THE ATTACK LOOMS
FIRST ARRIVALS IN CALIFORNIA
In chapter 5 we described the Southeast Asia travels of Nawaf al Hazmi, Khalid al
Mihdhar, and others in January 2000 on the first part of the "planes operation." In
that chapter we also described how Mihdhar was spotted in Kuala Lumpur early in
January 2000, along with associates who were not identified, and then was lost to
sight when the group passed through Bangkok. On January 15, Hazmi and Mihdhar
arrived in Los Angeles. They spent about two weeks there before moving on to San
Diego.
Two Weeks in Los Angeles
Why Hazmi and Mihdhar came to California, we do not know for certain. Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed (KSM), the organizer of the planes operation, explains that California was
a convenient point of entry from Asia and had the added benefit of being far away
from the intended target area.
Hazmi and Mihdhar were ill-prepared for a mission in the United States. Their only
qualifications for this plot were their devotion to Usama Bin Ladin, their veteran
service, and their ability to get valid U.S. visas. Neither had spent any
substantial time in the West, and neither spoke much, if any, English.
It would therefore be plausible that they or KSM would have tried to identify, in
advance, a friendly contact for them in the United States. In detention, KSM denies
that al Qaeda had any agents in Southern California. We do not credit this
denial.4We believe it is unlikely that Hazmi and Mihdhar-neither of whom, in
contrast to the Hamburg group, had any prior exposure to life in the West-would have
come to the United States without arranging to receive assistance from one or more
individuals informed in advance of their arrival.
KSM says that though he told others involved in the conspiracy to stay away from
mosques and to avoid establishing personal contacts, he made an exception in this
case and instructed Hazmi and Mihdhar to pose as newly arrived Saudi students and
seek assistance at local mosques. He counted on their breaking off any such
relationships once they moved to the East Coast.
Our inability to ascertain the activities of Hazmi and Mihdhar during their first two
weeks in the United States may reflect al Qaeda tradecraft designed to protect the
identity of anyone who may have assisted them during that period. Hazmi and Mihdhar
were directed to enroll in English-language classes upon arriving in Southern
California, so that they could begin pilot training as soon as possible. KSM claims
to have steered the two to San Diego on the basis of his own research, which
supposedly included thumbing through a San Diego phone book acquired at a Karachi
flea market. Contradicting himself, he also says that, as instructed, they attempted
to enroll in three language schools in Los Angeles.
After the pair cleared Immigration and Customs at Los Angeles International Airport,
we do not know where they went.8They appear to have obtained assistance from the
Muslim community, specifically the community surrounding the King Fahd mosque in
Culver City, one of the most prominent mosques in Southern California.
It is fairly certain that Hazmi and Mihdhar spent time at the King Fahd mosque and
made some acquaintances there. One witness interviewed by the FBI after the
September 11 attacks has said he first met the hijackers at the mosque in early
2000. Furthermore, one of the people who would befriend them-a man named Mohdar
Abdullah-recalled a trip with Hazmi and Mihdhar to Los Angeles in June when, on
their arrival, the three went to the King Fahd mosque. There Hazmi and Mihdhar
greeted various individuals whom they appeared to have met previously, including a
man named "Khallam." In Abdullah's telling, when Khallam visited the al Qaeda
operatives at their motel that evening, Abdullah was asked to leave the room so that
Hazmi, Mihdhar, and Khallam could meet in private. The identity of Khallam and his
purpose in meeting with Hazmi and Mihdhar remain unknown.
To understand what Hazmi and Mihdhar did in their first weeks in the United States,
evidently staying in Los Angeles, we have investigated whether anyone associated
with the King Fahd mosque assisted them. This subject has received substantial
attention in the media. Some have speculated that Fahad al Thumairy-an imam at the
mosque and an accredited diplomat at the Saudi Arabian consulate from 1996 until
2003-may have played a role in helping the hijackers establish themselves on their
arrival in Los Angeles. This speculation is based, at least in part, on Thumairy's
reported leadership of an extremist faction at the mosque.
A well-known figure at the King Fahd mosque and within the Los Angeles Muslim
community, Thumairy was reputed to be an Islamic fundamentalist and a strict
adherent to orthodox Wahhabi doctrine. Some Muslims concerned about his preaching
have said he "injected non-Islamic themes into his guidance/prayers at the [King
Fahd] Mosque" and had followers "supportive of the events of September 11,
2001." Thumairy appears to have associated with a
particularly radical faction within the community of local worshippers, and had a
network of contacts in other cities in the United States. After 9/11, Thumairy's
conduct was a subject of internal debate among some Saudi officials. He apparently
lost his position at the King Fahd mosque, possibly because of his immoderate
reputation. On May 6, 2003, Thumairy attempted to reenter the United States from
Saudi Arabia but was refused entry, based on a determination by the State Department
that he might be connected with terrorist activity.
When interviewed by both the FBI and the Commission staff, Thumairy has denied
preaching anti-Western sermons, much less promoting violent jihad. More to the
point, he claimed not to recognize either Hazmi or Mihdhar. Both denials are
somewhat suspect. (He likewise denied knowing Omar al Bayoumi-a man from San Diego
we will discuss shortly-even though witnesses and telephone records establish that
the two men had contact with each other. Similarly, Thumairy's claim not to know
Mohdar Abdullah is belied by Abdullah's contrary assertion.) On the other hand,
Thumairy undoubtedly met with and provided religious counseling to countless
individuals during his tenure at the King Fahd mosque, so he might not remember two
transients like Hazmi and Mihdhar several years later.
The circumstantial evidence makes Thumairy a logical person to consider as a possible
contact for Hazmi and Mihdhar. Yet, after exploring the available leads, we have not
found evidence that Thumairy provided assistance to the two operatives.
We do not pick up their trail until February 1, 2000, when they encountered Omar al
Bayoumi and Caysan Bin Don at a halal food restaurant on Venice Boulevard in Culver
City, a few blocks away from the King Fahd mosque. Bayoumi and Bin Don have both
told us that they had driven up from San Diego earlier that day so that Bayoumi
could address a visa issue and collect some papers from the Saudi consulate. Bayoumi
heard Hazmi and Mihdhar speaking in what he recognized to be Gulf Arabic and struck
up a conversation. Since Bin Don knew only a little Arabic, he had to rely heavily
on Bayoumi to translate for him.
Mihdhar and Hazmi said they were students from Saudi Arabia who had just arrived in
the United States to study English. They said they were living in an apartment near
the restaurant but did not specify the address. They did not like Los Angeles and
were having a hard time, especially because they did not know anyone. Bayoumi told
them how pleasant San Diego was and offered to help them settle there. The two pairs
then left the restaurant and went their separate ways.
Bayoumi and Bin Don have been interviewed many times about the February 1, 2000,
lunch. For the most part, their respective accounts corroborate each other. However,
Bayoumi has said that he and Bin Don attempted to visit the King Fahd mosque after
lunch but could not find it. Bin Don, on the other hand, recalls visiting the mosque
twice that day for prayers, both before and after the meal. Bin Don's recollection
is spotty and inconsistent. Bayoumi's version can be challenged as well, since the
mosque is close to the restaurant and Bayoumi had visited it, and the surrounding
area, on multiple occasions, including twice within six weeks of February 1. We do
not know whether the lunch encounter occurred by chance or design. We know about it
because Bayoumi told law enforcement that it happened.
Bayoumi, then 42 years old, was in the United States as a business student, supported
by a private contractor for the Saudi Civil Aviation Authority, where Bayoumi had
worked for over 20 years.
The object of considerable media speculation following 9/11, he lives now in Saudi
Arabia, well aware of his notoriety. Both we and the FBI have interviewed him and
investigated evidence about him.
Bayoumi is a devout Muslim, obliging and gregarious. He spent much of his spare time
involved in religious study and helping run a mosque in El Cajon, about 15 miles
from San Diego. It is certainly possible that he has dissembled about some aspects
of his story, perhaps to counter suspicion. On the other hand, we have seen no
credible evidence that he believed in violent extremism or knowingly aided extremist
groups.
Our investigators who have dealt directly with him and studied his background find
him to be an unlikely candidate for clandestine involvement with Islamist
extremists. The Move to San Diego By February 4, Hazmi and Mihdhar had come to San
Diego from Los Angeles, possibly driven by Mohdar Abdullah. Abdullah, a Yemeni
university student in his early 20s, is fluent in both Arabic and English, and was
perfectly suited to assist the hijackers in pursuing their mission.
After 9/11, Abdullah was interviewed many times by the FBI. He admitted knowing of
Hazmi and Mihdhar's extremist leanings and Mihdhar's involvement with the Islamic
Army of Aden (a group with ties to al Qaeda) back in Yemen. Abdullah clearly was
sympathetic to those extremist views. During a post-9/11 search of his possessions,
the FBI found a notebook (belonging to someone else) with references to planes
falling from the sky, mass killing, and hijacking. Further, when detained as a
material witness following the 9/11 attacks, Abdullah expressed hatred for the U.S.
government and "stated that the U.S. brought 'this' on themselves."
When interviewed by the FBI after 9/11, Abdullah denied having advance knowledge of
attacks. In May 2004, however, we learned of reports about Abdullah bragging to
fellow inmates at a California prison in September- October 2003 that he had known
Hazmi and Mihdhar were planning a terrorist attack. The stories attributed to
Abdullah are not entirely consistent with each other. Specifically, according to one
inmate, Abdullah claimed an unnamed individual had notified him that Hazmi and
Mihdhar would be arriving in Los Angeles with plans to carry out an attack. Abdullah
allegedly told the same inmate that he had driven the two al Qaeda operatives from
Los Angeles to San Diego, but did not say when this occurred. We have been unable to
corroborate this account.
Another inmate has recalled Abdullah claiming he first heard about the hijackers'
terrorist plans after they arrived in San Diego, when they told him they planned to
fly an airplane into a building and invited him to join them on the plane. According
to this inmate, Abdullah also claimed to have found out about the 9/11 attacks three
weeks in advance, a claim that appears to dovetail with evidence that Abdullah may
have received a phone call from Hazmi around that time, that he stopped making calls
from his telephone after August 25, 2001, and that, according to his friends, he
started acting strangely.
Although boasts among prison inmates often tend to be unreliable, this evidence is
obviously important. To date, neither we nor the FBI have been able to verify
Abdullah's alleged jailhouse statements, despite investigative efforts. We thus do
not know when or how Hazmi and Mihdhar first came to San Diego. We do know that on
February 4, they went to the Islamic Center of San Diego to find Omar al Bayoumi and
take him up on his offer of help. Bayoumi obliged by not only locating an apartment
but also helping them fill out the lease application, co-signing the lease and, when
the real estate agent refused to take cash for a deposit, helping them open a bank
account (which they did with a $9,900 deposit); he then provided a certified check
from his own account for which the al Qaeda operatives reimbursed him on the spot
for the deposit. Neither then nor later did Bayoumi give money to either Hazmi or
Mihdhar, who had received money from KSM.
Hazmi and Mihdhar moved in with no furniture and practically no possessions. Soon
after the move, Bayoumi used their apartment for a party attended by some 20 male
members of the Muslim community. At Bayoumi's request, Bin Don videotaped the
gathering with Bayoumi's video camera. Hazmi and Mihdhar did not mingle with the
other guests and reportedly spent most of the party by themselves off camera, in a
back room.
