1. Muhammad Mani Ahmad al Kahtani. Currently in custody, he is the last known Saudi
muscle candidate to be sent to the United States, in early August 2001, to round out
the number of hijackers. As discussed later in this chapter, he was refused entry.
Secretary of Defense interview with David Frost (BBC), June 27, 2004, available at
www.defenselink.mil. CIA analytic report, "Threat Threads: Recent Advances in
Understanding 11 September,"CTC 2002-30086CH, Sept. 16, 2002, p. 4; Intelligence
report, interrogation of KSM, July 3, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of
detainee, Apr. 3, 2003.
2. Khalid Saeed Ahmad al Zahrani. He traveled to Afghanistan illegally after being
prohibited by Saudi authorities from leaving Saudi Arabia. After being assigned to a
mission in the U.S., he secretly reentered the Kingdom but failed in an attempt to
have his name removed from the list of prohibited travelers so that he could obtain
a U.S. visa. See Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee, Apr. 20, 2002;
Oct. 4, 2002; Apr. 3, 2003.
3. Ali Abd al Rahman al Faqasi al Ghamdi. (aka Abu Bakr al Azdi) He reportedly was to
have been part of the planes operation but was held in reserve by Bin Ladin for a
later, even larger operation. Like other muscle hijackers, he reportedly set out for
Chechnya but diverted to Afghanistan. See Intelligence reports, interrogations of
Abu Bakr al Azdi, July 23, 2003; Sept. 25, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation
of Khallad, Nov. 6, 2003.
4 and 5. Saeed al Baluchi and Qutaybah al Najdi. Both were sent to Saudi Arabia via
Bahrain, where Najdi was stopped and briefly questioned by airport security
officials. Both were so frightened by the experience that they withdrew from the
operation. KSM urged Baluchi to obtain a U.S. visa, but Baluchi refused, fearing
that he might be watchlisted at the U.S. embassy. See Intelligence report,
interrogation of Khallad, July 9, 2003; Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM,
Mar. 27, 2003; July 3, 2003; Feb. 20, 2004.
6. Zuhair al Thubaiti: He has reportedly admitted membership in al Qaeda, stating
"proudly" that he was among a select number of operatives who had the personal
endorsement of Bin Ladin. He was not ultimately selected for the 9/11 attacks
because the al Qaeda leadership considered him too high-strung and lacking the
necessary temperament. CIA analytic report,"Threat Threads," Sept. 16, 2002, p. 3;
Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee, May 21, 2002; June 17,2002; June
20,2002; Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004 (two reports).
7. Saeed Abdullah Saeed ("Jihad") al Ghamdi. He arranged to travel to Afghanistan in
March 2000, swore allegiance to Bin Ladin (agreeing to serve as a suicide
operative), and was sent to Saudi Arabia by KSM with 9/11 hijacker Ahmad al Haznawi
to obtain a U.S. visa, but his visa application was denied because he appeared to be
intending to immigrate. DOS record, Ghamdi visa application, Nov. 13, 2000. CIA
analytic report,"Threat Threads," Sept. 16, 2002, p. 4; Intelligence reports,
interrogations of detainee, Apr. 11, 2002; Sept. 11, 2002; Intelligence report,
interrogation of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004.
8. Saud al Rashid. Describing him as headstrong and immature, KSM says he disappeared
after being sent to Saudi Arabia for a U.S. visa, either because he had second
thoughts or because his family interceded and confiscated his passport. Passport
photos of Rashid and three 9/11 hijackers-Nawaf al Hazmi, Mihdhar, and Omari-were
found together during a May 2002 raid in Karachi. After discovery of the photos in
2002, Rashid turned himself in to the Saudi authorities, but he has since been
released from custody. In a Commission interview, he has admitted training in
Afghanistan but denies hearing of al Qaeda before returning from Afghanistan or
meeting Bin Ladin, KSM, or any 9/11 hijacker other than Ahmad al Haznawi, whom he
claims seeing only once or twice at a guesthouse. He has no credible explanation why
photos of him were found with those of three other hijackers, or why others
identified him as a candidate hijacker. See Intelligence report, interrogation of
KSM, Mar. 27, 2003; June 11, 2003; July 3, 2003; Feb. 20, 2004; Intelligence report,
interrogation of Khallad, July 9, 2003; Saud al Rashid interview (Feb. 24, 2004).
9. Mushabib al Hamlan. Sent to Saudi Arabia to acquire a U.S. visa, he and his travel
companion, 9/11 hijacker Ahmed al Nami, both applied for and received visas on
October 28, 2000. Hamlan never returned to Afghanistan, probably dropping out either
because he changed his mind or because his family intervened.
In December 1999, while still in high school in Saudi Arabia, Hamlan became involved
with a group that gathered periodically to watch jihad propaganda tapes, and was
encouraged by a mentor named Bandar Marui to pursue jihad, especially as practiced
in the Bosnia-Herzegovina and Russian-Afghan wars and a book titled Gladiator of
Passion. As instructed, Hamlan acquired a passport, on February 15, 2000, and agreed
to go to Afghanistan after the hajj in mid-March 2000. He and two travel companions
obtained Pakistani visas in Sharjah, UAE, and traveled to Islamabad, where al Qaeda
facilitator Hassan Ghul took them to a guesthouse managed by Abu Zubaydah. Days
later, two men helped Hamlan cross the Pakistan- Afghanistan border.
At the Khaldan camp, Hamlan received military training courses. Upon hearing that the
camp was to be closed, he and others traveled to al Faruq camp near Kandahar, where
they received more training. He also met and proclaimed allegiance to Bin Ladin at
this time. Injured during a further training session, Hamlan was assigned to guard
the airport, where he met future hijacker Ahmed al Nami (whose recent laser eye
surgery had interrupted his training). An individual named Abu Basir al Yemeni
indoctrinated the two in Bin Ladin's anti-U.S. position and extolled the virtues of
martyrdom. Hamlan and Nami eventually agreed to approach Abu Hafs al Mauritani about
participating in a suicide operation. The day after visiting Abu Hafs, Hamlan and
Nami heard from Abu Basir that Bin Ladin was planning an attack against the United
States. After taking their passports, Abu Basir arranged for Hamlan and Nami to meet
Bin Ladin and instructed them to use the following phrase to express their desire to
become martyrs:"I want to be one of this religion's bricks and glorify this
religion." The al Qaeda leader accepted both applicants. In October 2000, Abu Basir
took Hamlan and Nami to Kandahar to meet KSM, who impressed on them the high
expectations for martyrs and instructed them on using coded telephone numbers. He
returned their passports, which had been altered and now contained forged tourism
stamps for Singapore, Malaysia, Turkey, and Egypt. KSM told them to meet with Atef
before returning to Saudi Arabia, where they should contact hijacker future 9/11
hijacker Waleed al Shehri for additional documentation. After meeting with Atef,
Hamlan and Nami traveled by car and by air to an address KSM had given them
inTehran, where arrangements were made for them to fly to Qatar. From Qatar they
traveled onward to the UAE and then to Mecca. Nami contacted KSM and received coded
instructions to go to Jeddah, call Waleed al Shehri, and obtain visas at the U.S.
consulate. In Jeddah, they briefly shared an apartment with Shehri, who provided
them with directions to the consulate and showed them how to fill out the visa
application. After acquiring visas, Hamlan and Nami presented their passports to
Shehri for inspection and returned to Mecca. Nami called KSM, who told them to
return to Afghanistan the next day. Despite instructions to the contrary, Hamlan
insisted on calling his family before leaving Saudi Arabia because he had begun to
have second thoughts after acquiring the visa. Told by his brother that their mother
had fallen ill. Hamlan decided not to return to Afghanistan even after Nami reminded
him of his allegiance to Bin Ladin and commitment to complete the suicide mission.
In Riyadh, he told his brothers that he had been on jihad in Chechnya. Fearing that
they might ask for his passport, he removed the U.S. visa-as later confirmed by
forensic analysis performed by Saudi authorities. Hamlan returned to college and
resumed living with his parents, who confiscated his passport. Thereafter, Hamlan
received a visit at the college from a former associate at al Faruq camp, Khalid al
Zahrani, who asked why he had not returned to Afghanistan. Zahrani admitted having
been sent by KSM to convince Hamlan to return to Afghanistan. Hamlan never did.
Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Mar. 16, 2003.
10. Abderraouf Jdey, a.k.a. Faruq al Tunisi. A Canadian passport holder, he may have
trained in Afghanistan with Khalid al Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi and received
instruction from KSM with Atta and Binalshibh. A letter recovered from a safehouse
in Pakistan, apparently written by Sayf al Adl, also suggests that Jdey was
initially part of the 9/11 operation at the same time as the Hamburg group. A
videotape of Jdey's martyrdom statement was found in the rubble of Atef 's house
near Kabul following a November 2001 airstrike, together with a martyrdom video of
Binalshibh. While both Binalshibh and Khallad confirm Jdey's status as an al Qaeda
recruit, KSM says Jdey was slated for a "second wave"of attacks but had dropped out
by the summer of 2001 while in Canada. FBI briefing (June 24, 2004); Intelligence
report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Sept. 11, 2003; Intelligence report,
interrogation of Khallad, May 21, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,
July 1, 2003.
108. On the few operatives fully aware of the plot and Abu Turab's training, see
Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 23, 2004. Abu Turab was the
son-in-law of Ayman al Zawahiri. Intelligence report, interrogation of Zubaydah,
Feb. 18, 2004. KSM also taught the muscle hijackers English and provided lessons
about airplanes. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Apr. 2, 2004. Binalshibh
also has discussed this training in post-capture statements, describing it as
hand-to-hand combat training. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Jan.
8, 2004. According to Binalshibh, after returning to Afghanistan, muscle hijacker
recruits fought on the front lines alongside the Taliban and participated in the
March 2001 destruction of the giant Buddha statues in Bamian Province, Afghanistan.
Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Mar. 31, 2004.
109. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 23, 2004. According to KSM, the
muscle hijackers learned about the specific targets and the Atta's completed
operational plan only in late August. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,
Apr. 2, 2004.
110. On the facilitator's comments, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of
detainee, Sept. 14, 2002; Oct. 3, 2002; May 5, 2003 (two reports), in which he
claims also to have assisted the Hamburg pilots and Binalshibh. On KSM's funding of
the hijackers, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, June 15, 2004; July
25, 2003.
111. On Ali's role and the transit of the hijackers, see Intelligence report,
interrogation of detainee, Feb. 12, 2004. According to the detainee, the operatives
arrived with their own money to buy plane tickets and anything else they needed. Ali
referred them to places where they could obtain travelers checks. He also helped
Ahmed al Ghamdi, one of the earliest operatives to transit Dubai, acquire a mobile
phone account so that the operatives could use that number as a travel agency point
of contact. Ibid.
112. In May 2001, however, Ali asked KSM to participate in a suicide mission and
offered to travel to the United States and assist the operatives there. As discussed
in a set of Atta-Binalshibh exchanges in August 2001, Ali (referred to by the
nickname "Losh") appears to have contacted Atta and expressed the desire to join the
operation. Ali actually applied for a U.S. visa on August 27, 2001, listing his
intended arrival date as September 4 for a one-week stay. His application was denied
because he appeared to be an economic immigrant. DOS record, visa application of Ali
Abdul Aziz Ali, Aug.27, 2001. Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Nov.
17, 2003; Intelligence report, documents captured with KSM, Sept. 24, 2003; CIA
notes,"DRG Research Notes," Jan. 17, 2004; FBI report,"Summary of Penttbom
Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, p. 72.
113. Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee, May 6, 2003; Jan. 8, 2004. See
also Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Sept. 11, 2003. Hawsawi's
role as financial facilitator appears to have begun when he and hijacker Banihammad
opened bank accounts at the same UAE bank while Banihammad was his way to the United
States. Banihammad, who was from the UAE, was familiar with the country's procedures
and helped Hawsawi complete his account application. Banihammad gave Hawsawi roughly
$3,000 and granted him power of attorney over his account so that Hawsawi could
forward the bank card to him in the United States. After Banihammad arrived in the
United States, Hawsawi deposited $4,900 into the account. FBI report, "Summary of
Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, p. 29.
114. All but 2 of the 15 muscle hijackers were admitted as tourists, affording a
six-month stay in the United States (except in the case of Mihdhar, who received
four months). The first pair to arrive were Waleed al Shehri (Flight 11) and Satam
al Suqami (Flight 11), who flew from the UAE to London and arrived in Orlando on
April 23, 2001, where Atta most likely met them. Suqami was admitted as a business
visitor, allowing him only a onemonth stay and thus making him an illegal overstay
by May 21, 2001. INS records, NIIS records of Waleed al Shehri and Satam al Suqami,
Apr. 23, 2001. Suqami was the only hijacker not to obtain a U.S. identification
document. Shehri and another individual (presumably Suqami) settled in Hollywood,
Florida, moving into a motel on April
30. FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing London EC, serial 2236;
315N-NY-280350-302, serial 7134; 315N-NY-280350, serial 8082).
The next set, Ahmed al Ghamdi (Flight 175) and Moqed (Flight 77), arrived at Dulles
Airport on May 2, 2001, on a flight from London originating in Dubai. INS records,
NIIS records of Ghamdi and Moqed, May 2, 2001. Although Customs declarations of the
two indicate that Moqed claimed to be carrying more than $10,000, the Customs
Service generated no report of this event. Both Ghamdi and Moqed gave the Hyatt
Hotel in Washington as their intended destination, but instead moved into the
apartment in Alexandria, Virginia, that Nawaf al Hazmi and Hani Hanjour had rented.
FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline,"Dec. 5, 2003 (citing flight manifest and Customs
records, referenced in 265A-NY-280350, serial 2746; 265A-NY-280359-RY, serial 5;
265A-NY-280350-302, New Hampshire ECs dated Sept. 28, 2001, Sept. 29, 2001;
265A-NY-280350, serial 9776; 265A-NY-280350-IN, serial 5151; 265A-NY-280350-302).
Hamza al Ghamdi (Flight 175), Mohand al Shehri (Flight 175), and Ahmed al Nami
(Flight 93) arrived in Miami on May 28, 2001. INS records, NIIS records of Hamza al
Ghamdi, Mohand al Shehri, and Ahmed al Nami, May 28, 2001. The three had taken a
flight from London after starting out in Dubai. Atta probably picked up the group at
the airport, having rented a Ford Explorer for the day. Shehri and Nami gave the
Sheraton in Miami as their intended destination, but do not appear to have stayed
there. Marwan al Shehhi helped them settle in Florida. Within a few days, Shehhi
found the group an apartment in Delray Beach, Florida. FBI report, "Hijackers
Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 265A-NY-280350-NK, serial 2851; 265A-NY-280350-CG,
serial 1928; 265A-NY- 280350-NK, serial 2851; 265A-NY-280350-DL, serial 1778;
265A-NY-280350-DL, 838; 265D-NY-280350-A, serial 16; 265A-NY-280350-NK, serial 2851;
265A-NY-280350-MM-302, serial 11703). Haznawi (Flight 93) and Wail al Shehri (Flight
11) arrived in Miami from London on June 8, 2001 using the same route as the
previous three. INS records, NIIS records of Haznawi and Wail al Shehri (June 8,
2001). FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 265A-NY-280350-RY,
serial 5). Saeed al Ghamdi (Flight 93) and Banihammad (Flight 175) arrived in
Orlando from London on June 27, 2001. INS records, NIIS records of Saeed al Ghamdi
and Banihammad, June 27, 2001. Saeed al Ghamdi was questioned by immigration
authorities as a possible intending immigrant, as he spoke little English, had no
return ticket, and listed no address on his arrival record. INS record, inspection
results for Ghamdi, June 27, 2001; primary inspector interview (Mar. 17, 2004);
secondary inspector interview (Apr. 19, 2004). Ghamdi and Banihammad presumably
stayed with the hijackers who preceded them or with Atta and Shehhi in the
Hollywood, Florida, apartment. Post- 9/11 investigation revealed that during this
time period Atta and Shehhi also checked into hotels or rented apartments with
unidentified males, probably the newly arrived muscle hijackers. FBI
report,"Hijackers Timeline,"Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 265A-NY-280350-302-19615;
265A-NY-280350-MM, serial 3255; 265A-NY-280350-MM-302, serial 34927;
265A-NY-280350-MM-Sub, serial 3255; 265A-NY-280350-RY, serial 5; 265A-NY-280350-MM-
302, serial 34927; 265A-NY-280350-MM, serials 48418, 2374, 4449, 4696;
265A-NY-280350, serials 925, 449, 18695).
The remaining hijackers entered the United States through New York. Salem al Hazmi
(Flight 77) and Omari (Flight 11) arrived at JFK on June 29, 2001, from Dubai with a
connection in Zurich. INS records, arrival records of Salem al Hazmi and Omari, June
29, 2001. They likely were picked up by Salem's older brother Nawaf-who was then
living in Paterson, New Jersey, with Hani Hanjour-the following day, for on June 30,
Nawaf had a minor car accident traveling eastbound on the George Washington Bridge,
toward JFK. FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing Bern EC Sept. 15,
2001; INS NIIS report; 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 7134; 265A-NY- 280350-HQ, serial
11297; Bern EC (Omari PNR, Swiss Air); 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 60839). On Salem
al Hazmi in the Paterson apartment, see FBI report of investigation, interview of
Jimi Nouri, Oct. 6, 2001, p. 5.
115. FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation,"Feb. 29,2004, pp.29-41; Adam
Drucker interview (Jan. 12, 2004).
116. In some cases, bank employees completed the Social Security number fields on the
new account application with a hijacker's date of birth or visa control number, but
did so on their own to complete the form. Adam Drucker interview (Jan. 12, 2004).
Contrary to persistent media reports, no financial institution filed a Suspicious
Activity Report (SAR)-which U.S. law requires banks to file within 30 days of a
suspicious transaction-with respect to any transaction of any of 19 hijackers before
9/11. A number of banks did file SARs after 9/11, when the hijackers'names became
public. Adam Drucker interview (Jan. 12, 2004); James Sloan interview (Nov. 14,
2003). Nor should SARs have been filed. The hijackers' transactions themselves were
not extraordinary or remarkable. See Commission analysis of financial transactions;
Adam Drucker interview (Jan. 12, 2004); Dennis Lormel interview (Jan. 16, 2004).
117. Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Mar. 26, 2004; Intelligence
report, interrogation of KSM, May 19, 2003.
118. Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee, Nov. 27, 2001; Feb. 5, 2002.
119. FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 315N-NY-280350-DL, serial
2812; 315N-NY- 280350-302, serial 21529; 315N-NY-280350-NK, serials 21529, 11815,
4718).
120. Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee, Oct. 18, 2001; Mar. 13, 2002;
Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Mar. 7, 2002; Intelligence reports,
interrogations of KSM, Aug. 20, 2003; Sept. 12, 2003, July 16, 2004; Intelligence
report, interrogation of Khallad, Sept. 12, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation
of detainee, Sept. 30, 2003; CIA analytic report, "Iran and al-Qa'ida: Ties Forged
in Islamic Extremism," CTC 2004- 40009HCX, March 2004, pp. i, 6-12.
121. Intelligence report, analysis of Hezbollah, Iran, and 9/11, Dec. 20, 2001;
Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, July 16, 2004.
122. Ibid.; Intelligence report, Hezbollah activities, Oct.11,2001; Intelligence
report, operative's travel to Saudi Arabia, Aug. 9, 2002.
123. Intelligence reports, hijacker activities, Oct. 11, 2001; Oct. 29, 2001; Nov.
14, 2001; Intelligence report, operative's claimed identification of photos of two
Sept. 11 hijackers, Aug. 9, 2002.
124. Intelligence reports, hijacker activities, Nov. 14, 2001; Oct. 2, 2001; Oct. 31,
2001.
125. Intelligence reports, hijacker activities, Oct. 19, 2001; Dec. 7, 2001.
126. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 16, 2004; Intelligence report;
interrogation of Binalshibh, July 16, 2004.
127. Intelligence report, analysis of Hezbollah, Iran, and 9/11, Dec. 20, 2001.
128. Intelligence report, Hezbollah and Sunni terrorist activities, Sept. 21, 2001;
Intelligence report, Hezbollah denies involvement in 9/11, Sept. 22, 2001.
129. For Atta and Shehhi's efforts, see FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom
Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, pp. 25-37.
130. Ibid., pp. 29-41.
131. FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 315N-NY-280350-302,
serials 12436, 7134); see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, June 15, 2004;
Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, June 9, 2004. Another example of
unusual travel was a trip by Suqami on July 10 from Fort Lauderdale to Orlando; he
stayed at a hotel in Lake Buena Vista with an unidentified male through July 12. FBI
report,"Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, p. 31.
132. FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 315N-NY-280350-302,
serial 27063; 315N-NY- 280350-DL, serial 2245); Commission investigation in Las
Vegas.
133. FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2001, pp. 41-44.
134. FBI letterhead memorandum, profile of Jarrah, Mar. 20, 2002.
135. FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 315N-NY-280350-302,
serial 7228; 315N-NY- 280350-F, serial 99; 315N-NY-280350-NK, serial 263). Documents
from Sawyer Aviation in Phoenix, Arizona, show Hanjour joining the flight simulator
club on June 23, 2001, with Faisal al Salmi, Rayed Abdullah, and Lotfi Raissi. FBI
report of investigation, interview of Jennifer Stangel, Sept. 14, 2001. But the
documents are inconclusive, as there are no invoices or payment records for Hanjour,
while such documents do exist for the other three. FBI memo, Penttbom investigation,
Oct. 7, 2001; FBI memo, Penttbom investigation, summary of dispatch sheets, Oct. 12,
2001; Don W. and Steve B. interview (Jan. 6, 2004). One Sawyer employee identified
Hanjour as being there during the time period, though she was less than 100 percent
sure. FBI report of investigation, interview of Tina Arnold, Oct. 17, 2001. Another
witness identified Hanjour as being with Salmi in the Phoenix area during the summer
of 2001. FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Lotfi Raissi, Jan. 4, 2004, p.
18. Documentary evidence for Hanjour, however, shows that he was in New Jersey for
most of June, and no travel records have been recovered showing that he returned to
Arizona after leaving with Hazmi in March. Nevertheless, the FBI's Phoenix office
believes it plausible that Hanjour returned to Arizona for additional training. FBI
electronic communication, Penttbom investigation, Feb. 19, 2002.
136. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Oct. 1, 2002.
137. CIA cable, communications analysis, Sept. 11, 2003.
138. On Hazmi, see FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation,"Feb. 29,2004, p.
46. On obtaining photo identification, see ibid.; FBI report,"Hijackers
Timeline,"Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 315N-NY-280350-NK, serial 1243; 315N-NY-280350-BS,
serial 352; 315N-NY-280350-302, serials 33059, 64343).
139. FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, p. 47.
140. For Binalshibh moving the muscle hijackers, see Intelligence report,
interrogation of Binalshibh, June 9, 2004. According to Binalshibh, he took each of
the muscle hijackers shopping for clothes and set them up with email accounts during
their time in Karachi. Ibid. For meeting with Atta and Bin Ladin, see Intelligence
reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Sept. 24, 2002; Feb. 18, 2004. Binalshibh has
provided inconsistent information about who else was present during his meeting with
Bin Ladin. In one interview, Binalshibh claimed he attended two different meetings,
one of which was attended by Bin Ladin, Atef, KSM, and Abu Turab al Jordani, and the
second of which was attended just by Bin Ladin, Atef, and KSM. More recently,
however, Binalshibh has mentioned only one meeting and has claimed he alone met with
Bin Ladin because Atef and KSM were busy with other matters. Compare Intelligence
report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Dec. 11, 2002, with Intelligence report,
interrogation of Binalshibh, Feb. 18, 2004.
530 NOTES TO CHAPTER 7
141. On Binalshibh's meeting with Bin Ladin, Intelligence reports, interrogations of
Binalshibh, Dec. 11, 2002; Sept. 24, 2002; Feb. 18, 2004; Apr. 7, 2004. KSM claims
that the White House and the Capitol were both acceptable targets and had been on
the list since the spring of 1999. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Apr.
2, 2004. On Binalshibh's receipt of money, Intelligence reports, interrogations of
Binalshibh, Oct. 23, 2002; Dec. 11, 2002. In one report, Binalshibh says that Atef
provided him with $3,000; in another he claims it was $5,000.
142. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Sept. 24, 2002; Oct. 23,
2002; Dec. 11, 2002.
143. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Sept. 24, 2002; Dec. 11,
2002.
144. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Oct. 1, 2002; Mar. 7, 2003;
Apr. 8, 2004.
145. FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, p. 48.
Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Oct. 1, 2002; Mar. 7, 2003; Dec.
21, 2002. Atta had a stopover in Zurich, where he bought two Swiss Army knives and
withdrew 1,700 Swiss francs from his SunTrust bank account. He may have intended to
use the knives during the attacks. It is unknown why he withdrew the money. FBI
report,"Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, p. 47.
Although U.S. authorities have not uncovered evidence that anyone met with Atta or
Binalshibh in Spain in July 2001, Spanish investigators contend that members of the
Spanish al Qaeda cell were involved in the July meeting and were connected to the
9/11 attacks. In an indictment of the Spanish cell members dated September 17, 2003,
the Spanish government relies on three main points. First is a 1997 trip to the
United States by Ghasoub al Abrash Ghalyoun, a Syrian living in Spain. During the
trip, Ghalyoun videotaped a number of U.S. landmarks, including the World Trade
Center. The Spanish indictment alleges that an al Qaeda courier was in Ghalyoun's
town in Spain shortly after the trip and that the courier probably delivered the
tape to al Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan. Second, the Spanish government contends
that during the relevant time period, an individual named Muhammed Belfatmi was near
the town where the Atta-Binalshibh meeting took place. and that Belfatmi traveled to
Karachi shortly before September 11 on the same flight as Said Bahaji, one of Atta's
Hamburg associates, and even stayed at the same hotel. Finally, Spanish authorities
rely on an intercepted telephone conversation between cell leader Imad Eddin Barakat
Yarkas and an individual named "Shakur" in August 2001, in which "Shakur" describes
himself as entering "the field of aviation" and "slitting the throat of the
bird.""Shakur" has been identified by Spanish authorities as Farid Hilali. Although
we cannot rule out the possibility that other facts will come to light as the
Spanish case progresses to trial, we have not found evidence that individuals in
Spain participated in the July meeting or in the 9/11 plot. See Baltasar Garzon
interview (Feb. 13, 2004); Indictment, Central Investigating Court No.5, Madrid,
Sept. 17, 2003, pp. 151-200, 315-366; Superseding Indictment, Central Investigating
Court No. 5, Madrid, April 28, 2004.
146. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Oct. 1, 2002; Mar. 7, 2003;
Apr. 17, 2003.
147. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Oct. 1, 2002; Mar. 7, 2003;
Sept. 11, 2003; Oct. 11, 2003; Feb. 18, 2004; Apr. 7, 2004. KSM claims to have
assigned the Pentagon specifically to Hanjour, the operation's most experienced
pilot. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004.
148. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Mar. 7, 2003; Oct. 11, 2003.
Binalshibh since has denied that the term electrical engineering was used to refer
to a potential nuclear target despite having said so earlier. Intelligence report,
interrogation of Binalshibh, Sept. 11, 2003. KSM has admitted that he considered
targeting a nuclear power plant as part of his initial proposal for the planes
operation. See chapter 5.2. He has also stated that Atta included a nuclear plant in
his preliminary target list, but that Bin Ladin decided to drop that idea.
Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Mar. 12, 2002.
149. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Oct. 1, 2002; Mar. 7, 2003;
Feb. 18, 2004.
150. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Sept. 24, 2002; Oct. 1,
2002; Mar. 7, 2003; Apr. 17, 2003.
151. On Binalshibh's new phones, see Intelligence report, interrogation of
Binalshibh, Dec. 21, 2002. On Binalshibh's call to KSM, see Intelligence reports,
interrogations of Binalshibh, Oct. 1, 2002; Mar. 31, 2003. CIA cable, Sept. 10,
2003; CIA report, Director's Review Group, Oct. 2003.
152. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Oct. 31, 2003; Intelligence report,
interrogation of Binalshibh, Nov. 1, 2003. KSM may also have intended to include
these documents as part of the historical file he maintained about the 9/11
operation. He says the file included letters and email communications among those
involved with the attacks, but was lost in Afghanistan when he fled after September
11. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Oct. 15, 2003.
153. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Nov. 1, 2003; Oct. 11, 2003;
Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Oct. 31, 2002.
154. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Oct. 31, 2002; Dec. 19,
2002; Apr. 17, 2003; Oct. 11, 2003; Nov. 1, 2003; Intelligence report interrogation
of KSM, Sept. 11, 2003.
155. FBI letterhead memorandum, Penttbom investigation, Mar. 20, 2002, p. 60; FBI
report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 315N-NY-280350-302, serial
20874); Jarrah travel documents (provided by the FBI).
156. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Dec. 11, 2002; Apr. 8, 2004.
157. According to Binalshibh, Jarrah was not aware of Moussaoui or the wire
transfers. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Dec. 11, 2002; Apr.
