports,
interrogations of KSM, Aug. 6, 2003; Jan. 9, 2004. Although Hazmi did not use his
housemate's telephone to make calls, he apparently received calls on it, including
calls from an individual named Ashraf Suboh, who called the house 16 times between
July 20 and November 18, 2000. Suboh's name and address appear in a printed email
recovered during searches at an al Qaeda site in Pakistan in May 2002. The document
was dated Jan. 9, 2001, and included his name and a mailing address. FBI letterhead
memorandum, San Diego investigation, July 2, 2002.
41. Salmi arrived in San Diego on August 7, 2000, and three days later moved into the
house where Hazmi resided. Omar al Bayoumi-who reported (at least nominally) to
Salmi's uncle at the Saudi Civil Aviation ministry- found this accommodation for
Salmi, although Salmi claims not to have known Bayoumi before coming to San Diego.
FBI report of investigation, interview of Yazeed al Salmi, Oct. 8, 2001. On Salmi's
move to Abdullah's house in La Mesa, see FBI report of investigation, interview of
Salmi, Sept. 21, 2001. On possible financial links, see FBI report, "Hijackers
Timeline," Nov. 14, 2003 (citing 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 59279); FBI electronic
communication, Information and questions re Salmi interview, June 9, 2004; FBI
report of investigation, interview of Salmi, June 17, 2004. For Salmi's possible
link to Hanjour, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Abdullah, July 23,
2002. We made efforts with the assistance of the FBI to interview Salmi, but without
success. The FBI interviewed Salmi on its own in June 2004 but failed to ask about
his reported childhood ties to Hanjour. FBI report of investigation interview of
Yazeed al Salmi, June 14, 2004.
42. At KSM's direction, Khallad notified Hazmi that another operative, who turned out
to be Hanjour, would be joining Hazmi soon. Intelligence report, interrogation of
Khallad, Feb. 17, 2004. On Hazmi's work at the gas station and his statement about
becoming famous, see FBI report of investigation, interview, May 21, 2002. The owner
of the gas station, Osama Mustafa, and the manager of the station, Iyad Kreiwesh,
have both been the subject of FBI counterterrorism investigations. The
investigations did not yield evidence of criminal conduct. Thumairy, the Saudi imam
in Los Angeles, allegedly presided over Kreiwesh's wedding at the King Fahd mosque,
witnessed by Abdullah and Benomrane, likely around September 2000. FBI report of
investigation, interview of Mohdar Abdullah, July 23, 2002; 4377 Parks Avenue, San
Diego record, "Application to Rent and Rental Deposit," Sept. 21, 2000.
43. On Hanjour's travel to San Diego, see INS record, NIIS record of Hanjour, Dec. 8,
2000. Hazmi's housemate remembers him taking an unexplained trip to the San Diego
airport around this time. FBI report of investigation, interview, Sept. 24, 2001. On
Hanjour and Hazmi leaving San Diego and the visit to the gas station, see FBI report
of investigation, interview of Mohdar Abdullah, Sept. 19, 2001. On Hazmi's comment
to his housemate, see Interview (Apr. 23, 2004). Although Hazmi's housemate claims
that the "Hani" whom Hazmi introduced him to is not the same person pictured in
Hanjour's photograph, we have little doubt that the housemate did in fact see
Hanjour on the day he and Hazmi left San Diego. Ibid.; FBI electronic communication,
Penttbom investigation, Sept. 15, 2001.
44. On Hazmi's contact with Abdullah, see FBI report of investigation, interview of
Mohdar Abdullah, Sept. 19, 2001; FBI report of investigation, interview of Ramez
Noaman, Oct. 1, 2001. On Hazmi's contact with his housemate, see FBI reports of
investigation, interviews, Sept. 24,2001; July 26,2002. On Hazmi's contact to
acquaintances in San Diego, see Danny G. interviews (Nov. 18, 2003; May 24, 2004).
45. For Shehhi's arrival, see INS record, NIIS record of Shehhi, May 29, 2000;
Customs record, secondary inspection record of Shehhi, May 29, 2000. For Shehhi
going to New York City, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (May 30,
2000, entry citing Dresdner bank records). For Atta's travel to the Czech Republic,
see ibid. (June 2, 2000, entry citing Teletype, Sept. 21, 2001, 280350-PR, serial
111). Upon entry, Atta received the customary authorization to stay six months as a
tourist. For Atta's arrival in Newark on June 3, 2000, see INS record, non-NIIS
record of Atta, June 3, 2000. For Atta's apparent motivation, see CIA analytic
report,"11 September: The Plot and the Plotters," CTC 2003-40044HC, June 1, 2003, p.
13; Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Oct. 2, 2002; Mar. 3, 2004.
46. Demonstrating Atta and Shehhi's uncertainty regarding flight schools, Atta
emailed a New Hampshire school on June 5, 2000, see FBI report, "Hijackers
Timeline,"Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 3975); and inquired with a
New Jersey school on June 22, 2000, see ibid. (citing 265A-NY-280350-NK, serial
15965). As they looked at flight schools on the East Coast, Atta and Shehhi stayed
in a series of short-term rentals in New York City. Ibid. (June 19, 2000, entry
citing 265A-NY-280350-302, serials 80926, 86069; June 25, 2000, entry citing
265A-NY-280350-302, serial 74902). For Jarrah's travel and training, see INS record,
NIIS record of Jarrah, June 27, 2000; FBI letterhead memorandum, profile of Jarrah,
Mar. 20, 2002. For Jarrah living with instructors, see ibid. For Jarrah purchasing a
vehicle, see FBI briefing materials, Penttbom, Dec. 10-11, 2003, p. 150 (citing
265A-NY- 280350-302, serials 21113, 66098).