Hazmi and Mihdhar immediately started looking for a different place to stay. Based on
their comment to Bayoumi about the first apartment being expensive, one might infer
that they wanted to save money. They may also have been reconsidering the wisdom of
living so close to the video camera-wielding Bayoumi, who Hazmi seemed to think was
some sort of Saudi spy. Just over a week after moving in, Hazmi and Mihdhar filed a
30-day notice of intention to vacate. Bayoumi apparently loaned them his cell phone
to help them check out possibilities for new accommodations.
Their initial effort to move turned out poorly. An acquaintance arranged with his
landlord to have Mihdhar take over his apartment. Mihdhar put down a $650 deposit
and signed a lease for the apartment effective March 1. Several weeks later, Mihdhar
sought a refund of his deposit, claiming he no longer intended to move in because
the apartment was too messy. When the landlord refused to refund the deposit,
Mihdhar became belligerent. The landlord remembers him "ranting and raving" as if he
were "psychotic."
Hazmi and Mihdhar finally found a room to rent in the home of an individual they had
met at a mosque in San Diego. According to the homeowner, the future hijackers moved
in on May 10, 2000. Mihdhar moved out after only about a month. On June 9, he left
San Diego to return to Yemen. Hazmi, on the other hand, stayed at this house for the
rest of his time in California, until mid-December; he would then leave for Arizona
with a newly arrived 9/11 hijacker-pilot, Hani Hanjour.
While in San Diego, Hazmi and Mihdhar played the part of recently arrived foreign
students. They continued to reach out to members of the Muslim community for help.
At least initially, they found well-meaning new acquaintances at the Islamic Center
of San Diego, which was only a stone's throw from the apartment where they first
lived. For example, when they purchased a used car (with cash), they bought it from
a man who lived across the street from the Islamic Center and who let them use his
address in registering the vehicle, an accommodation "to help a fellow Muslim
brother." Similarly, in April, when their cash supply may have been dwindling, Hazmi
persuaded the administrator of the Islamic Center to let him use the administrator's
bank account to receive a $5,000 wire transfer from someone in Dubai, in the United
Arab Emirates (this was KSM's nephew, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali).29 Hazmi and Mihdhar
visited other mosques as well, mixing comfortably as devout worshippers. During the
operatives' critical first weeks in San Diego, Mohdar Abdullah helped them.
Translating between English and Arabic, he assisted them in obtaining California
driver's licenses and with applying to language and flight schools. Abdullah also
introduced them to his circle of friends; he shared an apartment with some of those
friends near the Rabat mosque in La Mesa, a few miles from the hijackers'
residence.
Abdullah has emerged as a key associate of Hazmi and Mihdhar in San Diego. Detained
after 9/11 (first as a material witness, then on immigration charges), he was
deported to Yemen on May 21, 2004, after the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District
of California declined to prosecute him on charges arising out of his alleged
jailhouse admissions concerning the 9/11 operatives. The Department of Justice
declined to delay his removal pending further investigation of this new
information.
Other friends of Abdullah also translated for Hazmi and Mihdhar and helped them
adjust to life in San Diego. Some held extremist beliefs or were well acquainted
with known extremists. For example, immediately after 9/11, Osama Awadallah, a
Yemeni whose telephone number was found in Hazmi's Toyota at Washington Dulles
International Airport, was found to possess photos, videos, and articles relating to
Bin Ladin. Awadallah also had lived in a house where copies of Bin Ladin's fatwas
and other similar materials were distributed to the residents. Omar Bakarbashat, a
Saudi, also met Hazmi and Mihdhar at the Rabat mosque. He admitted helping Hazmi to
learn English and taking over the operatives' first apartment in San Diego after
they moved out. Bakarbashat apparently had downloaded stridently anti-American Web
pages to his computer's hard drive.
Another potentially significant San Diego contact for Hazmi and Mihdhar was Anwar
Aulaqi, an imam at the Rabat mosque. Born in New Mexico and thus a U.S. citizen,
Aulaqi grew up in Yemen and studied in the United States on a Yemeni government
scholarship. We do not know how or when Hazmi and Mihdhar first met Aulaqi. The
operatives may even have met or at least talked to him the same day they first moved
to San Diego. Hazmi and Mihdhar reportedly respected Aulaqi as a religious figure
and developed a close relationship with him.
When interviewed after 9/11, Aulaqi said he did not recognize Hazmi's name but did
identify his picture. Although Aulaqi admitted meeting with Hazmi several times, he
claimed not to remember any specifics of what they discussed. He described Hazmi as
a soft-spoken Saudi student who used to appear at the mosque with a companion but
who did not have a large circle of friends.
Aulaqi left San Diego in mid-2000, and by early 2001 had relocated to Virginia. As we
will discuss later, Hazmi eventually showed up at Aulaqi's mosque in Virginia, an
appearance that may not have been coincidental. We have been unable to learn enough
about Aulaqi's relationship with Hazmi and Mihdhar to reach a conclusion.
In sum, although the evidence is thin as to specific motivations, our overall
impression is that soon after arriving in California, Hazmi and Mihdhar sought out
and found a group of young and ideologically like-minded Muslims with roots in Yemen
and Saudi Arabia, individuals mainly associated with Mohdar Abdullah and the Rabat
mosque. The al Qaeda operatives lived openly in San Diego under their true names,
listing Hazmi in the telephone directory. They managed to avoid attracting much
attention.
Flight Training Fails; Mihdhar Bails Out
Hazmi and Mihdhar came to the United States to learn English, take flying lessons,
and become pilots as quickly as possible. They turned out, however, to have no
aptitude for English. Even with help and tutoring from Mohdar Abdullah and other
bilingual friends, Hazmi and Mihdhar's efforts to learn proved futile. This lack of
language skills in turn became an insurmountable barrier to learning how to
fly.
A pilot they consulted at one school, the Sorbi Flying Club in San Diego, spoke
Arabic. He explained to them that their flight instruction would begin with small
planes. Hazmi and Mihdhar emphasized their interest in learning to fly jets, Boeing
aircraft in particular, and asked where they might enroll to train on jets right
away. Convinced that the two were either joking or dreaming, the pilot responded
that no such school existed. Other instructors who worked with Hazmi and Mihdhar
remember them as poor students who focused on learning to control the aircraft in
flight but took no interest in takeoffs or landings. By the end of May 2000, Hazmi
and Mihdhar had given up on learning how to fly.
Mihdhar's mind seems to have been with his family back in Yemen, as evidenced by
calls he made from the apartment telephone. When news of the birth of his first
child arrived, he could stand life in California no longer. In late May and early
June of 2000, he closed his bank account, transferred the car registration to Hazmi,
and arranged his return to Yemen. According to KSM, Mihdhar was bored in San Diego
and foresaw no problem in coming back to the United States since he had not
overstayed his visa. Hazmi and Mohdar Abdullah accompanied him to Los Angeles on
June 9. After visiting the King Fahd mosque one last time with his friends, Mihdhar
left the country the following day.
KSM kept in fairly close touch with his operatives, using a variety of methods. When
Bin Ladin called KSM back from Pakistan to Afghanistan in the spring of 2000, KSM
asked Khallad (whom we introduced in chapter 5) to maintain email contact with Hazmi
in the United States. Mihdhar's decision to strand Hazmi in San Diego enraged KSM,
who had not authorized the departure and feared it would compromise the plan. KSM
attempted to drop Mihdhar from the planes operation and would have done so, he says,
had he not been overruled by Bin Ladin.
Following Mihdhar's departure, Hazmi grew lonely and worried that he would have
trouble managing by himself. He prayed with his housemate each morning at 5:00 A.M.
and attended services at the Islamic Center. He borrowed his housemate's computer
for Internet access, following news coverage of fighting in Chechnya and Bosnia.
With his housemate's help, Hazmi also used the Internet to search for a wife (after
obtaining KSM's approval to marry). This search did not succeed. Although he
developed a close relationship with his housemate, Hazmi preferred not to use the
house telephone, continuing the practice he and Mihdhar had adopted of going outside
to make phone calls.
After Mihdhar left, other students moved into the house. One of these, Yazeed al
Salmi, stands out. In July 2000, Salmi purchased $4,000 in traveler's checks at a
bank in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. On September 5, Hazmi deposited $1,900 of the
traveler's checks into his bank account, after withdrawing the same amount in cash.
It is possible that Hazmi was simply cashing the traveler's checks for a friend. We
do not know; Salmi claims not to remember the transaction. After 9/11, Salmi
reportedly confided to Mohdar Abdullah that he had previously known terrorist pilot
Hani Hanjour. After living in the same house with Hazmi for about a month, Salmi
moved to the La Mesa apartment shared by Abdullah and others.
By the fall of 2000, Hazmi no longer even pretended to study English or take flying
lessons. Aware that his co-conspirators in Afghanistan and Pakistan would be sending
him a new colleague shortly, he bided his time and worked for a few weeks at a gas
station in La Mesa where some of his friends, including Abdullah, were employed. On
one occasion, Hazmi told a fellow employee that he was planning to find a better
job, and let slip a prediction that he would become famous.
On December 8, 2000, Hani Hanjour arrived in San Diego, having traveled from Dubai
via Paris and Cincinnati. Hazmi likely picked up Hanjour at the airport. We do not
know where Hanjour stayed; a few days later, both men left San Diego. Before
departing, they visited the gas station in La Mesa, where Hazmi reportedly
introduced Hanjour as a "long time friend from Saudi Arabia." Hazmi told his
housemate that he and his friend "Hani" were headed for San Jose to take flying
lessons and told his friends that he would stay in touch. Hazmi promised to return
to San Diego soon, and he and Hanjour drove off.
Hazmi did not sever all contact with his friends in San Diego. According to Abdullah,
after Hazmi left San Diego in December 2000, he telephoned Abdullah twice: in
December 2000 or January 2001, Hazmi said he was in San Francisco and would be
attending flight school there; about two weeks later, he said he was attending
flight school in Arizona. Some evidence, which we will discuss later, indicates that
Hazmi contacted Abdullah again, in August 2001. In addition, during the month
following Hazmi's departure from San Diego, he emailed his housemate three times,
including a January 2001 email that Hazmi signed "Smer," an apparent attempt to
conceal his identity that struck the housemate as strange at the time. Hazmi also
telephoned his housemate that he and his friend had decided to take flight lessons
in Arizona, and that Mihdhar was now back in Yemen. That was their last contact.
When the housemate emailed Hazmi in February and March of 2001 to find out how he
was faring, Hazmi did not reply.
The housemate who rented the room to Hazmi and Mihdhar during 2000 is an apparently
law-abiding citizen with long-standing, friendly contacts among local police and FBI
personnel. He did not see anything unusual enough in the behavior of Hazmi or
Mihdhar to prompt him to report to his law enforcement contacts. Nor did those
contacts ask him for information about his tenants/housemates.
THE 9/11 PILOTS IN THE UNITED STATES
The Hamburg Pilots Arrive in the United States
In the early summer of 2000, the Hamburg group arrived in the United States to begin
flight training. Marwan al Shehhi came on May 29, arriving in Newark on a flight
from Brussels. He went to New York City and waited there for Mohamed Atta to join
him. On June 2, Atta traveled to the Czech Republic by bus from Germany and then
flew from Prague to Newark the next day. According to Ramzi Binalshibh, Atta did not
meet with anyone in Prague; he simply believed it would contribute to operational
security to fly out of Prague rather than Hamburg, the departure point for much of
his previous international travel.