17, 2003. FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004 (classified
version), pp. 89-90.
158. FBI report, Moussaoui, Zacarias, a.k.a. Shaqil, Aug. 18, 2001, pp. 7, 11; FBI
briefing materials, Penttbom, Dec. 10-11, 2003, p. 148 (citing 315N-NY-280350-302,
serial 98252).
159. FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004 (classified
version), p. 90; DOJ Inspector General interview of John Weess, Oct.22,2002; FBI
letterhead memorandum,"Moussaoui, Zacarias,"Aug.31, 2001.
160. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 2, 2003; Intelligence report,
interrogation of KSM, Sept. 11, 2003.
161. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, July 1, 2003; July 8, 2003. In
addition to Moussaoui, the two al Qaeda operatives identified by KSM as candidates
for the second wave of attacks were Abderraouf Jdey, a.k.a. Faruq alTunisi (a
Canadian passport holder, discussed earlier as a candidate hijacker) and Zaini
Zakaria, a.k.a. Mussa (a Jemaah Islamiah member who worked in Hambali's Malaysia
stronghold and was directed by Atef to enroll in flight training sometime in 2000,
according to KSM). Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 8, 2003;
Intelligence report, interrogation of Hambali, Mar. 4, 2004.
162. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Apr. 17, 2003. According to
Binalshibh, KSM said that the operative had been raised and educated in Europe and
that his arrest resulted, at least in part, from his having been insufficiently
discreet. KSM identified this operative as an exception in Bin Ladin's overall
record of selecting the right people for the 9/11 attacks. Intelligence report,
interrogation of Binalshibh, Dec. 18,2002. Subsequently, however, Binalshibh has
sought, somewhat incredibly, to exculpate a host of individuals, including
Moussaoui, from complicity in the 9/11 plot. Intelligence report, interrogation of
Binalshibh, Apr. 2, 2004.
163. For Binalshibh's claims, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh,
Nov. 7, 2002; Feb. 13, 2003; Feb. 27, 2003. On KSM, see intelligence report,
interrogation of KSM, July 2, 2003.
164. Jarrah returned to the United States on August 5, 2001. INS record, arrival
record of Jarrah, Aug. 5, 2001.
165. FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline,"Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 315N-NY-280350-302, serial
14139; Boston electronic communication). The communications were recovered from
materials seized during the March 2003 capture of KSM. For background, see
Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Aug. 13, 2002 (two cables);
Intelligence report, documents captured with KSM, Sept. 24, 2003.
166. Intelligence reports, interrogation of KSM, Aug. 12, 2003. Binalshibh, however,
has denied that law and politics referred to two separate targets; he claims that
both terms referred to the U.S. Capitol, even though in the context of the exchange
it seems clear that two different targets were contemplated. Intelligence report,
interrogations of Binalshibh, Sept. 11, 2003 (two reports).
167. CIA notes, "DRG Research Notes," Jan. 17, 2004. In another exchange between Atta
and Binalshibh on September 9-two days before the attacks-it still appears as though
the White House would be the primary target for the fourth plane and the U.S.
Capitol the alternate. See CIA report, Documents captured with KSM, Sept. 24, 2003.
168. On the Atta-Binalshibh communication, see Intelligence report, interrogation of
Binalshibh, Sept. 11, 2003. On Kahtani's attempt to enter the U.S., see INS record,
withdrawal of application for admission of Kahtani, Aug. 4, 2001. For Hawsawi, see
Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Apr. 3, 2003.
169. On Atta's trip to Newark, see FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation,"
Feb. 29, 2004, p. 50. On arrivals in Florida, see FBI report,"Hijackers
Timeline,"Dec. 5, 2004 (citing 315N-NY-280350, serials 388, 5860; 315N-NY-280350-BS,
serial 294; 315N-NY-280350-302, serial 66933). On travel to Las Vegas, see ibid.
(citing 315N-NY-280350-LV, serial 53299;315N-NY-280350-302, serial 110). Atta's
flight from Washington, D.C., arrived in Las Vegas within an hour of Hazmi and
Hanjour's arrival. Ibid. The three hijackers stayed in Las Vegas only one night,
departing on August 14. Ibid. (citing 315N-NY-280350-DL, serial 829;
315N-NY-280350-SD, serial 569; 315N-NY-280350-302, serial 165970). Detainee
interviews have not explained the Las Vegas meeting site. See, e.g., Intelligence
report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Nov. 5, 2003.
170. FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, pp. 52-57.
Hanjour successfully conducted a challenging certification flight supervised by an
instructor at Congressional Air Charters of Gaithersburg, Maryland, landing at a
small airport with a difficult approach. The instructor thought Hanjour may have had
training from a military pilot because he used a terrain recognition system for
navigation. Eddie Shalev interview (Apr. 9, 2004).
171. FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation,"Feb. 29, 2004, pp. 57-60.
According to Binalshibh, Atta deliberately selected morning flights because he
anticipated that the most people would be at work then. Intelligence report,
interrogation of Binalshibh, June 3, 2004.
172. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Oct. 1, 2002; Dec. 17, 2002;
Dec. 21, 2002.
173. On KSM's receipt of date of attacks, see Intelligence report, interrogations of
KSM and Binalshibh, May 27, 2003. Although Binalshibh also has claimed that he
called KSM with the date after receiving the information from Atta, KSM insists that
he learned of the date in a letter delivered by Essabar, and that it would have been
a serious breach of communications security to communicate the date over the phone.
Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Oct. 1, 2002; Dec. 17, 2002.
Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004. Most recently, Binalshibh
has claimed that he neither called nor sent a letter to KSM, but rather passed a
verbal message via Essabar. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Apr.
8, 2004. On Binalshibh's communication to Essabar, see Intelligence reports,
interrogations of Binalshibh, Dec. 17, 2002; Nov. 6, 2003; Apr. 8, 2004.
174. On Binalshibh's travel, see FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation,"Feb.
29, 2004 (classified version), p. 84. On Binalshibh's communication with Atta, see
Intelligence report, Documents captured with KSM, Sept. 24, 2003; Intelligence
report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Sept. 11, 2003. On Atta's call to his father,
see Intelligence report, re Atta, Sept. 13, 2001. On Jarrah's letter, see German BKA
report, investigative summary re Jarrah, July 18, 2002, p. 67.
175. Shortly after 9/11, Abdullah told at least one witness that the FBI was asking
questions about his having received a phone a call from Hazmi in August. FBI report
of investigation, interview, Sept. 24, 2001. In a July 2002 FBI interview, Abdullah
asked whether the FBI had taped the call. FBI report of investigation, interview of
Mohdar Abdullah, July 23, 2002. Also on possibility of Hazmi-Abdullah contact
shortly before 9/11, see Danny G. interviews (Nov. 18, 2003; May 24, 2004). On the
change in Abdullah's mood, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Mohdar
Abdullah, July 23, 2001. On the sudden interest of Abdullah and Salmi in proceeding
with marriage plans, see FBI report of investigation, interview, Sept. 24, 2001; FBI
report of investigation, interview of Samir Abdoun, Oct. 21, 2001. On anticipated
law enforcement interest in gas station employees and September 10, 2001, meeting,
see FBI report of investigation, interview, May 21, 2002.
176. Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Feb. 5, 2002.
177. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Aug. 14, 2003; Feb. 20, 2004.
178. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, June 3, 2003; Feb. 20, 2004; Apr.
3, 2004.
179. Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee, Nov. 27, 2001; Feb. 5, 2002.
Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, May 30, 2002.
180. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan. 9, 2004; Intelligence report,
interrogation of detainee, June 27, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of
detainee, Feb. 5, 2002. KSM also says that he and Atef were so concerned about this
lack of discretion that they urged Bin Ladin not to make any additional remarks
about the plot. According to KSM, only Bin Ladin, Atef, AbuTurab al Jordani,
Binalshibh, and a few of the senior hijackers knew the specific targets, timing,
operatives, and methods of attack. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Oct.
27, 2003; Feb. 23, 2004. Indeed, it was not until midsummer that Egyptian Islamic
Jihad leader Ayman al Zawahiri learned of the operation, and only after his group
had cemented its alliance with al Qaeda and Zawahiri had become Bin Ladin's deputy.
Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan. 9, 2004.
181. See Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 24, 2003.
182. On Omar's opposition, see, e.g., Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee,
May 30, 2002, in which the detainee says that when Bin Ladin returned after the
general alert during July, he spoke to his confidants about Omar's unwillingness to
allow an attack against the United States to originate from Afghanistan. See also
Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Oct. 27, 2003. There is some discrepancy
about the position of Zawahiri. According to KSM, Zawahiri believed in following the
injunction of Mullah Omar not to attack the United States; other detainees, however,
have said that Zawahiri was squarely behind Bin Ladin. Intelligence report,
interrogation of detainee, June 20, 2002; Intelligence report, interrogation of
detainee, June 27, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Sept. 26, 2003.
183. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan. 9, 2004; Intelligence reports,
interrogations of detainee, June 27, 2003; Dec. 26, 2003. On Abu Hafs's views, see
Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Oct. 7, 2003.
184. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Oct. 27, 2003; Sept. 27, 2003, in
which KSM also says Bin Ladin had sworn bayat to Omar upon first moving to
Afghanistan, following the Shura Council's advice. KSM claims he would have
disobeyed even had the council ordered Bin Ladin to cancel the operation.
Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan. 9, 2004.
185. See Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 24, 2003.
186. Abdul Faheem Khan interview (Oct. 23, 2003); see also Arif Sarwari interview
(Oct. 23, 2003).
187. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, May 8, 2003; July 24, 2003.
188. FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 315N-NY-280350, serial
3112; Western Union records; 315N-NY-280350-302, serials 28398, 37864). In addition,
Nawaf al Hazmi attempted to send Hawsawi the debit card for Mihdhar's bank account,
which still contained approximately $10,000. The package containing the card was
intercepted after the FBI found the Express Mail receipt for it in Hazmi's car at
Dulles Airport on 9/11. FBI report,"Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29,
2004, p. 61.
189. FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 315N-NY-280350-WF, serial
64; 315N-NY- 280350-BA, serials 273, 931, 628; 315N-NY-280350-302, serials 10092,
17495).
190. FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 315N-NY-280350, serials
6307, 9739). In the early morning hours of September 11, Jarrah made one final call
to Senguen from his hotel. FBI report,"HijackersTimeline," Dec. 5, 2003. The
conversation was brief and, according to Senguen, not unusual. FBI electronic
communication, Penttbom investigation, Sept. 18, 2001, pp. 5-6.
191. FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 315N-NY-280350-FD-302;
315N-NY-280350- SD, serial 1522; 315N-NY-280350-302, serials 16597, 5029, 6072,
11098, 11114, 11133, 4119; 315N-NY-280350- BS, serials 349, 19106, 16624;
315N-NY-280350-CD, serial 373; 315N-NY-280350, serials 7441, 21340; 315NNY-
280350-AT, serial 135). There have been many speculations about why Atta scheduled
the Portland flight. Although he may have believed that security was more relaxed at
the smaller airport, he and Omari had to pass through security again at Logan. Ibid.
(citing 315N-NY-280350-BS, serial 2909). Interrogation of detainees has produced no
solid explanation for the trip. See, e.g., Intelligence report, interrogation of
Binalshibh, Mar. 3, 2004.
192. FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline,"Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 315N-NY-280350, serial
2268;315N-NY-280350- 302, serials 32036, 9873; 315N-NY-280350-LO, serial 2).
8 "The System Was Blinking Red"
1. Beginning in December 1999, these briefings were conducted based on slides created
by the CIA's Bin Ladin unit. See Richard interview (Dec. 11,2003). We were able to
review the slides to identify the subjects of the respective briefings.
2. The exact number of persons who receive the PDB varies by administration. In the
Clinton administration, up to 25 people received the PDB. In the Bush
administration, distribution in the pre-9/11 time period was limited to six people.
The Commission received access to about four years of articles from the PDB related
to Bin Ladin, al Qaeda, the Taliban, and key countries such as Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, including all the Commission requested. The White House
declined to permit all commissioners to review these sensitive documents. The
Commission selected four representatives-the Chair, the Vice Chair, Commissioner
Gorelick, and the Executive Director-as its review team. All four reviewed all of
the more than 300 relevant articles. Commissioner Gorelick and the Executive
Director prepared a detailed summary, reviewed by the White House for constitutional
and especially sensitive classification concerns, that was then made available to
all Commissioners and designated staff. Except for the August 6, 2001, PDB article,
the summary could not include verbatim quotations, for example the titles of the
articles, but could paraphrase the substance. Two of the articles-the December 4,
1998, hijacking article (in chapter 4) and the August 6, 2001, article discussing
Bin Ladin's plans to attack in the United States (in this chapter)-were eventually
declassified.
3. The CIA produced to the Commission all SEIB articles relating to al Qaeda, Bin
Ladin, and other subjects identified by the Commission as being relevant to its
mission from January 1998 through September 20, 2001.
4. See CIA, SEIB, "Sunni Terrorist Threat Growing," Feb. 6, 2001; CIA
cable,"Intelligence Community Terrorist Threat Advisory," Mar. 30, 2001.
5. See NSC email, Clarke to Rice, Briefing on Pennsylvania Avenue, Mar. 23, 2001.
6. See NSC email, Clarke to Rice and Hadley, Terrorism Update, Mar. 30, 2001; NSC
email, Clarke to Rice, Terrorist Threat Warning, Apr. 10, 2001.
7. See FBI electronic communication, heightened threat advisory, Apr. 13, 2001.
8. See NSC email, Cressey to Rice and Hadley, Threat Update, Apr. 19, 2001; CIA,
SEIB, "Bin Ladin Planning Multiple Operations,"Apr. 20, 2001; NSC memo, Clarke for
Hadley,"Briefing Notes for al Qida Meeting,"undated (appears to be from April 2001).
9. For threats, see CIA, SEIB, "Bin Ladin Public Profile May Presage Attack," May 3,
2001; CIA, SEIB, "Bin Ladin Network's Plans Advancing," May 26, 2001; FBI report,
Daily UBL/Radical Fundamentalist Threat Update, ITOS Threat Update Webpage, May 7,
2001 (the walk-in's claim was later discredited). For Attorney General briefing, see
CIA briefing materials,"Briefing for the Attorney General, 15 May 2001, Al-Qa'ida,"
undated. For more threats and CSG discussion, see Intelligence report, Threat
Report, May 16, 2001; NSC memo, CSG agenda, May 17, 2001.
10. See CIA, SEIB, "Terrorist Groups Said Cooperating on US Hostage Plot," May 23,
2001; FAA information circular,"Possible Terrorist Threat Against American
Citizens," IC-2001-08, June 22, 2001 (this IC expired on August 22, 2001); CIA,
SEIB,"Bin Ladin Network's Plans Advancing,"May 26, 2001; NSC email, Clarke to Rice
and Hadley,"A day in the life of Terrorism intelligence," May 24, 2001.
11. See NSC email, Clarke to Rice and Hadley, Stopping Abu Zubaydah's attacks, May
29, 2001. For threat level, see White House document, "Selected Summer 2001 Threat
Response Activities," undated, pp. 1-2 (provided to the Commission by President Bush
on Apr. 29, 2004).
12. The information regarding KSM was not captioned as a threat. It was part of a
longer cable whose subject line was "Terrorism: Biographical Information on Bin
Ladin Associates in Afghanistan." The cable reported further that KSM himself was
regularly traveling to the United States. See Intelligence report, June 12, 2001.
This was doubted by the CIA's Renditions Branch, which had been looking for KSM
since 1997. It noted, however, that if the source was talking about the "real" KSM,
the CIA had both "a significant threat and opportunity to pick him up." See CIA
cable, request additional information on KSM, June 26, 2001. A month later, a report
from the source indicated that the information regarding KSM's travel to the United
States was current as of the summer of 1998. It noted further, however, that KSM
continued his old activities but not specifically the travel to the United States.
Significantly, it confirmed that the source was talking about the "real" KSM. See
CIA cable, follow-up source on KSM, July 11, 2001. As noted in chapter 7, KSM has
said that it was generally well known by the summer of 2001 that he was planning an
operation in the United States. Roger Cressey told us he did not recall seeing this
reporting, although he would have had access to it. Roger Cressey interview (June
23, 2004). For the summer threat reporting and actions taken in response, see NSC
memo, Clarke/Cressey agenda for June 22 CSG meeting, June 20, 2001; CIA, SEIB,"Bin
Ladin and Associates Making Near-Term Threats," June 25, 2001; CIA, SEIB,"Bin Ladin
Planning High-Profile Attacks,"June 30,2001; CIA cable,"Threat UBL Attack Against US
Interests Next 24-48 Hours," June 22, 2001; FBI report, Daily UBL/Radical
Fundamentalist Threat Update, ITOS Threat Update Webpage, June 22, 2001.
13. DOS cable, Riyadh 02326, "U.S. Visa Express Program Transforms NIV Scene in Saudi
Arabia," Aug. 19, 2001; NSC memo, Current US Terrorism Alert, July 3, 2001.
14. See CIA cable, "Possible Threat of Imminent Attack from Sunni Extremists," June
23, 2001; CIA, SEIB, "Bin Ladin Attacks May be Imminent," June 23, 2001; CIA,
SEIB,"Bin Ladin and Associates Making Near-Term Threats," June 25, 2001.
15. See NSC memo, Clarke to CSG regarding that day's CSG meeting, June 22, 2001; NSC
memo, Current U.S. Terrorism Alert, July 3, 2001. For the readiness of FESTs, see
NSC email, Clarke to Rice and Hadley, Terrorism Threat Update, June 25, 2001.
16. See NSC email, Clarke to Rice and Hadley, Possibility of an al Qaeda Attack, June
25, 2001; CIA report, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, "MBC TV Carries Video
Report on Bin Ladin, Followers in Training," June 24, 2001; CIA, SEIB,"Bin Ladin
Threats Are Real," June 30, 2001; John McLaughlin interview (Jan. 21, 2004); CIA
cable,"Continued Threat/Potential Attack by UBL," June 29, 2001.
17. See NSC email, Clarke to Rice and Hadley, Possibility of an al Qaeda Attack, June
28, 2001; NSC email, Clarke for Rice and others, Terrorist Alert, June 30, 2001.
18. See NSC email, Clarke to Rice and others, Terrorist Alert, June 30, 2001; CIA,
SEIB, "Bin Ladin Planning High-Profile Attacks," June 30, 2001; CIA, SEIB,"Planning
for Bin Ladin Attacks Continues, Despite Delays," July 2, 2001.
19. FBI report, National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (NLETS) message,
"National Threat Warning System-Potential Anti-U.S. Terrorist Attacks," July 2,
2001.
20. By July 3, DCI Tenet had asked about 20 of his counterparts in friendly foreign
intelligence services to detain specific al Qaeda members and to generally harass al
Qaeda-affiliated cells. NSC memo, Current U.S. Terrorism Alert, July 3, 2001. For
specific disruption activities and maintaining alert, see NSC email, Clarke to Rice
and Hadley, Threat Updates, July 6, 2001; Richard Clarke interview (Jan. 12, 2004).
21. For the Cheney call see President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr.
29, 2004). For the Hadley call see NSC email, Clarke to Rice and Edelman, Terrorism
Alert, July 2, 2001. For the G-8 summit see Associated Press Online, "Bush Faced
Threat at G-8 Summit," Sept. 26, 2001.
22. Veronica C. interview (May 25, 2004); INS memo, Veronica C. to Cadman, "Briefing
at the NSC," July 9, 2001; Roger Cressey interview (June 23, 2004). The Customs
representative, Ricardo C., did send out a general advisory that was based solely on
historical facts, such as the Ressam case, to suggest there was a threat. Ricardo C.
interview (June 12, 2004).
23. See CIA memo, "CTC Briefing for the Attorney General on the Usama Bin Ladin
Terrorist Threat," July 5, 2001, and the accompanying CIA briefing materials,"DCI
Update Terrorist Threat Review," July 3, 2001.
24. See NSC email, Clarke to Rice and Hadley, Threat Updates, July 6, 2001.
25. Ibid.; see also FBI memo, Kevin G. to Watson, "Protective Services Working Group
(PSWG) Meeting Held at FBIHQ 7/9/01," July 16, 2001, and accompanying attendance
sheets.
26. FBI report, Daily UBL/Radical Fundamentalist Threat Update, ITOS Threat Update
Webpage, July 20, 2001.
27. Thomas Pickard interview (Apr. 8, 2004).
28. See CIA, SEIB, "Bin Ladin Plans Delayed but Not Abandoned," July 13, 2001; CIA,
SEIB,"One Bin Ladin Operation Delayed, Others Ongoing," July 25, 2001; NSC memo,
Cressey to CSG, Threat SVTS, July 23, 2001.
29. FAA information circular, "Continued Middle Eastern Threats to Civil Aviation,"
IC-2001-04A, July 31, 2001.
30. George Tenet interview (Jan. 28, 2004).
31. See CIA, SEIB, "Bin Ladin Threats Are Real," June 30, 2001. For Tenet's response
to DOD's concerns about possible deception, see CIA memo, weekly meeting between
Rice andTenet, July 17,2001; John McLaughlin interview (Jan. 21, 2004); Richard
interview (Dec. 11, 2003).
32. NSC email, Clarke to Rice and Hadley, Threats Update, July 27, 2001.
33. FBI report, NLETS message, "Third Anniversary of the 1998 U.S. Embassy Bombings
in East Africa Approaches; Threats to U.S. Interests Continue,"Aug. 1, 2001.
34. CIA cable, "Threat of Impending al Qaeda Attack to Continue Indefinitely,"Aug. 3,
2001.
35. CIA letter, Tenet to the Commission, Mar. 26, 2004; Barbara S. interview (July
13, 2004); Dwayne D. interview (July 13, 2004).
36. President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004). For Rice's
reaction to the August 6 PDB article, see Condoleezza Rice testimony, Apr. 8, 2004.
37. The CTC analyst who drafted the briefing drew on reports over the previous four
years. She also spoke with an FBI analyst to obtain additional information. The FBI
material was written up by the CIA analyst and included in the PDB. A draft of the
report was sent to the FBI analyst to review. The FBI analyst did not, however, see
the final version, which added the reference to the 70 investigations. Barbara S.
interviews (Apr. 12, 2004); Joint Inquiry interview of Jen M., Nov. 20, 2002.
Because of the attention that has been given to the PDB, we have investigated each
of the assertions mentioned in it.
The only information that actually referred to a hijacking in this period was a
walk-in at an FBI office in the United States who mentioned hijackings among other
possible attacks. The source was judged to be a fabricator. FBI report, Daily
UBL/Radical Fundamentalist Threat Update, ITOS Threat Update Webpage, Aug. 1, 2001.
The FBI conducted an extensive investigation of the two individuals who were stopped
after being observed taking photographs of two adjacent buildings that contained FBI
offices. The person taking the photographs told the FBI that he was taking them for
a co-worker in Indiana who had never been to New York and wanted to see what it
looked like. The picture taker was in New York to obtain further information
regarding his pending citizenship application. He had an appointment at 26 Federal
Plaza, where the relevant INS offices were located. This same building houses
portions of the FBI's New York Field Office. Before going into the building the
individual pulled out the camera and took four photographs. When the FBI attempted
to contact the co-worker (and roommate) who had requested some photographs, it was
determined that he had fled without receiving his last paycheck after learning that
the FBI had asked his employer some questions about him. Further investigation
determined that he was an illegal alien using forged identity documents. Despite two
years of investigation, the FBI was unable to find the co-worker or determine his
true identity. The FBI closed the investigation on June 9, 2003, when it concluded
that it was unable to connect the men's activities to terrorism. Matthew interview
(June 18, 2004); FBI case file, no. 266A-NY-279198.
The 70 full-field investigations number was a generous calculation that included
fund-raising investigations. It also counted each individual connected to an
investigation as a separate full-field investigation. Many of these investigations
should not have been included, such as the one that related to a dead person, four
that concerned people who had been in long-term custody, and eight that had been
closed well before August 6, 2001. Joint Inquiry interview of Elizabeth and Laura,
Nov. 20, 2002; FBI report, "70 UBL Cases," undated (produced to the Joint Inquiry on
Aug. 12, 2002).
The call to the UAE was originally reported by the CIA on May 16. It came from an
anonymous caller. Neither the CIA nor the FBI was able to corroborate the
information in the call. FBI report, Daily UBL/Radical Fundamentalist Threat Update,
ITOS Threat Update Webpage, May 16, 2001.
38. See CIA, SEIB, "Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in US,"Aug. 7, 2001; see also
Roger Cressey interview (June 23, 2004). The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
testified that the FBI information in the PDB was omitted from the SEIB because of
concerns about protecting ongoing investigations, because the information had been
received from the FBI only orally, and because there were no clear, established
ground rules regarding SEIB contents. John McLaughlin testimony, Apr. 14, 2004.
39. Intelligence report, Consideration by Abu Zubaydah to Attack Targets in the
United States, Aug. 24, 2001.
40. George Tenet interview (July 2, 2004).
41. Condoleezza Rice testimony, Apr. 8, 2004; Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7,
2004).
42. Stephen Hadley meeting (Jan. 31, 2004).
43. It is also notable that virtually all the information regarding possible domestic
threats came from human sources. The information on overseas threats came mainly
from signals intelligence. Officials believed that signals intelligence was more
reliable than human intelligence. Roger Cressey interview (June 23, 2004).
44. NSC memo, Clarke to Rice, al Qaeda review, Jan. 25, 2001 (attaching NSC memo,
"Strategy for Eliminating the Threat from the Jihadists Networks of al Qida: Status
and Prospects,"Dec. 2000). Clarke had also mentioned domestic terrorist cells in
connection with the possibility of reopening Pennsylvania Avenue. See NSC email,
Clarke to Rice, Briefing on Pennsylvania Avenue, Mar. 23, 2001.
45. Roger Cressey interview (June 23, 2004).
46. This approach was consistent with how this same issue was addressed almost
exactly a year earlier, despite the fact that by 2001 the threat level was higher
than it had ever been previously. On June 30, 2000, NSC counterterrorism staffers
met with INS, Customs, and FBI officials to review border and port security
measures. The NSC staff 's Paul Kurtz wrote to then national security adviser Samuel
Berger, "We noted while there was no information regarding potential attacks in the
U.S. they should inform their officers to remain vigilant." NSC email, Kurtz to
Berger, Steinberg, and Rudman, warning re: UBL threat reporting, June 30, 2000.
47. FAA briefing materials, Office of Civil Aviation Security, "The Transnational
Threat to Civil Aviation," undated (slide 24). The presentation did indicate,
however, that if a hijacker was intending to commit suicide in a spectacular
explosion, the terrorist would be likely to prefer a domestic hijacking. Between
July 27 and September 11, 2001, the FAA did issue five new Security Directives to
air carriers requiring them to take some specific security measures. Two continued
certain measures that had been in place for at least a year. Others related only to
carrying specific passengers. See FAA security directives, SD 108-98, July 27, 2001;
SD 108-00, July 27, 2001; SD 108- 00, July 27, 2001; SD 108-01, Aug. 21, 2001; SD
108-01, Aug. 31, 2001. In order to issue more general warnings without directing
carriers to take specific action, the FAA issued Information Circulars. Of the eight
such circulars issued between July 2 and September 11, 2001, five highlighted
possible threats overseas. See FAA information circulars,"Possible Terrorist
Threat-Arabian Peninsula," IC-2001-11, July 18, 2001;"Recent Terrorist Activity in
the Middle East," IC-2001-03B, July 26, 2001;"Continued Middle Eastern Threats to
Civil Aviation," IC-2001- 04A, July 31, 2001;"Violence Increases in Israel,"
IC-2001-07A, Aug. 28, 2001;"ETA Bombs Airports in Spain," IC-2001-13, Aug. 29, 2001.
One, issued on August 16, warned about the potential use of disguised weapons. FAA
information circular,"Disguised Weapons," IC-2001-12, Aug. 16, 2001.
48. FAA report, "Record of Air Carrier Briefings-4/18/01 to 9/10/01," undated.
49. See Condoleezza Rice testimony, Apr. 8, 2004; NSC memo, U.S. Terrorism Alert,
July 3, 2001; FBI electronic communication, HeightenedThreat Advisory, Apr. 13,2001.
For the lack of NSC direction, see Roger Cressey interview (June 23, 2004).
50. Thomas Pickard interview (Apr. 8, 2004). For example, an international terrorism
squad supervisor in the Washington Field Office told us he was not aware of an
increased threat in the summer of 2001, and his squad did not take any special
actions to respond to it. The special agent in charge of the Miami Field Office told
us he did not learn of the high level of threat until after September 11. See
Washington Field Office agent interview (Apr. 1, 2004); Hector Pesquera interview
(Oct. 3, 2003).