47. For Atta and Shehhi visiting the Oklahoma school, see FBI report, "Hijackers
Timeline,"Dec. 5, 2003 (July 2, 2000, entry citing FBI electronic communication,
Sept. 13, 2001). For Moussaoui's enrollment, see Superseding Indictment, United
States v. Moussaoui, Crim. No. 01-455-A (E.D. Va. filed July 16, 2002), para. 44.
For Atta's initial training in Florida, see FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline,"Dec. 5,
2003 (July 7, 2000, entry citing 265A-NY-280350- TP-5382). Atta and Shehhi did not
take their return flight to New York, and there are no travel records indicating how
they traveled from Oklahoma to Florida. Ibid. (July 7, 2000, entry citing FBI
electronic communication, Sept. 19, 2001). For Atta and Shehhi's enrollment in the
advanced course, see ibid. (July 17, 2000, entry citing 265A-NY- 280350, serial
4234; 265A-NY-280350-CE, serial 632). The two also soon rented an apartment and
opened a joint bank account. Ibid. (July 13, 2000, entry citing
265A-NY-280350-TP-5679; July 7, 2000, entry citing 265A-NY- 280350-302-16752). Atta
bought a car. FBI briefing materials, Penttbom, Dec. 10-11, 2003, p. 150. For their
solo flights, see FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline,"Dec. 5, 2003 (July 30, 2000, entry
citing 265A-NY-280350-CE-624, 632). For passing the test, see ibid. (Aug. 14, 2000,
entry citing 265A-NY-280350-302, serials 9715, 26590). For Atta and Shehhi
continuing training, see ibid. (Sept. 1,2000, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-2435). For
Jarrah's training, see ibid. (June 27, 2000, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-TP
(FD-302), serial 1442).
48. Ali reportedly received the money sent to the United States from KSM in Pakistan
and via courier. Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee, Feb. 11, 2004
(two reports). Ramzi Binalshibh wired some funds withdrawn from Shehhi's bank
account in Germany, a total of more than $10,000 in four transfers between June 13
and September 27, 2000. FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29,
2004, pp. 16-17; German BKA (Bundeskriminalamt) report, investigative summary re
Binalshibh, July 4, 2002, pp. 39-41.
49. Adam Drucker interview (Jan. 12, 2004); wire transfer documents (provided by the
FBI), pp. 6-37. Ali did provide identification for his initial wire transfer to
Hazmi in April that, along with some contact information he provided when he made
subsequent transfers, helped the FBI unravel his aliases after 9/11. Intelligence
reports, interrogations of detainee, Feb. 11, 2004 (two reports).
50. The applications of Atta and Shehhi for student status include the same
supporting financial documentation. See INS record, Atta application to change
status, Sept. 19, 2000; INS record, Shehhi application to change status, Sept. 15,
2000. For Atta and Shehhi's enrolling at Jones Aviation, see FBI report, "Hijackers
Timeline,"Dec. 5, 2003 (Sept. 23, 2000, entry citing SunTrust Financial Records).
For Atta and Shehhi's behavior, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Ivan
Chirivella, Sept. 15, 2001. For their failure, haste, and return to Huffman, see FBI
report,"Hijackers Timeline,"Dec. 5, 2003 (Oct. 4, 2000, entry citing
265A-NY-280350-TP, serial 1474;265A-NY- 280350-302, serial 1361).
51. For Jarrah's certificate, see FBI letterhead memorandum, profile of Jarrah, Mar.
20, 2002. For Jarrah's leaving the United States, see FBI report, "Hijackers
Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Oct. 7, 2000, entry citing 265A-NY- 280350-302-7134). For
Jarrah and Senguen's travel to Paris, see FBI letterhead memorandum, profile of
Jarrah, Mar. 20, 2002. For Jarrah's return to the United States, see FBI
report,"Hijackers Timeline,"Dec. 5, 2003 (Oct. 29, 2000, entry citing INS NIIS
Report;265A-NY-280350-302, serial 7134). For their telephone contact, see FBI
letterhead memorandum, profile of Jarrah, Mar. 20, 2002. For their email contact,
see FBI electronic communication, Penttbom investigation, Sept. 18, 2001, p. 5.
52. For Binalshibh's deposit, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003
(June 27, 2000, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-TP (FD-302), serial 1442;
265A-NY-280350-TP, serial 9500). For his May and June visa applications, see DOS
records, Binalshibh visa applications, May 31, 2000; July 18, 2000; FBI briefing
materials, Penttbom, Dec. 10-11, 2003, pp. 136-137; CIA analytic report,"The Plot
and the Plotters," June 1, 2003, pp. 10, 12. For his September application in Yemen,
see DOS record, Binalshibh visa application, Sept. 16, 2000. For his October
application in Berlin, see DOS record, Binalshibh visa application, Nov. 1, 2000.
Even after the last application was rejected, Binalshibh sought ways to get a visa,
such as by marrying a U.S. citizen. He corresponded by email with a woman in
California, but Atta told him to discontinue this effort. Intelligence report,
interrogation of Binalshibh, Sept. 24, 2002.
Essabar may have been intended to replace Binalshibh. Like Atta, Shehhi, and Jarrah,
Essabar obtained a new passport even though his old one was nearly a year from
expiration, evidently to conceal his prior travel to Afghanistan during the first
half of 2000. On December 12, 2000, and January 28, 2001-after Binalshibh's four
U.S. visa applications had been denied-Essabar made two unsuccessful U.S. visa
applications, stating that he wished to visit the United States during the week of
February 15, 2001. DOS records, Essabar visa applications, Dec. 12, 2000; Jan. 8,
2001. See Federal Prosecutor General (Germany), response to Commission letter, June
25, 2004, p. 14. Neither Binalshibh nor Essabar were denied visas based on terrorism
concerns.
53. FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004 (classified
version), p. 82.
54. For KSM sending Moussaoui to Malaysia, see Intelligence Report, interrogation of
KSM, Mar. 24, 2003. For Moussaoui not finding a flight school, see Intelligence
report, interrogation of detainee, Jan. 22, 2002. For the ammonium nitrate purchase,
see Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Apr.9,2002; Intelligence report,
interrogation of detainee, Apr. 12, 2004. For the cargo planes operation, see
Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Apr. 12, 2004. For KSM's reaction,
see Intelligence Report, interrogation of KSM, Mar. 24, 2003. For Moussaoui's and
Binalshibh's trips and Moussaoui's emails, see FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom
Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004 (classified version), p. 85. There are no witnesses
who report that Moussaoui and Binalshibh actually met in London, but Moussaoui's
subsequent travel to Afghanistan implies that he received instructions from
Binalshibh. See ibid., p. 86. Somewhere in his travels, Moussaoui obtained the funds
he would bring to the United States. He declared $35,000 upon arrival on February
23, 2001, and he deposited $32,000 into a Norman, Oklahoma, bank account on February
26. FBI report,"Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, p. 78.
55. For Hanjour's entry, see INS record, NIIS record of Hanjour, Oct. 3, 1991. For
his university studies, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline,"Dec. 5, 2003 (Oct. 14,
1991, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-PX, serial 3792). For Hanjour being religious, see
FBI letterhead memorandum, Penttbom investigation, Jan. 4, 2004, p. 10. One witness
interviewed by the FBI after 9/11 remembers Hanjour and Nawaf al Hazmi becoming so
entranced during a prayer that both men began to cry. FBI report of investigation,
interview of Mourad Jdaini, Sept. 22, 2001. For Hanjour's trip to Afghanistan, his
initial studies in the United States, his rejection by the Saudi flight school, and
his desire for flight training in the United States, see Intelligence report,
interviews of Saudi hijackers' families, Dec. 22, 2001; FBI report of investigation,
interview of Adnan Khalil, Sept. 29, 2001.
56. For Hanjour's 1996 trip to the United States, see, e.g., FBI report, "Hijackers
Timeline,"Dec. 5, 2003 (Apr. 1, 1996, entry citing 265A-NT-280350, serial 2746;
265A-NT-280350-302, serial 9130). For his interest in flight training in Florida and
his training in California, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Adnan
Khalil, Sep. 14, 2001; FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Sept. 3,
1996, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-SF, serial 1847). For his 1996 flight instruction
in Arizona and return to Saudi Arabia, see ibid. (Sept. 29, 1996, entry citing
265A-NY-280350-IN, serial 953; Nov. 26, 1996, entry citing INS: 265A-NY-280350-NK).
For his return to Florida, see FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Bandar al
Hazmi, Jan. 15, 2002. For his 1998 flight training in Arizona, see FBI report,
"Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Feb. 2, 1998, entry citing 265A-NY-280350- IN,
serial 4468). For his flight training in Arizona with his two friends, see ibid.
(Feb. 24, 2000, entry citing 265A-NY-280530-IN, serial 4468). Hanjour initially was
nervous if not fearful in flight training. FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation
of Lotfi Raissi, Jan. 4, 2004, p. 11. His instructor described him as a terrible
pilot. FBI letterhead memorandum, interview of James McRae, Sept. 17, 2001. We have
seen no evidence of a familial relationship between Bandar al Hazmi and hijackers
Nawaf al Hazmi and Salem al Hazmi. TimT. interview (Jan. 5, 2004); Ken Williams
interview (May 11, 2004). Bandar al Hazmi claims he met Hanjour in Florida, as they
were both studying at the same English-language institute. FBI letterhead
memorandum, investigation of Bandar al Hazmi, Jan. 15, 2002. Rayed Abdullah, who
knew Bandar al Hazmi from high school, says he moved to Florida to become a
commercial pilot after speaking with Bandar al Hazmi, and claims he met Hanjour upon
arriving in Florida. FBI report of investigation, interview of Rayed Abdullah, Sept.
15, 2001; FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Abdullah Rayed Abdullah, Nov.
16, 2001, p. 8. This account is not credible, because Abdullah arrived in the United
States on November 15, 1997, the day before Hanjour arrived. Ken Williams interview
(May 11, 2004); FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline,"Dec. 5, 2003 (citing
265A-NY-280350-NK, serial 1379). The three of them did attend language school
together but not until after all three had arrived in the United States. FBI report
of investigation, interview of Rayed Abdullah, Sept. 15, 2001. The Phoenix FBI
office remains suspicious of Abdullah and Hazmi and their association with Hanjour.
Ken Williams interview (May 11, 2004). (Williams is the FBI agent who authored what
is referred to as the "Phoenix memo," discussed in chapter 8.) For Hanjour obtaining
his pilot's license in three months, see FBI report of investigation, interview of
Amro Hassan, Sept. 17, 2001, p. 2. For Hanjour receiving his commercial pilot's
license, see FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Apr. 15, 1999, entry
citing 265A-NY-280350-PX, serial 334). For Hanjour's apparent return to Saudi
Arabia, see ibid. (Apr. 28, 1999, entry citing INS I-94, 265A-NY-280350-NK, serial
1379). Bandar al Hazmi continued his training at Arizona Aviation with intermittent
trips home to Saudi Arabia, before departing the United States for the last time in
January 2000. Tim T. interview (Jan. 5, 2004); FBI report of investigation,
interview of Amro Hassan, Sept. 19, 2001. Rayed Abdullah trained at Arizona Aviation
and obtained a private pilot's license in December 1998. FBI letterhead memorandum,
investigation of Rayed Abdullah, May 5, 2001, p. 9. Abdullah then worked as a
computer programmer in Arizona before resuming flight training during the summer of
2001. FBI report of investigation, interview of Rayed Abdullah, Sept. 16, 2001, p.
5.