Atta and Shehhi had not settled on where they would obtain their flight training. In
contrast, Ziad Jarrah had already arranged to attend the Florida Flight Training
Center (FFTC) in Venice, Florida. Jarrah arrived in Newark on June 27 and then flew
to Venice. He immediately began the private pilot program at FFTC, intending to get
a multi-engine license. Jarrah moved in with some of the flight instructors
affiliated with his school and bought a car.
While Jarrah quickly settled into training in Florida, Atta and Shehhi kept searching
for a flight school. After visiting the Airman Flight School in Norman, Oklahoma
(where Zacarias Moussaoui would enroll several months later and where another al
Qaeda operative, Ihab Ali, had taken lessons in the mid1990s), Atta started flight
instruction at Huffman Aviation in Venice, Florida, and both Atta and Shehhi
subsequently enrolled in the Accelerated Pilot Program at that school. By the end of
July, both of them took solo flights, and by mid-August they passed the private
pilot airman test. They trained through the summer at Huffman, while Jarrah
continued his training at FFTC.
The Hamburg operatives paid for their flight training primarily with funds wired from
Dubai by KSM's nephew, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali. Between June 29 and September 17, 2000,
Ali sent Shehhi and Atta a total of $114,500 in five transfers ranging from $5,000
to $70,000. Ali relied on the unremarkable nature of his transactions, which were
essentially invisible amid the billions of dollars flowing daily across the
globe.
Ali was not required to provide identification in sending this money and the aliases
he used were not questioned.
In mid-September, Atta and Shehhi applied to change their immigration status from
tourist to student, stating their intention to study at Huffman until September 1,
2001. In late September, they decided to enroll at Jones Aviation in Sarasota,
Florida, about 20 miles north of Venice. According to the instructor at Jones, the
two were aggressive, rude, and sometimes even fought with him to take over the
controls during their training flights. In early October, they took the Stage I exam
for instruments rating at Jones Aviation and failed. Very upset, they said they were
in a hurry because jobs awaited them at home. Atta and Shehhi then returned to
Huffman.
In the meantime, Jarrah obtained a single-engine private pilot certificate in early
August. Having reached that milestone, he departed on the first of five foreign
trips he would take after first entering the United States. In October, he flew back
to Germany to visit his girlfriend, Aysel Senguen. The two traveled to Paris before
Jarrah returned to Florida on October 29. His relationship with her remained close
throughout his time in the United States. In addition to his trips, Jarrah made
hundreds of phone calls to her and communicated frequently by email.
Jarrah was supposed to be joined at FFTC by Ramzi Binalshibh, who even sent the
school a deposit. But Binalshibh could not obtain a U.S. visa. His first
applications in May and June 2000 were denied because he lacked established ties in
Germany ensuring his return from a trip to the United States. In September, he went
home to Yemen to apply for a visa from there, but was denied on grounds that he also
lacked sufficient ties to Yemen. In October, he tried one last time, in Berlin,
applying for a student visa to attend "aviation language school," but the prior
denials were noted and this application was denied as well, as incomplete.
Unable to participate directly in the operation, Binalshibh instead took on the role
of coordinating between KSM and the operatives in the United States. Apart from
sending a total of about $10,000 in wire transfers to Atta and Shehhi during the
summer of 2000, one of Binalshibh's first tasks in his new role as plot coordinator
was to assist another possible pilot, Zacarias Moussaoui.
In the fall of 2000, KSM had sent Moussaoui to Malaysia for flight training, but
Moussaoui did not find a school he liked. He worked instead on other terrorist
schemes, such as buying four tons of ammonium nitrate for bombs to be planted on
cargo planes flying to the United States. When KSM found out, he recalled Moussaoui
back to Pakistan and directed him to go to the United States for flight training. In
early October, Moussaoui went to London. When Binalshibh visited London in December,
he stayed at the same 16-room dormitory where Moussaoui was still residing. From
London, Moussaoui sent inquiries to the Airman Flight School in Norman,
Oklahoma.
Confronting training or travel problems with Hazmi, Mihdhar, Binalshibh, and
Moussaoui, al Qaeda was looking for another possible pilot candidate. A new recruit
with just the right background conveniently presented himself in Afghanistan.
The Fourth Pilot: Hani Hanjour
Hani Hanjour, from Ta'if, Saudi Arabia, first came to the United States in 1991 to
study at the Center for English as a Second Language at the University of Arizona.
He seems to have been a rigorously observant Muslim. According to his older brother,
Hani Hanjour went to Afghanistan for the first time in the late 1980s, as a
teenager, to participate in the jihad and, because the Soviets had already
withdrawn, worked for a relief agency there.
In 1996, Hanjour returned to the United States to pursue flight training, after being
rejected by a Saudi flight school. He checked out flight schools in Florida,
California, and Arizona; and he briefly started at a couple of them before returning
to Saudi Arabia. In 1997, he returned to Florida and then, along with two friends,
went back to Arizona and began his flight training there in earnest. After about
three months, Hanjour was able to obtain his private pilot's license. Several more
months of training yielded him a commercial pilot certificate, issued by the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) in April 1999. He then returned to Saudi Arabia.
Hanjour reportedly applied to the civil aviation school in Jeddah after returning
home, but was rejected. He stayed home for a while and then told his family he was
going to the United Arab Emirates to work for an airline. Where Hanjour actually
traveled during this time period is unknown. It is possible he went to the training
camps in Afghanistan.
The fact that Hanjour spent so much time in Arizona may be significant. A number of
important al Qaeda figures attended the University of Arizona in Tucson or lived in
Tucson in the 1980s and early 1990s.
Some of Hanjour's known Arizona associates from the time of his flight training in
the late 1990s have also raised suspicion.
FBI investigators have speculated that al Qaeda may have directed other extremist
Muslims in the Phoenix area to enroll in aviation training. It is clear that when
Hanjour lived in Arizona in the 1990s, he associated with several individuals
holding extremist beliefs who have been the subject of counterterrorism
investigations. Some of them trained with Hanjour to be pilots. Others had apparent
connections to al Qaeda, including training in Afghanistan.
By the spring of 2000, Hanjour was back in Afghanistan. According to KSM, Hanjour was
sent to him in Karachi for inclusion in the plot after Hanjour was identified in al
Qaeda's al Faruq camp as a trained pilot, on the basis of background information he
had provided. Hanjour had been at a camp in Afghanistan for a few weeks when Bin
Ladin or Atef apparently realized that he was a trained pilot; he was told to report
to KSM, who then trained Hanjour for a few days in the use of code words.
On June 20, Hanjour returned home to Saudi Arabia. He obtained a U.S. student visa on
September 25 and told his family he was returning to his job in the UAE. Hanjour did
go to the UAE, but to meet facilitator Ali Abdul Aziz Ali.
Ali opened a bank account in Dubai for Hanjour and providing the initial funds for
his trip. On December 8, Hanjour traveled to San Diego. His supposed destination was
an English as a second language program in Oakland, California, which he had
scheduled before leaving Saudi Arabia but never attended. Instead, as mentioned
earlier, he joined Nawaf al Hazmi in San Diego.
Hazmi and Hanjour left San Diego almost immediately and drove to Arizona. Settling in
Mesa, Hanjour began refresher training at his old school, Arizona Aviation. He
wanted to train on multi-engine planes, but had difficulties because his English was
not good enough. The instructor advised him to discontinue but Hanjour said he could
not go home without completing the training. In early 2001, he started training on a
Boeing 737 simulator at Pan Am International Flight Academy in Mesa. An instructor
there found his work well below standard and discouraged him from continuing. Again,
Hanjour persevered; he completed the initial training by the end of March 2001. At
that point, Hanjour and Hazmi vacated their apartment and started driving east,
anticipating the arrival of the "muscle hijackers"-the operatives who would storm
the cockpits and control the passengers. By as early as April 4, Hanjour and Hazmi
had arrived in Falls Church, Virginia.
The three pilots in Florida continued with their training. Atta and Shehhi finished
up at Huffman and earned their instrument certificates from the FAA in November. In
mid-December 2000, they passed their commercial pilot tests and received their
licenses. They then began training to fly large jets on a flight simulator. At about
the same time, Jarrah began simulator training, also in Florida but at a different
center. By the end of 2000, less than six months after their arrival, the three
pilots on the East Coast were simulating flights on large jets.
Travels in Early 2001
Jarrah, Atta, and Shehhi, having progressed in their training, all took foreign trips
during the holiday period of 2000-2001. Jarrah flew through Germany to get home to
Beirut. A few weeks later, he returned to Florida via Germany, with Aysel Senguen.
She stayed with him in Florida for ten days, even accompanying him to a flight
training session. We do not know whether Atta or al Qaeda leaders knew about
Jarrah's trips and Senguen's visit. The other operatives had broken off regular
contact with their families. At the end of January 2001, Jarrah again flew to
Beirut, to visit his sick father. After staying there for several weeks, Jarrah
visited Senguen in Germany for a few days before returning to the United States at
the end of February.
While Jarrah took his personal trips, Atta traveled to Germany in early January 2001
for a progress meeting with Ramzi Binalshibh. Binalshibh says Atta told him to
report to the al Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan that the three Hamburg pilots had
completed their flight training and were awaiting orders. Atta also disclosed that a
fourth pilot, Hanjour, had joined Hazmi. Upon returning to Florida, Atta wired
Binalshibh travel money. Binalshibh proceeded to Afghanistan, made his report, and
spent the next several months there and in Pakistan.
When Atta returned to Florida, Shehhi left for Morocco, traveling to Casablanca in
mid-January. Shehhi's family, concerned about not having heard from him, reported
him missing to the UAE government. The UAE embassy in turn contacted the Hamburg
police and a UAE representative tried to find him in Germany, visiting mosques and
Shehhi's last address in Hamburg. After learning that his family was looking for
him, Shehhi telephoned them on January 20 and said he was still living and studying
in Hamburg. The UAE government then told the Hamburg police they could call off the
search.
Atta and Shehhi both encountered some difficulty reentering the United States, on
January 10 and January 18, respectively. Because neither presented a student visa,
both of them had to persuade INS inspectors that they should be admitted so that
they could continue their flight training. Neither operative had any problem
clearing Customs.
After returning to Florida from their trips, Atta and Shehhi visited Georgia, staying
briefly in Norcross and Decatur, and renting a single-engine plane to fly with an
instructor in Lawrenceville. By February 19, Atta and Shehhi were in Virginia. They
rented a mailbox in Virginia Beach, cashed a check, and then promptly returned to
Georgia, staying in Stone Mountain. We have found no explanation for these travels.
In mid-March, Jarrah was in Georgia as well, staying in Decatur. There is no
evidence that the three pilots met, although Jarrah and Atta apparently spoke on the
phone. At the end of the month, Jarrah left the United States again and visited
Senguen in Germany for two weeks. In early April, Atta and Shehhi returned to
Virginia Beach and closed the mailbox they had opened in February.
By the time Atta and Shehhi returned to Virginia Beach from their travels in Georgia,
Hazmi and Hanjour had also arrived in Virginia, in Falls Church. They made their way
to a large mosque there, the Dar al Hijra mosque, sometime in early April.
As we mentioned earlier, one of the imams at this mosque was the same Anwar Aulaqi
with whom Hazmi had spent time at the Rabat mosque in San Diego. Aulaqi had moved to
Virginia in January 2001. He remembers Hazmi from San Diego but has denied having
any contact with Hazmi or Hanjour in Virginia.