51. Dale Watson interview (Jan. 6, 2004).
52. See Thomas Pickard interviews (Jan. 21, 2004; Apr. 8, 2004); Thomas Pickard
testimony, Apr. 13, 2004; Thomas Pickard letter to the Commission, June 24, 2004;
John Ashcroft testimony, Apr. 13,2004. We cannot resolve this dispute. Pickard
recalls the alleged statement being made at a briefing on July 12. The Department of
Justice has informed us that the only people present at that briefing were Pickard,
Ashcroft, Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson, and Ashcroft's chief of staff,
David Ayres. There are no records of the discussions at these briefings. Thompson
and Ayres deny Ashcroft made any such statement. Dale Watson, who did not attend any
of the briefings, told us that Pickard complained after one of the briefings that
Ashcroft did not want to be briefed on the threats because "nothing ever happened."
Ruben Garcia, head of the FBI's Criminal Division, who attended some of Pickard's
briefings of the Attorney General but not the one at which Pickard alleges Ashcroft
made the statement, recalls that Ashcroft was "not enthusiastic" about the
classified portions of the briefings that related to counterterrorism. We have been
told that Pickard and Ashcroft did not have a good relationship. This may have
influenced their views on the facts surrounding their meetings. Larry Thompson
interview (Jan. 29, 2004); Dale Watson interview (June 3, 2004); Ruben Garcia
interview (Apr. 29, 2004); Thompson and Ayres letter to the Commission, July 12,
2004.
53. See Thomas Pickard interviews (Jan. 21, 2004; Apr. 8, 2004); John Ashcroft
meeting (Dec. 17, 2003); John Ashcroft testimony, Apr. 13, 2004.
54. Indeed, the number of FISA warrants in effect in the summer of 2001 may well have
been less than it was at the beginning of the year. Because of problems with
inaccuracies in the applications, FISAs were allowed to lapse rather than be renewed
with continuing inaccuracies. Michael Rolince interview (Apr. 12, 2004); Marion
Bowman interview (Mar. 6, 2004).
55. See CIA cable, Base/FBI comments on draft cable, Nov. 27, 2000; FBI electronic
communication, USS Cole investigation, Nov. 21, 2000; FBI electronic communication,
USS Cole investigation, Jan. 10, 2001 (draft).
56. For the recollection of the FBI agent, see Al S. interviews (Aug. 26, 2003; Sept.
15, 2003). See also FBI report of investigation, interview of source, July 18, 2000;
attachment to FBI electronic communication, USS Cole investigation, Jan. 10, 2001
(draft); FBI electronic communication, UBL investigation, Jan. 16, 2001.
57. For speculation regarding identities, see CIA cable, "Photo of UBL Associate,"
Dec. 27, 2000. Retrospective analysis of available information would have answered
that question, but that analysis was not done until after 9/11. For analysis, see
Intelligence report, Retrospective review of 11 September 2001 hijackers'
activities, Sept. 23, 2002.
58. CIA cable, "Request for January 2000 Malaysian Surveillance Photos," Dec. 12,
2000; CIA cable,"Photo of UBL Associate," Dec. 27, 2000; CIA cable,"Review of
Malaysia 'Khaled' Photos," Jan. 5, 2001.
59. The CIA knew that Mihdhar and Khallad had both been to Bangkok in January 2000.
They had not yet discovered that Khallad, traveling under an alias, had actually
flown to Bangkok with Mihdhar. Still, as Director Tenet conceded in his testimony
before the Joint Inquiry, the Kuala Lumpur meeting took on additional significance
once Khallad was identified as having attended the meeting. See Joint Inquiry
report, p. 149.
60. For Tenet and Black testimony, see Joint Inquiry testimony of George Tenet, Oct.
17, 2002; Joint Inquiry testimony of Cofer Black, Sept. 26, 2002. For documents not
available to CIA personnel who drafted the testimony, see, e.g., FBI electronic
communication, UBL investigation, Jan. 16, 2001; FBI emails between Al S. and
Michael D., re: source, Jan. 9-11, 2001; FBI electronic communication, USS Cole
investigation, Jan. 4, 2001; DOJ Inspector General interview of Jennifer M., Dec. 9,
2002. For the views of the FBI investigators, see DOJ InspecNOTES TO CHAPTER 8 537
tor General interviews of Steve B., Sept. 16, 2002; Nov. 14, 2002; Al S. interviews
(Aug. 26, 2003; Sept. 15, 2003). The DOJ Inspector General came to the same
conclusion. See DOJ Inspector General report, "A Review of the FBI's Handling of
Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks" (hereinafter "DOJ IG
9/11 Report"), July 2, 2004, pp. 308-310.
61. DOJ Inspector General interview of Michael D., Nov. 6, 2002; Michael D. interview
(May 4, 2004); DOJ Inspector General interview of Chris, Nov. 27, 2002.
62. For the internal CIA reports to which the FBI did not have access, see CIA cable,
"UBL Operative Khallad," Jan. 3, 2001; CIA cable, source debriefing, Jan. 5, 2001.
The FBI agent informed us that he was unaware how such internal CIA communications
worked, or that the operational cables even existed, and so did not know to ask for
them. Such messages are routinely not shared in order to protect intelligence
sources and methods. In this case, application of the routine procedure did not
serve that purpose because the FBI agent was aware of the source's identity as well
as the methods used to obtain the information. Moreover, the FBI agent also may have
been absent from the room when the identification was made. The source had brought a
sheaf of documents with him that the FBI agent left the room to copy while the
interview of the witness continued. Because of the circumstances of the interview
site, the agent would have been absent for a significant period of time. In
addition, the case officer was frequently given photographs from a broad range of
CIA stations to show to this particular witness. He did not focus on the purpose of
showing the photographs; he was only concerned with whether the source recognized
the individuals. DOJ Inspector General interview of Michael D., Nov. 6, 2002;
Michael D. interview (May 4, 2004); DOJ Inspector General interview of Chris, Nov.
27, 2002.
63. John interview (Apr. 2, 2004). See also CIA email, Dave to John, "Re: Liaison
Response,"May 18, 2001. The old reporting from early 2000 that was reexamined
included CIA cable, "Transit of UBL Associate Khalid Through Dubai," Jan. 4, 2000;
CIA cable,"Recent Influx of Suspected UBL Associates to Malaysia," Jan. 5, 2000; CIA
cable,"UBL Associates: Flight Manifest for MH072," Jan. 9, 2000; CIA cable,"UBL
Associates: Identification of Possible UBL Associates," Mar. 5, 2000. For cable
information, see CIA records, audit of cable databases.
64. For a record of the exchange between John and Dave, see CIA emails, Dave to John,
May 17, 18, 24, 2001; CIA email, Richard to Alan, identification of Khallad, July
13, 2001. For the account of John's FBI counterpart, see Michael Rolince interview
(Apr. 12, 2004). For John's focus on Malaysia, see DOJ Inspector General interview
of John, Nov. 1, 2002.
65. DOJ Inspector General interview of John, Nov. 1, 2002.
66. For the account of the desk officer, see DOJ Inspector General interview of
Michael D., Oct. 31, 2002. For cable information, see CIA records, audit of cable
databases.
67. DOJ Inspector General interviews of Jane, Nov. 4, 2002; July 16, 2003.
68. DOJ Inspector General interview of Jane, Nov. 4, 2002; DOJ Inspector General
interview of Dave, Oct. 31, 2002.
69. DOJ Inspector General interviews of Jane, Nov. 4, 2002; July 16, 2003.
70. DOJ Inspector General interview of Jane, Nov. 4, 2002; DOJ Inspector General
interview of Dave, Oct. 31, 2002; DOJ Inspector General interview of Russ F., Sept.
17, 2002; DOJ Inspector General interview of Steve B., Sept. 16, 2002.
71." Jane" did not seek OIPR's permission to share this information at the meeting."
Jane" also apparently did not realize that one of the agents in attendance was a
designated intelligence agent, so she could have shared all of the information with
that agent regardless of the caveats. No one who was at the meeting suggested that
option, however. DOJ Inspector General interview of Steve B., Sept. 16, 2002; DOJ
Inspector General interview of Jane, July 16, 2003. These caveats were different
from the legal limits we discussed in section 3.2. The Attorney General's July 1995
procedures concerned FISA information developed in an FBI intelligence
investigation. This, however, was NSA information. These particular caveats were the
result of the Justice Department's and NSA's overabundance of caution in December
1999. During the millennium crisis, Attorney General Reno authorized electronic
surveillance of three U.S. persons overseas. Because the searches were not within
the United States, no FISA warrant was needed. Reno approved the surveillances
pursuant to section 2.5 of Executive Order 12333 with the proviso that the results
of these particular surveillances not be shared with criminal investigators or
prosecutors without the approval of the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review.
Because of the complexity of determining whether particular reporting was the fruit
of particular surveillances, NSA decided to place these caveats on all its Bin
Ladin-related reporting, not just reporting on the surveillances authorized by Reno.
As a result, these caveats were placed on the reports relating to Mihdhar even
though they were not covered by Reno's December 1999 order. See DOJ memo, Reno to
Freeh, FISA surveillance of a suspected al Qaeda operative, Dec. 24, 1999; NSA
email, William L. to Karen C.,"distribution restrictions,"Dec. 10, 1999; NSA email,
William L. to Anthony L.,"doj restrictions," Dec. 20, 1999; NSA email, William L. to
Brian C.,"dissemination of terrorism reporting," Dec. 29, 1999. See also NSA memo,
Ann D. to others,"Reporting Guidance," Dec. 30, 1999. In May 2000, it was brought to
the Attorney General's attention that these caveats prevented certain attorneys in
the Terrorism and Violent Crime Section (TVCS) from reading the reporting. After
discussions with NSA, the caveats were changed to specifically permit dissemination
of these reports to designated attorneys in the TVCS and two attorneys in the U.S.
Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York. See NSA memo, Joan R. to
Townsend and Reynolds,"Resumed Delivery of Classified Intelligence to TVCS," June 9,
2000; NSA memo, Hayden to Asst. Attorney General,"Proposal to Provide UBL-related
Product to U.S. Attorney's Office/Southern District of New York,"Aug. 30, 2000.
72. For the facts known by Dave at this time, see CIA records, audit of cable
databases; see also CIA email, Dave to John, timeline entries, May 15, 2001. For CIA
analyst's role, see DOJ Inspector General interview of Dave, Oct. 31, 2002. For
Jane's account, see DOJ Inspector General interview of Jane, July 16, 2003.
73. DOJ Inspector General interview of Mary, Oct. 29, 2002.
74. For Mary's account, see DOJ Inspector General interview of Mary, Oct. 29, 2002.
For the reporting regarding Mihdhar and Hazmi, see CIA cable, Khalid's passport,
Jan. 4, 2000; CIA cable, Mihdhar's visa application, Jan. 5, 2000; CIA cable, Hazmi
entered U.S., Mar. 6, 2000. For Mary's cable access information, see CIA records,
audit of cable databases.
75. DOJ Inspector General interview of Mary, Oct. 29, 2002; DOJ Inspector General
interview of Jane, Nov. 4, 2002.
76. DOJ Inspector General interview of Mary, Oct. 29, 2002; Intelligence report,
Watchlisting of Bin Ladin-related individuals, Aug. 23, 2001; Joint Inquiry
testimony of Christopher Kojm, Sept. 19, 2002. The watchlist request included
Mihdhar, Nawaf al Hazmi, Salah Saeed Mohammed Bin Yousaf (they did not yet realize
this was an alias for Tawfiq bin Attash, a.k.a. Khallad), and Ahmad Hikmat Shakir
(who assisted Mihdhar in Kuala Lumpur).
77. Jane told investigators that she viewed this matter as just another lead and so
assigned no particular urgency to the matter. DOJ Inspector General interviews of
Jane, July 16, 2003; Nov. 4, 2002. For the draft lead, see attachment to FBI email,
Jane to Craig D., "Re: FFI Request,"Aug. 28, 2001. For the final version, see FBI
electronic communication,"Request to Open a Full Field Investigation,"Aug. 28, 2001.
78. FBI email, Craig D. to John L., "Fwd: Re: FFI Request,"Aug. 28, 2001; FBI email,
John L. to Steve and others,"Fwd: Re: FFI Request,"Aug. 28, 2001. For an
introduction to these legal limits and "the wall," see section 3.2. In December
2000, pursuant to concerns of the FISA Court, the New York Field Office began
designating certain agents as either intelligence or criminal agents. Intelligence
agents could see FISA materials and any other information that bore cautions about
sharing without obtaining the FISA Court's permission or permission from the Justice
Department's OIPR. FBI electronic communication,"Instructions re FBI FISA
Policy,"Dec. 7, 2000.
79. While one witness recalls a discussion with a senior FBI official, that official
denies that such a discussion took place. The other alleged participant does not
recall such a meeting. John interview (Apr. 2, 2004); Michael Rolince interview
(Apr. 12, 2004); Jane interview (July 13, 2004); DOJ Inspector General interview of
Rodney M., Nov. 5, 2002. For investigation's goal, see FBI electronic communication,
"Request to Open a Full Field Investigation," Aug. 28, 2001.
80. DOJ Inspector General interviews of Jane, July 16, 2003; Nov. 4, 2002; DOJ
Inspector General interviews of Steve B., Sept. 16, 2002; Nov. 14, 2002; Jane
interview ( July 13, 2004). FBI email, Jane to John L., "Fwd: Re: FFI Request,"Aug.
29, 2001.
The analyst's email, however, reflects that she was confusing a broad array of
caveats and legal barriers to information sharing and rules governing criminal
agents' use of information gathered through intelligence channels. There was no
broad prohibition against sharing information gathered through intelligence channels
with criminal agents. This type of sharing occurred on a regular basis in the field.
The court's procedures did not apply to all intelligence gathered regardless of
collection method or source. Moreover, once information was properly shared, the
criminal agent could use it for further investigation.
81. FBI email, Jane to Steve, NSLU Response, Aug. 29, 2001." Jane" says she only
asked whether there was sufficient probable cause to open the matter as a criminal
case and whether the criminal agent could attend any interview if Mihdhar was found.
She said the answer she received to both questions was no. She did not ask whether
the underlying information could have been shared. Jane interview ( July 13, 2004).
The NSLU attorney denies advising that the agent could not participate in an
interview and notes that she would not have given such inaccurate advice. The
attorney told investigators that the NSA caveats would not have precluded criminal
agents from joining in any search for Mihdhar or from participating in any
interview. Moreover, she said that she could have gone to the NSA and obtained a
waiver of any such caveat because there was no FISA information involved in this
case. There are no records of the conversation between "Jane" and the attorney."
Jane" did not copy the attorney on her email to the agent, so the attorney did not
have an opportunity to confirm or reject the advice "Jane" was giving to the agent.
DOJ Inspector General interview of Sherry S., Nov. 7, 2002. "Jane" asked the New
York agent assigned to the Mihdhar search to sign a FISA acknowledgment form
indicating the agent understood how he had to treat FISA information. Because no
FISA information was involved, she should not have required him to sign such a form.
To the extent she believed, incorrectly, that the Attorney General's 1995 procedures
applied to this situation, there was in fact an exception in place for New York. DOJ
Inspector General interview of Sherry S., Nov. 7, 2002. More fundamentally,"Jane"
apparently understood the welter of restrictions to mean, in workday shorthand, that
any information gathered by intelligence agencies should not be shared with criminal
agents. This was incorrect. DOJ Inspector General interviews of Jane, July 16, 2003;
Nov. 4, 2002.
82. FBI emails between Steve B. and Jane, re: NSLU Response, Aug. 29, 2001. While the
agent expressed his frustration with the situation to "Jane," he made no effort to
press the matter further by discussing his concerns with either his supervisor or
the chief division counsel in New York.
83. Attorney General Ashcroft testified to us that this and similar
information-sharing issues arose from Attorney General Reno's 1995 guidelines,
discussed in chapter 3, and specifically from a March 1995 memorandum of then Deputy
Attorney General Jamie Gorelick. John Ashcroft testimony, Apr. 13, 2004; DOJ memo,
Gorelick to White, "Instructions on Separation of Certain Foreign
Counterintelligence and Criminal Investigations," Mar. 4, 1995.
We believe the Attorney General's testimony does not fairly or accurately reflect the
significance of the 1995 documents and their relevance to the 2001 discussions.
Whatever the merits of the March 1995 Gorelick memorandum and the subsequent July
1995 Attorney General procedures on information sharing, they did not apply to the
information the analyst decided she could not share with the criminal agent. As
discussed earlier, the reason "Jane" decided she could not share information was
because the initial information on Mihdhar had been analyzed by the NSA. This reason
was unrelated to either of the 1995 documents. The Gorelick memorandum applied to
two particular criminal cases, neither of which was involved in the summer 2001
information-sharing discussions. As the FBI agent observed in his email, Part A of
the 1995 procedures applied only to information obtained pursuant to a FISA warrant.
None of the Mihdhar material was FISA information. There was an exemption for the
Southern District of New York from Part B of the 1995 procedures, so they did not
apply. Also, the 1995 procedures did not govern whether information could be shared
between intelligence and criminal agents within the FBI, a separation that the
Bureau did not begin making formally until long after the procedures were in place.
The 1995 procedures governed only the sharing of information with criminal
prosecutors. Even in that situation, the restriction obliged running the information
through the OIPR screen. What had happened, as we discussed in chapter 3, was a
growing battle within the Justice Department during the 1990s, and between parts of
Justice and the FISA Court, over the scope of OIPR's screening function and the
propriety of using FISA-derived information in criminal matters. The FISA Court's
concern with FBI sloppiness in its FISA applications also began to take a toll: the
court began designating itself as the gatekeeper for the sharing of intelligence
information; the FBI was required to separately designate criminal and intelligence
agents; and the court banned one supervisory FBI agent from appearing before it. By
late 2000, these factors had culminated in a set of complex rules and a widening set
of beliefs-a bureaucratic culture-that discouraged FBI agents from even seeking to
share intelligence information. Neither Attorney General acted to resolve the
conflicting views within the Justice Department. Nor did they challenge the strict
interpretation of the FISA statute set forth by the FISA Court and OIPR. Indeed,
this strict interpretation remained in effect until the USA PATRIOT Act was passed
after 9/11.
Simply put, there was no legal reason why the information the analyst possessed could
not have been shared with the criminal agent. On August 27, "Jane" requested the
NSA's permission to share the information with the criminal agents, but she intended
for the information only to help the criminal agents in their ongoing Cole
investigation. She still did not believe they could be involved in the intelligence
investigation even if the NSA permitted the information to be shared. DOJ IG 9/11
Report, July 2, 2004, p. 339. The next day the NSA notified its representative at
FBI headquarters that it had approved the passage of the information to the criminal
agents. NSC email, Carlene C. to Richard K.,"Response to FBI Sanitization
Request,"Aug. 28, 2001. Thus,"Jane" had permission to share the information with the
criminal agent prior to their August 29 emails.
84. DOJ Inspector General interview of Robert F., Dec. 18, 2002; FBI electronic
communication, Los Angeles lead, Sept. 10, 2001.
85. Hazmi and Mihdhar used their true names to obtain California driver's licenses
and open New Jersey bank accounts. Hazmi also had a car registered and had been
listed in the San Diego telephone book. Searches of readily available databases
could have unearthed the driver's licenses, the car registration, and the telephone
listing. A search on the car registration would have unearthed a license check by
the South Hackensack Police Department that would have led to information placing
Hazmi in the area and placing Mihdhar at a local hotel for a week in early July
2001. The hijackers actively used the New Jersey bank accounts, through ATM, debit
card, and cash transactions, until September 10. Among other things, they used their
debit cards to pay for hotel rooms; and Hazmi used his card on August 27 to purchase
tickets on Flight 77 for himself and his brother (and fellow hijacker), Salem al
Hazmi. These transactions could have helped locate them if the FBI had obtained the
bank records in time. There would have been no easy means, however, to determine the
existence of these accounts, and obtaining bank cooperation pre-9/11 might have been
problematic. The most likely means of successfully finding the men in the short time
available was one not often used pre-9/11 for suspected terrorists: an FBI BOLO (be
on the lookout) combined with a media campaign. This alone might have delayed or
disrupted the plot, even if the men had not been physically located before September
11. But this would have been considered only if the FBI believed that they were
about to carry out an imminent attack. No one at the FBI-or any other
agency-believed that at the time. See FBI report, financial spreadsheet re: 9/11
hijackers, undated; South Hackensack, N.J., Police Department report, Detective
Bureau Report, Oct. 17, 2001 (case no. 20018437). According to Ramzi Binalshibh, had
KSM known that Moussaoui had been arrested, he would have canceled the 9/11 attacks.
Intelligence report, interrogation of Ramzi Binalshibh, Feb. 14, 2003. The publicity
regarding Mihdhar and Hazmi might have had a similar effect because they could have
been identified by the airlines and might have jeopardized the operation.
86. Joint Inquiry report, pp. xiii, 325-335; DOJ IG 9/11 Report, July 2, 2004, pp.
59-106.
87. FBI electronic communication, Phoenix memo, July 10, 2001.
88. Ibid.; Joint Inquiry report, pp. 325-335; DOJ IG 9/11 Report, July 2, 2004, pp.
59-106.
89. DOJ Inspector General interview of Kenneth Williams, July 22, 2003.
90. Unlike Moussaoui, the typical student at Pan Am Flight Academy holds an FAA
Airline Transport Pilot rating or the foreign equivalent, is employed by an airline,
and has several thousand flight hours. Moussaoui also stood out for several other
reasons. He had paid nearly $9,000 in cash for the training, yet had no explanation
for the source of these funds; he had asked to fly a simulated flight from London's
Heathrow Airport to New York's John F. Kennedy Airport; and he was also particularly
interested in the operation of the aircraft doors. FBI electronic communication,
Request OIPR permission to contact U.S. Attorney's Office regarding Zacarias
Moussaoui, Aug. 18, 2001. For a detailed, step-by-step chronology of activities
taken regarding Moussaoui prior to September 11, see DOJ IG 9/11 Report, July 2,
2004, pp. 109-197.
91. FBI electronic communication, Request OIPR permission to contact U.S. Attorney's
Office regarding Zacarias Moussaoui, Aug. 18, 2001.
92. DOJ Inspector General interview of Harry S., June 6, 2002; DOJ Inspector General
interview of Greg J., July 9, 2002; FBI letterhead memorandum, Zacarias Moussaoui,
Aug. 19, 2001.
93. DOJ IG 9/11 Report, July 2, 2004, p. 128.
94. Criminal search warrants must be approved by Department of Justice attorneys
before submission to the court. Therefore, approval from the Minneapolis U.S.
Attorney's Office was required before a criminal search warrant could be obtained.
DOJ Inspector General interview of Coleen Rowley, July 16, 2002. Another agent,
however, said that he spoke to an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Minneapolis office
and received advice that the facts were almost sufficient to obtain a criminal
warrant. DOJ Inspector General interview of Greg J., July 9, 2002. The Assistant
United States Attorney said that if the FBI had asked for a criminal warrant that
first night, he would have sought it. He believed that there was sufficient probable
cause for a criminal warrant at that time. DOJ Inspector General interview of
William K., May 29, 2003. Mary Jo White, the former U.S. Attorney for the Southern
District of New York, told us that based on her review of the evidence known
pre-9/11, she would have approved a criminal search warrant. Mary Jo White interview
(May 17, 2004). Because the agents never presented the information to the
Minneapolis U.S. Attorney's Office before 9/11, we cannot know for sure what its
judgment would have been or whether a judge would have signed the warrant. In any
event, the Minneapolis agents were concerned that if they tried to first obtain a
criminal warrant but the U.S. Attorney's Office or the judge refused, the FISA Court
might reject an application for a FISA warrant on the grounds that the agents were
attempting to make an end run around the criminal process. Therefore, it was judged
too risky to seek a criminal warrant unless it was certain that it would be
approved. DOJ Inspector General interview of Greg J., July 9, 2002. In addition, FBI
headquarters specifically instructed Minneapolis that it could not open a criminal
investigation. DOJ IG 9/11 Report, July 2, 2004, p. 138. Finally, the Minneapolis
Field Office mistakenly believed that the 1995 Attorney General procedures required
OIPR's approval before it could contact the U.S. Attorney's Office about obtaining a
criminal warrant.
95. The FISA definition of "foreign power" includes "a group engaged in international
terrorism or activities in preparation therefor."
96. FBI electronic communication, Request to contact U.S. Attorney's Office regarding
Zacarias Moussaoui, Aug. 18, 2001. For CTC contact, see FBI email, Harry S. to Chuck
F., "Please Pass To [desk officer],"Aug. 24, 2001; FBI email, Harry S. to Chuck
F.,"Re: Fwd: 199M-MP-60130 (Zacarias Moussaoui),"Aug. 24, 2001.
97. DOJ Inspector General interview of Greg J., July 9, 2002; FBI electronic
communication, Moussaoui investigation, Aug. 22, 2002; FBI electronic communication,
Moussaoui investigation, Aug. 30, 2002.
98. FBI letterhead memorandum, Zacarias Moussaoui, Aug. 21, 2001; CIA cable, subjects
involved in suspicious 747 flight training, Aug. 24, 2001; CIA cable, "Zacarias
Moussaoui and Husayn 'Ali Hasan Ali-Attas,"Aug. 28, 2001; Joseph H., interview (May
4, 2004); FBI letterhead memorandum, Zacarias Moussaoui, Sept. 5, 2001.
99. FBI teletype, "Zacarias Moussaoui-International Terrorism," Sept. 4, 2001.
100. DOJ Inspector General interview of Greg J., July 9, 2002.
101. Minneapolis may have been more concerned about Moussaoui's intentions because
the case agent and the supervisory agent were both pilots. They were, therefore,
more highly sensitized to the odd nature of Moussaoui's actions and comments
regarding flying. DOJ Inspector General interview of Greg J., July 9, 2002; DOJ
Inspector General interview of Harry S., June 20, 2002.
102. DOJ Inspector General interview of Michael Rolince, May 5, 2004; Michael Rolince
interview (Apr. 12, 2004); DOJ IG 9/11 Report, July 2, 2004, pp. 168-170, 188.
103. CIA briefing materials, DCI Update, "Islamic Extremist Learns to Fly,"Aug. 23,
2001. Deputy Director of Central Intelligence John McLaughlin testified that he was
told about Moussaoui several days before Tenet was briefed, although he did not
recall the specific date of the briefing. John McLaughlin testimony, Apr. 14, 2004.
104. George Tenet interviews (Jan. 28, 2004; July 2, 2004).
105. For the renewed request, see FBI letterhead memorandum, Zacarias Moussaoui,
Sept. 11, 2001. For the initial British response, see British Security Service memo,
re: Zacarias Moussaoui, Sept. 12, 2001; information provided to the Commission by
the British government; British liaison telex, "Zacarias Moussaoui-Background
Information," Sept. 13, 2001. See also Joseph H. interview (May 4, 2004).
106. Joint Inquiry report (classified version), pp. 340-341. Notably, the FBI analyst
"Mary" who was looking at the Mihdhar information suggested that the U.S. government
talk to Ressam to see if he knew anything about Mihdhar. See CIA email, Mary to
John, seeking identification by Ressam, Aug. 21, 2001. There is no evidence that
Ressam was asked about Moussaoui or Mihdhar prior to 9/11.
107. According to Ramzi Binalshibh, had KSM known that Moussaoui had been arrested,
he would have cancelled the 9/11 attacks. Intelligence report, interrogation of
Ramzi Binalshibh, Feb. 14, 2003.
108. Joint Inquiry report (classified version), pp. 329-331; Joint Inquiry interview
of Mike, Alice, Larry, John, Terry, Aug. 12, 2002.
109. CIA cable, Key UBL personalities, Sept. 25, 2000.
110. CIA cable, Mukhtar information, May 23, 2002.
111. CIA cable, Biographical Information on Key UBL Associates in Afghanistan, June
11, 2001; Intelligence report, biographical information on Bin Ladin associates in
Afghanistan, June 12, 2001. For the subsequent identification, see CIA cable,
follow-up source on KSM, July 11, 2001.
112. For the reporting identifying Mukhtar as KSM, see CIA cable, source information
re: KSM, Aug. 28, 2001.
113. John interview (Apr. 2, 2004).
9 Heroism and Horror
1. For the WTC's layout, see Port Authority diagrams, "World Trade Center Concourse
Level," "Concourse Level," and "Plaza Level," undated. For the number of square feet
of office space, see Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) report, "World Trade
Center Building Performance Study," undated. For the number of workers and
passersby, see Port Authority briefing (May 13, 2004). For the dimensions, see FEMA
report,"World Trade Center Building Performance Study," undated. In addition, the
outside of each tower was covered by a frame of 14-inch-wide steel columns; the
centers of the steel columns were 40 inches apart. These exterior walls bore most of
the weight of the building. The interior core of the buildings was a hollow steel
shaft, in which elevators and stairwells were grouped. Ibid. For stairwells and
elevators, see Port Authority response to Commission interrogatory, May 2004.
2. See Port Authority response to Commission interrogatory, May 2004.
3. Ibid. These deviations were necessary because of the placement of heavy elevators
and machine rooms, and were located between the 42nd and 48th floors and the 76th
and 82nd floors in both towers. For the doors being closed but unlocked, see Port
Authority briefing (May 13, 2004).