57. Intelligence report, interviews of Saudi hijackers' families, Dec. 22, 2001.
58. Al Qaeda figures at the university or in Tucson included Mubarak al Duri,
reportedly Bin Ladin's principal procurement agent for weapons of mass destruction;
Muhammad Bayazid, an al Qaeda arms procurer and trainer; Wadi al Hage, an operative
convicted for the East Africa bombings; and Wail Julaidan, a Saudi extremist with
ties to al Qaeda. CIA and FBI joint analytic report, "Arizona: Long Term Nexus for
Islamic Extremists," May 15, 2002, p. 3.
59. Rayed Abdullah, who lived and trained with Hanjour, was a leader at the Islamic
Cultural Center in Phoenix and reportedly gave extremist speeches at the mosque. Ken
Williams interview (Jan. 7, 2004); FBI electronic communication, Rayed Abdullah,
Sept. 22, 2003. Another Hanjour associate, Faisal al Salmi, took flight training
with Rayed Abdullah but wanted to keep his training secret. FBI letterhead
memorandum, investigation of Rayed Abdullah, May 5,2001; FBI report of
investigation, interview of Malek Seif, Oct.25,2001. When polygraphed on whether he
had taken flight training at the behest of an organization, al Salmi's negative
response was deemed deceptive. FBI electronic communication, investigation of
Zakaria Soubra, June 5, 2002, p. 8.
60. For al Qaeda activity in Arizona, see Ken Williams interview (Jan. 7, 2004). On
al Qaeda directing individuals in the Phoenix area to enroll in flight training
without telling them why, see FBI electronic communication, investigation of Rayed
Abdullah, Sept. 22, 2003. Ghassan al Sharbi, who was captured in March 2002 in
Pakistan along with Abu Zubaydah, studied at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in
Prescott, Arizona. Greg Krikorian, "Detainee Facing Deportation Summoned to Probe,"
Los AngelesTimes, Jan. 24, 2003; Ken Williams interview (Jan. 7, 2004). Although
Sharbi has not been tied to the 9/11 attacks, he reportedly attended the training
camps in Afghanistan and swore bayat to Bin Ladin during the summer of 2001. FBI
memorandum, investigation of Hamed al Sulami, Aug. 1, 2002, p. 6.
After he left the camps, Sharbi looked for his friend Hamdan al Shalawi, another
student in Arizona, for a secret project. Shalawi reportedly trained in the camps in
November 2000, learning how to conduct "Khobar Towers"-type attacks that he and a
colleague planned to execute in Saudi Arabia. FBI electronic communication,
investigation of Hamdan al Shalawi, Oct. 16, 2003, p. 2; Intelligence report, trace
request on Shalawi, Nov. 27, 2000. Shalawi, however, denies this, claiming to have
been studying in Arizona at the time, which neither the FBI nor we have been able to
confirm. Shalawi was involved in a widely publicized incident in November 1999, when
he and his friend Muhammed al Qudhaieen were detained because the crew of a
cross-country America West flight reported that Qudhaieen had attempted to open the
cockpit door on two occasions. FBI letterhead memorandum, Hamed al Sulami, July 25,
2002, p. 7. After the 9/11 attacks, FBI agents in Phoenix considered whether the
incident was a "dry run" for the attacks. See, e.g., FBI letterhead memorandum,
investigation of Fahad al Wahedi, Nov. 8, 2002, p. 4. In our interviews of Shalawi
and Qudhaieen, they both claimed that Qudhaieen was only looking for the lavatory on
the plane. Mohammad al Qudhaieen interview (Oct. 25, 2003); Hamdan al Shalawi
interview (Oct. 22, 2003). Shalawi admits having gone to Afghanistan, but only once
in the late 1980s after the war with the Soviet Union. Shalawi interview (Oct. 22,
2003).
Finally, another admitted associate of Hani Hanjour in Arizona, Hamed al Sulami, has
had telephone contact with Sulayman al Alwan, a radical Saudi cleric from Qassim
Province who was reported to be Abu Zubaydah's spiritual advisor and, as discussed
later in this chapter, may have had a role in recruiting one or more of the muscle
hijackers. FBI memorandum, investigation of Hamed al Sulami, Aug. 1, 2002, p. 2; FBI
memorandum, investigation of Fahad al Wahedi, Nov. 8, 2002, p. 4; CIA analytic
report, "The Plot and the Plotters," June 1, 2003, p. 27.
61. For Hanjour's meeting KSM, experience in the camp, and incorporation into the
9/11 operation, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004. It is
unknown how Hanjour got to the camps or who may have directed him to go there. For
new arrivals' procedures, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, May 15,
2003.
62. For Hanjour returning home and obtaining a visa, see DOS records, visa
applications for Hanjour, Sept. 10, 2000; Sept. 25, 2000. For Hanjour's statement to
his family, see Intelligence report, interviews of Saudi hijackers' families, Dec.
22, 2001. For the meeting, see Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Jan.
7, 2004.
63. Ali initially gave Hanjour $3,000 to open the account and later deposited another
$5,000 into the account. See FBI report, financial timeline of 9/11 hijackers, Dec.