At the Dar al Hijra mosque, Hazmi and Hanjour met a Jordanian named Eyad al Rababah.
Rababah says he had gone to the mosque to speak to the imam, Aulaqi, about finding
work. At the conclusion of services, which normally had 400 to 500 attendees,
Rababah says he happened to meet Hazmi and Hanjour. They were looking for an
apartment; Rababah referred them to a friend who had one to rent. Hazmi and Hanjour
moved into the apartment, which was in Alexandria.
Some FBI investigators doubt Rababah's story. Some agents suspect that Aulaqi may
have tasked Rababah to help Hazmi and Hanjour. We share that suspicion, given the
remarkable coincidence of Aulaqi's prior relationship with Hazmi. As noted above,
the Commission was unable to locate and interview Aulaqi. Rababah has been deported
to Jordan, having been convicted after 9/11 in a fraudulent driver's license
scheme.
Rababah, who had lived in Connecticut, New York, and New Jersey, told investigators
that he had recommended Paterson, New Jersey, as a place with an Arabic-speaking
community where Hazmi and Hanjour might want to settle. They asked for his help in
getting them an apartment in Paterson. Rababah tried without success. He says he
then suggested that Hazmi and Hanjour travel with him to Connecticut where they
could look for a place to live.
On May 8, Rababah went to Hazmi and Hanjour's apartment to pick them up for the trip
to Connecticut. There he says he found them with new roommates-Ahmed al Ghamdi and
Majed Moqed. These two men had been sent to America to serve as muscle hijackers and
had arrived at Dulles Airport on May 2. Rababah drove Hanjour to Fairfield,
Connecticut, followed by Hazmi, who had Moqed and Ghamdi in his car. After a short
stay in Connecticut, where they apparently called area flight schools and real
estate agents, Rababah drove the four to Paterson to have dinner and show them
around. He says that they returned with him to Fairfield that night, and that he
never saw them again.
Within a few weeks, Hanjour, Hazmi, and several other operatives moved to Paterson
and rented a one-room apartment. When their landlord later paid a visit, he found
six men living there-Nawaf al Hazmi, now joined by his younger brother Salem,
Hanjour, Moqed, probably Ahmed al Ghamdi, and Abdul Aziz al Omari; Hazmi's old
friend Khalid al Mihdhar would soon join them.
Atta and Shehhi had already returned to Florida. On April 11, they moved into an
apartment in Coral Springs. Atta stayed in Florida, awaiting the arrival of the
first muscle hijackers.
Shehhi, on the other hand, bought a ticket to Cairo and flew there from Miami on
April 18. We do not know much more about Shehhi's reason for traveling to Egypt in
April than we know about his January trip to Morocco.
Shehhi did meet with Atta's father, who stated in a post-9/11 interview that Shehhi
just wanted to pick up Atta's international driver's license and some money. This
story is not credible. Atta already had the license with him and presented it during
a traffic stop on April 26 while Shehhi was still abroad. Shehhi spent about two
weeks in Egypt, obviously more time than would have been needed just to meet with
Atta's father. Shehhi could have traveled elsewhere during this time, but no records
indicating additional travel have been discovered.
Shehhi returned to Miami on May 2. That day, Atta and Jarrah were together, about 30
miles to the north, visiting a Department of Motor Vehicles office in Lauderdale
Lakes, Florida, to get Florida driver's licenses. Back in Virginia, Hazmi and
Hanjour were about to leave for Connecticut and New Jersey. As the summer
approached, the lead operatives were settled in Florida and New Jersey, waiting for
the rest of their contingent to join them.
ASSEMBLING THE TEAMS
During the summer and early autumn of 2000, Bin Ladin and senior al Qaeda leaders in
Afghanistan started selecting the muscle hijackers-the operatives who would storm
the cockpits and control the passengers. Despite the phrase widely used to describe
them, the so-called muscle hijackers were not at all physically imposing; most were
between 5' 5" and 5' 7" in height.
Recruitment and Selection for 9/11
Twelve of the 13 muscle hijackers (excluding Nawaf al Hazmi and Mihdhar) came from
Saudi Arabia: Satam al Suqami, Wail al Shehri, Waleed al Shehri, Abdul Aziz al
Omari, Ahmed al Ghamdi, Hamza al Ghamdi, Mohand al Shehri, Majed Moqed, Salem al
Hazmi, Saeed al Ghamdi, Ahmad al Haznawi, and Ahmed al Nami. The remaining recruit,
Fayez Banihammad, came from the UAE. He appears to have played a unique role among
the muscle hijackers because of his work with one of the plot's financial
facilitators, Mustafa al Hawsawi.
Saudi authorities interviewed the relatives of these men and have briefed us on what
they found. The muscle hijackers came from a variety of educational and societal
backgrounds. All were between 20 and 28 years old; most were unemployed with no more
than a high school education and were unmarried.
Four of them-Ahmed al Ghamdi, Saeed al Ghamdi, Hamza al Ghamdi, and Ahmad al
Haznawi-came from a cluster of three towns in the al Bahah region, an isolated and
underdeveloped area of Saudi Arabia, and shared the same tribal affiliation. None
had a university degree. Their travel patterns and information from family members
suggest that the four may have been in contact with each other as early as the fall
of 1999.
Five more-Wail al Shehri, Waleed al Shehri, Abdul Aziz al Omari, Mohand al Shehri,
and Ahmed al Nami-came from Asir Province, a poor region in southwestern Saudi
Arabia that borders Yemen; this weakly policed area is sometimes called "the wild
frontier." Wail and Waleed al Shehri were brothers. All five in this group had begun
university studies. Omari had graduated with honors from high school, had attained a
degree from the Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud Islamic University, was married, and had a
daughter.
The three remaining muscle hijackers from Saudi Arabia were Satam al Suqami, Majed
Moqed, and Salem al Hazmi. Suqami came from Riyadh. Moqed hailed from a small town
called Annakhil, west of Medina. Suqami had very little education, and Moqed had
dropped out of university. Neither Suqami nor Moqed appears to have had ties to the
other, or to any of the other operatives, before getting involved with extremists,
probably by 1999.
Salem al Hazmi, a younger brother of Nawaf, was born in Mecca. Salem's family
recalled him as a quarrelsome teenager. His brother Nawaf probably recommended him
for recruitment into al Qaeda. One al Qaeda member who knew them says that Nawaf
pleaded with Bin Ladin to allow Salem to participate in the 9/11 operation.
Detainees have offered varying reasons for the use of so many Saudi operatives.
Binalshibh argues that al Qaeda wanted to send a message to the government of Saudi
Arabia about its relationship with the United States. Several other al Qaeda
figures, however, have stated that ethnicity generally was not a factor in the
selection of operatives unless it was important for security or operational
reasons.
KSM, for instance, denies that Saudis were chosen for the 9/11 plot to drive a wedge
between the United States and Saudi Arabia, and stresses practical reasons for
considering ethnic background when selecting operatives. He says that so many were
Saudi because Saudis comprised the largest portion of the pool of recruits in the al
Qaeda training camps. KSM estimates that in any given camp, 70 percent of the
mujahideen were Saudi, 20 percent were Yemeni, and 10 percent were from elsewhere.
Although Saudi and Yemeni trainees were most often willing to volunteer for suicide
operations, prior to 9/11 it was easier for Saudi operatives to get into the United
States.
Most of the Saudi muscle hijackers developed their ties to extremists two or three
years before the attacks. Their families often did not consider these young men
religious zealots. Some were perceived as devout, others as lacking in faith. For
instance, although Ahmed al Ghamdi, Hamza al Ghamdi, and Saeed al Ghamdi attended
prayer services regularly and Omari often served as an imam at his mosque in Saudi
Arabia, Suqami and Salem al Hazmi appeared unconcerned with religion and, contrary
to Islamic law, were known to drink alcohol.
Like many other al Qaeda operatives, the Saudis who eventually became the muscle
hijackers were targeted for recruitment outside Afghanistan- probably in Saudi
Arabia itself. Al Qaeda recruiters, certain clerics, and-in a few cases-family
members probably all played a role in spotting potential candidates. Several of the
muscle hijackers seem to have been recruited through contacts at local universities
and mosques.
According to the head of one of the training camps in Afghanistan, some were chosen
by unnamed Saudi sheikhs who had contacts with al Qaeda. Omari, for example, is
believed to have been a student of a radical Saudi cleric named Sulayman al Alwan.
His mosque, which is located in al Qassim Province, is known among more moderate
clerics as a "terrorist factory." The province is at the very heart of the strict
Wahhabi movement in Saudi Arabia. Saeed al Ghamdi and Mohand al Shehri also spent
time in al Qassim, both breaking with their families. According to his father,
Mohand al Shehri's frequent visits to this area resulted in his failing exams at his
university in Riyadh. Saeed al Ghamdi transferred to a university in al Qassim, but
he soon stopped talking to his family and dropped out of school without informing
them.
The majority of these Saudi recruits began to break with their families in late 1999
and early 2000. According to relatives, some recruits began to make arrangements for
extended absences. Others exhibited marked changes in behavior before disappearing.
Salem al Hazmi's father recounted that Salem- who had had problems with alcohol and
petty theft-stopped drinking and started attending mosque regularly three months
before he disappeared.
Several family members remembered that their relatives had expressed a desire to
participate in jihad, particularly in Chechnya. None had mentioned going to
Afghanistan. These statements might be true or cover stories. The four recruits from
the al Ghamdi tribe, for example, all told their families that they were going to
Chechnya. Only two-Ahmed al Ghamdi and Saeed al Ghamdi-had documentation suggesting
travel to a Russian republic.
Some aspiring Saudi mujahideen, intending to go to Chechnya, encountered difficulties
along the way and diverted to Afghanistan. In 1999, Ibn al Khattab-the primary
commander of Arab nationals in Chechnya-reportedly had started turning away most
foreign mujahideen because of their inexperience and inability to adjust to the
local conditions. KSM states that several of the 9/11 muscle hijackers faced
problems traveling to Chechnya and so went to Afghanistan, where they were drawn
into al Qaeda.
Khallad has offered a more detailed story of how such diversions occurred. According
to him, a number of Saudi mujahideen who tried to go to Chechnya in 1999 to fight
the Russians were stopped at the Turkish-Georgian border. Upon arriving inTurkey,
they received phone calls at guesthouses in places such as Istanbul and Ankara,
informing them that the route to Chechnya via Georgia had been closed. These Saudis
then decided to travel to Afghanistan, where they could train and wait to make
another attempt to enter Chechnya during the summer of 2000. While training at al
Qaeda camps, a dozen of them heard Bin Ladin's speeches, volunteered to become
suicide operatives, and eventually were selected as muscle hijackers for the planes
operation. Khallad says he met a number of them at the Kandahar airport, where they
were helping to provide extra security. He encouraged Bin Ladin to use them. Khallad
claims to have been closest with Saeed al Ghamdi, whom he convinced to become a
martyr and whom he asked to recruit a friend, Ahmed al Ghamdi, to the same cause.
Although Khallad claims not to recall everyone from this group who was later chosen
for the 9/11 operation, he says they also included Suqami, Waleed and Wail al
Shehri, Omari, Nami, Hamza al Ghamdi, Salem al Hazmi, and Moqed.