4. For rooftop access and evacuations, see Port Authority response to Commission
interrogatory, May 2004. For the helipad not conforming, see PANYNJ interview 14
(July 8, 2004). In the interests of promoting candor and protecting privacy, we
agreed not to identify most individuals we interviewed. Individuals are identified
by a code, and individuals' ranks or units are disclosed only in a broad manner.
5. For the 1993 attack's effect, see Alan Reiss testimony, May 18, 2004. For the
attack's testing the city's response capability, see FDNY report, "Report from the
Chief of Department, Anthony L. Fusco," in William Manning, ed., The World Trade
Center Bombing: Report and Analysis (FEMA, undated), p. 11.
6. For the towers' loss of power and the other effects, see New York City report,
"Report of the World Trade Center Review Committee," 1995, p. 4. For generators'
shutting down, see Port Authority briefing (May 13, 2004). For the rescue efforts,
see FDNY report,"Report from the Chief of Department, Anthony L. Fusco," in Manning,
ed., The World Trade Center Bombing, p. 11. For the evacuation time, see PANYNJ
interview 5 (May 15, 2004).
7. For information on rooftop evacuations, see Port Authority response to Commission
interrogatory, May 2004; NYPD interview 25, Aviation (June 21, 2004). For the rappel
rescue, see Port Authority response to Commission interrogatory, May 2004. For
figure of 15 hours, see "World Trade Center Bombing," NY Cop Online Magazine, Dec.
12, 2000 (online at www.nycop.com). For the general false impression, see Civilian
interview 3 (May 4, 2004); Commission analysis of letters written to the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) concerning the September 11
attacks. For the WTC fire safety plan, see Port Authority response to Commission
interrogatory, May 2004.
8. For the upgrades, see Port Authority memorandum to the Commission for Nov. 3,
2003, meeting; Port Authority briefing (May 13, 2004).
9. For the upgrades, see Port Authority memorandum to the Commission for Nov. 3,
2003, meeting; Port Authority response to Commission interrogatory, May 2004. For
the fire alarm, see PANYNJ interview 10 (June 16, 2004); PANYNJ interview 7 (June 2,
2004).
10. Port Authority memorandum to Commission for Nov. 3, 2003 meeting; WTC interview 6
(May 25, 2004).
11. For fire safety teams, see PANYNJ Interview 7 (Jun. 2, 2004). For fire drill
procedures, see Civilian interview 1 (Mar. 2, 2004); Civilian interview 10 (Mar. 24,
2004). For aids to the September 11 evacuation, see, e.g., Civilian interview 14
(Apr. 7, 2004); Civilian interview 20 (May 4, 2004); Civilian interview 21 (May 4,
2004); Civilian Interview 13 (Mar. 25, 2004).
12. For instructions to civilians, see, e.g., Civilian interview 20 (May 4, 2004);
Civilian interview 21 (May 4, 2004); Civilian interview 12 (May 4, 2004); Stanley
Praimnath testimony, May 18, 2004 (videotaped). For civilians' participation, see
Civilian interview 10 (Mar. 24, 2004); Civilian interview 15 (Apr. 21, 2004);
Commission analysis of letters written to OSHA concerning the September 11 attacks.
For civilians not being instructed not to evacuate up, see Port Authority briefing
(May 13, 2004). For the standard fire drill announcement, see Port Authority
response to Commission interrogatory, May 2004. For civilians' recollection, see
Civilian interview 1 (Mar.2, 2004); Civilian interview 13 (Mar. 25, 2004); Civilian
interview 10 (Mar. 24, 2004). For Port Authority acknowledgment of lack of a
protocol, see PANYNJ interview 2 (Apr. 14, 2004).
13. For SPI transition, see PANYNJ Interview 11 (Jun. 23, 2004); Alan Reiss prepared
statement, May 18, 2004, p. 8. For fire safety plan, see PANYNJ Interview 8 (June 6,
2004).
14. See Port Authority Police Department (PAPD) report, "Port Authority of New York
and New Jersey," undated (online at www.panynj.gov).
15. PANYNJ interview 4 (May 10, 2004).
16. For 40,000 officers, see NYPD information provided to the Commission, July 9,
2004. For standard operating procedures, see NYPD regulations, "Patrol Guide: Rapid
Mobilization," and "Patrol Guide: Mobilization Readiness Levels," Jan. 1, 2000.
17. For the 35 radio zones, see NYPD report, "Radio Zones," undated. For other
citywide radio channels, see, e.g., NYPD report,"Transit Patrol VHF," undated; NYPD
interview 18, ESU (Feb. 24, 2004).
18. For the NYPD supervising the emergency call system and employing more than 1,200
people, see NYPD report, "Communications Section," undated (online at
www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/otsd/ commsec.html). For fire emergencies being
transferred to the FDNY dispatch, see FDNY interview 28, Dispatch (Jan. 29, 2004).
19. See FDNY email to the Commission, July 9, 2004; Thomas Von Essen interview (Apr.
7, 2004). For operations being headed by the sole five-star chief, see FDNY
regulations, "Regulations" chapter of "Operational Procedures and Policies," July
1999.
20. For department organization, see FDNY report, "Unit Location Chart," Sept. 11,
2001; FDNY regulations, "Firefighting Procedures,""Engine Company," and "Ladder
Company Operations" chapters of "Operational Procedures and Policies," July 1999.
21. FDNY interview 48, SOC (Mar. 11, 2004).
22. FDNY interview 28, Dispatch (Jan. 29, 2004). Each center was staffed at all times
with a supervisor and seven dispatchers who worked in 12-hour tours. Positions
included a decision dispatcher, responsible for directing the appropriate fire
apparatus to the scene; a voice alarm or notification dispatcher, responsible for
intra- and interagency communications; a radio in and radio out dispatcher who
tracked the movement of fire apparatuses; and three alarm dispatchers, responsible
for sending the appropriate number of units to a fire scene to correspond with the
designated alarm level. Ibid.
23. FDNY regulations, "Communications" chapter of "Operational Procedures and
Policies,"July 1999; FDNY interview 60, HQ (May 11, 2004); FDNY interview 64, HQ
(June 30, 2004).
24. FDNY report, "Report from the Chief of Department, Anthony L. Fusco," in Manning,
ed., The World Trade Center Bombing, p. 11.
25. PANYNJ interview 1 (Nov. 6, 2003); PANYNJ interview 4 (May 10, 2004). In early
2001, New York provided its firefighters with new digital radios. The procurement
process for these radios remains controversial, and they proved unpopular with the
rank and file, who believed that adequate training in their use had not been
provided. The new radios were withdrawn shortly after they had been introduced into
the field. While the new radios briefly were in service, the WTC repeater channel
could be left on at all times, because the new radios operated on entirely different
frequencies and thus were not vulnerable to interference from the repeater system.
Thomas Von Essen interview (Apr. 7, 2004). For the new radios permitting the
repeater to stay on, see PANYNJ interview 1 (Nov. 6, 2003); PANYNJ interview 4 (May
10, 2004).
26. For civilian fatalities, see New York City press release, Office of the Mayor
Press Release No. 042-01, Feb. 8, 2001. For firefighter fatalities, see Terry
Golway, So Others Might Live (Basic Books, 2002), p. 304.
27. For the creation of the Office of Emergency Management (OEM), see Rudolph
Giuliani interview (Apr. 20, 2004). For OEM's purposes, see Richard Sheirer
interview (Apr. 7, 2004). For OEM's sending field responder, see ibid.; OEM
interview 1 (Feb. 12, 2004). Other data monitored by OEM's Watch Command included
Emergency Medical Service data regarding patterns of illness (to spot a potential
epidemic in its early stages), live video feeds from New York Harbor and city
streets, and television news channels. Richard Sheirer interview (Apr.7, 2004); OEM
interview 3 (Mar. 16, 2004). The Watch Command's monitoring of EMS data proved
instrumental in an extremely early identification and then highly effective
containment of the 1999 West Nile outbreak, which likely would have resulted in many
more fatalities but for OEM. Richard Sheirer interview (Apr. 7, 2004).
28. Richard Sheirer testimony (May 18, 2004); OEM interview 3 (Mar. 16, 2004).
29. New York City memo, "Direction and Control of Emergencies in the City of New
York," July 2001 (signed by Mayor Giuliani).
30. For the exact time of impact, see FAA analysis of American 11 radar returns and
Commission analysis of FAA radar data and air traffic control software logic. For
the zone of impact, see National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
report, "Interim Report on the Federal Building Fire Safety Investigation of the
World Trade Center," June 28, 2004. On people alive on the 92nd floor and above
after the impact, see Commission analysis of conditions on tower floors and advice
received by civilians in the towers based on (1) calls to NYPD 911 from or
concerning people in the towers on September 11, 2001, and (2) transcripts of
recorded calls to the Port Authority police desk from people in the towers on
September 11, 2001 (hereafter "Commission analysis of 911/PAPD calls"). Everyone
alive on the 91st floor was able to evacuate. Civilian interview 7 (Mar. 22, 2004);
Civilian interview 6 (Mar. 22, 2004). For civilians being alive but trapped, see
Commission analysis of 911/PAPD calls; Civilian interview 17 (May 11, 2004);
Civilian interview 2 (Mar. 19, 2004).
31. For fire in the 77th floor elevator and damage to the 22nd floor, see Commission
analysis of 911/PAPD calls; Port Authority transcripts of recorded Port Authority
calls and radio channels, Sept. 11, 2001, vol. II, channel 8, p. 4 (22nd floor). For
a fireball in the lobby, see PAPD interview 1, WTC Command (Oct. 14, 2003); Civilian
interview 14 (Apr. 7, 2004). Burning jet fuel descended at least one elevator bank.
FDNY interview 4, Chief (Jan. 8, 2004). For the roofs being engulfed and the winds,
see, e.g., NYPD interview 16, Aviation (Apr. 1, 2004).
32. Commission analysis of 911/PAPD calls.
33. Ibid.
34. For the on-duty fire safety director's perspective, see WTC interview 6 (May 25,
2004). For the chiefs being told by the Port Authority fire safety director that the
evacuation order was given earlier, see PANYNJ interview 13 (Nov. 20, 2003). For him
no longer being the designated fire safety director, see PANYNJ interview 11 (June
23, 2004).
35. For public announcements not being heard, see, e.g., Civilian interview 6 (Mar.
22, 2004); Civilian interview 7 (Mar. 22, 2004); Civilian interview 9 (Mar. 23,
2004); Civilian interview 14 (Apr. 7, 2004); Commission analysis of 911/PAPD calls.
The evacuation tone was heard in some locations below the impact. Civilian interview
7 (Mar. 22, 2004); Commission analysis of 911/PAPD calls. For some emergency
intercoms being unusable, see WTC interview 9 (June 8, 2004); Port Authority
transcripts of recorded Port Authority calls and radio channels, Sept. 11, 2001. For
evidence that some were usable, see WTC interview 6 (May 25, 2004).
36. For callers being disconnected, see Commission analysis of 911/PAPD calls. For
the standard operating procedure and only a few people being available, causing
calls to be transferred, see FDNY interview 28, Dispatch (Jan. 29, 2004). For delays
and terminations, see Commission analysis of 911/PAPD calls.
37. For operators' and dispatchers' situational awareness and instructions to
callers, see Commission analysis of 911/PAPD calls. For standard operating
procedures for a high-rise fire, see FDNY interview 28, Dispatch (Jan. 29, 2004).
For the fire chiefs' view, see FDNY interview 61, Chief (May 12, 2004); FDNY
interview 62, Chief (May 12, 2004). For many injuries occurring during the
evacuation, see Zachary Goldfarb and Steven Kuhr, "EMS Response to the Explosion,"
in Manning, ed., The World Trade Center Bombing, p. 94.
38. FDNY interview 15, Chief (Jan. 14, 2004): FDNY interview 4, Chief (Jan. 8, 2004).
39. For operators' and dispatchers' lack of knowledge, see Commission analysis of
911/PAPD calls. For operators departing from protocol, see ibid.
40. Commission analysis of 911/PAPD calls; Port Authority transcripts of recorded
Port Authority calls and radio channels, Sept. 11, 2001, vol. II, channel 9, pp.
1-2, 23-24; channel 10, pp. 2, 6, 23.
41. See Civilian interview 6 (Mar. 22, 2004); Civilian interview 7 (Mar. 22, 2004);
Civilian interview 14 (Apr. 7, 2004); Civilian interview 9 (Mar. 23, 2004). For Port
Authority employees remaining, see Civilian interview 6 (Mar. 22, 2004); Civilian
interview 7 (Mar. 22, 2004), Port Authority report, September 11 Special Awards
Ceremony, vol. 1, undated (recognitions 2, 3, 4, and 5).
42. For trouble reaching exits, see, e.g., Civilian interview 9 (Mar. 23, 2004). For
"locked" doors, see, e.g., Civilian interview 6 (Mar. 22, 2004); Civilian Interview
14 (Apr. 7, 2004); WTC interview 9 (June 8, 2004); Civilian interview 7 (Mar. 22,
2004).
43. For smoke rising and its effect, see Commission analysis of 911/PAPD calls. For
people jumping, see Civilian interview 13 (Mar. 25, 2004); Commission analysis of
911/PAPD calls; Port Authority transcripts of recorded Port Authority calls and
radio channels, vol. II, WTC channel 26 (channel W), Sept. 11, 2001, pp. 4-6.
44. There is no evidence of a dispute between Morgan Stanley and the Port Authority
over the Port Authority's "defend in place"evacuation policy before September 11.
For occupants who were unaware of what happened, see, e.g., Civilian interview 1
(Mar. 2, 2004). For civilians concluding that the incident had occurred in the other
building, see Civilian interview 13 (Mar. 25, 2004); Civilian interview 1 (Mar. 2,
2004). For others being aware that a major incident had occurred, see, e.g.,
Civilian interview 13 (Mar. 25, 2004); Civilian interview 10 (Mar. 24, 2004). Some
of them could actually feel the heat from the explosion in the North Tower. See,
e.g., Civilian interview 10 (Mar. 24, 2004); Civilian interview 15 (Apr. 21, 2004).
For people deciding to leave or being advised to do so by fire wardens, see, e.g.,
Civilian interview 1 (Mar. 2, 2004); Civilian interview 8 (Mar. 23, 2004); Civilian
statement 1, undated. For Morgan Stanley occupying 20 floors and ordering its
employees to leave, see Civilian interview 19 (June 6, 2004).
45. Port Authority, transcripts of recorded Port Authority calls and radio channels,
Sept. 11, 2001, vol. II, channel 17, p. 1; PANYNJ interview 7 (June 2, 2004). Fire
command stations were equipped with manuals containing prescripted announcements
corresponding to a number of specified emergencies. Once the FDNY arrived on the
scene, however, all decisions relating to evacuation or other emergency procedures
were left to its discretion.
46. When a notable event occurred, it was standard procedure for the on-duty deputy
fire safety director to make an "advisory" announcement to tenants who were affected
by or might be aware of the incident, in order to acknowledge the incident and to
direct tenants to stand by for further instructions. The purpose of advisory
announcements, as opposed to "emergency" announcements (such as to evacuate), was to
reduce panic. PANYNJ interview 7 (June 2, 2004); Port Authority response to
Commission interrogatory, May 2004. For the content of the announcement, see, e.g.,
Brian Clark testimony, May 18, 2004 (videotaped); Civilian interview 3 (May 4,
2004); Civilian interview 13 (Mar. 25, 2004); Civilian statement 1, undated. For the
protocol and prescripted announcements and the death of the director of fire safety
and the deputy fire safety director, see PANYNJ interview 7 (June 2, 2004); PANYNJ
interview 12 (July 7, 2004). For people not thinking a second plane would hit, see,
e.g., PANYNJ interview 7 (June 2, 2004). For the quotation, see FDNY interview 63,
Chief (May 16, 2004). For civilians remaining, see Civilian interview 1 (Mar. 2,
2004); Civilian interview 13 (Mar. 25, 2004); Civilian interview 8 (Mar. 23, 2004);
Civilian interview 16 (Apr. 27, 2004); Commission analysis of letters written to
OSHA concerning the September 11 attacks. For civilians returning after evacuating,
see Civilian interview 1 (Mar. 2, 2004); Civilian interview 11 (Mar. 25, 2004);
Civilian interview 4 (Mar. 16, 2004); Commission analysis of letters written to OSHA
concerning the September 11 attacks.
47. For advice on the ground floor, see Civilian interview 4 (Mar. 16, 2004).
Nineteen of them returned upstairs, where 18 died; the 20th was told by her
supervisor, who was in the group, to leave rather than return upstairs. The
supervisor also survived. Civilian interview 4 (Mar. 16, 2004). For advice in the
sky lobbies, see, e.g., Civilian interview 15 (Apr. 21, 2004). For security
officials not being part of the fire safety staff, see PANYNJ interview 7 (June 2,
2004).
48. For people told to stand by, see Port Authority transcripts of recorded Port
Authority calls and radio channels, Sept. 11, 2001, vol. II, channel 8, pp. 7-8. For
people advised to leave, see ibid., vol. II, channel 9, pp. 2, 4, 9.
49. It is also not known if the deputy fire safety director received the order by the
PAPD to evacuate the complex; however, the Port Authority has told us that deputy
fire safety directors did not generally take direct orders from the PAPD under the
regular chain of command. PANYNJ interview 7 (June 2, 2004). For the announcement,
see Civilian interview 16 (Apr. 27, 2004); Civilian interview 13 (Mar. 25, 2004).
For the announcement's deviating from protocol, see PANYNJ interview 7 (June 2,
2004).
50. For senior leaders' response by 9:00 A.M., see FDNY interview 18, Chief (Jan. 22,
2004); FDNY interview 54, Chief (Apr. 15, 2004); FDNY interview 5, Chief (Dec. 16,
2003); FDNY interview 52, Chief (Apr. 5, 2004); FDNY interview 27, HQ (Jan.
28,2004). For the Chief of Department's and Chief of Operation's actions, see FDNY
interview 18, Chief (Jan. 22, 2004). For senior leaders' response by 9:59, see FDNY
report, McKinsey & Company, "FDNY Report,"Aug. 19, 2002, p. 32.
51. FDNY interview 60, HQ (May 11, 2004); see FDNY record, computer-aided dispatch
report, Sept. 11, 2001, 08:47:20-9:00:00.
52. For the chief 's and companies' arrival, see Jules Naudet and Gedeon Naudet,
video footage, Sept. 11, 2001; FDNY interview 4, Chief (Jan. 8, 2004). For burned
civilians, see FDNY interview 29, Battalion 1 (Jan. 29, 2004). For the building's
physical conditions, see FDNY interview 16, Battalion 1 (Jan. 20, 2004). For
conditions in the lobby, see Jules Naudet and Gedeon Naudet, video footage, Sept.
11, 2001.
53. For the initial incident commander and command post location, see Jules Naudet
and Gedeon Naudet, video footage, Sept. 11, 2001; FDNY interview 4, Chief (Jan. 8,
2004). For the transfer of incident command, see FDNY interview 15, Chief (Jan. 14,
2004). For ascertaining building systems' status from building personnel, see FDNY
interview 4, Chief (Jan. 8, 2004); PANYNJ interview 13 (Nov. 20, 2003); FDNY
interview 15, Chief (Jan. 14, 2004). For speaking with OEM and PAPD officials, see
FDNY interview 15, Chief (Jan. 14, 2004); Jules Naudet and Gedeon Naudet, video
footage, Sept. 11, 2001.
54. For the ladder and engine companies' climb, see FDNY interview 59, Battalion 2
(Apr. 22, 2004); Jules Naudet and Gedeon Naudet, video footage, Sept. 11, 2001. For
tactical 1, see FDNY interview 59, Battalion 2 (Apr. 22, 2004). For other units
lining up in the lobby, see Jules Naudet and Gedeon Naudet, video footage, Sept. 11,
2001.
55. For FDNY instructing building personnel and PAPD to evacuate the South Tower, see
FDNY interview 4, Chief (Jan. 8, 2004); FDNY interview 15, Chief (Jan. 14, 2004);
PANYNJ interview 13 (Nov. 20, 2003). For lack of concern about a second plane, see
FDNY interview 63, Chief (May 16, 2004).
56. FDNY interview 4, Chief (Jan. 8, 2004); FDNY interview 15, Chief (Jan. 14, 2004).
57. For their situational awareness, see FDNY interview 4, Chief (Jan. 8, 2004); FDNY
interview 15, Chief (Jan. 14, 2004) (quotation).
58. Peter Hayden testimony, May 18, 2004 (videotaped).
59. On the lack of information, see FDNY interview 4, Chief (Jan. 8, 2004); FDNY
interview 15, Chief (Jan. 14, 2004).
60. On the staging areas, see FDNY interview 47, Chief (Mar. 11, 2004); FDNY
interview 44, Chief (Mar. 8, 2004); FDNY interview 33, EMS (Feb. 9, 2004). For EMS's
response, see Jules Naudet and Gedeon Naudet, video footage, Sept. 11, 2001. For
private ambulances responding, see FDNY interview 35, EMS (Feb. 10, 2004).
61. NYPD recordings, City Wide 1, Special Operations Division, and Divisions 1, 2,
and 3 radio channels, Sept. 11, 2001.
62. For the Chief of Department's actions, see NYPD interview 8, HQ (Feb. 24, 2004).
For the number of officers, see NYPD regulations, "Patrol Guide: Rapid
Mobilization," Jan. 1, 2000; NYPD recordings, City Wide 1 and Divisions 1, 2, and 3
radio channels, Sept. 11, 2001.
63. For shifting the mobilization point, see NYPD interview 17, 1st Precinct (Apr. 1,
2004). For stationing officers around the perimeter, see NYPD recordings, City Wide
1, Special Operations Division, and Divisions 1, 2, and 3 radio channels, Sept. 11,
2001. For officers being diverted, see, e.g., NYPD interview 21, 6th Precinct (May
4, 2004).
64. For the helicopters' dispatch, see NYPD records, "Aviation Unit Flight Data
Sheets," Sept. 11, 2001. For communications with air traffic controllers and their
situational awareness, see NYPD interview 12, Aviation (Mar. 10, 2004); NYPD
interview 14, Aviation (Mar. 11, 2004); NYPD interview 13, Aviation (Mar. 10, 2004);
NYPD interview 16, Aviation (Apr. 1, 2004).
65. NYPD recording, Special Operations Division radio channel, Sept. 11, 2001.
66. For the third helicopter, see NYPD records, "Aviation Unit Flight Data Sheets,"
Sept. 11, 2001. For the helicopters' subsequent actions and protocol, see NYPD
interview 12, Aviation (Mar. 10, 2004); NYPD interview 14, Aviation (Mar. 11, 2004);
NYPD interview 13, Aviation (Mar. 10, 2004); NYPD interview 16, Aviation (Apr. 1,
2004); NYPD interview 15, ESU (Mar. 11, 2004).
67. Commission analysis of 911/PAPD calls; NYPD recordings, City Wide 1, Special
Operations, and Division 1, 2, and 3 radio channels, Sept. 11, 2001.
68. NYPD memo, requests for departmental recognition 4 and 6, Jun. 26, 2002. For
those on the 22nd floor apparently not being located, see PANYNJ recognition 1,
undated.
69. NYPD interview 15, ESU (Mar. 11, 2004); NYPD interview 18, ESU (Feb. 24, 2004).
70. For other officers' positioning, see NYPD interview 20, Manhattan SouthTask Force
(May 4, 2004); NYPD interview 21, 6th Precinct (May 4, 2004); NYPD interview 19,
13th Precinct (May 4, 2004); NYPD interview 4, Housing (Feb. 17, 2004); PAPD
interview 4, Port Authority Bus Terminal Command (Nov. 20, 2003). For officers
assisting in the North Tower evacuation, see NYPD memo, request for departmental
recognition 1 and 2, June 26, 2002.
71. NYPD recording, Transit Division 1 radio channel, Sept. 11, 2001.
72. NYPD recordings, City Wide 1, Special Operations Division, and Divisions 1, 2,
and 3 radio channels, Sept. 11, 2001.
73. For the on-site commanding officer's actions, see PAPD interview 1, WTC command
(Oct. 14, 2003). For the on-duty sergeant's initial instructions, see PAPD statement
3, WTC Command (Nov. 12, 2001). For his instructions to meet at the desk, see PAPD
statement 3, WTC Command (Nov. 12, 2001); PAPD statement 12, WTC Command (Mar. 28,
2002). On the scarcity of radios, see PAPD statement 9, PATH Command (Jan. 28,
2002); PAPD statement 8, WTC Command (Jan. 12, 2002).
74. PAPD interview 7, WTC Command (Nov. 25, 2003).
75. For the response, see PAPD statement 2, WTC Command (Nov. 10, 2001). For the lack
of such written standard operating procedures, see PAPD interview 3, LaGuardia
Airport Command (Nov. 20, 2003); PAPD regulations, " Manual of Police Division
Instructions," undated (in existence before 9/11). Instead, the PAPD relied on
tradition to dictate its response procedures. On the lack of interoperable
frequencies, see PANYNJ interview 4 (May 10, 2004); PAPD statement 9, PATH Command
(Jan. 28, 2002).
76. For the evacuation order, see PAPD statement 3, WTC Command (Nov. 12, 2001); PAPD
interview 1, WTC Command (Oct. 14, 2003). For its transmission, see Port Authority
transcripts of recorded Port Authority calls and radio channels, Sept. 11, 2001,
vol. II, channel W, p. 7.
77. PAPD statement 1, Administrative Command, Nov. 2, 2001; PAPD statement 4,
Administrative Command, Nov. 24, 2001.
78. For the Emergency Operations Center's activation, see OEM interview 3 (Mar. 16,
2004); OEM interview 2 (Mar. 4, 2004). For the request for search teams, see OEM
interview 5 (Mar. 19, 2004). For the senior OEM official's arrival, see OEM
interview 4 (Mar. 18, 2004). For other OEM officials' arrival, see Richard Sheirer
interview (Apr. 7, 2004); OEM interview 6 (Mar. 24, 2004).
79. For the time of impact, see FAA analysis of United Airlines Flight 175 radar
returns and Commission analysis of FAA radar data and air traffic control software
logic. For the impact zone, see NIST report, "Interim Report on the Federal Building
and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center," June 18, 2004, appendix
H-41. For portions undamaged, see Civilian interview 10 (Mar. 24, 2004). For
stairwell A remaining passable, see Civilian interview 8 (Mar. 23, 2004); Civilian
interview 1 (Mar. 2, 2004); Civilian interview 13 (Mar. 25, 2004); Civilian
interview 4 (Mar. 16, 2004).
80. For the sky lobby, see Civilian interview 10 (Mar. 24, 2004). For the condition
of people on the impact floors, see Civilian interview 10 (Mar. 24, 2004); Civilian
interview 4 (Mar. 16, 2004); Commission analysis of 911/PAPD calls. For events in
the sky lobby after impact, see Civilian interview 10 (Mar. 24, 2004).
81. For conditions in the impact zone above the 78th floor, see Civilian interview 4
(Mar. 16, 2004); Civilian interview 3 (May 4, 2004); Commission analysis of 911/PAPD
calls. For conditions on the 81st floor, see Civilian interview 4 (Mar. 16, 2004);
Civilian interview 3 (May 4, 2004).
82. For the four people, see Civilian interview 1 (Mar. 2, 2004); Civilian interview
13 (Mar. 25, 2004); Civilian interview 4 (Mar. 16, 2004); Civilian interview 8 (Mar.
23, 2004). For the first person to descend stairwell A, see Civilian interview 13
(Mar. 25, 2004).
83. For civilians ascending the stairs, see Civilian interview 8 (Mar. 23, 2004);
Civilian interview 16 (Apr. 27, 2004); Civilian interview 1 (Mar. 2, 2004);
Commission analysis of letters written to OSHA concerning the September 11 attacks.
For the intention of the group ascending the stairwell and the conditions, see
Civilian interview 8 (Mar. 23, 2004).
84. On civilians finding locked doors, see, e.g., Civilian interview 16 (Apr. 27,
2004); Commission analysis of letters written to OSHA concerning the September 11
attacks. On the lock release order, see Port Authority transcripts of recorded Port
Authority calls and radio channels, Sept. 11,2001, vol. II, channel X, pp.25-31;
Port Authority response to Commission interrogatory, May 2004. The Security Command
Center did not control access areas in the Observation Deck and other private tenant
spaces. It is unknown whether there were any prior or subsequent orders or attempts
to release the building's locks.
85. For trouble descending, see Brian Clark testimony, May 18, 2004 (videotaped);
Richard Fern testimony, May 18, 2004 (videotaped); Commission analysis of letters
written to OSHA concerning the September 11 attacks. The conditions of stairwell C
are unknown. For conditions in stairwells, see, e.g., Civilian Interview 1 (Mar.2,
2004); Civilian Interview 13 (Mar. 25, 2004).
86. For some civilians remaining, see Civilian interview 10 (Mar. 24, 2004). For some
civilians ascending, see, e.g., Civilian interview 1 (Mar. 2, 2004); Civilian
interview 11 (Mar. 25, 2004).