9, 2004, p. 36 (Dec. 5, 2000, and Jan. 28, 2001, entries). Intelligence report,
interrogation of detainee, Feb. 11, 2004. Hanjour also maintained another account,
into which more than $9,600 was deposited. While in the United States, he accessed
both accounts via ATM. FBI Report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29,
2004, pp. 9, 11, 13, 17-18, 19. For Hanjour's travel and supposed destination, see
INS record, NIIS record of Hanjour, Dec. 8, 2000; DOS record, Hanjour visa
application, Sept. 25, 2000. For his enrollment but failure to attend, see FBI
report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Nov. 6, 2000, entry citing
265A-NY-280350-302, serial 11165; 265A-NY-280350-SF, serial 160).
64. For Hanjour's refresher training, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5,
2003 (Dec. 13, 2000, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-IN, serial 29652). For his desire
to train on multi-engine planes, his language difficulties, the instructor's advice,
and his reaction, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Rodney McAlear, Apr.
10, 2002. For his training at Pan Am International Flight Academy and completion by
March 2001, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Feb. 8, 2001,
entries citing 265A-NY-280350, serial 2870; 265A-NY-280350- PX, serials 334, 1033).
For the Academy's instructor's reaction, see FBI report of investigation, interview
of James Milton, Apr. 12, 2002; FBI electronic communication, Penttbom
investigation, Sept. 16, 2001, pp. 2-3. For his perseverance, see ibid., p. 3. For
vacating their apartment, see FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline,"Dec. 5, 2003 (Mar. 31,
2001, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-PX, serial 762). During the cross-country drive,
Hazmi received a speeding ticket in Oklahoma on April 1, 2001. Ibid. (citing
265A-NY-280350-W, serial 693, items k2453, k2454;265A-NY- 280350-OC, serial
1541;265A-NY-280350-302, serials 58753,58757). For arrival in Virginia, see ibid.
(citing 265ANY- 280350-NH, serial 1859).
65. For Atta's training at Huffman, see, e.g., FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline,"Dec.
5, 2003 (Nov. 19, 2000, entry citing 265A-280350-TP-5382). For Atta's certificate,
see ibid. (Nov. 20, 2000, entry citing FAA records). For Shehhi's training at
Huffman, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Erik Seiberlich, Sept. 12,
2001. For Shehhi's certificate, see FBI report,"Summary of Penttbom Investigation,"
Feb. 29, 2004, p. 20. For Atta and Shehhi taking the commercial pilot test, see FBI
report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Dec. 19, 2000, entry citing 265ANY-
280350-302-9715, serial 26590). For Atta and Shehhi's commercial pilot licenses, see
ibid.(Dec. 21,2000, entries citing FAA records;265A-NY-280350-302-2340). For Atta
and Shehhi's simulator training, see ibid. (Dec. 30, 2000, entry citing
265A-NY-280350-302, serial 1177). For Jarrah's training, see ibid. (Dec. 15, 2000,
entries citing 265DNY- 280350-1399, serial 8048).
66. For Jarrah's trip to Beirut and return trip with Senguen, see FBI letterhead
memorandum, profile of Jarrah, Mar. 20, 2002. For Senguen accompanying Jarrah to
flight training, see German BKA report, investigative summary re Jarrah, July
18,2002, p. 60. According to Binalshibh, Senguen visited Jarrah in order to verify
that he actually was studying to become a pilot. Intelligence report, interrogation
of Binalshibh, June 9, 2004. For Jarrah's second trip to Beirut and visiting
Senguen, see FBI letterhead memorandum, profile of Jarrah, Mar. 20, 2002; FBI
electronic communication, Penttbom investigation, Sept. 18, 2001, p. 5.
67. For Atta's trip to Germany and meeting with Binalshibh, see Intelligence reports,
interrogations of Binalshibh, Sept. 24, 2002; Dec. 10, 2002; FBI Penttbom timeline
briefing (Dec. 10-11, 2003). For Atta giving money to Binalshibh, see ibid. For Atta
returning to Florida, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Jan. 10,
2001, entry citing INS NIIS report; 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 7134). For
Binalshibh's trip to Afghanistan, see FBI Penttbom timeline briefing (Dec. 10-11,
2003).
68. For Shehhi's trip, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Jan. 11
and 12, 2001, entries citing 265A-NY-280350-TP, serials 11182, 11183;
265A-NY-280350-OUT, serials 2248, 2256, Intelligence report). We do not have
information on what Shehhi did in Morocco. Atta's cell phone was used on January 2
to call the Moroccan embassy in Washington, D.C. before Shehhi left. FBI
report,"Hijackers Timeline,"Dec. 5, 2003 (citing cellular telephone records).
Shehhi's trip occurred at a time when Abdelghani Mzoudi, one of the Hamburg cell
associates, was also in Morocco. Mzoudi claims he went home to Morocco to get
married but could not because he was injured in a car accident there. German BKA
report, investigative summary re Mzoudi, Jan. 13, 2003, p. 43. He denies having met
with Shehhi, and neither German nor U.S. investigators have uncovered evidence of a
meeting. See Federal Prosecutor General (Germany), response to Commission letter,
June 25, 2004. For Shehhi's family contacting the UAE embassy, which contacted
Hamburg police, and the UAE official's search, see German BKA report, investigative
summary re Shehhi, July 9, 2002, p. 23. For Shehhi's call home, see FBI
report,"Hijackers Timeline,"Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 265A-NY-280350-BN-98). For the
search being called off, see German BKA report, investigative summary re Shehhi,
July 9, 2002, p. 24.
69. Reports that Atta was in the Prague airport on May 30-31, 2000, and that he was
turned back because he lacked a visa appear to be a case of mistaken identity: a
Pakistani traveler with a name similar to Atta's attempted to enter the Czech
Republic from Saudi Arabia via Germany but was forced to return to Germany because
he lacked a valid Czech visa. CIA cable, report re traveler to Prague, Dec. 8, 2001.