According to KSM, operatives volunteered for suicide operations and, for the most
part, were not pressured to martyr themselves. Upon arriving in Afghanistan, a
recruit would fill out an application with standard questions, such as, What brought
you to Afghanistan? How did you travel here? How did you hear about us? What
attracted you to the cause? What is your educational background? Where have you
worked before? Applications were valuable for determining the potential of new
arrivals, for filtering out potential spies from among them, and for identifying
recruits with special skills. For instance, as pointed out earlier, Hani Hanjour
noted his pilot training. Prospective operatives also were asked whether they were
prepared to serve as suicide operatives; those who answered in the affirmative were
interviewed by senior al Qaeda lieutenant Muhammad Atef.
KSM claims that the most important quality for any al Qaeda operative was willingness
to martyr himself. Khallad agrees, and claims that this criterion had preeminence in
selecting the planes operation participants. The second most important criterion was
demonstrable patience, Khallad says, because the planning for such attacks could
take years.
Khallad claims it did not matter whether the hijackers had fought in jihad
previously, since he believes that U.S. authorities were not looking for such
operatives before 9/11. But KSM asserts that young mujahideen with clean records
were chosen to avoid raising alerts during travel. The al Qaeda training camp head
mentioned above adds that operatives with no prior involvement in activities likely
to be known to international security agencies were purposefully selected for the
9/11 attacks.
Most of the muscle hijackers first underwent basic training similar to that given
other al Qaeda recruits. This included training in firearms, heavy weapons,
explosives, and topography. Recruits learned discipline and military life. They were
subjected to artificial stresses to measure their psychological fitness and
commitment to jihad. At least seven of the Saudi muscle hijackers took this basic
training regime at the al Faruq camp near Kandahar. This particular camp appears to
have been the preferred location for vetting and training the potential muscle
hijackers because of its proximity to Bin Ladin and senior al Qaeda leadership. Two
others-Suqami and Moqed-trained at Khaldan, another large basic training facility
located near Kabul, where Mihdhar had trained in the mid-1990s.
By the time operatives for the planes operation were picked in mid-2000, some of them
had been training in Afghanistan for months, others were just arriving for the first
time, and still others may have been returning after prior visits to the camps.
According to KSM, Bin Ladin would travel to the camps to deliver lectures and meet
the trainees personally. If Bin Ladin believed a trainee held promise for a special
operation, that trainee would be invited to the al Qaeda leader's compound at Tarnak
Farms for further meetings.
KSM claims that Bin Ladin could assess new trainees very quickly, in about ten
minutes, and that many of the 9/11 hijackers were selected in this manner. Bin
Ladin, assisted by Atef, personally chose all the future muscle hijackers for the
planes operation, primarily between the summer of 2000 and April 2001. Upon choosing
a trainee, Bin Ladin would ask him to swear loyalty for a suicide operation. After
the selection and oath-swearing, the operative would be sent to KSM for training and
the filming of a martyrdom video, a function KSM supervised as head of al Qaeda's
media committee.
KSM sent the muscle hijacker recruits on to Saudi Arabia to obtain U.S. visas. He
gave them money (about $2,000 each) and instructed them to return to Afghanistan for
more training after obtaining the visas. At this early stage, the operatives were
not told details about the operation. The majority of the Saudi muscle hijackers
obtained U.S. visas in Jeddah or Riyadh between September and November of 2000.
KSM told potential hijackers to acquire new "clean" passports in their home countries
before applying for a U.S. visa. This was to avoid raising suspicion about previous
travel to countries where al Qaeda operated. Fourteen of the 19 hijackers, including
nine Saudi muscle hijackers, obtained new passports. Some of these passports were
then likely doctored by the al Qaeda passport division in Kandahar, which would add
or erase entry and exit stamps to create "false trails" in the passports.
In addition to the operatives who eventually participated in the 9/11 attacks as
muscle hijackers, Bin Ladin apparently selected at least nine other Saudis who, for
various reasons, did not end up taking part in the operation: Mohamed Mani Ahmad al
Kahtani, Khalid Saeed Ahmad al Zahrani, Ali Abd al Rahman al Faqasi al Ghamdi, Saeed
al Baluchi, Qutaybah al Najdi, Zuhair al Thubaiti, Saeed Abdullah Saeed al Ghamdi,
Saud al Rashid, and Mushabib al Hamlan. A tenth individual, a Tunisian with Canadian
citizenship named Abderraouf Jdey, may have been a candidate to participate in 9/11,
or he may have been a candidate for a later attack. These candidate hijackers either
backed out, had trouble obtaining needed travel documents, or were removed from the
operation by the al Qaeda leadership. Khallad believes KSM wanted between four and
six operatives per plane. KSM states that al Qaeda had originally planned to use 25
or 26 hijackers but ended up with only the 19.
Final Training and Deployment to the United States
Having acquired U.S. visas in Saudi Arabia, the muscle hijackers returned to
Afghanistan for special training in late 2000 to early 2001. The training reportedly
was conducted at the al Matar complex by Abu Turab al Jordani, one of only a handful
of al Qaeda operatives who, according to KSM, was aware of the full details of the
planned planes operation. Abu Turab taught the operatives how to conduct hijackings,
disarm air marshals, and handle explosives. He also trained them in bodybuilding and
provided them with a few basic English words and phrases.
According to KSM, Abu Turab even had the trainees butcher a sheep and a camel with a
knife to prepare to use knives during the hijackings. The recruits learned to focus
on storming the cockpit at the earliest opportunity when the doors first opened, and
to worry about seizing control over the rest of the plane later. The operatives were
taught about other kinds of attack as well, such as truck bombing, so that they
would not be able to disclose the exact nature of their operation if they were
caught. According to KSM, the muscle did not learn the full details-including the
plan to hijack planes and fly them into buildings-before reaching the United
States.
After training in Afghanistan, the operatives went to a safehouse maintained by KSM
in Karachi and stayed there temporarily before being deployed to the United States
via the UAE. The safehouse was run by al Qaeda operative Abd al Rahim Ghulum
Rabbani, also known as Abu Rahmah, a close associate of KSM who assisted him for
three years by finding apartments and lending logistical support to operatives KSM
would send.
According to an al Qaeda facilitator, operatives were brought to the safehouse by a
trusted Pakistani al Qaeda courier named Abdullah Sindhi, who also worked for KSM.
The future hijackers usually arrived in groups of two or three, staying at the safe
house for as long as two weeks. The facilitator has identified each operative whom
he assisted at KSM's direction in the spring of 2001. Before the operatives left
Pakistan, each of them received $10,000 from KSM for future expenses.
From Pakistan, the operatives transited through the UAE en route to the United
States. In the Emirates they were assisted primarily by al Qaeda operatives Ali
Abdul Aziz Ali and Mustafa al Hawsawi. Ali apparently assisted nine future hijackers
between April and June 2001 as they came through Dubai. He helped them with plane
tickets, traveler's checks, and hotel reservations; he also taught them about
everyday aspects of life in the West, such as purchasing clothes and ordering food.
Dubai, a modern city with easy access to a major airport, travel agencies, hotels,
and Western commercial establishments, was an ideal transit point.
Ali reportedly assumed the operatives he was helping were involved in a big operation
in the United States, he did not know the details.
When he asked KSM to send him an assistant, KSM dispatched Hawsawi, who had worked on
al Qaeda's media committee in Kandahar. Hawsawi helped send the last four operatives
(other than Mihdhar) to the United States from the UAE. Hawsawi would consult with
Atta about the hijackers' travel schedules to the United States and later check with
Atta to confirm that each had arrived. Hawsawi told the muscle hijackers that they
would be met by Atta at the airport. Hawsawi also facilitated some of the
operation's financing.
The muscle hijackers began arriving in the United States in late April 2001. In most
cases, they traveled in pairs on tourist visas and entered the United States in
Orlando or Miami, Florida; Washington, D.C.; or New York. Those arriving in Florida
were assisted by Atta and Shehhi, while Hazmi and Hanjour took care of the rest. By
the end of June, 14 of the 15 muscle hijackers had crossed the Atlantic.
The muscle hijackers supplied an infusion of funds, which they carried as a mixture
of cash and traveler's checks purchased in the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Seven muscle
hijackers are known to have purchased a total of nearly $50,000 in traveler's checks
that were used in the United States. Moreover, substantial deposits into
operatives'U.S. bank accounts immediately followed the entry of other muscle
hijackers, indicating that those newcomers brought money with them as well. In
addition, muscle hijacker Banihammad came to the United States after opening bank
accounts in the UAE into which were deposited the equivalent of approximately
$30,000 on June 25, 2001. After his June 27 arrival in the United States, Banihammad
made Visa and ATM withdrawals from his UAE accounts.
The hijackers made extensive use of banks in the United States, choosing both
branches of major international banks and smaller regional banks. All of the
hijackers opened accounts in their own name, and used passports and other
identification documents that appeared valid on their face. Contrary to numerous
published reports, there is no evidence the hijackers ever used false Social
Security numbers to open any bank accounts. While the hijackers were not experts on
the use of the U.S. financial system, nothing they did would have led the banks to
suspect criminal behavior, let alone a terrorist plot to commit mass murder.
The last muscle hijacker to arrive was Khalid al Mihdhar. As mentioned earlier, he
had abandoned Hazmi in San Diego in June 2000 and returned to his family in Yemen.
Mihdhar reportedly stayed in Yemen for about a month before Khallad persuaded him to
return to Afghanistan. Mihdhar complained about life in the United States. He met
with KSM, who remained annoyed at his decision to go AWOL. But KSM's desire to drop
him from the operation yielded to Bin Ladin's insistence to keep him.
By late 2000, Mihdhar was in Mecca, staying with a cousin until February 2001, when
he went home to visit his family before returning to Afghanistan. In June 2001,
Mihdhar returned once more to Mecca to stay with his cousin for another month.
Mihdhar said that Bin Ladin was planning five attacks on the United States. Before
leaving, Mihdhar asked his cousin to watch over his home and family because of a job
he had to do.
On July 4, 2001, Mihdhar left Saudi Arabia to return to the United States, arriving
at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York. Mihdhar gave his intended
address as the Marriott Hotel, New York City, but instead spent one night at another
New York hotel. He then joined the group of hijackers in Paterson, reuniting with
Nawaf al Hazmi after more than a year. With two months remaining, all 19 hijackers
were in the United States and ready to take the final steps toward carrying out the
attacks.
Assistance from Hezbollah and Iran to al Qaeda
As we mentioned in chapter 2, while in Sudan, senior managers in al Qaeda maintained
contacts with Iran and the Iranian-supported worldwide terrorist organization
Hezbollah, which is based mainly in southern Lebanon and Beirut. Al Qaeda members
received advice and training from Hezbollah. Intelligence indicates the persistence
of contacts between Iranian security officials and senior al Qaeda figures after Bin
Ladin's return to Afghanistan. Khallad has said that Iran made a concerted effort to
strengthen relations with al Qaeda after the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole,
but was rebuffed because Bin Ladin did not want to alienate his supporters in Saudi
Arabia. Khallad and other detainees have described the willingness of Iranian
officials to facilitate the travel of al Qaeda members through Iran, on their way to
and from Afghanistan. For example, Iranian border inspectors would be told not to
place telltale stamps in the passports of these travelers. Such arrangements were
particularly beneficial to Saudi members of al Qaeda.
Our knowledge of the international travels of the al Qaeda operatives selected for
the 9/11 operation remains fragmentary. But we now have evidence suggesting that 8
to 10 of the 14 Saudi "muscle" operatives traveled into or out of Iran between
October 2000 and February 2001.