87. For conditions in the 90s and 100s, see Commission analysis of 911/PAPD calls.
For the 105th floor and the condition of the less affected area, see Civilian
interview 16 (Apr. 27, 2004). For the other areas of the 105th, 88th, and 89th
floors, see Commission analysis of 911/PAPD calls.
88. For the callers, see Commission analysis of 911/PAPD calls. There are many
variables to consider in determining whether, and to what extent, stairwell A was
actually a viable exit. Knowing that the stairway was initially passable from at
least the 91st floor down, we can conclude that it was likely open from top to
bottom, on floors farther removed from the impact. However, in areas near the impact
zone some doors leading to the stairwell may have jammed. We know that access to
stairway A was possible from at least the 81st and 84th floors, and from several
other floors between the 84th and 91st floor. It is likely that access was possible
from floors higher up as well. It is not known, however, whether 911 callers had a
clear path to the stairwell entrance from their locations. Damage caused by the
impact of the plane, and the resulting smoke and heat, may have prevented some from
being able to reach the entrance to the staircase; but the stated locations of at
least some callers indicate that they were near stairwell A on their floor. Based on
conditions described by civilians who descended stairwell A from at or above the
impact zone, we conclude that stairwell A may have become effectively impassable as
the morning progressed.
89. Commission analysis of 911/PAPD calls.
90. Brian Clark testimony, May 18, 2004 (videotaped); Civilian interview 1 (Mar. 2,
2004); Commission analysis of 911/PAPD calls.
91. Commission analysis of 911/PAPD calls.
92. Civilian interview 1 (Mar. 2, 2004); Civilian interview 8 (Mar. 23, 2004);
Civilian interview 13 (Mar. 25, 2004); Civilian interview 4 (Mar. 16, 2004);
Commission analysis of 911/PAPD calls.
93. OEM interview 1 (Feb. 12, 2004); PANYNJ interview 7 (June 2, 2004); Civilian
interview 13 (Mar. 25, 2004); Civilian interview 1 (Mar. 2, 2004); Civilian
interview 8 (Mar. 23, 2004).
94. Civilian interview 8 (Mar. 23, 2004); Civilian interview 1 (Mar. 2, 2004);
Civilian interview 4 (Mar. 16, 2004); Civilian interview 13 (Mar. 25, 2004); NYPD
interview 15, ESU (Mar. 11, 2004).
95. Civilian interview 6 (Mar. 22, 2004); Civilian interview 7 (Mar. 22, 2004)
(quotation); Civilian interview 9 (Mar. 3, 2004); Civilian interview 14 (Apr. 7,
2004).
96. Commission analysis of 911/PAPD calls. It is not clear whether callers from below
the impact were trapped in offices or otherwise obstructed from proceeding, or were
simply calling to seek advice. In any case, the 911 operators and FDNY dispatchers
who advised them did not appear to be basing their advice on these or other factual
considerations.
97. Port Authority transcripts of recorded Port Authority calls and radio channels,
Sept. 11, 2001.
98. For the evacuation route for civilians, see Civilian interview 6 (Mar. 22, 2004);
Civilian interview 7 (Mar. 22, 2004); Civilian interview 14 (Apr. 7, 2004); Civilian
interview 9 (Mar. 23, 2004); PANYNJ interview 7 (Jun. 2, 2004).
99. FDNY interview 40, Battalion 4 (Feb. 12, 2004); FDNY interview 16, Battalion 1
(Jan. 20, 2004); FDNY interview 24, Battalion 6 (Jan. 23, 2004); FDNY interview 29,
Battalion 1 (Jan. 29, 2004); NYPD interview 6, ESU (Feb. 19, 2004); NYPD interview
10, ESU (Mar. 1, 2004); FDNY interview, transcript 10, Battalion 2, Dec. 6, 2001.
100. Civilian interview 7 (Mar. 22, 2004); Civilian interview 6 (Mar. 22, 2004); PAPD
interview 4, Port Authority Bus Terminal Command (Nov. 20, 2003); NYPD interview 10,
ESU (Mar. 1, 2004). For people killed by debris, see, e.g., WTC interview 9 (June 8,
2004).
101. FDNY records, computer-aided dispatch report, alarm box 8087, Sept. 11, 2001,
09:10:02; FDNY interview 45, HQ (Mar. 8, 2004).
102. For the 23 engines and 13 ladders dispatched, see FDNY records, computer-aided
dispatch report, Sept. 11, 2001, 09:08:28-09:15:00. For units that self-dispatched,
see FDNY interview 60, HQ (May 11, 2004); FDNY report, McKinsey & Company,
"FDNY Report,"Aug.19,2002, p. 35. For units riding heavy, see ibid., p.131; FDNY
interview 25, Battalion 1 (Jan. 23, 2004); FDNY interview 21, Battalion 1 (Jan. 22,
2004); FDNY interview 7, Battalion 4 (Jan. 9, 2004); FDNY interview 9, Battalion 8
(Jan. 9, 2004); FDNY interview 50, Battalion 11 (Mar. 17, 2004); FDNY interview 31,
Battalion 1 (Jan. 30, 2004); FDNY interview 34, Battalion 1 (Feb. 9, 2004). For
extra personnel being a particular issue for SOC companies, see FDNY report, 9/11
fatalities list. For firefighters responding when told not to, see FDNY interview
46, Battalion 10 (Mar. 9, 2004). For firefighters responding from firehouses
separately from the on-duty unit, see FDNY interview 46, Battalion 10 (Mar. 9,
2004); FDNY interview, transcript 26, Battalion 2, Jan. 16, 2002; FDNY interview,
transcript 14, Battalion 32, Dec. 12, 2001; FDNY interview, transcript 19, Battalion
2, Jan. 8, 2002. For firefighters responding from home, see FDNY interview 14,
Battalion 1 (Jan. 13, 2004); FDNY interview 17, Battalion 6 (Jan. 22, 2004); FDNY
interview 19, Battalion 4 (Jan. 22, 2004); FDNY interview, transcript 6, Battalion 6
(Oct. 12, 2001); FDNY interview 11, Battalion 1 (Jan. 13, 2004); FDNY interview,
transcript 2, Battalion 2, Oct. 9, 2001. For numerous additional FDNY personnel
reporting, see FDNY interview 3, Chief (Jan. 7, 2004); FDNY interview 8, Fire
Marshall (Jan. 9, 2004).
103. FDNY interview 15, Chief (Jan. 14, 2004); Jules Naudet and Gedeon Naudet, video
footage, Sept. 11, 2001.
104. For FDNY personnel requesting the repeater's activation, see FDNY interview 4,
Chief (Jan. 8, 2004). For one button on the repeater channel being activated, see
PANYNJ interview 1 (Nov. 6, 2003); PANYNJ interview 4 (May 10, 2004); Port Authority
records, measurements of repeater activation tones on Sept. 11,2001, undated. For it
being unclear who triggered activation, see WTC interview 6 (May 25, 2004). For the
mechanics of activating the repeater, see PANYNJ interview 1 (Nov. 6, 2003); PANYNJ
interview 4 (May 10, 2004).
105. For the testing of the repeater system, see Port Authority recording, WTC
channel 30 (repeater channel), Sept. 11,2001. For the master handset not being able
to transmit, see PANYNJ interview 1 (Nov. 6, 2003); PANYNJ interview 4 (May 10,
2004); Port Authority records, measurements of repeater activation tones on Sept.
11, 2001, undated. For the chief on the handset not being able to hear, see Port
Authority recording, WTC channel 30 (repeater channel), Sept. 11, 2001. On why he
could not hear, see PANYNJ interview 1 (Nov. 6, 2003); PANYNJ interview 4 (May 10,
2004). For the repeater channel being in use in the South Tower, see Port Authority
recording, WTC channel 30 (repeater channel), Sept. 11, 2001.
106. FDNY interview 15, Chief (Jan. 14, 2004); FDNY interview 4, Chief (Jan. 8,
2004); FDNY interview 5, Chief (Dec. 16, 2003). For the quotation, see Joseph
Pfeifer testimony, May 18, 2004 (videotaped).
107. Peter Hayden testimony, May 18, 2004 (videotaped).
108. FDNY interview 15, Chief (Jan. 14, 2004); FDNY interview 4, Chief (Jan. 8,
2004); FDNY interview 5, Chief (Dec. 16, 2003).
109. On units ascending to the impact zone, see, e.g., FDNY interview 16, Battalion 1
(Jan. 20, 2004); FDNY interview 40, Battalion 4 (Feb. 12, 2004). On tasks below the
impact zone, see FDNY interview 9, Battalion 8 (Jan. 9, 2004); FDNY interview,
transcript 16, Battalion 31, Dec. 20, 2001. For rescuing civilians on the 22nd
floor, see PANYNJ recognition 1, undated.
110. See FDNY interview 58, Division 3 (Apr. 22, 2004). For units using tactical 1,
see FDNY interview 15, Chief (Jan. 14, 2004); FDNY interview 40, Battalion 4 (Feb.
12, 2004); FDNY interview 23, Chief (Jan. 23, 2004).
111. See FDNY interview 29, Battalion 1 (Jan. 29, 2004); FDNY interview 16, Battalion
1 (Jan. 20, 2004); Jules Naudet and Gedeon Naudet, video footage, Sept. 11, 2001.
For equipment being carried, see ibid.
112. FDNY interview 38 , Battalion 4 (Feb. 11, 2004). For the working elevator, see
FDNY interview 23, Chief (Jan. 23, 2004).
113. FDNY interview 38, Battalion 4 (Feb. 11, 2004); FDNY interview 25, Battalion 1
(Jan. 23, 2004); FDNY interview 40, Battalion 4 (Feb. 12, 2004); FDNY interview 24,
Battalion 6 (Jan. 23, 2004); FDNY interview 10, Battalion 1 (Jan. 12, 2004); FDNY
interview 20, Battalion 6 (Jan. 22, 2004).
114. FDNY interview 23, Chief (Jan. 23, 2004); FDNY interview 30, Battalion 4 (Jan.
30, 2004); FDNY interview 13, Battalion 1 (Jan. 13, 2004); FDNY interview 29,
Battalion 1 (Jan. 29, 2004); FDNY interview 26, Battalion 8 (Jan. 28, 2004).
115. FDNY interview 40, Battalion 4 (Feb. 12, 2004); FDNY interview 20, Battalion 6
(Jan. 22, 2004); FDNY interview 16, Battalion 1 (Jan. 20, 2004); FDNY interview 29,
Battalion 1 (Jan. 29, 2004); FDNY interview 13, Battalion 1 (Jan. 13, 2004); NYPD
interview 6, ESU (Feb. 19, 2004); FDNY interview 23, Chief (Jan. 23, 2004); FDNY
interview 25, Battalion 1 (Jan. 23, 2004).
116. For the instruction to return to the lobby, see FDNY interview 5, Chief (Dec.
16, 2003); Jules Naudet and Gedeon Naudet video footage, Sept. 11,2001. For the
rumor being debunked, the other chief continuing operations, and no evidence of
units returning, see Jules Naudet and Gedeon Naudet, video footage, Sept. 11, 2001;
FDNY interview 15, Chief (Jan. 14, 2004). For the chief in lobby asked about
helicopters, see FDNY interview, transcript 7, Chief, Oct. 23, 2001. For the
rejection of helicopters, see Rudolph Giuliani interview (Apr. 20, 2004).
117. For the diminished communications, see FDNY interview 29, Battalion 1 (Jan. 29,
2004); FDNY interview, transcript 5, Battalion 6 (Oct. 12, 2001); FDNY interview 42,
Field Comm (Feb. 13, 2004); Jules Naudet and Gedeon Naudet, video footage, Sept. 11,
2001; FDNY interview 15, Chief (Jan. 14, 2004); FDNY interview 5, Chief (Dec. 16,
2003). For lobby chiefs hearing nothing in response, see FDNY interview 15, Chief
(Jan. 14, 2004); FDNY interview 5, Chief (Dec. 16, 2003).
118. For firefighters on the 54th floor, see NYPD interview 23, Intelligence (June
10, 2004). For firefighters on the 44th floor, see PAPD interview 7, WTC Command
(Nov. 25, 2004). For firefighters between the 5th and 37th floors, see, e.g., FDNY
interview 29, Battalion 1 (Jan. 29, 2004); FDNY interview 40, Battalion 4 (Feb. 12,
2004).
119. For their commencing operations, see Port Authority recording, WTC channel 30
(repeater channel), Sept. 11, 2001. For OEM field responder joining, see OEM
interview 1 (Feb. 12, 2004). For units not rerouting to South Tower, see OEM
interview 1 (Feb. 12, 2004); Port Authority recording, WTC channel 30 (repeater
channel), Sept. 11, 2001; FDNY interview, transcript 4, Battalion 4, Oct. 9, 2001;
FDNY interview, transcript 20, Battalion 10 (Jan. 10, 2001).
120. For the ladder company in stairwell B, see Port Authority recording, WTC channel
30 (repeater channel), Sept. 11, 2001. For the other ladder company, see OEM
interview 1 (Feb. 12, 2004). For the senior chief 's perspective, see Port Authority
recording, WTC channel 30 (repeater channel), Sept. 11, 2001.
121. Port Authority recording, WTC channel 30 (repeater channel), Sept. 11, 2001.
122. For the chiefs' situational awareness, see Port Authority recording, WTC channel
30 (repeater channel), Sept. 11, 2001; FDNY interview 4, Chief (Jan. 8, 2004); FDNY
15, Chief (Jan. 14, 2004); FDNY interview 43, Chief (Mar. 3, 2004). For the senior
chief 's perspective, see Port Authority recording, WTC channel 30 (repeater
channel), Sept. 11, 2001.
123. Port Authority recording, WTC channel 30 (repeater channel), Sept. 11, 2001. It
is unknown whether the lobby chief ceased to communicate on the repeater channel
because of technical problems or because he simply switched channels in order to be
able to communicate with chiefs outside the South Tower. The FDNY strongly maintains
that there must have been a technical problem resulting from the impact of one of
the planes, because they do not believe this chief would have switched channels
without first so advising on the repeater channel. FDNY letter to the Commission,
July, 2, 2004. However, the repeater channel subsequently worked very well for FDNY
personnel on the 78th floor and in an elevator on the 40th floor. Port Authority
recording, WTC channel 30 (repeater channel), Sept. 11, 2001.
124. FDNY interview 37, Battalion 35 (Feb. 10, 2004); FDNY interview 2, Battalion 48
(Dec. 15, 2003); FDNY interview, transcript 11, Battalion 32, Dec. 12, 2001.
125. On the need for more companies, see FDNY interview 6, HQ (Jan. 8, 2004). For
only two units being dispatched, see OEM interview 1 (Feb. 12, 2004); Port Authority
recording, WTC channel 30 (repeater channel), Sept. 11, 2001; FDNY interview,
transcript 4, Battalion 4, Oct. 9, 2001; FDNY interview, transcript 20, Battalion
10, Jan. 10, 2001. For the delayed dispatch, see FDNY records, computer-aided
dispatch report, alarm box 8087, Sept. 11, 2001, 09:03:00-09:10:02. For units staged
at the Brooklyn-Battery tunnel, see ibid., alarm box 1377, Sept. 11, 2001,
08:52:59-09:47:05. On units who parked and walked, see FDNY interview 46, Battalion
10 (Mar. 9, 2004); FDNY interview, transcript 24, Battalion 35, Jan. 25, 2002; FDNY
interview, transcript 22, Battalion 7, Jan. 16, 2002. For confusion about the
towers, see FDNY interview, transcript 8, Chief, Oct. 23, 2001; Port Authority
recording, WTC channel 30 (repeater channel), Sept. 11, 2001. On the inability to
find the staging area, see FDNY interview 2, Battalion 48 (Dec. 15, 2003); FDNY
interview, transcript 17, Battalion 12, Dec. 20, 2001. On jumpers and debris, see
FDNY interview 2, Battalion 48 (Dec. 15, 2003); FDNY interview 22, Battalion 28
(Jan. 22, 2004); FDNY interview 39, Battalion 35 (Feb. 11, 2004); FDNY interview,
transcript 11, Battalion 32, Dec. 12, 2001; FDNY interview, transcript 15, Battalion
48, Dec. 13, 2001; FDNY interview, transcript 17, Battalion 12, Dec. 20, 2001.
126. For the chief 's perspective, see FDNY interview 43, Chief (Mar. 3, 2004). For
the four companies, see FDNY interview, transcript 13, Battalion 11, Dec. 12, 2001.
127. FDNY interview 43, Chief (Mar.3, 2004). For finding working elevator in
NorthTower, see FDNY interview 53, Battalion 11 (Apr. 14, 2004).
128. For the second alarm, see FDNY interview 6, HQ (Jan. 8, 2004). For the other
units, see FDNY records, computer-aided dispatch report, alarm box 1377, Sept.
11,2001,09:42:45-09:47:05. For some having gone through the tunnel and responded to
the Marriott, see FDNY interview, transcript 15, Battalion 48, Dec. 13, 2001.
129. Port Authority recording, WTC channel 30 (repeater channel), Sept. 11, 2001.
130. FDNY interview 42, Field Comm (Feb. 13, 2004); FDNY interview 45, HQ (Mar.8,
2004); FDNY interview 46, Battalion 10 (Mar. 9, 2004); FDNY interview 18, Chief
(Jan. 22, 2004); FDNY interview 27, HQ (Jan. 28, 2004); FDNY interview 47, Chief
(Mar. 11, 2004); OEM interview 6 (Mar. 24, 2004).
131. FDNY interview 42, Field Comm (Feb. 13, 2004).
132. Ibid.
133. FDNY interview 27, HQ (Jan. 28, 2004).
134. For no chief fearing a total collapse, see FDNY interview 45, HQ (Mar. 8, 2004);
Thomas Von Essen interview (Apr. 7, 2004); FDNY interview 52, Chief (Apr. 5, 2004);
FDNY interview 4, Chief (Jan. 8, 2004); FDNY interview 15, Chief (Jan. 14, 2004);
FDNY interview 5, Chief (Dec. 16, 2003). For one chief 's perspective, see FDNY
interview 52, Chief (Apr.5, 2004). For the opinion not being conveyed, see FDNY
interview 4, Chief (Jan. 8, 2004); FDNY interview 15, Chief (Jan. 14, 2004); FDNY
interview 5, Chief (Dec. 16, 2003).
135. FDNY interview 5, Chief (Dec. 16, 2003).
136. For the fifth alarm, see FDNY records, computer-aided dispatch report, alarm box
2033, Sept. 11, 2001, 09:54:29. On numbers dispatched, see ibid., Sept.
11,2001,08:47:20-09:54:29. For the paramedic, see FDNY interview 32, Chief (Feb. 9,
2004).
137. NYPD interview 8, HQ (Feb. 24, 2004). Each Level 4 mobilization fields about
1,000 officers.
138. NYPD interview 8, HQ (Feb. 24, 2004).
139. NYPD interview 15, ESU (Mar. 11, 2004); NYPD interview 18, ESU (Feb. 24, 2004).
140. For the ESU team's arrival in the North Tower and attempt to talk with the FDNY
chiefs without OEM intervention, see Jules Naudet and Gedeon Naudet, video footage,
Sept. 11, 2001; NYPD interview 5, ESU (Feb. 19, 2004); NYPD interview 6, ESU (Feb.
19, 2004). For the decision to have the ESU team ascend, see NYPD interview 15, ESU
(Mar. 11, 2004); NYPD interview 18, ESU (Feb. 24, 2004). For the first ESU team in
the South Tower checking in with the FDNY command post there, see OEM interview 1
(Feb. 12, 2004).
141. For the ESU teams' preparations and one team entering the South Tower, see NYPD
interview 15, ESU (Mar. 11, 2004); NYPD interview 18, ESU (Feb. 24, 2004). For the
fifth team's status at 9:59, see NYPD interview 15, ESU (Mar. 11, 2004); NYPD
interview 18, ESU (Feb. 24, 2004); NYPD interview 7, ESU (Feb. 20, 2004). For the
team at the North Tower, see NYPD interview 11, ESU (Mar. 9, 2004); NYPD interview
10, ESU (Mar. 1, 2004).
142. NYPD interview 6, ESU (Feb. 19, 2004).
143. New York City Police Museum interview of Kenneth Winkler, Apr. 17, 2003
(videotaped); NYPD interview 15, ESU (Mar. 11, 2004).
144. NYPD interview 22, Intelligence (June 10, 2004); NYPD interview 23, Intelligence
(June 10, 2004); NYPD interview 24, Intelligence (June 15, 2004).
145. NYPD interview 20, Manhattan SouthTask Force (May 4, 2004); NYPD interview 21,
6th Precinct (May 4, 2004); NYPD interview 19, 13th Precinct (May 4, 2004); NYPD
interview 4, Housing (Feb. 17, 2004); PAPD interview 4, Port Authority Bus Terminal
Command (Nov. 20, 2003).
146. NYPD interview 19, 13th Precinct (May 4, 2004); NYPD interview 2, Transit (Jan.
2, 2004).
147. For the instructions to civilians, see NYPD interview 3, HQ (Jan. 15, 2004). For
the officers at 5 WTC and the concourse, see NYPD memo, requests for departmental
recognition 3 and 5, June 26, 2002; NYPD memo, request for departmental recognition
3, June 26, 2002. For officers in the South Tower, see NYPD memo, request for
departmental recognition 6, June 26,2002; NYPD memo, request for departmental
recognition 4, June 26, 2002.
148. For the Chief of Department's instructions, see NYPD interview 8, HQ (Feb. 24,
2004). For the helicopter's perspective, see NYPD recordings, City Wide 1 and
Special Operations Division radio channels, Sept. 11, 2001. For pilot's belief and
the helicopter not hovering, see NYPD interview 12, Aviation (Mar. 10, 2004). For
the other helicopter, see NYPD interview 16, Aviation (Apr. 1, 2004); NYPD interview
1, Aviation (Sept. 26, 2003).
149. For the warning, see NYPD recording, Special Operations Division radio channel,
Sept. 11, 2001. For no pilot predicting a collapse, see, e.g., NYPD interview 12,
Aviation (Mar. 10, 2004); NYPD interview 14, Aviation (Mar. 11, 2004).
150. For the 911 call, see Commission analysis of 911/PAPD calls. For the inaccurate
conveyance, see NYPD report, McKinsey & Company, "NYPD Call-routing and
Message Dispatch: Draft Summary Report,"July 23, 2002.
151. For the initial responders and the assignments, see PAPD statement 3, WTC
Command, Nov. 12, 2001; PAPD statement 12, WTC Command, Mar. 28, 2002. For officers
assigned to rescue, see Port Authority transcripts of recorded Port Authority calls
and radio channels, Sept. 11, 2001, vol. II, channel W, p. 26. For others climbing
toward the impact zone, see PAPD statement 4, Administration Command, Nov. 24, 2001.
152. For the PAPD Superintendent and inspector's ascent, see PAPD statement 3, WTC
Command, Nov. 12, 2001. For the PAPD Chief 's and officers' ascent, see PANYNJ
statement 1, Feb. 1, 2002. For the calls to the PAPD desk, see Port Authority
transcripts of recorded Port Authority calls and radio channels, Sept. 11, 2001,
vol. II, channel 10, pp. 16-17.
153. For officers responding on their own initiative, see PAPD interview 8, JFK
Command (Mar. 31, 2004); PAPD statement 11, WTC Command, Mar. 28, 2002. For the
desk's instructions, see PAPD statement 10, Port Authority Bus Terminal Command,
Mar. 20, 2002; PAPD interview 3, LaGuardia Command (Nov. 20, 2003). For formulating
an ad hoc plan, see PAPD interview 3, LaGuardia Command (Nov. 20, 2003); PAPD
statement 6, Port Authority Bus Terminal Command, Jan. 4, 2002. For poor situational
awareness, see PAPD statement 7, Administrative Command, Jan. 6, 2002; PAPD
interview 8, JFK Command (Mar. 31, 2004). For the lack of equipment, see PAPD
interview 9, LaGuardia Command (Apr. 1, 2004); PAPD statement 13, Port Newark
Command, Mar. 5, 2002.
154. On the PAPD officer reaching the 44th floor, see PAPD interview 7, WTC Command
(Nov. 25, 2003). For the PAPD teams, see PAPD, statement 4, Administrative Command,
Nov. 24, 2001; PAPD interview 1, WTC Command (Oct. 14, 2003). For the officers
climbing, see PAPD statement 3, WTC Command, Nov. 12, 2001. For officers on the
ground floors, see PAPD interview 4, Port Authority BusTerminal Command (Nov. 20,
2003); PAPD interview 2, Holland Tunnel Command (Oct. 27, 2003); PAPD statement 2,
WTC Command, Nov. 10, 2001.
155. On remaining in the bunker, see OEM interview 3 (Mar. 16, 2004). For the
evacuation order, see OEM interview 4 (Mar. 18, 2004). On liaisons and OEM, see OEM
interview 3 (Mar. 16, 2004). For field responders' placement, see OEM interview 6
(Mar. 24, 2004); OEM interview 1 (Feb. 12, 2004); Richard Sheirer interview (Apr. 7,
2004); OEM interview 7 (Mar. 31, 2004); FDNY interview, transcript 25, OEM, Oct. 17,
2001.
156. NIST report, "Progress Report on the Federal Building and Fire Safety
Investigation of the WTC," June 18, 2004, appendix H, p. 40.
157. For information about 911 calls, see Commission analysis of 911/PAPD calls. For
people alive on the 92nd and 79th floors, see ibid.; Civilian interview 5 (May 26,
2004). For civilians being assisted, see PAPD interview 4, Port Authority Bus
Terminal Command (Nov. 6, 2004); NYPD interview 10, ESU (Mar. 1, 2004); FDNY
interview, transcript 10, Battalion 2, Dec. 6, 2001. For injured civilians being
assisted, see FDNY interview, transcript 10, Battalion 2, Dec. 6, 2001; FDNY
interview 40, Battalion 4 (Feb. 12, 2004); PAPD interview 6, Lincoln Tunnel Command
(Nov. 24, 2003).
158. For the overall command post, see FDNY interview 52, Chief (Apr. 5, 2004). For
the North Tower lobby, see FDNY interview 4, Chief (Jan. 8, 2004). For South Tower
staging, see FDNY interview 6, HQ (Jan. 8, 2004). For EMS staging areas, see FDNY
interview 32, Chief (Feb. 9, 2004); FDNY interview 35, EMS (Feb. 10, 2004).
159. For situational awareness in North Tower lobby, see FDNY interview 15, Chief
(Jan. 14, 2004). For overall command post, see FDNY interview 52, Chief (Apr. 5,
2004).
160. For the collapse's effect on the firefighters, see FDNY interview 29, Battalion
1 (Jan. 29, 2004); FDNY interview 40, Battalion 4 (Feb. 12, 2004); FDNY interview
25, Battalion 1 (Jan. 23, 2004); FDNY interview 24, Battalion 6 (Jan. 23, 2004);
FDNY interview 23, Chief (Jan. 23, 2004); FDNY interview 16, Battalion 1 (Jan. 20,
2004). For the reaction of firefighters not facing the south, see FDNY interview 7,
Battalion 4 (Jan.9, 2004); FDNY interview 10, Battalion 1 (Jan. 12, 2004); FDNY
interview 12, Battalion 4 (Jan. 13, 2004); FDNY interview 26, Battalion 8 (Jan. 28,
2004); FDNY interview 29, Battalion 1 (Jan. 29, 2004); FDNY interview 16, Battalion
1 (Jan. 20, 2004).
161. It is possible that the repeater channel satellite on the roof of 5 WTC was
damaged or destroyed when the South Tower collapsed. That the repeater channel
stopped recording transmissions at 9:59 does not mean transmissions no longer could
be made on it.
162. For the FDNY boat radioing of the collapse, see FDNY recording, FDNY Manhattan
Dispatch Channel, Sept. 11, 2001. For the van being abandoned, see FDNY interview
42, Field Comm (Feb. 13, 2004). For the order one minute after the collapse, see
FDNY interview 4, Chief (Jan. 8, 2004); Jules Naudet and Gedeon Naudet, video
footage, Sept. 11, 2001. For the subsequent order, see FDNY interview 40, Battalion
4 (Feb. 12, 2004).
163. For evacuation instructions, our analysis is based on more than 100 interviews
we conducted and our review of 500 internal FDNY interview transcripts. For three
firefighters hearing "imminent collapse," see FDNY interview, transcript 20,
Battalion 10, Jan. 10,2002; FDNY interview, transcript 23, Battalion 7, Jan.
21,2002; FDNY interview, transcript 21, Battalion 8, Jan. 9, 2002.
164. For firefighters hearing orders over tactical 1, see, e.g., FDNY interview 40,
Battalion 4 (Feb. 12, 2004); FDNY interview 29, Battalion 1 (Jan. 29, 2004). For one
chief giving the instruction, see FDNY interview 23, Chief (Jan. 23, 2004).