70. For Czech source reporting and credibility assessment, see CIA briefing (Jan. 28,
2004); Eliska T. interview (May 20, 2004). For the information being reported to
CIA, see CIA briefing (Jan. 28, 2004). For the leak and the ministers' statements,
see CIA briefing (Jan. 28, 2004); Shirley interview (Apr. 29, 2004). On April 4,
2001, Atta cashed an $8,000 check at a bank in Virginia Beach; he appears on a bank
surveillance tape. For FBI evidence of Atta being in Virginia Beach, see FBI report,
"Hijackers Timeline,"Dec. 5, 2003 (Apr. 4, 2001, entry citing 265ANY-
280350-302-615, 688, 896, 898). For FBI evidence of Atta being in Coral Springs, see
ibid. (Apr. 11, 2001, entries citing 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 381;
265A-NY-280350-MM, serials 3817, 5214). For Czech government finding no evidence of
Atta's presence and having evidence that Ani was not in Prague, see CIA briefing
(Jan. 28, 2004). Aside from scrutinizing various official records, the Czech
government also reviewed surveillance photos taken outside the Iraqi embassy. CIA
briefing (Jan. 28, 2004); Shirley interview (Apr. 29, 2004). None of the people
photographed that day resembled Atta, although the surveillance only operated from
8:00 A.M. to 3:00 P.M. CIA cable, review of surveillance photos, Feb. 27, 2002. For
Ani's denials of any meetings and request to superiors, see CIA briefing (Jan. 28,
2004); Intelligence report, interrogation of Ahmad Khalil Ibrahim Samir al Ani, Oct.
1, 2003. For KSM's denial of the meeting, see Shirley interview (Apr. 29, 2004).
Binalshibh has stated that Atta and he were so close that Atta probably would have
told him of a meeting with an Iraqi official. Intelligence report, interrogation of
Binalshibh, Oct. 2, 2002. Binalshibh also stated that Bin Ladin was upset with Iraqi
leader Saddam Hussein for committing atrocities against Iraqi Muslims, and that Bin
Ladin would never have approved such a meeting. Intelligence report, interrogation
of Binalshibh, Oct. 4, 2002. For Atta not using an alias during his July 2001 trip,
see FBI memo, Penttbom investigation, Jan. 14, 2002.
71. Atta was admitted as a tourist for an eight-month stay, even though the legal
limit for tourists is six months. Shehhi was admitted for a four-month "business"
stay. The Atta and Shehhi applications to change status were ultimately adjudicated
on July 17 and August 9, 2001. Each received until October 1, 2001, to complete his
studies. For Atta's INS inspection, see INS records, NIIS record of Atta, Jan. 10,
2001; copy of Atta's Egyptian passport; Atta's inspection results; student/school
form presented by Atta; primary and secondary inspectors interviews (Mar. 25, 2004).
For Shehhi's INS inspection, see INS records, NIIS record of Shehhi, Jan. 18,2001;
Shehhi's inspection results; primary inspector interview (Mar. 26, 2004); secondary
inspector interview (Mar. 22, 2004).
72. For Atta and Shehhi staying in Norcross and Decatur, see FBI report, "Hijackers
Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Jan. 25, 2001, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-3631;
265A-NY-280350-AT-141). For the plane rental in Lawrenceville, see ibid. (Jan. 31,
2001, entry citing 265A-NY-280350, serial 13850). These locations are all near
Atlanta. For return to Virginia, see ibid. (citing 265A-NY-280350-NF-48). For
mailbox rental, see ibid. (Feb. 20, 2001, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-NF-48,51). For
check cashing, see FBI report,"Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, p.
26. For return to Georgia, see FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Feb.
21, 2001, entry citing 65A-NY-280350-302, serial 49563). For Jarrah staying in
Decatur, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Mar. 15, 2001, entry
citing 265A-NY-280350, serial 15661). For Atta-Jarrah call, see FBI letterhead
memorandum, profile of Jarrah, Mar. 20, 2002. For Jarrah's apparent visit with
Senguen, see INS records, NIIS record for Jarrah, Feb. 25, 2001 (with departure date
of Mar. 30, 2001); NIIS record for Jarrah, Apr. 13, 2001. For Atta and Shehhi
returning to Virginia Beach, see FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline,"Dec. 5, 2003 (Apr.
3, 2001, entry citing FBI electronic communication, Sept. 17, 2001). For Atta
closing the mailbox, see ibid. (Apr. 4, 2001, entry citing FBI electronic
communication, Sept. 18, 2001).
73. For Atta and Shehhi arriving in Virginia, see FBI report, "Hijackers
Timeline,"Dec. 5, 2003 (Apr. 3, 2001, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-302-615,688, 896,
898). For Hazmi and Hanjour arriving in Virginia, see ibid. (Apr. 4, 2001, entry
citing 265A-NY-280350-NH, serial 1859). For their attendance at the Dar al Hijra
mosque, see FBI electronic communication, request for interviews, Aug. 6, 2002.
74. For Aulaqi moving to Virginia, see FBI electronic communication, analysis related
to Penttbom investigation, Oct. 23, 2001. For his denial of contacts with Hazmi and
Hanjour, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Anwar Aulaqi, Sept. 17, 2001.