In October 2000, a senior operative of Hezbollah visited Saudi Arabia to coordinate
activities there. He also planned to assist individuals in Saudi Arabia in traveling
to Iran during November. A top Hezbollah commander and Saudi Hezbollah contacts were
involved.
Also in October 2000, two future muscle hijackers, Mohand al Shehri and Hamza al
Ghamdi, flew from Iran to Kuwait. In November, Ahmed al Ghamdi apparently flew to
Beirut, traveling-perhaps by coincidence-on the same flight as a senior Hezbollah
operative. Also in November, Salem al Hazmi apparently flew from Saudi Arabia to
Beirut.
In mid-November, we believe, three of the future muscle hijackers, Wail al Shehri,
Waleed al Shehri, and Ahmed al Nami, all of whom had obtained their U.S. visas in
late October, traveled in a group from Saudi Arabia to Beirut and then onward to
Iran. An associate of a senior Hezbollah operative was on the same flight that took
the future hijackers to Iran. Hezbollah officials in Beirut and Iran were expecting
the arrival of a group during the same time period. The travel of this group was
important enough to merit the attention of senior figures in Hezbollah.
Later in November, two future muscle hijackers, Satam al Suqami and Majed Moqed, flew
into Iran from Bahrain. In February 2001, Khalid al Mihdhar may have taken a flight
from Syria to Iran, and then traveled further within Iran to a point near the Afghan
border.
KSM and Binalshibh have confirmed that several of the 9/11 hijackers (at least eight,
according to Binalshibh) transited Iran on their way to or from Afghanistan, taking
advantage of the Iranian practice of not stamping Saudi passports. They deny any
other reason for the hijackers' travel to Iran. They also deny any relationship
between the hijackers and Hezbollah.
In sum, there is strong evidence that Iran facilitated the transit of al Qaeda
members into and out of Afghanistan before 9/11, and that some of these were future
9/11 hijackers. There also is circumstantial evidence that senior Hezbollah
operatives were closely tracking the travel of some of these future muscle hijackers
into Iran in November 2000. However, we cannot rule out the possibility of a
remarkable coincidence-that is, that Hezbollah was actually focusing on some other
group of individuals traveling from Saudi Arabia during this same time frame, rather
than the future hijackers.
We have found no evidence that Iran or Hezbollah was aware of the planning for what
later became the 9/11 attack. At the time of their travel through Iran, the al Qaeda
operatives themselves were probably not aware of the specific details of their
future operation.
After 9/11, Iran and Hezbollah wished to conceal any past evidence of cooperation
with Sunni terrorists associated with al Qaeda. A senior Hezbollah official
disclaimed any Hezbollah involvement in 9/11. We believe
this topic requires further investigation by the U.S. government.
FINAL STRATEGIES AND TACTICS
Final Preparations in the United States
During the early summer of 2001, Atta, assisted by Shehhi, was busy coordinating the
arrival of most of the muscle hijackers in southern Florida-picking them up at the
airport, finding them places to stay, and helping them settle in the United
States.
The majority settled in Florida. Some opened bank accounts, acquired mailboxes, and
rented cars. Several also joined local gyms, presumably to stay fit for the
operation. Upon first arriving, most stayed in hotels and motels; but by mid- June,
they settled in shared apartments relatively close to one another and Atta.
Though these muscle hijackers did not travel much after arriving in the United
States, two of them, Waleed al Shehri and Satam al Suqami, took unusual trips.
On May 19, Shehri and Suqami flew from Fort Lauderdale to Freeport, the Bahamas,
where they had reservations at the Bahamas Princess Resort. The two were turned away
by Bahamian officials on arrival, however, because they lacked visas; they returned
to Florida that same day. They likely took this trip to renew Suqami's immigration
status, as Suqami's legal stay in the United States ended May 21.
On July 30, Shehri traveled alone from Fort Lauderdale to Boston. He flew to San
Francisco the next day, where he stayed one night before returning via Las Vegas.
While this travel may have been a casing flight-Shehri traveled in first class on
the same type of aircraft he would help hijack on September 11 (a Boeing 767) and
the trip included a layover in Las Vegas-Shehri was neither a pilot nor a plot
leader, as were the other hijackers who took surveillance flights.
The three Hamburg pilots-Atta, Shehhi, and Jarrah-took the first of their
cross-country surveillance flights early in the summer. Shehhi flew from New York to
Las Vegas via San Francisco in late May. Jarrah flew from Baltimore to Las Vegas via
Los Angeles in early June. Atta flew from Boston to Las Vegas via San Francisco at
the end of June. Each traveled in first class, on United Airlines. For the east-west
transcontinental leg, each operative flew on the same type of aircraft he would
pilot on September 11 (Atta and Shehhi, a Boeing 767; Jarrah, a Boeing 757).
Hanjour and Hazmi, as noted below, took similar crosscountry surveillance flights in
August.
Jarrah and Hanjour also received additional training and practice flights in the
early summer. A few days before departing on his cross-country test flight, Jarrah
flew from Fort Lauderdale to Philadelphia, where he trained at Hortman Aviation and
asked to fly the Hudson Corridor, a low-altitude "hallway" along the Hudson River
that passes New York landmarks like the World Trade Center. Heavy traffic in the
area can make the corridor a dangerous route for an inexperienced pilot. Because
Hortman deemed Jarrah unfit to fly solo, he could fly this route only with an
instructor.
Hanjour, too, requested to fly the Hudson Corridor about this same time, at Air Fleet
Training Systems in Teterboro, New Jersey, where he started receiving ground
instruction soon after settling in the area with Hazmi. Hanjour flew the Hudson
Corridor, but his instructor declined a second request because of what he considered
Hanjour's poor piloting skills. Shortly thereafter, Hanjour switched to Caldwell
Flight Academy in Fairfield, New Jersey, where he rented small aircraft on several
occasions during June and July. In one such instance on July 20, Hanjour-likely
accompanied by Hazmi-rented a plane from Caldwell and took a practice flight from
Fairfield to Gaithersburg, Maryland, a route that would have allowed them to fly
near Washington, D.C. Other evidence suggests that Hanjour may even have returned to
Arizona for flight simulator training earlier in June.
There is no indication that Atta or Shehhi received any additional flight training in
June. Both were likely too busy organizing the newly arrived muscle hijackers and
taking their cross-country surveillance flights. Atta, moreover, needed to
coordinate with his second-in-command, Nawaf al Hazmi.
Although Atta and Hazmi appear to have been in Virginia at about the same time in
early April, they probably did not meet then. Analysis of late April communications
associated with KSM indicates that they had wanted to get together in April but
could not coordinate the meeting.
Atta and Hazmi probably first met in the United States only when Hazmi traveled
round-trip from Newark to Miami between June 19 and June 25.
After he returned to New Jersey, Hazmi's behavior began to closely parallel that of
the other hijackers. He and Hanjour, for instance, soon established new bank
accounts, acquired a mailbox, rented cars, and started visiting a gym. So did the
four other hijackers who evidently were staying with them in New Jersey. Several
also obtained new photo identification, first in New Jersey and then at the Virginia
Department of Motor Vehicles, where Hazmi and Hanjour had obtained such documents
months earlier, likely with help from their Jordanian friend, Rababah.
Atta probably met again with Hazmi in early July. Returning from his initial
cross-country surveillance flight, Atta flew into New York. Rather than return
immediately to Florida, he checked into a New Jersey hotel. He picked up tickets to
travel to Spain at a travel agency in Paterson on July 4 before departing for Fort
Lauderdale. Now that the muscle hijackers had arrived, he was ready to meet with
Ramzi Binalshibh for the last time.
The Meeting in Spain
After meeting with Atta in Berlin in January 2001, Binalshibh had spent much of the
spring of 2001 in Afghanistan and Pakistan, helping move the muscle hijackers as
they passed through Karachi. During the Berlin meeting, the two had agreed to meet
later in the year in Kuala Lumpur to discuss the operation in person again. In late
May, Binalshibh reported directly to Bin Ladin at an al Qaeda facility known as
"Compound Six" near Kandahar.
Bin Ladin told Binalshibh to instruct Atta and the others to focus on their security
and that of the operation, and to advise Atta to proceed as planned with the targets
discussed before Atta left Afghanistan in early 2000-the World Trade Center, the
Pentagon, the White House, and the Capitol. According to Binalshibh, Bin Ladin said
he preferred the White House over the Capitol, asking Binalshibh to confirm that
Atta understood this preference. Binalshibh says Bin Ladin had given the same
message to Waleed al Shehri for conveyance to Atta earlier that spring. Binalshibh
also received permission to meet Atta in Malaysia. Atef provided money for the trip,
which KSM would help Binalshibh arrange in Karachi.
In early June, Binalshibh traveled by taxi from Kandahar to Quetta, Pakistan, where
al Qaeda courier Abu Rahmah took him to KSM. According to Binalshibh, KSM provided a
plane ticket to Malaysia and a fraudulent Saudi passport to use for the trip. KSM
told him to ask Atta to select a date for the attacks. Binalshibh was to return to
Germany and then inform KSM of the date. KSM also gave Binalshibh the email address
of Zacarias Moussaoui for future contact. Binalshibh then left for Kuala
Lumpur.
Binalshibh contacted Atta upon arriving in Malaysia and found a change in plan. Atta
could not travel because he was too busy helping the new arrivals settle in the
United States. After remaining in Malaysia for approximately three weeks, Binalshibh
went to Bangkok for a few days before returning to Germany. He and Atta agreed to
meet later at a location to be determined.
In early July, Atta called Binalshibh to suggest meeting in Madrid, for reasons
Binalshibh claims not to know. He says he preferred Berlin, but that he and Atta
knew too many people in Germany and feared being spotted together. Unable to buy a
ticket to Madrid at the height of the tourist season, Binalshibh booked a seat on a
flight to Reus, near Barcelona, the next day. Atta was already en route to Madrid,
so Binalshibh phoned Shehhi in the United States to inform him of the change in
itinerary.
Atta arrived in Madrid on July 8. He spent the night in a hotel and made three calls
from his room, most likely to coordinate with Binalshibh. The next day, Atta rented
a car and drove to Reus to pick up Binalshibh; the two then drove to the nearby town
of Cambrils. Hotel records show Atta renting rooms in the same area until July 19,
when he returned his rental car in Madrid and flew back to Fort Lauderdale. On July
16, Binalshibh returned to Hamburg, using a ticket Atta had purchased for him
earlier that day. According to Binalshibh, they did not meet with anyone else while
in Spain.
Binalshibh says he told Atta that Bin Ladin wanted the attacks carried out as soon as
possible. Bin Ladin, Binalshibh conveyed, was worried about having so many
operatives in the United States. Atta replied that he could not yet provide a date
because he was too busy organizing the arriving hijackers and still needed to
coordinate the timing of the flights so that the crashes would occur simultaneously.
Atta said he required about five to six weeks before he could provide an attack
date. Binalshibh advised Atta that Bin Ladin had directed that the other operatives
not be informed of the date until the last minute. Atta was to provide Binalshibh
with advance notice of at least a week or two so that Binalshibh could travel to
Afghanistan and report the date personally to Bin Ladin.