165. For the chief on the 35th floor and the first instruction, see FDNY interview
23, Chief (Jan. 23, 2004). For the chief on the 23rd floor, see FDNY interview 29,
Battalion 1 (Jan. 29, 2004); FDNY interview 16, Battalion 1 (Jan. 20, 2004). For the
chief on the 35th floor hearing of the South Tower collapse and taking subsequent
action, see FDNY interview 23, Chief (Jan. 23, 2004). For firefighters beginning to
evacuate because of these chiefs, see, e.g., FDNY interview 16, Battalion 1 (Jan.
20, 2004); FDNY interview, transcript 9, Battalion 6, Dec. 5, 2001.
166. For radios not working in high-rise environments, see FDNY interview 9,
Battalion 8 (Jan. 9,2004); FDNY interview 13, Battalion 1 (Jan. 13, 2004). For
tactical 1 being overburdened, see FDNY interview 16, Battalion 1 (Jan. 20, 2004).
For the quotation, see FDNY interview, transcript 9, Battalion 6, Dec. 5, 2001.
167. For off-duty firefighters in the North Tower, see NYPD interview 6, ESU (Feb.
19, 2004); FDNY interview 24, Battalion 6 (Jan. 23, 2004). For firefighters
dispatched to the South Tower, see FDNY interview 53, Battalion 11 (Apr. 14, 2004);
FDNY interview, transcript 20, Battalion 10, Jan. 10, 2001.
168. For units stopping or delaying evacuation to help, see FDNY interview 40,
Battalion 4 (Feb. 12, 2004); FDNY interview 59, Battalion 2 (Apr. 22, 2004); FDNY
interview, transcript 3, Battalion 2, Oct. 9, 2001; FDNY interview, transcript 5,
Battalion 6, Oct. 12, 2001. For companies first trying to regroup, see FDNY
interview, transcript 3, Battalion 2, Oct. 9, 2001; FDNY interview, transcript 4,
Battalion 4, Oct. 9, 2001. For the lack of urgency, see FDNY interview 57, SOC (Apr.
15, 2004); FDNY interview 25, Battalion 1 (Jan. 23, 2004); FDNY interview 16,
Battalion 1(Jan. 20, 2004); FDNY interview, transcript 9, Battalion 6, Dec. 5, 2001;
FDNY interview, transcript 4, Battalion 4, Oct. 9, 2001; FDNY interview, transcript
3, Battalion 2, Oct. 9, 2001. For the belief that urgency would have increased on
learning of the South Tower's collapse, see FDNY interview, transcript 9, Battalion
6, Dec. 5, 2001; FDNY interview, transcript 5, Battalion 6, Oct. 12, 2001. For
firefighters sitting and not evacuating, see FDNY interview 16, Battalion 1 (Jan.
20, 2004); NY State Court interview 1 (June 22, 2004). For firefighters not leaving
while others remained and convincing others to stay with them, see FDNY interview,
transcript 4, Battalion 4, Oct. 9, 2001; FDNY interview 57, SOC (Apr. 15, 2004).
169. FDNY interview 57, SOC (Apr. 15, 2004); FDNY interview 55, Battalion 8 (Apr. 15,
2004); FDNY interview, transcript 9, Battalion 6, Dec. 5, 2001; FDNY interview 59,
Battalion 2 (Apr. 22, 2004); FDNY interview 10, Battalion 1 (Jan. 12, 2004); FDNY
interview 7, Battalion 4 (Jan. 9, 2004); FDNY interview 13, Battalion 1 (Jan. 13,
2004); FDNY interview 23, Chief (Jan. 23, 2004); FDNY interview 26, Battalion 8
(Jan. 28, 2004); FDNY interview 12, Battalion 4 (Jan. 13, 2004).
170. FDNY interview 59, Battalion 2 (Apr. 22, 2004).
171. For hotel's damage, see Jules Naudet and Gedeon Naudet, video footage, Sept. 11,
2001. For individuals in the lobby, see FDNY interview 43, Chief (Mar. 3, 2004);
FDNY interview 36, Chief (Feb. 10, 2004); FDNY interview 1, Chief (Mar. 26, 2004).
On assisting the civilians, see FDNY interview 43, Chief (Mar. 3, 2004). For the
line of 20 men and the 4 survivors, see FDNY interview, transcript 13, Battalion 11,
Dec. 12, 2001.
172. For the two companies and their actions, see FDNY interview 22, Battalion 28
(Jan. 22, 2004); FDNY interview 37, Battalion 35 (Feb. 10, 2004); FDNY interview 39,
Battalion 35 (Feb. 11, 2004); FDNY interview 41, Battalion 35 (Feb. 12, 2004); FDNY
interview, transcript 12, Battalion 35, Dec. 12, 2001. For the PAPD having cleared
the area, see PAPD statement 3, WTC command, Nov. 12, 2001. For FDNY personnel
checking the area afterward, see FDNY interview, transcript 12, Battalion 35, Dec.
12, 2001.
173. For the senior leaders confirming the collapse, and the Chief of Department
issuing a radio order, see FDNY interview 52, Chief (Apr. 5, 2004). For his ordering
the post's relocation and two companies to respond, see FDNY interview 45, HQ (Mar.
8, 2004).
174. For the chiefs' delay in learning of the collapse, see FDNY interview 4, Chief
(Jan. 8, 2004); FDNY interview 56, Chief (Apr. 23, 2004). On one chief 's view of
the North Tower, see FDNY interview 51 (Apr. 2, 2004); FDNY interview 36, Chief
(Feb. 10, 2004).
175. For firefighters' actions after the collapse, see FDNY interview 49, Chief (Mar.
17, 2004); FDNY interview 52, Chief (Apr. 5, 2004); FDNY interview 36, Chief (Feb.
10, 2004); FDNY interview 45, HQ (Mar. 8, 2004); FDNY interview 51 (Apr. 2, 2004);
FDNY interview 22, Battalion 28 (Jan. 22, 2004); FDNY interview 1, Chief (Mar. 26,
2004); FDNY interview, transcript 1, Battalion 7, Jan. 28, 2001; FDNY interview,
transcript 12, Battalion 35, Dec. 12, 2001. For some not knowing about the collapse
but others knowing and remaining to help, see FDNY interview 49, Chief (Mar. 17,
2004); FDNY interview 52, Chief (Apr. 5, 2004); FDNY interview 36, Chief (Feb. 10,
2004); FDNY interview 45, HQ (Mar. 8, 2004). For the quotation, see FDNY interview
49, Chief (Mar. 17, 2004). For the firefighter directing those exiting, see FDNY
interview 29, Battalion 1 (Jan. 29, 2004); FDNY interview 24, Battalion 6 (Jan. 23,
2004). For the using a bullhorn, see FDNY interview 52, Chief (Apr. 5, 2004). For
the three senior members' actions, see FDNY interview 51 (Apr. 2, 2004).
176. NYPD recordings, City Wide 1 and Special Operations Division radio channels,
Sept. 11, 2001; see also NYPD interview 12, Aviation (Mar. 10, 2004); NYPD interview
14, Aviation (Mar. 11, 2004); NYPD interview 13, Aviation (Mar. 10, 2004); NYPD
interview 16, Aviation (Apr. 1, 2004).
177. NYPD recordings, City Wide 1, Special Operations Division, and Divisions 1, 2,
and 3 radio channels, Sept. 11, 2001; NPYD interview 15, ESU (Mar. 11, 2004); NYPD
interview 18, ESU (Feb. 24, 2004).
178. For the ESU teams' situational awareness, see, e.g., NYPD interview 5, ESU (Feb.
19, 2004); NYPD interview 6, ESU (Feb. 19, 2004). For the evacuation order, see NYPD
interview 15, ESU (Mar. 11, 2004); NYPD interview 18, ESU (Feb. 24, 2004).
179. For the message being clearly heard, see, e.g., NYPD interview 5, ESU (Feb. 19,
2004); NYPD interview 6, ESU (Feb. 19, 2004). For the subsequent exchange, see NYPD
interview 6, ESU (Feb. 19, 2004); NYPD interview 5, ESU (Feb. 19, 2004); NYPD
interview 15, ESU (Mar. 11, 2004); NYPD interview 18, ESU (Feb. 24, 2004).
180. For the ESU team's perspective, see NYPD interview 5, ESU (Feb. 19, 2004); NYPD
interview 6, ESU (Feb. 19, 2004). For a firefighter stating he would not take
instructions from the NYPD, see FDNY interview 38, Battalion 4 (Feb. 11, 2004). For
a firefighter alleging that ESU officers passed him without sharing evacuation
instruction, see FDNY interview 57, SOC (Apr. 15, 2004). A member of the only ESU
team that this firefighter could have encountered above the 11th floor states that
his team did share its evacuation instruction with firefighters it encountered. NYPD
interview 6, ESU (Feb. 19, 2004).
181. NYPD interview 11, ESU (Mar. 9, 2004); NYPD interview 10, ESU (Mar. 1, 2004).
182. NYPD interview 7, ESU (Feb. 20, 2004); NYPD interview 15, ESU (Mar. 11, 2004);
NYPD interview 18, ESU (Feb. 24, 2004).
183. NYPD interview 22, Intelligence (June 10, 2004); NYPD interview 23, Intelligence
(June 10, 2004); NYPD interview 24, Intelligence (June 15, 2004).
184. NYPD interview 20, Manhattan SouthTask Force (May 4, 2004); NYPD interview 21,
6th Precinct (May 4, 2004); NYPD interview 4, Housing (Feb. 17, 2004); PAPD
interview 4, Port Authority Bus Terminal Command (Nov. 20, 2003).
185. For officers being in the concourse, see NYPD recordings, City Wide 1, Special
Operations Division, and Divisions 1, 2, and 3 radio channels, Sept. 11, 2001. For
the survivors' actions, see NYPD memo, requests for departmental recognition 3, 4, 5
and 6, June 26, 2002; NYPD interview 19, 13th Precinct (May 4, 2004); NYPD interview
2, Transit (Jan. 2, 2004).
186. For the collapse's effect, see PAPD interview 3, LaGuardia Command (Nov. 20,
2003). For officers not receiving the evacuation order, see PAPD interview 7, WTC
Command (Nov. 25, 2003); PAPD interview 5, Lincoln Tunnel Command (Nov. 24, 2003).
For officers deciding to evacuate, see PAPD interview 10, GW Bridge Command (Sept.
25, 2003); PAPD statement 5, Lincoln Tunnel Command (Dec. 10, 2001). For officers
slowing their descent, see PAPD interview 10, GW Bridge Command (Sept. 25, 2003).
187. For the North Tower collapsing at 10:28:25, see NIST report, "Progress Report on
the Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the WTC," June 18, 2004,
appendix H, p. 40. For those in stairwell B who survived the North Tower's collapse,
see FDNY report, Division 3 report on operations on Sept. 11, 2001, undated; Dennis
Cauchon and Martha Moore,"Miracles Emerge from Debris," USA Today, Sept. 6, 2002, p.
A1.
188. According to the number of death certificates issued by the New York City
Medical Examiner's Office, the WTC attacks killed 2,749 nonterrorists, including
nonterrorist occupants of the hijacked aircraft. New York City Office of the Chief
Medical Examiner report, "WTCVictim List," undated (as of July 9, 2004). The
Pentagon attack killed 184 nonterrorists, including the occupants of the hijacked
aircraft. FBI report, list of Pentagon victims, undated (as of July 9, 2004). Forty
nonterrorists died in the crash of United Airlines Flight 93 in Pennsylvania. FBI
report, list of Flight 93 victims, undated (as of July 9, 2004). Our conclusion that
these first responder death totals were the largest in U.S. history is based on our
inability to find contrary evidence. For FDNY fatalities, see FDNY report, September
11 tribute, undated (online at
www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/fdny/media/tribute/tribute.html). For PAPD fatalities, see
PAPD report,"In Memoriam," undated (online at www.panynj.gov/AboutthePortAuthority
/PortAuthorityPolice/InMemoriam/). For NYPD fatalities, see NYPD report,"NYPD
Memorial: 2001 Heroes," undated (online at
www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/nypd/html/memorial_01.html).
189. Rudolph Giuliani interview (Apr. 20, 2004); OEM interview 3 (Mar. 16, 2004);
Richard Sheirer interview (Apr. 7, 2004); Thomas Von Essen interview (Apr. 7, 2004);
Bernard Kerik interview (Apr. 6, 2004).
190. The Incident Command System (ICS) is a formalized management structure for
command, control, and coordination during an emergency response. ICS provides a
means to coordinate the efforts of individual agencies as they work toward the three
main priorities of most emergencies-life safety, incident stability, and
property/environment conservation. Within ICS, incident command is organized into
five major components: the command function, the planning section, the operations
section, the logistics section, and the finance/administration section. When
multiple agencies or jurisdictions are involved in a response, ICS provides for and
can evolve into a unified command, with a decisionmaker from each key agency
represented at the incident command level. For the system being used on 9/11, see,
e.g., Arlington County, Virginia, report, Titan Systems Corp., "Arlington County:
After-Action Report on the Response to the September 11 Terrorist Attack on the
Pentagon," 2002, pp. 11, A-20-A-21.
191. Grant C. Peterson, "Introduction: Arlington County and the After-Action Report,"
July 28, 2003 (presented at conference in Arlington, Va.,"Local Response to
Terrorism: Lessons Learned from the 9/11 Attack on the Pentagon").
192. For the death toll, see FBI report, list of Pentagon victims, undated. For
patient care and victim disposition, see Arlington County, "After-Action Report,"
pp. B-1, B-12-B-15.
193. For reasons the response was mainly a success, see Arlington County,
"After-Action Report," pp. 11-12; Edward Plaugher interview (Oct. 16, 2003). For
preparations for the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank meetings, see
"Washington Is Seeking Support to Handle Protests at 2 Meetings," New York Times,
Aug. 18, 2001, p. A8; Arlington County,"After-Action Report," pp. 12, A-4, C-26.
194. For a list of the response agencies, see James Schwartz and Christopher Combs,
"Incident Command, Joint Operations Center and Incident Communications," July 28,
2003 (presented at conference in Arlington, Va.,"Local Response to Terrorism:
Lessons Learned from the 9/11 Attack on the Pentagon"). When the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms moved from the Department of the Treasury to the Department of
Justice after 9/11 in connection with the creation of DHS, it was renamed the Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (still abbreviated ATF); see ATF press
release,"ATF Moves to the Department of Justice," Jan. 24, 2003.
195. For the establishment of incident command on September 11, see Arlington County,
"After-Action Report," appendix 1, p. 1-1; Schwartz and Combs,"Incident Command."
196. Arlington County, "After-Action Report," appendix 1, p. 1-1. Other sources put
the time of the partial collapse as late as 10:14. See Edward P. Plaugher,"Fire
& EMS," July 28, 2003 (presented at conference in Arlington, Va.,"Local
Response to Terrorism: Lessons Learned from the 9/11 Attack on the Pentagon").
197. Ibid., pp. A-30-A-31.
198. Edward A. Flynn, "Law Enforcement," July 28, 2003 (presented at conference in
Arlington, Va., on "Local Response to Terrorism: Lessons Learned from the 9/11
Attack on the Pentagon").
199. Arlington County, "After-Action Report," pp. 12-13.
200. For the estimate, see NIST report, "WTC Investigation Progress," June 22-23,
2004. For the updated death certificate information, see New York City report,"WTC
Victim List," June 21, 2004. The analysis in this paragraph is based upon the
following sources: CNN, "September 11: A Memorial," updated 2004 (online at
www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/memorial/index.html); company contacts, June 29, 2004
(online at http://worldtradeaftermath.com/wta/contacts/companies_list.asp?
letter=a); CNN, WTC tenants, 2001 (online at
www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/trade.center/tenants1.html); September 11 personal
tributes, June 19, 2004 (online at www.legacy.com/LegacyTribute/Sept11.asp);
September 11 personal profiles, Oct. 11, 2003 (online at
www.september11victims.com/september11Victims); New York Times, Portraits: 9/11/01:
The Collected "Portraits of Grief" (Times Books, 2002). It is possible that a person
who worked above the impact zone had not yet reached his or her office and was
killed below the impact zone, either by falling debris, by the fireballs that
exploded into the lobby, or by being trapped in an elevator. Individuals below the
impact zone may have been killed for the same reasons. Individuals may also have
been killed while in the process of evacuating.
201. Ironically, had the towers remained up longer, scores more first responders
would have died. Twenty-six additional FDNY companies-more than 150
firefighters-were en route at the time of the South Tower's collapse, and scores
more PAPD officers on Church and Vesey were preparing to enter the towers.
202. The "advisory" announcement directed by protocol (without the expanded
instruction for occupants to return to their floors) would have given greater leeway
to those who judged, based on a firsthand awareness of conditions on their floors
(e.g., some could feel heat from North Tower explosion), that evacuation was
warranted. In retrospect, occupants would only have had to reach a point below the
77th floor to be safe.
203. Appended to the directive was a list of different types of emergencies with
designated Incident Commanders. Terrorist incidents were subdivided according to the
types of attack. Conventional weapons and bomb threats were assigned to the NYPD,
while chemical, biological, and nuclear attacks designated "NYPD or FDNY" as the
Incident Commander. The directive noted:"The handling of a threat of a chemical or
biological release or the use of conventional weapons falls to the NYPD. Dealing
with the consequences of the explosion or release is the responsibility of the FDNY.
The investigation that follows, once the consequences of the event have been
mitigated, is the responsibility of the NYPD. Any conflicts regarding the issue of
Command at these incidents will be resolved by OEM." New York City memo, Office of
the Mayor,"Direction and Control of Emergencies in the City of New York," July 2001.
204. For the NYPD clearing lanes, see, e.g., FDNY interview 43, Chief (Mar. 3, 2004).
205. For the Mayor and Police Commissioner's consultation with the FDNY Chief of
Department, see Rudolph Giuliani interview (Apr. 20, 2004).
206. The FDNY's lack of command and control had some unintended positive
consequences. One battalion chief was dispatched to the South Tower but instead
responded to the North Tower, where he was instrumental in saving many lives after
the South Tower collapsed. Some FDNY units dispatched to the South Tower-where they
would have perished-instead were mistakenly sent to the North Tower and in many
cases survived.
207. For the FDNY addressing these issues, see generally FDNY report, McKinsey
& Company, "FDNY Report," Aug. 19, 2002; Peter Hayden interview (Jan. 14,
2004). For the PAPD not changing standard operating procedures or training, see PAPD
regulations,"Manual of Police Division Instructions,"undated (in existence before
and after 9/11); Barry Pickard interview (Nov. 24, 2003).
208. One instance in which the FDNY/NYPD rivalry may have had an impact on the total
fatalities was the alleged failure of ESU officers descending past at least two
firefighters after 9:59 in the North Tower to share their evacuation instructions.
It should be noted, however, that at least one firefighter has conceded that he,
too, descended past other stationary firefighters without telling them to evacuate.
In addition, according to one of the ESU officers and one of the firefighters in the
North Tower, at least some FDNY personnel were unwilling to take evacuation orders
from police that morning.
209. Based on more than 100 interviews we conducted and our review of 500 internal
FDNY interview transcripts, we conclude that out of these 32 companies, all on-duty
members of 19 companies are likely to have known to evacuate (Engine Companies 1, 4,
7, 9, 15, 16, 21, 24, 28, 33, 39, and 65; Ladder Companies 1, 5, 6, 8, 9, 110; and
Rescue 1). We also conclude that at least some members of each of five companies
knew to evacuate (two firefighters from Ladder Company 10; the officer of Ladder
Company 20; all but the officer of Engine Company 10; at least two firefighters from
Squad 18; and at least three firefighters from Engine 6). We do not know whether
members of the eight other companies knew to evacuate (Engine Companies 55, 207, and
226; Rescue 2, 3, and 4; Hazmat 1; and Squad 1) because they all died, and we have
come across no on-point eyewitness accounts related to their operations. It is very
possible that at least some of these firefighters did hear the evacuation order but
nevertheless failed to evacuate in the only 29-minute period between the collapse of
the two towers. In addition, it is possible that several of the eight companies for
which we have no record of their receiving evacuation instructions were in the South
Tower and thus died in its earlier collapse.
210. Eric Lipton, "A New Weapon for Firefighters," New York Times, May 30, 2004, p.
27. 10 Wartime
1. All times are Eastern Daylight Time. Sometime around 10:30, after the decision had
already been made not to return to Washington, a reported threat to "Angel"-the code
word for Air Force One-was widely disseminated in the Presidential Emergency
Operations Center (PEOC) and aboard Air Force One. Notes from the morning indicate
that Vice President Cheney informed President Bush in a phone conversation shortly
after 10:30 that an anonymous threat had been phoned into the White House that was
viewed as credible. At about the same time, news of the threat was conveyed on the
air threat conference call. The Secret Service's Intelligence Division tracked down
the origin of this threat and, during the day, determined that it had originated in
a misunderstanding by a watch officer in the White House Situation Room. The
director of the White House Situation Room that day disputes this account. But the
Intelligence Division had the primary job of running down the story, and we found
their witnesses on this point to be credible. During the afternoon of September 11
the leadership of the Secret Service was satisfied that the reported threat to
"Angel" was unfounded.
At the White House press briefing on September 12, spokesperson Ari Fleischer
described the threat to Air Force One as "real and credible." White House
transcript, Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer, Sept. 12, 2001 (online at
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/print/20010912-8.html). Fleischer told us
he cited the information in good faith. Indeed, Fleischer had conferred with Vice
President Cheney and Karen Hughes before the briefing, and they had decided to let
people know about the threat, all of them believing it was true. According to
Fleischer, only weeks later did he learn-from press reports-that the threat was
unfounded. We have not found any evidence that contradicts his account. Ari
Fleischer interview (Apr. 22, 2004); Chuck Green interview (Mar. 10, 2004); Deborah
Loewer meeting (Feb. 6, 2004); Ralph Sigler meeting (May 10, 2004); Andrew Card
meeting (Mar. 31, 2004); Edward Marinzel interview (Apr. 21, 2004); Secret Service
briefing (Jan. 29, 2004).
2. Edward Marinzel interview (Apr. 21, 2004); USSS memo, interview with Edward
Marinzel, Oct. 3, 2001; President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29,
2004); Ari Fleischer interview (Apr. 22, 2004); Deborah Loewer meeting (Feb. 6,
2004); White House record, PEOC Watch Log, Sept. 11, 2001.
3. Commission analysis of Air Force One radar data; Edward Marinzel interview (Apr.
21, 2004); USSS memo, interview with Edward Marinzel, Oct. 3, 2001; Deborah Loewer
meeting (Feb. 6, 2004).
4. White House record, Situation Room Communications Log, Sept. 11, 2001.
5. White House transcript, Rice interview with Bob Woodward of the Washington Post,
Oct. 24, 2001, p. 367. In the interview, Rice also said the President characterized
the war as "global in nature." Ibid.
6. See White House transcript, Rice interview with Scott Pelley of CBS, Aug. 2, 2002,
p. 408; but see Rice's statement to Bob Woodward:"In the first video conference, the
assumption that everybody kind of shared was that it was global terrorists. . . . I
don't believe anybody said this is likely al Qaeda. I don't think so." White House
transcript, Rice interview with Bob Woodward, Oct. 24, 2001, p. 367.
7. NSC memo, Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting (held by secure
teleconference), Sept. 11, 2001.
8. The Secretary's decision was broadcast on the air threat conference call at 10:43.
A minute later, Secretary Rumsfeld spoke to the Vice President, and he asked
Rumsfeld to run the issue by the President. At 10:45 conferees were told to "hold
off " on Defcon 3, but a minute later the order was reinstated. Rumsfeld believed
the matter was urgent and, having consulted DOD directives, concluded he had the
authority to issue the order and would brief the President. Rumsfeld briefed the
President on the decision at 11:15. See DOD transcript, Air Threat Conference Call,
Sept. 11, 2001; Stephen Cambone interviews (July 8, 2004; July 12, 2004); DOD notes,
Stephen Cambone notes, Sept. 11, 2001.
9. The 9/11 crisis tested the U.S. government's plans and capabilities to ensure the
continuity of constitutional government and the continuity of government operations.
We did not investigate this topic, except as needed in order to understand the
activities and communications of key officials on 9/11. The Chair, Vice Chair, and
senior staff were briefed on the general nature and implementation of these
continuity plans.
10. White House transcript, Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation,
Sept. 11, 2001 (online at
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html).
11. White House transcript, Rice interview with Bob Woodward, Oct. 24, 2001, p. 371.
12. Joshua Bolten meeting (Mar. 18, 2004); see also Steven Brill, After: How America
Confronted the September 12 Era (Simon & Schuster, 2003), pp. 50-51.
13. The collapse of the World Trade Center towers on the morning of September 11
coated Lower Manhattan with a thick layer of dust from the debris and fire. For days
a plume of smoke rose from the site. Between September 11 and September 21,2001, EPA
issued five press releases regarding air quality in Lower Manhattan. A release on
September 16 quoted the claim of the assistant secretary for labor at OSHA that
tests show "it is safe for New Yorkers to go back to work in New York's financial
district." (OSHA's responsibility extends only to indoor air quality for workers,
however.) The most controversial press release, on September 18, quoted EPA
Administrator Christine Whitman as saying that the air was "safe" to breathe. This
statement was issued the day after the financial markets reopened. The EPA Office of
Inspector General investigated the issuance of these press releases and concluded
that the agency did not have enough data about the range of possible pollutants
other than asbestos to make a judgment, lacked public health benchmarks for
appropriate levels of asbestos and other pollutants, and had imprecise methods for
sampling asbestos in the air; it also noted that more than 25 percent of the bulk
dust samples collected before September 18 showed the presence of asbestos above the
agency's 1 percent benchmark. EPA Inspector General report,"EPA's Response to the
World Trade Center Collapse: Challenges, Successes, and Areas for Improvement," Aug.
21, 2003.
We do not have the expertise to examine the scientific accuracy of the pronouncements
in the press releases. The issue is the subject of pending civil litigation.
We did examine whether the White House improperly influenced the content of the press
releases so that they would intentionally mislead the public. The EPA press releases
were coordinated with Samuel Thernstrom, associate director for communications at
the White House Council on Environmental Quality. Oral reports, interviews with EPA
officials, and materials on the EPA's Web site were not coordinated through the
White House. Although the White House review process resulted in some editorial
changes to the press releases, these changes were consistent with what the EPA had
already been saying without White House clearance. See, e.g., David France and Erika
Check, "Asbestos Alert; How much of the chemical does the World Trade Center
wreckage contain?" Newsweek Web Exclusive, Sept. 14, 2001 (quoting EPA Administrator
Whitman as saying the air quality is not a health problem); Andrew C. Revkin,"After
the Attacks: The Chemicals; Monitors Say Health Risk From Smoke Is Very Small," New
York Times, Sept. 14, 2001, p. A6 (EPA says levels of airborne asbestos below
threshold of concern); Hugo Kugiya,"Terrorist Attacks; Asbestos Targeted in Cleanup
Effort; EPA's Whitman:'No reason for concern,'" Newsday, Sept. 16, 2001, p. W31
(Whitman says there is no reason for concern given EPA tests for asbestos). There
were disputes between the EPA's communications person and the White House
coordinator regarding the press releases. The EPA communications person said she
felt extreme pressure from the White House coordinator, and felt that they were no
longer her press releases. EPA Inspector General interview of Tina Kreisher, Aug.
28, 2002. The White House coordinator, however, told us that these disputes were
solely concerned with process, not the actual substance of the releases. Samuel
Thernstrom interview (Mar. 31, 2004). Former EPA administrator Christine Whitman
agreed with the White House coordinator. Christine Whitman interview (June 28, 2004)
The documentary evidence supports this claim. Although Whitman told us she spoke
with White House senior economic adviser Lawrence Lindsey regarding the need to get
the financial markets open quickly, she denied he pressured her to declare the air
was safe due to economic expediency. We found no evidence of pressure on EPA to say
the air was safe in order to permit the markets to reopen. Moreover, the most
controversial release that specifically declared the air safe to breathe was
released after the markets had already reopened. The EPA did not have the
health-based benchmarks needed to assess the extraordinary air quality conditions in
Lower Manhattan after 9/11. The EPA and the White House therefore improvised and
applied standards developed for other circumstances in order to make pronouncements
regarding air safety, advising workers at Ground Zero to use protective gear and
advising the general population that the air was safe. Whether those improvisations
were appropriate is still a subject for medical and scientific debate. See EPA
Inspector General report, "EPA's Response to the World Trade Center Collapse,"Aug.
21, 2003, pp. 9-19.
14. Brill, After, pp. 47-50.
15. We studied this episode and interviewed many of the participants. The NYSE, Amex,
and Nasdaq have developed plans for coordination and cooperation in the event of a
disaster affecting one or all of them, but these plans do not include other
exchanges or international components. The White House efforts during the crisis
were coordinated by the President's Working Group on Financial Markets, a group
created in the 1980s.
16. Brill, After, pp. 53-55, 89-91. Following interim reports in 1999 and 2000, a
congressional commission chaired by former senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman, and
directed by retired general Charles Boyd, had, in January 2001, recommended the
creation of a cabinet department dedicated to "homeland security." In May 2001,
President Bush named Vice President Cheney to head a task force on problems of
national preparedness. His recently hired coordinator, Admiral Steven Abbot, had
started work just before the 9/11 attack.