75. The apartment was already occupied by two other individuals. The al Qaeda
operatives spent little time with their roommates, but did mention at one point that
they had considered going to Afghanistan for jihad. FBI report of investigation,
interview of Ahmad Ahmad, Oct. 4, 2002. For Hazmi and Hanjour meeting Rababah, see
FBI electronic communication, request for interviews of certain individuals, Aug. 6,
2002. For Rababah seeking work at the mosque, his meeting them, and his assistance
in finding them an apartment, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Eyad al
Rababah, June 10, 2002. For Hazmi and Hanjour renting the apartment, see FBI report
of investigation, interview of Derar Mohammed Saleh, Jan. 16, 2003.
76. For FBI agents' suspicions, see Jim B. interview (Nov. 6, 2003). Rababah was
reluctant to admit meeting the hijackers at the mosque and initially told a story
about meeting them for the first time at a store. Rababah attributed his initial
prevarication to wanting to protect the mosque from anti-Arab sentiment following
September 11. FBI report of investigation, interview of Eyad al Rababah, June 10,
2002; Robert B. interview (Nov. 6, 2003). For Rababah's deportation, see Peter A.
interview (Oct. 10, 2003).
77. FBI report of investigation, interview of Eyad al Rababah, June 10, 2002.
78. For Rababah going to the apartment and finding new roommates, see FBI report of
investigation, interview of Eyad al Rababah, June 10, 2002. For the trips to
Connecticut and New Jersey, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (May
8, 2001, entries citing 265A-NY-280350-NH, serial 1859); FBI electronic
communication, summary of Penttbom investigation, June 3,2002. For the telephone
calls, see FBI report,"HijackersTimeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (May 8, 2001, entry citing
265A-NY-280350-NH, serial 1859). For return to Connecticut and Rababah not seeing
the hijackers again, see ibid. (May 10, 2001, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-NH, serial
1859); FBI report of investigation, interview of Eyad al Rababah, June 10, 2002.
79. For the apartment rental in New Jersey, see FBI report of investigation,
interview of Eyad al Rababah, June 10, 2002; FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline,"Dec.
5, 2003 (May 21, 2001, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-302, serials 25453, 25445). For
the landlord finding six people, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Jimi
Nouri, Sept. 19, 2001. Although no specific evidence places Omari in the apartment,
the muscle hijackers based in New Jersey likely lived together, as they apparently
conducted other activities jointly, such as obtaining identification cards. See,
e.g., FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline,"Dec. 5, 2003 (July 1, 2001, entries citing
265A-NY-280350-FD- 302, serials 4718, 11815, 20900, 21529).
80. For Atta's renting the apartment, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5,
2003 (citing 265A-NY280350-302, serial 381; 265A-NY-280350-MM, serial 3817). For
Shehhi's presence in Florida, see, e.g., ibid. (Apr. 13, 2001, entry citing
265A-NY-280350-302, serial 17575).
81. For Shehhi's ticket purchase, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003
(Apr. 13, 2001, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 17575; Apr. 18, 2001 entry
citing 265A-NY-280350-CG, serial 1928; 265A-NY- 280350-302, serial 16379; Apr.
19,2001, entry citing CIA report;265A-NY-280350-302, serial 17575). For Shehhi's
visit with Atta's father, see ibid. (Apr. 20, 2001, entry citing CIA report). For
Atta having license during April 26, 2001, traffic stop and Shehhi spending two
weeks abroad, see ibid. (citing 265A-NY-280350-MM, serial 2746; May 2,2001, entry
citing 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 16379;265A-NY-280350-CG, serial 1928); FBI
Penttbom timeline briefing (Dec. 10-11, 2003).
82. For Shehhi's return, see INS record, NIIS record of Shehhi, May 2, 2001. For Atta
and Jarrah obtaining driver's licenses, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline,"Dec. 5,
2003 (May 2, 2001, entry citing 265A-NY-280350- MM, serial 59). Also on May 2, Atta
and two unidentified companions appeared at the Miami District Immigration Office,
where an inspector reduced Atta's authorized length of stay by two months,
correcting the mistake made back in January. Interview of inspector (Mar. 25, 2004).
83. For a description of the muscle hijackers, see CIA analytic report, "The Plot and
the Plotters," June 1, 2003, pp. 34-52.
84. On Banihammad, see CIA analytic report, "Facilitating Disaster: An Overview of 11
September Finance," CTC 2002-40093H, Aug. 22, 2002, p. 4
85. Intelligence reports, interviews of Saudi hijackers' families, Dec. 22, 2001;
July 17, 2002; Saudi Arabian Mabahith briefing (Oct. 17, 2003) (disclosing that two
of the muscle hijackers had married shortly before joining the plot and only one,
Wail al Shehri, was employed, as a physical education teacher).
86. CIA analytic report, "The Plot and the Plotters," June 1, 2003, p. 25.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid., p. 26.
89. Ibid., p. 25. On Nawaf 's efforts on behalf of his brother, see CIA analytic
report, "Afghanistan Camps Central to 11 September Plot: Can al-Qa'ida Train on the
Run?" CTC 2003-40071CH, June 20, 2003, p. 1; Intelligence report, interrogation of
detainee, Oct. 18, 2001.
90. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Feb. 18, 2004; Intelligence
report, interrogations of KSM and another detainee, Feb. 18, 2004; Intelligence
report, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, Feb. 19, 2004; Intelligence report,
interrogation of Nashiri, Feb. 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee,
Feb. 18, 2004.
91. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan 7, 2004. Khallad agrees about the
recruit pool, but also argues that operatives' ethnicity was important for symbolic
reasons, citing the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam embassy bombings and the planes
operation as examples. In the planes operation, Khallad notes, Bin Ladin selected
operatives from Mecca (Mihdhar and the Hazmi brothers) and would have used more had
they been available. Moreover, with respect to the remaining Saudi muscle hijackers,
Khallad claims Bin Ladin chose them because he wanted the 9/11 attacks to resound
across Saudi Arabia, especially among the southern tribes and those of the hijackers
themselves. According to Khallad, Bin Ladin wanted operatives from strong tribal
areas of Saudi Arabia and chose two Saudi brothers from the al Shehri tribe, of
which their father was a leader. Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Feb.