As to targets, Atta understood Bin Ladin's interest in striking the White House. Atta
said he thought this target too difficult, but had tasked Hazmi and Hanjour to
evaluate its feasibility and was awaiting their answer. Atta said that those two
operatives had rented small aircraft and flown reconnaissance flights near the
Pentagon. Atta explained that Hanjour was assigned to attack the Pentagon, Jarrah
the Capitol, and that both Atta and Shehhi would hit the World Trade Center. If any
pilot could not reach his intended target, he was to crash the plane. If Atta could
not strike the World Trade Center, he planned to crash his aircraft directly into
the streets of New York. Atta told Binalshibh that each pilot had volunteered for
his assigned target, and that the assignments were subject to change.
During the Spain meeting, Atta also mentioned that he had considered targeting a
nuclear facility he had seen during familiarization flights near New York-a target
they referred to as "electrical engineering." According to Binalshibh, the other
pilots did not like the idea. They thought a nuclear target would be difficult
because the airspace around it was restricted, making reconnaissance flights
impossible and increasing the likelihood that any plane would be shot down before
impact. Moreover, unlike the approved targets, this alternative had not been
discussed with senior al Qaeda leaders and therefore did not have the requisite
blessing. Nor would a nuclear facility have particular symbolic value. Atta did not
ask Binalshibh to pass this idea on to Bin Ladin, Atef, or KSM, and Binalshibh says
he did not mention it to them until after September 11.
Binalshibh claims that during their time in Spain, he and Atta also discussed how the
hijackings would be executed. Atta said he, Shehhi, and Jarrah had encountered no
problems carrying box cutters on cross-country surveillance flights. The best time
to storm the cockpit would be about 10-15 minutes after takeoff, when the cockpit
doors typically were opened for the first time. Atta did not believe they would need
any other weapons. He had no firm contingency plan in case the cockpit door was
locked. While he mentioned general ideas such as using a hostage or claiming to have
a bomb, he was confident the cockpit doors would be opened and did not consider
breaking them down a viable idea. Atta told Binalshibh he wanted to select planes
departing on long flights because they would be full of fuel, and that he wanted to
hijack Boeing aircraft because he believed them easier to fly than Airbus aircraft,
which he understood had an autopilot feature that did not allow them to be crashed
into the ground.
Finally, Atta confirmed that the muscle hijackers had arrived in the United States
without incident. They would be divided into teams according to their
English-speaking ability. That way they could assist each other before the operation
and each team would be able to command the passengers in English. According to
Binalshibh, Atta complained that some of the hijackers wanted to contact their
families to say goodbye, something he had forbidden. Atta, moreover, was nervous
about his future communications with Binalshibh, whom he instructed to obtain new
telephones upon returning to Germany. Before Binalshibh left Spain, he gave Atta
eight necklaces and eight bracelets that Atta had asked him to buy when he was
recently in Bangkok, believing that if the hijackers were clean shaven and well
dressed, others would think them wealthy Saudis and give them less notice.
As directed, upon returning from Spain, Binalshibh obtained two new phones, one to
communicate with Atta and another to communicate with KSM and others, such as
Zacarias Moussaoui. Binalshibh soon contacted KSM and, using code words, reported
the results of his meeting with Atta. This important exchange occurred in
mid-July.
The conversation covered various topics. For example, Jarrah was to send Binalshibh
certain personal materials from the hijackers, including copies of their passports,
which Binalshibh in turn would pass along to KSM, probably for subsequent use in al
Qaeda propaganda.
The most significant part of the mid-July conversation concerned Jarrah's troubled
relationship with Atta. KSM and Binalshibh both acknowledge that Jarrah chafed under
Atta's authority over him. Binalshibh believes the disagreement arose in part from
Jarrah's family visits. Moreover, Jarrah had been on his own for most of his time in
the United States because Binalshibh's visa difficulty had prevented the two of them
from training together. Jarrah thus felt excluded from the decisionmaking.
Binalshibh had to act as a broker between Jarrah and Atta.
Concerned that Jarrah might withdraw from the operation at this late stage, KSM
emphasized the importance of Atta and Jarrah's resolving their differences.
Binalshibh claims that such concern was unwarranted, and in their mid- July
discussion reassured KSM that Atta and Jarrah would reconcile and be ready to move
forward in about a month, after Jarrah visited his family. Noting his concern and
the potential for delay, KSM at one point instructed Binalshibh to send "the skirts"
to "Sally"-a coded instruction to Binalshibh to send funds to Zacarias Moussaoui.
While Binalshibh admits KSM did direct him to send Moussaoui money during the
mid-July conversation, he denies knowing exactly why he received this
instruction-though he thought the money was being provided "within the framework" of
the 9/11 operation.
KSM may have instructed Binalshibh to send money to Moussaoui in order to help
prepare Moussaoui as a potential substitute pilot for Jarrah. On July 20, 2001,
Aysel Senguen, Jarrah's girlfriend, purchased a one-way ticket for Jarrah from Miami
to Dusseldorf. On Jarrah's previous four trips from the United States to see Senguen
and his family in Lebanon, he had always traveled with a round-trip ticket. When
Jarrah departed Miami on July 25, Atta appears to have driven him to the airport,
another unique circumstance.
Binalshibh picked up Jarrah at the airport in Dusseldorf on July 25. Jarrah wanted to
see Senguen as soon as possible, so he and Binalshibh arranged to meet a few days
later. When they did, they had an emotional conversation during which Binalshibh
encouraged Jarrah to see the plan through.
While Jarrah was in Germany, Binalshibh and Moussaoui were in contact to arrange for
the transfer of funds. Binalshibh received two wire transfers from Hawsawi in the
UAE totaling $15,000 and, within days, relayed almost all of this money to Moussaoui
in two installments.
Moussaoui had been taking flight lessons at the Airman Flight School in Norman,
Oklahoma, since February but stopped in late May. Although at that point he had only
about 50 hours of flight time and no solo flights to his credit, Moussaoui began
making inquiries about flight materials and simulator training for Boeing 747s. On
July 10, he put down a $1,500 deposit for flight simulator training at Pan Am
International Flight Academy in Eagan, Minnesota, and by the end of the month, he
had received a simulator schedule to train from
August 13 through August 20. Moussaoui also purchased two knives and inquired of two
manufacturers of GPS equipment whether their products could be converted for
aeronautical use-activities that closely resembled those of the 9/11 hijackers
during their final preparations for the attacks.
On August 10, shortly after getting the money from Binalshibh, Moussaoui left
Oklahoma with a friend and drove to Minnesota. Three days later, Moussaoui paid the
$6,800 balance owed for his flight simulator training at Pan Am in cash and began
his training. His conduct, however, raised the suspicions of his flight instructor.
It was unusual for a student with so little training to be learning to fly large
jets without any intention of obtaining a pilot's license or other goal. On August
16, once the instructor reported his suspicion to the authorities, Moussaoui was
arrested by the INS on immigration charges.
KSM denies ever considering Moussaoui for the planes operation. Instead he claims
that Moussaoui was slated to participate in a "second wave" of attacks. KSM also
states that Moussaoui had no contact with Atta, and we are unaware of evidence
contradicting this assertion.
Yet KSM has also stated that by the summer of 2001, he was too busy with the planes
operation to continue planning for any second-wave attacks. Moreover, he admits that
only three potential pilots were ever recruited for the alleged second wave,
Moussaoui plus two others who, by midsummer of 2001, had backed out of the
plot.
We therefore believe that the effort to push Moussaoui forward in August 2001 lends
credence to the suspicion that he was being primed as a possible pilot in the
immediate planes operation. Binalshibh says he assumed Moussaoui was to take his
place as another pilot in the 9/11 operation. Recounting a post-9/11 discussion with
KSM in Kandahar, Binalshibh claims KSM mentioned Moussaoui as being part of the 9/11
operation. Although KSM never referred to Moussaoui by name, Binalshibh understood
he was speaking of the operative to whom Binalshibh had wired money. Binalshibh says
KSM did not approve of Moussaoui but believes KSM did not remove him from the
operation only because Moussaoui had been selected and assigned by Bin Ladin
himself.
KSM did not hear about Moussaoui's arrest until after September 11. According to
Binalshibh, had Bin Ladin and KSM learned prior to 9/11 that Moussaoui had been
detained, they might have canceled the operation. When Binalshibh discussed
Moussaoui's arrest with KSM after September 11, KSM congratulated himself on not
having Moussaoui contact the other operatives, which would have compromised the
operation. Moussaoui had been in contact with Binalshibh, of course, but this was
not discovered until after 9/11. As it turned out,
Moussaoui was not needed to replace Jarrah. By the time Moussaoui was arrested in
mid-August, Jarrah had returned to the United States from his final trip to Germany,
his disagreement with Atta apparently resolved. The operatives began their final
preparations for the attacks.
Readying the Attacks
A week after he returned from meeting Binalshibh in Spain, Atta traveled to Newark,
probably to coordinate with Hazmi and give him additional funds. Atta spent a few
days in the area before returning to Florida on July 30. The month of August was
busy, as revealed by a set of contemporaneous Atta- Binalshibh communications that
were recovered after September 11.
On August 3, for example, Atta and Binalshibh discussed several matters, such as the
best way for the operatives to purchase plane tickets and the assignment of muscle
hijackers to individual teams. Atta and Binalshibh also revisited the question of
whether to target the White House. They discussed targets in coded language,
pretending to be students discussing various fields of study: "architecture"
referred to the World Trade Center, "arts" the Pentagon,"law" the Capitol, and
"politics" the White House.
Binalshibh reminded Atta that Bin Ladin wanted to target the White House. Atta again
cautioned that this would be difficult. When Binalshibh persisted, Atta agreed to
include the White House but suggested they keep the Capitol as an alternate target
in case the White House proved too difficult. Atta also suggested that the attacks
would not happen until after the first week in September, when Congress
reconvened.
Atta and Binalshibh also discussed "the friend who is coming as a tourist"- a cryptic
reference to candidate hijacker Mohamed al Kahtani (mentioned above), whom Hawsawi
was sending the next day as "the last one" to "complete the group." On August 4,
Atta drove to the Orlando airport to meet Kahtani. Upon arrival, however, Kahtani
was denied entry by immigration officials because he had a one-way ticket and little
money, could not speak English, and could not adequately explain what he intended to
do in the United States. He was sent back to Dubai. Hawsawi contacted KSM, who told
him to help Kahtani return to Pakistan.
On August 7, Atta flew from Fort Lauderdale to Newark, probably to coordinate with
Hazmi. Two days later, Ahmed al Ghamdi and Abdul Aziz al Omari, who had been living
in New Jersey with Hazmi and Hanjour, flew to Miami-probably signifying that the
four hijacking teams had finally been assigned. While Atta was in New Jersey, he,
Hazmi, and Hanjour all purchased tickets for another set of surveillance flights.
Like Shehhi, Jarrah, Atta, and Waleed al Shehri before them, Hazmi and Hanjour each
flew in first class on the same type of aircraft they would hijack on 9/11 (a Boeing
757), and on transcontinental flights that connected to Las Vegas. This time,
however, Atta himself also flew directly to Las Vegas, where all three stayed on
August 13-14. Beyond Las Vegas's reputation for welcoming tourists, we have seen no
credible evidence explaining why, on this occasion and others, the operatives flew
to or met in Las Vegas.
Through August, the hijackers kept busy with their gym training and the pilots took
frequent practice flights on small rented aircraft. The operatives also began to
make purchases suggesting that the planning was coming to an end. In mid-August, for
example, they bought small knives that may actually have been used in the attacks.
On August 22, moreover, Jarrah attempted to purchase four GPS units from a pilot
shop in Miami. He was able to buy only one unit, which he picked up a few days later
when he also purchased three aeronautical charts.