17. Ashcroft told us that he established a "hold until cleared" policy because of the
high rate of flight from deportation proceedings. John Ashcroft testimony, Apr. 13,
2004. For closure of hearings and secrecy of the detainee names, see DOJ email,
Chief Immigration Judge Michael Creppy to all immigration judges,"Cases requiring
special procedures," Sept. 21, 2001. This policy has been challenged in two U.S.
courts of appeals. The Sixth Circuit held that there is a constitutional right of
public access to these hearings; the Third Circuit reached the opposite result. The
Supreme Court has not yet decided to resolve this "circuit split." See Detroit Free
Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002); North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v.
Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2215 (2003). For the
length of the clearance process, see DOJ Inspector General report, "The September 11
Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration Charges in
Connection with the Investigation of the September 11 Attacks,"Apr. 2003, p. 51.
18. DOJ Inspector General report, "The September 11 Detainees,"Apr. 2003, pp.
142-150, 195-197.
19. John Ashcroft testimony, Apr. 13, 2004; DOJ record, "Special Interest Cases,"
Sept. 16, 2003. These numbers do not add up to 768 because we have not included all
categories. Some of those remanded to the Marshals Service were held as material
witnesses, and individuals were released "on bond" only after they were "cleared" by
the FBI of any connection to 9/11. For the response to our questions about the 9/11
detainee program, see DOJ emails, Daniel Levin to the Commission, July 9, 2004; July
13, 2004. There is one exception to the statement in the text that the detainees
were lawfully held on immigration charges; one detainee was held for a short time
"despite the fact that there was no valid immigration charge." DOJ Inspector General
report,"The September 11 Detainees," Apr. 2003, p. 15, n. 22. See also Khaled Medhat
Abou El Fadl testimony, Dec. 8, 2003.
20. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, May 10, 2003.
21. The complete title of the Act is Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act
of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 273 (signed into law Oct. 26, 2001).
22. John Ashcroft interview (Dec. 17, 2003).
23. On the early development of the Patriot Act, see, e.g., Brill, After, pp. 73-76,
120-125.
24. During the morning of September 11, the FAA suspended all nonemergency air
activity in the national airspace. While the national airspace was closed, decisions
to allow aircraft to fly were made by the FAA working with the Department of
Defense, Department of State, U.S. Secret Service, and the FBI. The Department of
Transportation reopened the national airspace to U.S. carriers effective 11:00 A.M.
on September 13, 2001, for flights out of or into airports that had implemented the
FAA's new security requirements. See FAA response to Commission questions for the
record, June 8, 2004.
25. After the airspace reopened, nine chartered flights with 160 people, mostly Saudi
nationals, departed from the United States between September 14 and 24. In addition,
one Saudi government flight, containing the Saudi deputy defense minister and other
members of an official Saudi delegation, departed Newark Airport on September
14. Every airport involved in these Saudi flights was open when the flight departed,
and no inappropriate actions were taken to allow those flights to depart. See City
of St. Louis Airport Authority, Lambert-St. Louis International Airport response to
Commission questions for the record, May 27,2004; Los Angeles International Airport
response to Commission questions for the record, June 2, 2004; Greater Orlando
Aviation Authority, Orlando International Airport response to Commission questions
for the record, June 8, 2004; Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, Washington
Dulles International Airport response to Commission questions for the record, June
8, 2004; Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, JFK Airport response to
Commission questions for the record, June 4, 2004; Massachusetts Port Authority,
Logan International Airport, and Hanscom Airfield response to Commission questions
for the record, June 17, 2004; Las Vegas-McCarran International Airport response to
Commission questions for the record, June 22, 2004; Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey, Newark Airport response to supplemental question for the record, July 9,
2004.
Another particular allegation is that a flight carrying Saudi nationals from Tampa,
Florida, to Lexington, Kentucky, was allowed to fly while airspace was closed, with
special approval by senior U.S. government officials. On September 13, Tampa police
brought three young Saudis they were protecting on an off-duty security detail to
the airport so they could get on a plane to Lexington. Tampa police arranged for two
private investigators to provide security on the flight. They boarded a chartered
Learjet. Dan Grossi interview (May 24, 2004); Manuel Perez interview (May 27, 2004);
John Solomon interview (June 4, 2004); Michael Fendle interview (June 4, 2004). The
plane took off at 4:37 P.M., after national airspace was open, more than five hours
after the Tampa airport had reopened, and after other flights had arrived at and
departed from that airport. Hillsborough County Aviation Authority, Tampa
International Airport response to Commission questions for the record, June 7, 2004.
The plane's pilot told us there was "nothing unusual whatsoever" about the flight
other than there were few airplanes in the sky. The company's owner and director of
operations agreed, saying that "it was just a routine little trip for us" and that
he would have heard if there had been anything unusual about it. The pilot said he
followed standard procedures and filed his flight plan with the FAA prior to the
flight, adding,"I was never questioned about it." Christopher Steele interview (June
14, 2004); Barry Ellis interview (June 14, 2004). FAA records confirm this account.
FAA supplemental response to Commission questions for the record, June 8, 2004. When
the plane arrived at Lexington Blue Grass Airport, that airport had also been open
for more than five hours. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Airport Board, Blue Grass
Airport response to Commission questions for the record, June 8, 2004. The three
Saudi nationals debarked from the plane and were met by local police. Their private
security guards were paid, and the police then escorted the three Saudi passengers
to a hotel where they joined relatives already in Lexington. Mark Barnard interview
(June 7, 2004). The FBI is alleged to have had no record of the flight and denied
that it occurred, hence contributing to the story of a "phantom flight." This is
another misunderstanding. The FBI was initially misinformed about how the Saudis got
to Lexington by a local police officer in Lexington who did not have firsthand
knowledge of the matter. The Bureau subsequently learned about the flight. James M.
interview (June 18, 2004).
26. Richard Clarke interview (Jan. 12, 2004).
27. Andrew Card meeting (Mar. 31, 2004); President Bush and Vice President Cheney
meeting (Apr. 29, 2004); Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004); Prince Bandar
interview (May 5, 2004); Richard Clarke interview (Jan. 12, 2004); Richard Clarke
testimony, Mar. 24, 2004 ("I would love to be able to tell you who did it, who
brought this proposal to me, but I don't know"). Instead, the matter was handled as
follows. Within days of September 11, fearing reprisals against Saudi nationals,
Rihab Massoud, the deputy chief of mission at the Saudi embassy in Washington, D.C.,
called Dale Watson, the FBI's assistant director for counterterrorism, and asked for
help in getting some of its citizens out of the country. Rihab Massoud interview
(May 11, 2004). At about the same time, Michael Rolince, chief of the FBI's
international terrorism operations section, also heard from an FBI official in
Newark about a proposed flight of Saudis out of the country. Michael Rolince
interview (June 9, 2004). We believe this was the Saudi deputy defense minister's
flight. Rolince says he told the Newark official that the Saudis should not be
allowed to leave without having the names on their passports matched to their faces,
and their names run through FBI case records to see whether they had surfaced
before. Rolince and Watson briefed Robert Mueller, the director of the FBI, about
the issue and how they were handling it. The State Department played a role as well
in flights involving government officials or members of the royal family. State
coordinated with the FBI and FAA to allow screening by the FBI of flights with Saudi
nationals on board. There is no evidence that State tried to limit the screening.
DOS record, Log of USA 9-11 Terrorist Attack Task Force, Sept. 13, 2001; Jack S.
interview (June 14, 2004). The FBI effectively approved the Saudi flights at the
level of a section chief. Having an opportunity to check the Saudis was useful to
the FBI. This was because the U.S. government did not, and does not, routinely run
checks on foreigners who are leaving the United States. This procedure was
convenient to the FBI, as the Saudis who wished to leave in this way would gather
and present themselves for record checks and interviews, an opportunity that would
not be available if they simply left on regularly scheduled commercial flights.
28. These flights were screened by law enforcement officials, primarily the FBI. For
example, one flight, the so-called Bin Ladin flight, departed the United States on
September 20 with 26 passengers, most of them relatives of Usama Bin Ladin.
Screening of this flight was directed by an FBI agent in the Baltimore Field Office
who was also a pilot. This agent, coordinating with FBI headquarters, sent an
electronic communication to each of the field offices through which the Bin Ladin
flight was scheduled to pass, including the proposed flight manifest and directing
what screening should occur. He also monitored the flight as it moved around the
country-from St. Louis to Los Angeles to Orlando to Washington Dulles, and to Boston
Logan-correcting for any changes in itinerary to make sure there was no lapse in FBI
screening at these locations. Again, each of the airports through which the Bin
Ladin flight passed was open, and no special restrictions were lifted to accommodate
its passage. James C. interview (June 3, 2004).
The Bin Ladin flight and other flights we examined were screened in accordance with
policies set by FBI headquarters and coordinated through working-level interagency
processes. Michael Rolince interview (June 9, 2004). Although most of the passengers
were not interviewed, 22 of the 26 people on the Bin Ladin flight were interviewed
by the FBI. Many were asked detailed questions. None of the passengers stated that
they had any recent contact with Usama Bin Ladin or knew anything about terrorist
activity. See, e.g., FBI report of investigation, interview of Mohammed Saleh Bin
Laden, Sept. 21, 2001. As Richard Clarke noted, long before 9/11 the FBI was
following members of the Bin Ladin family in the United States closely. Richard
Clarke testimony, Mar. 24, 2004. Two of the passengers on this flight had been the
subjects of preliminary investigations by the FBI, but both their cases had been
closed, in 1999 and March 2001, respectively, because the FBI had uncovered no
derogatory information on either person linking them to terrorist activity. Their
cases remained closed as of 9/11, were not reopened before they departed the country
on this flight, and have not been reopened since. FBI electronic communication,
Summary of Information Regarding Flights taken by Saudi Citizens Out of the U.S.
Shortly After September 11, 2001, Oct. 29, 2003, pp. 9-10.
29. Michael Rolince interview (June 9, 2004). Massoud corroborates this account. He
said the FBI required the names and personal information of all departing passengers
sponsored for departure by the Saudi Embassy. Rihab Massoud interview (May 11,
2004).
558 NOTES TO CHAPTER 10
30. Jack S. interview (June 14, 2004).
31. The FBI checked a variety of databases for information on the Bin Ladin flight
passengers and searched the aircraft. Because it was not clear to us whether the
TIPOFF terrorist watchlist was checked by the FBI, the Terrorist Screening Center
checked the names of individuals on the flight manifests of six Saudi flights
against the current TIPOFF watchlist at our request prior to our hearing in April
2004. There were no matches. At our request, based on additional information,
theTerrorist Screening Center in June and July 2004 rechecked the names of
individuals believed to be on these six flights, the names of individuals on three
more charter flights, the names of individuals on the flight containing the Saudi
Deputy Defense Minister, and the names of Saudi nationals on commercial flights that
journalists have alleged are suspect. There were no matches. Tim D. interviews (Apr.
12, 2004; June 30, 2004; July 9, 2004); FBI memo, Terrorist Screening Center to
Director's Office, "Request by 9/11 Commission Task Force to screen the airline
passenger lists through the TDSB and TIPOFF databases," Mar. 30, 2004.
32. White House transcript, Vice President Cheney interview with Charlie Gibson of
ABC, Sept. 4, 2002, p. 11. 33." The only . . . true advice I receive is from our war
council." White House transcript, President Bush interview with Bob Woodward and Dan
Balz of the Washington Post, Dec. 20, 2001.
34. On Secretary Rumsfeld's remarks, see White House transcript, President Bush
interview with Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, Dec. 20,2001. The President's adviser,
Karen Hughes, who was in the interview, listed the points Rumsfeld made at the
smaller NSC meeting. Ibid.
35. On the President's tasking in the earlier meeting held that day, see NSC memo,
Summary of Conclusions for NSC Meeting Held on September 12, 2001, Dec. 17, 2001. On
the paper that went beyond al Qaeda, see NSC memo, Deputies Draft Paper (attached to
Agenda for NSC Meeting Scheduled for Sept. 12, 2001). The Summary of Conclusions for
the afternoon meeting indicates that the paper was discussed. On giving priority to
preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, see White House
transcript, Hadley interview with Dan Balz and Bob Woodward, Jan. 11, 2002, p. 535.
36. NSC memo, Summary of Conclusions for Principals Committee Meeting Held on
September 13, 2001. In addition to the usual members of President Bush's war
cabinet, Secretary of Transportation Mineta and FAA security chief Canavan also
attended.
37. DOS cable, State 158711, "Deputy Secretary Armitage's Meeting with General
Mahmud: Actions and Support Expected of Pakistan in Fight Against Terrorism," Sept.
14, 2001. On September 14, 2001, the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad sent Musharraf 's
answer to the State Department by cable.
38. DOS cable, Islamabad 5123, "Musharraf Accepts the Seven Points," Sept. 14, 2001.
39. NSC memo, Summary of Conclusions of NSC Meeting Held on September 13, 2001.
According to the Summary of Conclusions, this meeting of the President and his
advisers took place in the White House Situation Room; however, the agenda alerting
agencies to the meeting specified that it would be conducted via the secure video
teleconference system (SVTS). Thus, it is unclear whether the attendees met
face-to-face at the White House or held their meeting remotely via SVTS.
40. State Department memo, "Gameplan for Polmil Strategy for Pakistan and
Afghanistan," Sept. 14, 2001 (tasked by President Bush). The paper was sent to the
White House on September 14, 2001. The demand to free all imprisoned foreigners
reflected the U.S. government's concern about the welfare of several foreign aid
workers in Afghanistan who had been imprisoned by the Taliban in August 2001. Two
young American women, Heather Mercer and Dayna Curry of the organization "Shelter
Now International,"were among those arrested and charged with promoting
Christianity. The Taliban and other Islamists found their activities an affront to
Islam and in violation of Afghanistan's laws and the regime's tenets. Wendy
Chamberlin interview (Oct. 28, 2003). Powell stated that the President wanted to get
the hostages out but that desire would not restrain American action. White House
transcript, President Bush interview with Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, Dec. 20, 2001.
41. State Department memo, "Gameplan for Polmil Strategy for Pakistan and
Afghanistan," Sept. 14, 2001.
42. White House transcript, President Bush interview with Bob Woodward and Dan Balz,
Dec. 20, 2001.
43. Stephen Hadley meeting (Jan. 31, 2004). Hadley told us that the White House was
not satisfied with the Defense Department's plans to use force in Afghanistan after
9/11. Ibid.; see also White House transcript, Rice interview with John King of CNN,
Aug. 2, 2002, p. 421.
44. Tommy Franks interview (Apr. 9, 2004).
45. NSC memo, Hadley to recipients, "Discussion Paper for NSC meeting at Camp David
on 14 September," Sept. 14, 2001.
46. CIA memo, "Going to War," Sept. 15, 2001.
47. White House transcript, President Bush interview with Bob Woodward and Dan Balz,
Dec. 20, 2001.
48. DOD briefing materials, "Evolution of Infinite Resolve Planning (AQ, UBL),"
undated (provided to the Commission on Mar. 19, 2004). According to Deputy National
Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, the President responded to Shelton by saying that
the boots-on-the-ground option was an interesting idea. He wanted to know what the
CIA would do when ground forces were in Afghanistan. White House transcript, Hadley
interview with Dan Balz and Bob Woodward, Jan. 11, 2002, p. 545.
49. NSC memo, "Conclusions of National Security Council Meeting," Sept. 17, 2001;
White House transcript, President Bush interview with Bob Woodward and Dan Balz,
Dec. 20, 2001.
50. NSC memo, "Conclusions of National Security Council Meeting," Sept. 17, 2001.
51. See NSC memo, Rice to Cheney, Powell, O'Neill, Rumsfeld, Ashcroft, Gonzales,
Card, Tenet, and Shelton, Sept. 16, 2001.
52. NSC memo, "Conclusions of National Security Council Meeting," Sept. 17, 2001.
53. NSC memo, Summary of Conclusions of Terrorist Fund-raising Meeting Held on
September 18, 2001.
54. DOS briefing materials, "Fact Sheet on Response to Terrorist Attacks in US,"
Sept. 17, 2001.
55. DOS cable, State 161279, "Deputy Secretary Armitage-Mamoud Phone Call," Sept. 18,
2001.
56. White House transcript, Vice President Cheney interview with Dan Balz and Bob
Woodward, Jan. 18, 2002, pp. 7-8.
57. Stephen Hadley meeting (Jan. 31, 2004).
58. See National Security Presidential Directive 9, Oct. 25, 2001.
59. President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004). On Iran, see
Condoleezza Rice testimony, Apr. 8, 2004.
60. Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror (Free
Press, 2004), p. 32. According to Clarke, he responded that "al Qaeda did this."
When the President pressed Clarke to check if Saddam was involved and said that he
wanted to learn of any shred of evidence, Clarke promised to look at the question
again, but added that the NSC and the intelligence community had looked in the past
for linkages between al Qaeda and Iraq and never found any real linkages. Ibid.
61. President Bush told us that Clarke had mischaracterized this exchange. On the
evening of September 12, the President was at the Pentagon and then went to the
White House residence. He dismissed the idea that he had been wandering around the
Situation Room alone, saying, "I don't do that." He said that he did not think that
any president would roam around looking for something to do. While Clarke said he
had found the President's tone "very intimidating," ("Clarke's Take on Terror,"
CBSnews.com, Mar. 21, 2004, online at www.cbsnews.com/stories
/2004/03/19/60minutes/printable607356.shtml), President Bush doubted that anyone
would have found his manner intimidating. President Bush and Vice President Cheney
meeting (Apr. 29, 2004). Roger Cressey, Clarke's deputy, recalls this exchange with
the President and Clarke concerning Iraq shortly after 9/11, but did not believe the
President's manner was intimidating. Roger Cressey interview (June 23, 2004).
62. NSC memo, Kurtz to Rice, Survey of Intelligence Information on any Iraq
Involvement in the September 11 Attacks, Sept. 18, 2001. On 60 Minutes (CBS, Mar.
21, 2004), Clarke said that the first draft of this memo was returned by the NSC
Front Office because it did not find a tie between Iraq and al Qaeda; Rice and
Hadley deny that they asked to have the memo redone for this reason.
63. See DOD notes, Victoria Clarke notes, Sept. 11, 2001; DOD notes, Stephen Cambone
notes, Sept. 11, 2001. Cambone's notes indicate this exchange took place at 2:40
P.M. on September 11, 2001. Steven Cambone interview (July 15, 2004).
64. Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004). For an account of Rumsfeld's and
Wolfowitz's position on Iraq, see Bob Woodward, Bush at War (Simon &
Schuster, 2002), pp. 83-84. Rice told us that the Bush at War account of the Camp
David discussions on Iraq accorded with her memory.
65. DOD memo, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, "War on Terrorism:
Strategic Concept," Sept. 14, 2001.
66. Colin Powell interview (Jan. 21, 2004). Rumsfeld told Bob Woodward that he had no
recollection of Wolfowitz's remarks at Camp David. DOD transcript, "Secretary
Rumsfeld Interview with the Washington Post," Jan. 9, 2002 (online at
www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2002/t02052002_t0109wp.html).
67. Colin Powell interview (Jan. 21, 2004). Powell raised concerns that a focus on
Iraq might negate progress made with the international coalition the administration
was putting together for Afghanistan. Taking on Iraq at this time could destroy the
international coalition. Ibid.
68. Colin Powell interview (Jan. 21, 2004).
69. White House transcript, President Bush interview with Bob Woodward and Dan Balz,
Dec. 20, 2001.
70. Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004).
71. NSC memo, "Conclusions of National Security Council Meeting," Sept. 17, 2001.
72. Condoleezza Rice testimony, Apr.8,2004; see also Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack
(Simon & Schuster, 2004), p. 22.
73. DOD memo, Wolfowitz to Rumsfeld, "Preventing More Events," Sept. 17, 2001. We
review contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda in chapter 2. We have found no credible
evidence to support theories of Iraqi government involvement in the 1993 WTC
bombing. Wolfowitz added in his memo that he had attempted in June to get the CIA to
explore these theories.
74. DOD memo, Wolfowitz to Rumsfeld, "Were We Asleep?" Sept. 18, 2001.
75. DOD memo, Rumsfeld to Shelton, "Some Thoughts for CINCs as They Prepare Plans,"
Sept. 19, 2001. In a memo that appears to be from Under Secretary of Defense Douglas
Feith to Rumsfeld, dated September 20, the author expressed disappointment at the
limited options immediately available in Afghanistan and the lack of ground options.
The author suggested instead hitting terrorists outside the Middle East in the
initial offensive, perhaps deliberately selecting a non-al Qaeda target like Iraq.
Since U.S. attacks were expected in Afghanistan, an American attack in South America
or Southeast Asia might be a surprise to the terrorists. The memo may have been a
draft never sent to Rumsfeld, or may be a draft of points being suggested for
Rumsfeld to deliver in a briefing to the President. DOD memo, Feith to
Rumsfeld,"Briefing Draft," Sept. 20, 2001.
76. Hugh Shelton interview (Feb. 5, 2004).
77. Tommy Franks interview (Apr. 9, 2004).
78. NSC memo, memorandum of conversation from meeting of President Bush with Prime
Minister Blair, Sept. 20, 2001.
79. Tommy Franks interview (Apr. 9, 2004).
80. White House transcript, President Bush's Address to a Joint Session of Congress
and the American People, Sept. 20, 2001. British Prime Minister Tony Blair attended
the session.
81. Ibid. Several NSC officials, including Clarke and Cressey, told us that the
mention of the Cole in the speech to Congress marked the first public U.S.
declaration that al Qaeda had been behind the October 2000 attack. Clarke said he
added the language on this point to the speech. Richard Clarke interview (Feb. 3,
2004); Roger Cressey interview (Dec. 15, 2003).
82. White House transcript, President Bush's Address to a Joint Session of Congress
and the American People, Sept. 20, 2001. President Bush told the Washington Post
that he considered having Powell deliver the ultimatum to the Taliban, but
determined it would have more impact coming directly from the president. White House
transcript, President Bush interview with Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, Dec. 20, 2001.
83. White House transcript, President Bush's Address to a Joint Session of Congress
and the American People, Sept. 20, 2001.
84. Ibid.
85. Tommy Franks interview (Apr. 9, 2004). Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Richard Myers and Major General Del Dailey, commander of Joint Special Operations
Command, also attended the September 21 meeting. The meeting was in direct response
to the President's September 17 instruction to Rumsfeld to develop a military
campaign plan for Afghanistan. The original "Infinite Justice"name was a
continuation of a series of names begun in August 1998 with Operation Infinite
Reach, the air strikes against Bin Ladin's facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan after
the embassy bombings. The series also included Operation Infinite Resolve, a variety
of proposed follow-on strikes on al Qaeda targets in Afghanistan.
86. DOD Special Operations Command and Central Command briefings (Sept. 15-16, 2003;
Apr. 8-9, 2004; Apr. 28, 2004); Tommy Franks interview (Apr. 9, 2004). On death of
Atef, see Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, p. 349; Henry,
"The CIA in Afghanistan, 2001-2002," Studies in Intelligence (classified version),
vol. 47, no. 2 (2003), pp. 1, 11. See Donald Rumsfeld testimony, Mar. 23, 2004
(nearly two-thirds of the known leaders of al Qaeda had been killed or captured).
11 Foresight-and Hindsight
1. Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford Univ. Press,
1962), p. 387.
2. Intelligence Community analytic report, "The Foreign Terrorist Threat in the
United States," NIE 95-13, July 1995, pp. v, vii-viii, 10-11, 13, 18.
3. Intelligence Community analytic report, "The ForeignTerrorist Threat in the US:
Revisiting Our 1995 Estimate," ICB 97-8, Apr. 1997, p. 1.
4. For Bin Ladin being mentioned in only two other sentences, see ibid.
5. Titles are drawn from articles in the National Intelligence Daily and the Senior
Executive Intelligence Brief.
6. John McLaughlin interview (Jan. 21, 2004).
7. Ibid.; Pattie Kindsvater interview (Sept. 12, 2003).
8. Tim Weiner, "U.S. Hard Put to Find Proof Bin Laden Directed Attacks," New York
Times, Apr. 13, 1999, p. A1.
9. Paul R. Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Brookings Institution Press,
2001), p. 23; see also ibid., pp. 5, 21-22.
10. For a concise statement of the role of the national estimate process, see Task
force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, Making Intelligence Smarter:
The Future of U.S. Intelligence (Council on Foreign Relations, 1996), pp. 34-35
(additional views of Richard Betts).
11. Waldo Heinrichs, Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into
World War II (Oxford Univ. Press, 1988), p. 215.
12. For the response being routine, see Gordon Prange, At Dawn We Slept: The Untold
Story of Pearl Harbor (McGraw- Hill, 1981), pp. 732-733. For a brief summary of
these routines and the reasons why the intercepts were not properly digested, see
Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 2d ed. (Longman, 1999), p.
194, n. 72.
13. PDBs were not routinely briefed to congressional leaders, though this item could
have been in some other intelligence briefing. It was not circulated in the NID or
SEIB. For the September 1998 report, see Intelligence report, "Terrorism: Possible
Attack on a U.S. City," Sept. 8, 1998.
14. For the August report, see Intelligence report, "Terrorism: Alleged Threat by
Arab Terrorists to Attack the World Trade Center in New York," Aug. 12, 1998. An FAA
civil aviation security official believed the plan was improbable because Libyan
planes were required to operate within airspace limitations and the Libyans did not
possess aircraft with the necessary range to make good on the threat. Jack S.
interview (June 13, 2004). On September 30, 1999, the FAA closed the file on the
August report after investigation could not corroborate the report, and the source's
credibility was deemed suspect. FAA report, Transportation Security Intelligence ICF
Report 980162, undated; but see FAA/TSA rebuttal to the Joint Inquiry's Sept. 18,
2002, staff statement, undated, p. 1 (stating that the FAA did not formally analyze
this threat). The Algerian hijackers had placed explosives in key areas of the
cabin. However, there was some speculation in the media based on reports from a
passenger aboard the plane that the hijackers had discussed crashing it into the
Eiffel Tower. FAA report, FAA Intelligence Case File 94-305, undated.
15. For Murad's idea, see chapter 5, note 33.
16. For Clarke's involvement in the 1996 Olympics, see Richard Clarke interview (Dec.
18, 2003). For the 1998 exercise, see Chuck Green interview (Apr. 21, 2004); NSC
briefing paper, Nov. 10, 1998.
17. For the report of the National Transportation Safety Board, see NTSB report,
"Aircraft Accident Brief," Mar. 13,2002 (online at
www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/2002/aab0201.htm). For the early 2000 CSG discussion, see NSC
note, CSG SVTS agenda, Jan. 31, 2000.
18. Richard Clarke testimony, Mar. 24, 2004.
19. FAA memo, Office of Civil Aviation Security Intelligence, "Usama Bin Ladin/World
Islamic Front Hijacking Threat," Intelligence Note 99-06, Aug. 4, 1999, pp. 5-6.
20. Ibid.
21. As part of his 34-page analysis, the attorney explained why he thought that a
fueled Boeing 747, used as a weapon, "must be considered capable of destroying
virtually any building located anywhere in the world." DOJ memo, Robert D. to
Cathleen C.,"Aerial Intercepts and Shoot-downs: Ambiguities of Law and Practical
Considerations," Mar. 30, 2000, p. 10. Also, in February 1974, a man named Samuel
Byck attempted to commandeer a plane at Baltimore Washington International Airport
with the intention of forcing the pilots to fly into Washington and crash into the
White House to kill the president. The man was shot by police and then killed
himself on the aircraft while it was still on the ground at the airport.
22. For NORAD's hypothesis of aircraft as weapons, see, e.g., Ralph Eberhardt
interview (Mar. 1, 2004). For the 2001 Positive Force 01 exercise, see DOD briefing
(Apr. 29, 2004); Tom Cecil and Mark Postgate interview (June 7, 2004).
23. For the Gates report's recommendations, see DCI task force report, "Improving
Intelligence Warning,"May 29, 1992. For strengthening of the warning official, see
DCI memo,"Warning," July 17, 1992. For the recommendations languishing, see Charles
Allen interview (Sept. 22, 2003). For CTC having responsibility for warning, see
Robert Vickers interview (Sept. 17, 2003). For the Board's warnings, see, e.g.,
Community Counterterrorism Board report,"Intelligence CommunityTerroristThreat
Advisory: Bin Ladin Orchestrating Possible Anti-US Attacks,"June 30, 2000.
24. CIA briefing materials, "DCI Update,"Aug. 23, 2001.
25. James Pavitt interview (Jan. 8, 2004). For more on this meeting, see Condoleezza
Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004); George Tenet interview (Jan. 28, 2004).