18, 2004.
92. CIA analytic report, "The Plot and the Plotters," June 1, 2003, pp. 24, 26.
According to Saudi authorities, none of the hijackers had any record of extremist
activity, but Satam al Suqami and Salem al Hazmi both had minor criminal offense
records. Saudi Arabian Mabahith briefing (Oct. 17, 2003).
93. CIA analytic report, "Afghanistan Camps Central to 11 September Plot," June 20,
2003, pp. 1-2.
94. For trainer's comments, see Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Feb.
8, 2002. For Omari's, Ghamdi's, and Shehri's backgrounds, see CIA analytic report,
"The Plot and the Plotters," June 1, 2003, p. 27; Intelligence reports, interviews
of Saudi hijackers' families, Dec. 22, 2001; July 17, 2002.
95. CIA analytic report, "The Plot and the Plotters,"June 1,2003, p. 26; Intelligence
reports, interviews of Saudi hijackers' families, Dec. 22, 2001; July 17, 2002.
According to Saudi authorities, a substantial number of the hijackers isolated
themselves and became religious only within a few months of leaving the Kingdom. All
but Ahmad al Haznawi, who called his aunt to inquire about his sick mother, ceased
contact with their families about six months before the attacks. Saudi Arabian
Mabahith briefing (Oct. 17, 2003).
96. CIA analytic report, "The Plot and the Plotters,"June 1,2003, p. 26; Intelligence
reports, interviews of Saudi hijackers' families, Dec. 22, 2001; July, 17, 2002.
97. On Khattab, see CIA analytic report, "The Plot and the Plotters," June 1, 2003,
p. 26, n. 2. For KSM's claim, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, May 15,
2003. For difficulties traveling to Chechnya, see also Saudi Arabian Mabahith
briefing (Oct. 17, 2003).
98. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Khallad, Sept. 5, 2003; Mar. 26, 2004;
Jan. 8, 2004; Jan. 7, 2004. Khallad claims he also encouraged Salem al Hazmi to
participate in a suicide operation. Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad,
Apr. 13, 2004.
99. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, May 15, 2003; Jan. 9, 2004; Oct. 21,
2003. KSM does acknowlNOTES TO CHAPTER 7 525 edge that the commander of al Faruq
training camp was known to urge trainees to swear bayat. Moreover, peer pressure
certainly appears to have been a factor in swaying recruits to choose "martyrdom."
Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Apr. 30, 2004.
100. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 18, 2004; Intelligence report,
interrogation of Khallad, Jan. 8, 2004.
101. Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Feb. 18, 2004; Intelligence
report, interrogation of KSM, Jan. 7, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of
detainee, Feb. 8, 2003.
102. CIA analytic report, "Afghanistan Camps Central to 11 September Plot," June 20,
2003, pp. 2-3.
103. Ibid., p. 8; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, May 15, 2003.
104. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, May 15, 2003; Jan. 9, 2004; Apr. 2,
2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Apr. 13, 2004; Intelligence
report, interrogation of detainee, Apr. 14, 2004. For description of martyrdom video
filming, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, May 21, 2004.
105. Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Apr. 13, 2004; Intelligence
reports, interrogations of KSM, Aug. 20, 2003; Apr. 13, 2004; Apr. 5, 2004; Apr. 3,
2004.
Dates of U.S. visas obtained in 2000: Ahmed al Ghamdi (September 3), Saeed al Ghamdi
(September 4), Hamza al Ghamdi (October 17), Mohand al Shehri (October 23), Wail and
Waleed al Shehri (October 24), Ahmed al Nami (October 28), Ahmad al Haznawi
(November 12), Majed Moqed (November 20), and Satam al Suqami (November 21). Five
Saudi muscle hijackers obtained visas in 2001: Ahmed al Nami (April 23), Saeed al
Ghamdi (June 12), Khalid al Mihdhar (June 13), Abdul Aziz Omari (June 18) and Salem
al Hazmi (June 20). For Nami, Ghamdi, and Mihdhar, this was their second visa, and
each applied using a new passport. Banihammad, the only non-Saudi muscle hijacker,
also obtained his visa much later than most of the Saudi muscle hijackers, on June
18, 2001. See Commission analysis of DOS records; CIA analytic report, "The Plot and
the Plotters," June 1, 2003, p. 55. According to KSM, the three hijackers who
obtained their first visas much later than the others were not replacements for
unsuccessful candidates. KSM simply wanted to get as many hijackers into the United
States as possible to enhance the odds for success, even if each flight ended up
with as many as six or seven. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 20,
2004.
106. Only the passports of Satam al Suqami and Abdul Aziz al Omari were recovered
after 9/11. Both had been doctored. According to KSM, two hijacker passports were
damaged in the doctoring process. These may have belonged to Saeed al Ghamdi and
Ahmed al Nami, as both acquired new passports and new U.S. visas, although the old
visas were still valid. Of the hijacker visa applications we were able to review,
all were incomplete. Tourist visas were granted anyway. On obtaining "clean"
passports and the two damaged passports, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of
KSM, July 3, 2003; Sept. 9, 2003. Wail and Waleed al Shehri had a family member in
the Saudi passport office who provided them with new passports for their trip to the
United States. See CIA analytic report, Al Qaeda Travel Issues, CTC 2004-40002H,
Jan. 2004, p. 12.
107. Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Apr. 5, 2004; Intelligence
report, interrogation of KSM, Mar. 20, 2004. The candidate operatives were