Perhaps most significant, however, was the purchase of plane tickets for September
11. On August 23, Atta again flew to Newark, probably to meet with Hazmi and select
flights. All 19 tickets were booked and purchased between August 25 and September
5.
It therefore appears that the attack date was selected by the third week of August.
This timing is confirmed by Binalshibh, who claims Atta called him with the date in
mid-August. According to Binalshibh, Atta used a riddle to convey the date in code-a
message of two branches, a slash, and a lollipop (to non-Americans, 11/9 would be
interpreted as September 11). Binalshibh says he called Atta back to confirm the
date before passing it to KSM.
KSM apparently received the date from Binalshibh in a message sent through
Binalshibh's old Hamburg associate, Zakariya Essabar. Both Binalshibh and KSM claim
that Essabar was not privy to the meaning of the message and had no foreknowledge of
the attacks. According to Binalshibh, shortly after the date was chosen, he advised
Essabar and another Hamburg associate, Said Bahaji, that if they wanted to go to
Afghanistan, now was the time because it would soon become more difficult. Essabar
made reservations on August 22 and departed Hamburg for Karachi on August 30; Bahaji
purchased his tickets on August 20 and departed Hamburg for Karachi on September
3.
Binalshibh also made arrangements to leave for Pakistan during early September,
before the attacks, as did Ali and Hawsawi, the plot facilitators in the UAE. During
these final days, Binalshibh and Atta kept in contact by phone, email, and instant
messaging. Although Atta had forbidden the hijackers to contact their families, he
apparently placed one last call to his own father on September 9. Atta also asked
Binalshibh to contact the family of one hijacker, pass along goodbyes from others,
and give regards to KSM. Jarrah alone appears to have left a written farewell-a
sentimental letter to Aysel Senguen.
Hazmi, however, may not have been so discreet. He may have telephoned his former San
Diego companion, Mohdar Abdullah, in late August. Several bits of evidence indicate
that others in Abdullah's circle may have received word that something big would
soon happen. As noted earlier, Abdullah's behavior reportedly changed noticeably.
Prior to September 11, both he and Yazeed al Salmi suddenly became intent on
proceeding with their planned marriages. One witness quotes Salmi as commenting
after the 9/11 attacks, "I knew they were going to do something, that is why I got
married." Moreover, as of August 2001, Iyad Kreiwesh and other employees at the
Texaco station where Hazmi had worked suddenly were anticipating attention from law
enforcement authorities in the near future. Finally, according to an uncorroborated
witness account, early on the morning of September 10, Abdullah, Osama Awadallah,
Omar Bakarbashat, and others behaved suspiciously at the gas station. According to
the witness, after the group met, Awadallah said "it is finally going to happen" as
the others celebrated by giving each other high fives.
Dissent within the al Qaeda Leadership While tactical preparations for the attack
were nearing completion, the entire operation was being questioned at the top, as al
Qaeda and the Taliban argued over strategy for 2001. Our focus has naturally been on
the specifics of the planes operation. But from the perspective of Bin Ladin and
Atef, this operation was only one, admittedly key, element of their unfolding plans
for the year. Living in Afghanistan, interacting constantly with the Taliban, the al
Qaeda leaders would never lose sight of the situation in that country. Bin Ladin's
consistent priority was to launch a major attack directly against the United States.
He wanted the planes operation to proceed as soon as possible. Mihdhar reportedly
told his cousin during the summer of 2001 that Bin Ladin was reputed to have
remarked, "I will make it happen even if I do it by myself."
According to KSM, Bin Ladin had been urging him to advance the date of the attacks.
In 2000, for instance, KSM remembers Bin Ladin pushing him to launch the attacks
amid the controversy after then-Israeli opposition party leader Ariel Sharon's visit
to the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. KSM claims Bin Ladin told him it would be enough
for the hijackers simply to down planes rather than crash them into specific
targets. KSM says he resisted the pressure.
KSM claims to have faced similar pressure twice more in 2001. According to him, Bin
Ladin wanted the operation carried out on May 12, 2001, seven months to the day
after the Cole bombing. KSM adds that the 9/11 attacks had originally been
envisioned for May 2001. The second time he was urged to launch the attacks early
was in June or July 2001, supposedly after Bin Ladin learned from the media that
Sharon would be visiting the White House. On both occasions KSM resisted, asserting
that the hijacking teams were not ready. Bin Ladin pressed particularly strongly for
the latter date in two letters stressing the need to attack early. The second letter
reportedly was delivered by Bin Ladin's son-in-law, Aws al Madani.
Other evidence corroborates KSM's account. For instance, Mihdhar told his cousin that
the attacks were to happen in May, but were postponed twice, first to July, then to
September. Moreover, one candidate hijacker remembers a general warning being issued
in the al Qaeda camps in July or early August, just like the warnings issued two
weeks before the Cole bombing and ten days before the eventual 9/11 attacks. During
the midsummer alert, al Qaeda members dispersed with their families, security was
increased, and Bin Ladin disappeared for about 30 days, until the alert was
canceled.
While the details of the operation were strictly compartmented, by the time of the
alert, word had begun to spread that an attack against the United States was coming.
KSM notes that it was generally well known by the summer of 2001 that he was
planning some kind of operation against the United States. Many were even aware that
he had been preparing operatives to go to the United States, leading some to
conclude that al Qaeda was planning a nearterm attack on U.S. soil. Moreover, Bin
Ladin had made several remarks that summer hinting at an upcoming attack and
generating rumors throughout the worldwide jihadist community. Bin Ladin routinely
told important visitors to expect significant attacks against U.S. interests soon
and, during a speech at the al Faruq camp, exhorted trainees to pray for the success
of an attack involving 20 martyrs. Others have confirmed hearing indications of an
impending attack and have verified that such news, albeit without specific details,
had spread across al Qaeda.
Although Bin Ladin's top priority apparently was to attack the United States, others
had a different view. The Taliban leaders put their main emphasis on the year's
military offensive against the Northern Alliance, an offensive that ordinarily would
begin in the late spring or summer. They certainly hoped that this year's offensive
would finally finish off their old enemies, driving them from Afghanistan. From the
Taliban's perspective, an attack against the United States might be
counterproductive. It might draw the Americans into the war against them, just when
final victory seemed within their grasp.
There is evidence that Mullah Omar initially opposed a major al Qaeda operation
directly against the United States in 2001. Furthermore, by July, with word
spreading of a coming attack, a schism emerged among the senior leadership of al
Qaeda. Several senior members reportedly agreed with Mullah Omar. Those who
reportedly sided with Bin Ladin included Atef, Sulayman Abu Ghayth, and KSM. But
those said to have opposed him were weighty figures in the organization-including
Abu Hafs the Mauritanian, Sheikh Saeed al Masri, and Sayf al Adl. One senior al
Qaeda operative claims to recall Bin Ladin arguing that attacks against the United
States needed to be carried out immediately to support insurgency in the
Israeli-occupied territories and protest the presence of U.S. forces in Saudi
Arabia. Beyond these rhetorical appeals, Bin Ladin also reportedly thought an attack
against the United States would benefit al Qaeda by attracting more suicide
operatives, eliciting greater donations, and increasing the number of sympathizers
willing to provide logistical assistance.
Mullah Omar is reported to have opposed this course of action for ideological reasons
rather than out of fear of U.S. retaliation. He is said to have preferred for al
Qaeda to attack Jews, not necessarily the United States. KSM contends that Omar
faced pressure from the Pakistani government to keep al Qaeda from engaging in
operations outside Afghanistan. Al Qaeda's chief financial manager, Sheikh Saeed,
argued that al Qaeda should defer to theTaliban's wishes. Another source says that
Sheikh Saeed opposed the operation, both out of deference to Omar and because he
feared the U.S. response to an attack. Abu Hafs the Mauritanian reportedly even
wrote Bin Ladin a message basing opposition to the attacks on the Qur'an.
According to KSM, in late August, when the operation was fully planned, Bin Ladin
formally notified the al Qaeda Shura Council that a major attack against the United
States would take place in the coming weeks. When some council members objected, Bin
Ladin countered that Mullah Omar lacked authority to prevent al Qaeda from
conducting jihad outside Afghanistan. Though most of the Shura Council reportedly
disagreed, Bin Ladin persisted. The attacks went forward.
The story of dissension within al Qaeda regarding the 9/11 attacks is probably
incomplete. The information on which the account is based comes from sources who
were not privy to the full scope of al Qaeda andTaliban planning. Bin Ladin and
Atef, however, probably would have known, at least, that
The general Taliban offensive against the Northern Alliance would rely on al
Qaeda military support.
Another significant al Qaeda operation was making progress during the summer-a
plot to assassinate the Northern Alliance leader, Ahmed Shah Massoud. The
operatives, disguised as journalists, were in Massoud's camp and prepared to
kill him sometime in August. Their appointment to see him was delayed.
But on September 9, the Massoud assassination took place. The delayedTaliban
offensive against the Northern Alliance was apparently coordinated to begin as soon
as he was killed, and it got under way on September 10.
As they deliberated earlier in the year, Bin Ladin and Atef would likely have
remembered that Mullah Omar was dependent on them for the Massoud assassination and
for vital support in the Taliban military operations. KSM remembers Atef telling him
that al Qaeda had an agreement with the Taliban to eliminate Massoud, after which
the Taliban would begin an offensive to take over Afghanistan. Atef hoped Massoud's
death would also appease the Taliban when the 9/11 attacks happened. There are also
some scant indications that Omar may have been reconciled to the 9/11 attacks by the
time they occurred.
Moving to Departure Positions
In the days just before 9/11, the hijackers returned leftover funds to al Qaeda and
assembled in their departure cities. They sent the excess funds by wire transfer to
Hawsawi in the UAE, about $26,000 altogether.
The hijackers targeting American Airlines Flight 77, to depart from Dulles, migrated
from New Jersey to Laurel, Maryland, about 20 miles from Washington, D.C. They
stayed in a motel during the first week in September and spent time working out at a
gym. On the final night before the attacks, they lodged at a hotel in Herndon,
Virginia, close to the airport.
Further north, the hijackers targeting United Airlines Flight 93, to depart from
Newark, gathered in that city from their base in Florida on September 7. Just after
midnight on September 8-9, Jarrah received a speeding ticket in Maryland as he
headed north on I-95. He joined the rest of his team at their hotel.
Atta was still busy coordinating the teams. On September 7, he flew from Fort
Lauderdale to Baltimore, presumably to meet with the Flight 77 team in Laurel. On
September 9, he flew from Baltimore to Boston. By then, Shehhi had arrived there,
and Atta was seen with him at his hotel. The next day, Atta picked up Omari at
another hotel, and the two drove to Portland, Maine, for reasons that remain
unknown. In the early morning hours of September 11, they boarded a commuter flight
to Boston to connect to American Airlines Flight 11. The two spent their last night
pursuing ordinary activities: making ATM withdrawals, eating pizza, and shopping at
a convenience store. Their three fellow hijackers for Flight 11 stayed together in a
hotel in Newton, Massachusetts, just outside of Boston.
Shehhi and his team targeting United Airlines Flight 175 from Logan Airport spent
their last hours at two Boston hotels.
The plan that started with a proposal by KSM in 1996 had evolved to overcome numerous
obstacles. Now 19 men waited in nondescript hotel rooms to board four flights the
next morning.