26. For the briefing to the President-elect, see James Pavitt interview (Jan. 8,
2004). The CIA's formal analysis of what would happen if Bin Ladin alone was removed
as compared with the importance of shutting down the sanctuary was offered in
several places. See, e.g., CIA analytic report, "Likely Impact of Taliban Actions
Against Al Qaeda," Feb. 21, 2001 (provided as background for Tenet meetings with
Rice on Feb. 23 and Mar. 7, 2001).
27. Richard Clarke testimony, Mar. 24, 2004.
28. Mike interview (Dec. 11, 2003) (reading from CIA email, Mike to Winston Wiley,
Aug. 27, 1997).
29. For President Bush's statement of al Qaeda's responsibility for the Cole attack,
see White House transcript, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American
People," Sept. 20, 2001 (online at
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html).
30. For Pavitt's view, see James Pavitt interview (Jan. 8, 2004).
31. Hugh Shelton interview (Feb. 5, 2004). Zinni was concerned about excessive
collateral damage caused by Tomahawk strikes. See Anthony Zinni interview (Jan. 29,
2004).
32. For Shelton's view, see Hugh Shelton interview (Feb. 5, 2004). For Cohen's view,
see William Cohen interview (Feb. 5, 2004).
33. Russell Honore interview (Oct. 29, 2003).
34. James Pavitt interview (Jan. 8, 2004).
35. Ibid.
36. Cofer Black interview (Dec. 9, 2003).
37. Rich interview (Dec. 11, 2003).
38. CIA memo, Tenet to Gordon and others, "Usama Bin Ladin,"Dec. 4, 1998, p. 2.
39. See, e.g., Joan Dempsey interview (Nov. 12, 2003); Jeff B. interview (Dec. 11,
2003); Louis Andre interview (Nov. 10, 2003); Mary C. interview (Oct. 25, 2003);
Maureen Baginski interview (Nov. 15, 2003); Thomas Wilson interview (Dec. 4, 2003).
Assistant DCI Charles Allen did redouble his efforts to coordinate and improve
collection at the tactical level, but this was not a plan to address larger
weaknesses in the fundamental capabilities of the intelligence community. See
Charles Allen interview (Sept. 22, 2003).
40. For Dempsey's action, see Joan Dempsey interview (Nov. 12, 2003). For Minihan's
view, see Joint Inquiry interview of Kenneth Minihan, Sept. 12, 2002. For the CIA
viewing the memorandum as intended for non-CIA intelligence agencies, see Dave Carey
interview (Oct. 31, 2003).
41. George Tenet interview (Jan. 22, 2004); James Pavitt interview (Jan. 8, 2004).
42. For the New York Times article about the Jordanian arrests, see Reuters, "Jordan
Seizes 13 and Links Them to Afghan Explosives Training," New York Times, Dec. 16,
1999, p. A13. For the Ressam story being on the front page, see, e.g., Sam Howe
Verhovek with Tim Weiner,"Man Seized with Bomb Parts at Border Spurs U.S. Inquiry,"
New York Times, Dec. 18, 1999, p. A1. For television coverage, see Vanderbilt
University Television News Archive, Dec. 13, 22-31, 1999.
12 What to Do? A Global Strategy
1. For spending totals, see David Baumann, "Accounting for the Deficit," National
Journal, June 12, 2004, p. 1852 (combining categories for defense discretionary,
homeland security, and international affairs).
2. White House press release, "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism," Feb. 2003
(online at www.whitehouse. gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030214-7.html).
3. "Islamist terrorism is an immediate derivative of Islamism. This term
distinguishes itself from Islamic by the fact that the latter refers to a religion
and culture in existence over a millennium, whereas the first is a
political/religious phenomenon linked to the great events of the 20th century.
Furthermore Islamists define themselves as 'Islamiyyoun/Islamists' precisely to
differentiate themselves from 'Muslimun/Muslims.' . . . Islamism is defined as 'an
Islamic militant, anti-democratic movement, bearing a holistic vision of Islam whose
final aim is the restoration of the caliphate.'"Mehdi Mozaffari,"Bin Laden and
Islamist Terrorism," Militaert Tidsskrift, vol. 131 (Mar. 2002), p. 1 (online at
www.mirkflem.pup.blueyonder.co.uk/pdf/islamistterrorism.pdf). The Islamist movement,
born about 1940, is a product of the modern world, influenced by Marxist-Leninist
concepts about revolutionary organization. "Islamists consider Islam to be as much a
religion as an 'ideology,' a neologism which they introduced and which remains
anathema to the ulamas (the clerical scholars)." Olivier Roy, The Failure of
Political Islam, trans. Carol Volk (Harvard Univ. Press, 1994), p. 3. Facing
political limits by the end of the 1990s, the extremist wing of the Islamist
movement "rejected the democratic references invoked by the moderates; and as a
result, raw terrorism in its most spectacular and destructive form became its main
option for reviving armed struggle in the new millennium." Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The
Trail of Political Islam, trans. Anthony Roberts (Harvard Univ. Press, 2002), p. 14.
4. Opening the Islamic Conference of Muslim leaders from around the world on October
16, 2003, then Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamad said:"Today we, the whole
Muslim ummah [community of believers] are treated with contempt and dishonour. Our
religion is denigrated. Our holy places desecrated. Our countries are occupied. Our
people are starved and killed. None of our countries are truly independent. We are
under pressure to conform to our oppressors' wishes about how we should behave, how
we should govern our lands, how we should think even." He added:"There is a feeling
of hopelessness among the Muslim countries and their people. They feel that they can
do nothing right. They believe that things can only get worse. The Muslims will
forever be oppressed and dominated by the Europeans and Jews." The prime minister's
argument was that the Muslims should gather their assets, not striking back blindly,
but instead planning a thoughtful, long-term strategy to defeat their worldwide
enemies, which he argued were controlled by the Jews. "But today the Jews rule the
world by proxy. They get others to fight and die for them." Speech at the Opening of
the Tenth Session of the Islamic Summit Conference, Oct. 16, 2003 (online at
www.oicsummit2003.0rg.my/speech_03.php).
5. CIA map, "Possible Remote Havens for Terrorist and Other Illicit Activity," May
2003.
6. For the numbers, see Tariq interview (Oct. 20, 2003).
7. For Pakistan playing a key role in apprehending 500 terrorists, see Richard
Armitage testimony, Mar. 23, 2004.
8. For Pakistan's unpoliced areas, see Tasneem Noorani interview (Oct. 27, 2003).
9. Pakistanis and Afghanis interviews (Oct. 2003); DOD Special Operations Command and
Central Command briefings (Sept. 15-16, 2004); U.S. intelligence official interview
(July 9, 2004).
10. Pervez Musharraf, "A Plea for Enlightened Moderation: Muslims Must
RaiseThemselves UpThrough Individual Achievement and Socioeconomic Emancipation,"
Washington Post, June 1, 2004, p. A23.
11. For a review of ISAF's role, see NATO report, "NATO in Afghanistan," updated July
9, 2004 (online at www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan).
12. United States Institute of Peace report, "Establishing the Rule of Law in
Afghanistan," Mar. 2004, pp. 1-3 (online at
www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr117.html).
13. For the change, see Lakhdar Brahimi interview (Oct. 24, 2003); U.S.officials in
Afghanistan interview (Oct. 2003). For the request that the United States remain,
see Kandahar province local leaders interview (Oct. 21, 2003). For the effect of the
United States leaving, see Karim Khalili interview (Oct. 23, 2003).
14. Some have criticized the Bush administration for neglecting Afghanistan because
of Iraq. Others, including General Franks, say that the size of the U.S. military
commitment in Afghanistan has not been compromised by the commitments in Iraq. We
have not investigated the issue and cannot offer a judgment on it.
15. Even if the U.S. forces, stretched thin, are reluctant to take on this role, "a
limited, but extremely useful, change in the military mandate would involve
intelligence sharing with civilian law enforcement and a willingness to take action
against drug warehouses and heroin laboratories." United States Institute of Peace
report,"Establishing the Rule of Law in Afghanistan," Mar. 2004, p. 17.
16. For barriers to Saudi monitoring of charities, see, e.g., Robert Jordan interview
(Jan. 14, 2004); David Aufhauser interview (Feb. 12, 2004).
17. For the Saudi reformer's view, see Members of majles al-shura interview (Oct. 14,
2003).
18. Neil MacFarquhar, "Saudis Support a Jihad in Iraq, Not Back Home," New York
Times, Apr. 23, 2004, p. A1.
19. Prince Bandar Bin Sultan, "A Diplomat's Call for War," Washington Post, June 6,
2004, p. B4 (translation of original in Al-Watan, June 2, 2004).
20. President Clinton meeting (Apr. 8, 2004).
21. For Jordan's initiatives, see testimony of William Burns before the Subcommittee
on the Middle East and Central Asia of the House International Relations Committee,
Mar. 19, 2003 (online at www.house.gov /international_relations/108/burn0319.htm).
For the report, see United Nations Development Programme report, Arab Human
Development Report 2003: Building a Knowledge Society (United Nations, 2003) (online
at www.miftah.org/Doc/Reports/Englishcomplete2003.pdf).
22. DOD memo, Rumsfeld to Myers, Wolfowitz, Pace, and Feith, "Global War on
Terrorism," Oct. 16, 2003 (online at
www.usatoday.com/news/washington/executive/rumsfeld-memo.htm).
23. For the statistics, see James Zogby, What ArabsThink: Values, Beliefs, and
Concerns (Zogby International, 2002). For fear of a U.S. attack, see Pew Global
Attitudes Project report, Views of a Changing World: June 2003 (Pew Research Center
for the People and the Press, 2003), p. 2. In our interviews, current and former
U.S. officials dealing with the Middle East corroborated these findings.
24. For polling soon after 9/11, see Pew Research Center for the People and the Press
report, "America Admired, Yet Its New Vulnerability Seen as Good Thing, Say Opinion
Leaders; Little Support for Expanding War on Terrorism" (online at
http://people-press.org/reports/print.php3? ReportID=145). For the quotation, see
Pew Global Attitudes Project report,"War With Iraq Further Divides Global Publics
But World Embraces Democratic Values and Free Markets," June 3, 2003 (online at
www.pewtrusts.com/ideas/ideas_item.cfm? content_
item_id=1645&content_type_id=7).
25. For the Occidentalist "creed of Islamist revolutionaries," see, e.g., Avishai
Margalit and Ian Buruma, Occidentalism: The West in the Eyes of Its Enemies (Penguin
Press, 2004).
26. We draw these statistics, significantly, from the U.S. government's working paper
circulated in April 2004 to G-8 "sherpas" in preparation for the 2004 G-8 summit.
The paper was leaked and published in Al-Hayat. "U.S. Working Paper for G-8
Sherpas," Al-Hayat, Feb. 13, 2004 (online at http://english.daralhayat.com/Spec/02-
2004/Article-20040213-ac40bdaf-c0a8-01ed-004e-5e7ac897d678/story.html).
27. Richard Holbrooke, "Get the Message Out," Washington Post, Oct. 28, 2001, p. B7;
Richard Armitage interview (Jan. 12, 2004).
28. Testimony of George Tenet, "The Worldwide Threat 2004: Challenges in a Changing
Global Context," before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Feb. 24, 2004.
29. U.S. Department of Energy Advisory Board report, "A Report Card on the Department
of Energy's Nonproliferation Programs with Russia," Jan. 10, 2001, p. vi.
30. For terrorists being self-funding, see United Nations report, "Second Report of
the [UN] Monitoring Group, Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1390," Sept. 19,
2002, p. 13.
31. For legal entry, see White House report, Office of Homeland Security, "The
National Strategy for Homeland Security," July 2002, p. 20 (online at
www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/index.html). For illegal entry, see Chicago Council
on Foreign Relations task force report, Keeping the Promise: Immigration Proposals
from the Heartland (Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 2004), p. 28.
32. The names of at least three of the hijackers (Nawaf al Hazmi, Salem al Hazmi, and
Khalid al Mihdhar) were in information systems of the intelligence community and
thus potentially could have been watchlisted. Had they been watchlisted, the
connections to terrorism could have been exposed at the time they applied for a visa
or at the port of entry. The names of at least three of the hijackers (Nawaf al
Hazmi, Salem al Hazmi, and Khalid al Mihdhar), were in information systems of the
intelligence community and thus potentially could have been watchlisted. Had they
been watchlisted, their terrorist affiliations could have been exposed either at the
time they applied for a visa or at the port of entry. Two of the hijackers (Satam al
Suqami and Abdul Aziz al Omari) presented passports manipulated in a fraudulent
manner that has subsequently been associated with al Qaeda. Based on our review of
their visa and travel histories, we believe it possible that as many as eleven
additional hijackers (Wail al Shehri, Waleed al Shehri, Mohand al Shehri, Hani
Hanjour, Majed Moqed, Nawaf al Hazmi, Hamza al Ghamdi, Ahmed al Ghamdi, Saeed al
Ghamdi, Ahmed al Nami, and Ahmad al Haznawi) held passports containing these same
fraudulent features, but their passports have not been found so we cannot be sure.
Khalid al Mihdhar and Salem al Hazmi presented passports with a suspicious indicator
of Islamic extremism. There is reason to believe that the passports of three other
hijackers (Nawaf al Hazmi, Ahmed al Nami, and Ahmad al Haznawi) issued in the same
Saudi passport office may have contained this same indicator; however, their
passports have not been found, so we cannot be sure.
33. Khallad Bin Attash, Ramzi Binalshibh, Zakariya Essabar, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, and
Saeed al Ghamdi (not the individual by the same name who became a hijacker) tried to
get visas and failed. Kahtani was unable to prove his admissibility and withdrew his
application for admission after an immigration inspector remained unpersuaded that
he was a tourist. All the hijackers whose visa applications we reviewed arguably
could have been denied visas because their applications were not filled out
completely. Had State visa officials routinely had a practice of acquiring more
information in such cases, they likely would have found more grounds for denial. For
example, three hijackers made statements on their visa applications that could have
been proved false by U.S. government records (Hani Hanjour, Saeed al Ghamdi, and
Khalid al Mihdhar), and many lied about their employment or educational status. Two
hijackers could have been denied admission at the port of entry based on violations
of immigration rules governing terms of admission-Mohamed Atta overstayed his
tourist visa and then failed to present a proper vocational school visa when he
entered in January 2001; Ziad Jarrah attended school in June 2000 without properly
adjusting his immigration status, an action that violated his immigration status and
rendered him inadmissible on each of his six subsequent reentries into the United
States between June 2000 and August 5, 2001. There were possible grounds to deny
entry to a third hijacker (Marwan al Shehhi). One hijacker violated his immigration
status by failing to enroll as a student after entry (Hani Hanjour); two hijackers
overstayed their terms of admission by four and eight months respectively (Satam al
Suqami and Nawaf al Hazmi). Atta and Shehhi attended a flight school (Huffman
Aviation) that the Justice Department's Inspector General concluded should not have
been certified to accept foreign students, see DOJ Inspector General's report, "The
INS' Contacts with Two September 11 Terrorists: A Review of the INS's Admissions of
Atta and Shehhi, its Processing of their Change of Status Applications, and its
Efforts to Track Foreign Students in the United States," May 20, 2002.
34. John Gordon interview (May 13, 2004).
35. For a description of a layering approach, see Stephen Flynn, America the
Vulnerable: How the U.S. Has Failed to Secure the Homeland and Protect Its People
from Terrorism (HarperCollins, 2004), p. 69.
36. The logical and timely rollout of such a program is hampered by an astonishingly
long list of congressional mandates. The system originated in the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 and applied to all
non-U.S. citizens who enter or exit the United States at any port of entry. Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996), � 110. The Data Management Improvement Act of
2000 altered this mandate by incorporating a requirement for a searchable
centralized database, limiting the government's ability to require new data from
certain travelers and setting a series of implementation deadlines. Pub. L. No.
106-215, 114 Stat. 337 (2000), � 2(a). The USA PATRIOT Act mandated that the
Attorney General and Secretary of State "particularly focus" on having the
entry-exit system include biometrics and tamper-resistant travel documents readable
at all ports of entry. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001), � 1008(a). In the
Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act, Congress directed that, not
later than October 26, 2004, the attorney general and the secretary of state issue
to all non-U.S. citizens only machine-readable, tamper-resistant visas and other
travel and entry documents that use biometric identifiers and install equipment at
all U.S. ports of entry to allow biometric authentication of such documents. Pub.L.
No.107-173,116 Stat. 543 (2002), � 303(b). The Act also required that increased
security still facilitate the free flow of commerce and travel. Ibid. �
102(a)(1)(C). The administration has requested a delay of two years for the
requirement of tamper-proof passports. Testimony of Thomas Ridge before the House
Judiciary Committee, Apr. 21, 2004 (online at www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?
theme=45&content=3498&print=true). Program planners have set a goal
of collecting information, confirming identity, providing information about foreign
nationals throughout the entire immigration system, and ultimately enabling each
point in the system to assess the lawfulness of travel and any security risks.
37. There are at least three registered traveler programs underway, at different
points in the system, designed and run by two different agencies in the Department
of Homeland Security (outside the U.S. VISIT system), which must ultimately be the
basis for access to the United States.
38. For the statistics, see DOS report, "Workload Statistics by Post Regions for All
Visa Classes" June 18, 2004. One post-9/11 screening process, known as Condor, has
conducted over 130,000 extra name-checks. DOS letter, Karl Hofmann to the
Commission, Apr. 5, 2004. The checks have caused significant delays in some cases
but have never resulted in visas being denied on terrorism grounds. For a discussion
of visa delays, see General Accounting Office report,"Border Security: Improvements
Needed to Reduce Time Taken to Adjudicate Visas for Science Students and Scholars,"
Feb. 2004. We do not know all the reasons why visa applications have dropped so
significantly. Several factors beyond the visa process itself include the National
Security Entry-Exit Registration System, which requires additional screening
processes for certain groups from Arab and Muslim countries; the Iraq war; and
perNOTES TO CHAPTER 12 565 haps cyclical economic factors. For the cost to the
United States of visa backlogs, see National Foreign Trade Council report,"Visa
Backlog Costs U.S. Exporters More Than $30 Billion Since 2002, New Study Finds,"
June 2, 2004 (online at www.nftc.org/newsflash/newsflash.asp?
Mode=View&articleid=1686&Category=All).
39. These issues are on the G-8 agenda. White House press release, "G-8 Secure and
Facilitated Travel Initiative (SAFTI),"June 9,2004 (online at
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040609-51.html). Lax passport issuance
standards are among the vulnerabilities exploited by terrorists, possibly including
two of the 9/11 hijackers. Three models exist for strengthened prescreening: (1)
better screening by airlines, such as the use of improved document authentication
technology; (2) posting of border agents or inspectors in foreign airports to work
cooperatively with foreign counterparts; and (3) establishing a full preinspection
regime, such as now exists for travel to the United States from Canada and Ireland.
All three models should be pursued, in addition to electronic prescreening .
40. Among the more important problems to address is that of varying transliterations
of the same name. For example, the current lack of a single convention for
transliterating Arabic names enabled the 19 hijackers to vary the spelling of their
names to defeat name-based watchlist systems and confuse any potential efforts to
locate them. While the gradual introduction of biometric identifiers will help, that
process will take years, and a name match will always be useful. The ICAO should
discuss the adoption of a standard requiring a digital code for all names that need
to be translated into the Roman alphabet, ensuring one common spelling for all
countries.
41. On achieving more reliable identification, see Markle Foundation task force
report, Creating a Trusted Information Network for Homeland Security (Markle
Foundation, 2003), p. 72 (online at www.markle.org).
42. General Accounting Office report, MassTransit: Federal Action Could HelpTransit
Agencies Address Security Challenges, GAO-03-263, Dec. 2002 (online at
www.gao.gov/new.items/d03263.pdf). 13 How to Do It? A Different Way of Organizing
the Government
1. The Bush administration clarified the respective missions of the different
intelligence analysis centers in a letter sent by Secretary Ridge, DCITenet, FBI
Director Mueller, andTTIC Director Brennan to Senators Susan Collins and Carl Levin
on April 13, 2004. The letter did not mention any element of the Department of
Defense. It stated that the DCI would define what analytical resources he would
transfer from the CTC to TTIC no later than June 1, 2004. DCI Tenet subsequently
told us that he decided that TTIC would have primary responsibility for terrorism
analysis but that the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency would grow their own
analysts. TTIC will have tasking authority over terrorism analysts in other
intelligence agencies, although there will need to be a board to supervise
deconfliction. George Tenet interview (July 2, 2004). We have not received any
details regarding this plan. 2." TTIC has no operational authority. However, TTIC
has the authority to task collection and analysis from Intelligence Community
agencies, the FBI, and DHS through tasking mechanisms we will create. The analytic
work conducted at TTIC creates products that inform each of TTIC's partner elements,
as well as other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate." Letter from Ridge
and others to Collins and Levin, Apr. 13, 2004.
3. Donald Rumsfeld prepared statement, Mar. 23, 2004, p. 20.
4. In this conception, the NCTC should plan actions, assigning responsibilities for
operational direction and execution to other agencies. It would be built on TTIC and
would be supported by the intelligence community as TTIC is now. Whichever route is
chosen, the scarce analytical resources now dispersed amongTTIC, the Defense
Intelligence Agency's Joint Interagency Task Force-Combatting Terrorism (JITF-CT),
and the DCI's Counterterrorist Center (CTC) should be concentrated more effectively
than they are now.
The DCI's Counterterrorist Center would become a CIA unit, to handle the direction
and execution of tasks assigned to the CIA. It could have detailees from other
agencies, as it does now, to perform this operational mission. It would yield much
of the broader, strategic analytic duties and personnel to the NCTC. The CTC would
rely on the restructured CIA (discussed in section 13.2) to organize, train, and
equip its personnel.
Similarly, the FBI's Counterterrorism Division would remain, as now, the operational
arm of the Bureau to combat terrorism. As it does now, it would work with other
agencies in carrying out these missions, retaining the JTTF structure now in place.
The Counterterrorism Division would rely on the FBI's Office of Intelligence to
train and equip its personnel, helping to process and report the information
gathered in the field.
The Defense Department's unified commands-SOCOM, NORTHCOM, and CENTCOM-would be the
joint operational centers taking on DOD tasks. Much of the excellent analytical
talent that has been assembled in the Defense Intelligence Agency's JITF-CT should
merge into the planned NCTC.
The Department of Homeland Security's Directorate for Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection should retain its core duties, but the NCTC should have
the ultimate responsibility for producing net assessments that utilize Homeland
Security's analysis of domestic vulnerabilities and integrate all-source analysis of
foreign intelligence about the terrorist enemy.
The State Department's counterterrorism office would be a critical participant in the
NCTC's work, taking the lead in directing the execution of the counterterrorism
foreign policy mission. The proposed National Counterterrorism Center should offer
one-stop shopping to agencies with counterterrorism and homeland security
responsibilities. That is, it should be an authoritative reference base on the
transnational terrorist organizations: their people, goals, strategies,
capabilities, networks of contacts and support, the context in which they operate,
and their characteristic habits across the life cycle of operations-recruitment,
reconnaissance, target selection, logistics, and travel. For example, this Center
would offer an integrated depiction of groups like al Qaeda or Hezbollah worldwide,
overseas, and in the United States. The NCTC will not eliminate the need for the
executive departments to have their own analytic units. But it would enable
agency-based analytic units to become smaller and more efficient. In particular, it
would make it possible for these agency-based analytic units to concentrate on
analysis that is tailored to their agency's specific responsibilities.
A useful analogy is in military intelligence. There, the Defense Intelligence Agency
and the service production agencies (like the Army's National Ground Intelligence
Center) are the institutional memory and reference source for enemy order of battle,
enemy organization, and enemy equipment. Yet the Joint Staff and all the theater
commands still have their own J-2s. They draw on the information they need,
tailoring and applying it to their operational needs. As they learn more from their
tactical operations, they pass intelligence of enduring value back up to the Defense
Intelligence Agency and the services so it can be evaluated, form part of the
institutional memory, and help guide future collection.
In our proposal, that reservoir of institutional memory about terrorist organizations
would function for the government as a whole, and would be in the NCTC.
5. The head of the NCTC would thus help coordinate the operational side of these
agencies, like the FBI's Counterterrorism Division. The intelligence side of these
agencies, such as the FBI's Office of Intelligence, would be overseen by the
National Intelligence Director we recommend later in this chapter.
6. The quotation goes on:"It includes gaps in intelligence, but also intelligence
that, like a string of pearls too precious to wear, is too sensitive to give to
those who need it. It includes the alarm that fails to work, but also the alarm that
has gone off so often it has been disconnected. It includes the unalert watchman,
but also the one who knows he'll be chewed out by his superior if he gets higher
authority out of bed. It includes the contingencies that occur to no one, but also
those that everyone assumes somebody else is taking care of. It includes
straightforward procrastination, but also decisions protracted by internal
disagreement. It includes, in addition, the inability of individual human beings to
rise to the occasion until they are sure it is the occasion-which is usually too
late. . . . Finally, as at Pearl Harbor, surprise may include some measure of
genuine novelty introduced by the enemy, and some sheer bad luck." Thomas Schelling,
foreword to Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford Univ.
Press, 1962), p. viii.
7. For the Goldwater-Nichols Act, see Pub. L. No. 99-433, 100 Stat. 992 (1986). For a
general discussion of the act, see Gordon Lederman, Reorganizing the Joint Chiefs of
Staff: The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 (Greenwood,1999); James Locher, Victory on
the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon (Texas A&M Univ.
Press, 2003).
8. For a history of the DCI's authority over the intelligence community, see CIA
report, Michael Warner ed., Central Intelligence; Origin and Evolution (CIA Center
for the Study of Intelligence, 2001). For the Director's view of his community
authorities, see DCI directive, "Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1/1: The
Authorities and Responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence as Head of
the U.S. Intelligence Community," Nov. 19, 1998.
9. As Norman Augustine, former chairman of Lockheed Martin Corporation, writes
regarding power in the government, "As in business, cash is king. If you are not in
charge of your budget, you are not king." Norman Augustine, Managing to Survive in
Washington: A Beginner's Guide to High-Level Management in Government (Center for
Strategic and International Studies, 2000), p. 20.
10. For the DCI and the secretary of defense, see 50 U.S.C. 403-6(a). If the director
does not concur with the secretary's choice, then the secretary is required to
notify the president of the director's nonconcurrence. Ibid. For the DCI and the
attorney general, see 50 U.S.C. � 403-6(b)(3).
11. The new program would replace the existing National Foreign Intelligence Program.
12. Some smaller parts of the current intelligence community, such as the State
Department's intelligence bureau and the Energy Department's intelligence entity,
should not be funded out of the national intelligence program and should be the
responsibility of their home departments.
13. The head of the NCTC should have the rank of a deputy national intelligence
director, e.g., Executive Level II, but would have a different title.
14. If the organization of defense intelligence remains as it is now, the appropriate
official would be the under secretary of defense for intelligence. If defense
intelligence is reorganized to elevate the responsibilities of the director of the
DIA, then that person might be the appropriate official.
15. For the information technology architecture, see Ruth David interview (June 10,
2003). For the necessity of moving from need-to-know to need-to-share, see James
Steinberg testimony, Oct. 14, 2003. The Director still has no strategy for removing
information-sharing barriers and-more than two years since 9/11-has only appointed a
working group on the subject. George Tenet prepared statement, Mar. 24, 2004, p. 37.
16. The intelligence community currently makes information shareable by creating
"tearline" reports, with the nonshareable information at the top and then, below the
"tearline," the portion that recipients are told they can share. This proposal
reverses that concept. All reports are created as tearline data, with the shareable
information at the top and with added details accessible on a system that requires
permissions or authentication.
17. See Markle FoundationTask Force report, Creating aTrusted Information Network for
Homeland Security (Markle Foundation, 2003); Markle Foundation Task Force report,
Protecting America's Freedom in the Information Age (Markle Foundation, 2002) (both
online at www.markle.org).
18. Markle Foundation Task Force report, Creating a Trusted Information Network, p.
12. The pressing need for such guidelines was also spotlighted by the Technology and
Privacy Advisory Committee appointed by Secretary Rumsfeld to advise the Department
of Defense on the privacy implications of its Terrorism Information Awareness
Program. Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee report, Safeguarding Privacy in
the Fight Against Terrorism (2004) (online at
www.sainc.com/tapac/TAPAC_Report_Final_5-10-04.pdf). We take no position on the
particular recommendations offered in that report, but it raises issues that pertain
to the government as a whole- not just to the Department of Defense.
19. This change should eliminate the need in the Senate for the current procedure of
sequential referral of the annual authorization bill for the national foreign
intelligence program. In that process, the Senate Armed Services Committee reviews
the bill passed by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence before the bill is
brought before the full Senate for consideration.
20. This recommendation, and measures to assist the Bureau in developing its
intelligence cadre, are included in the report accompanying the Commerce, Justice
and State Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2005, passed by the House of
Representatives on July 7, 2004. H.R. Rep. No. 108-576, 108th Cong., 2d sess.
(2004), p. 22.
21. Letter from Ridge and others to Collins and Levin, Apr. 13, 2004.
22. For the directorate's current capability, see Patrick Hughes interview (Apr. 2,
2004).
