"THE SYSTEM WAS BLINKING RED"
THE SUMMER OF THREAT
As 2001 began, counterterrorism officials were receiving frequent but fragmentary
reports about threats. Indeed, there appeared to be possible threats almost
everywhere the United States had interests-including at home.
To understand how the escalation in threat reporting was handled in the summer of
2001, it is useful to understand how threat information in general is collected and
conveyed. Information is collected through several methods, including signals
intelligence and interviews of human sources, and gathered into intelligence
reports. Depending on the source and nature of the reporting, these reports may be
highly classified-and therefore tightly held-or less sensitive and widely
disseminated to state and local law enforcement agencies. Threat reporting must be
disseminated, either through individual reports or through threat advisories. Such
advisories, intended to alert their recipients, may address a specific threat or be
a general warning.
Because the amount of reporting is so voluminous, only a select fraction can be
chosen for briefing the president and senior officials. During 2001, Director of
Central Intelligence GeorgeTenet was briefed regularly regarding threats and other
operational information relating to Usama Bin Ladin.
He in turn met daily with President Bush, who was briefed by the CIA through what is
known as the President's Daily Brief (PDB). Each PDB consists of a series of six to
eight relatively short articles or briefs covering a broad array of topics; CIA
staff decides which subjects are the most important on any given day. There were
more than 40 intelligence articles in the PDBs from January 20 to September 10,
2001, that related to Bin Ladin. The PDB is considered highly sensitive and is
distributed to only a handful of high-level officials.
The Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB), distributed to a broader group of
officials, has a similar format and generally covers the same subjects as the PDB.
It usually contains less information so as to protect sources and methods. Like
their predecessors, the Attorney General, the FBI Director, and Richard Clarke, the
National Security Council (NSC) counterterrorism coordinator, all received the SEIB,
not the PDB.
Clarke and his staff had extensive access to terrorism reporting, but they did not
have access to internal, nondisseminated information at the National Security Agency
(NSA), CIA, or FBI. The Drumbeat Begins In the spring of 2001, the level of
reporting on terrorist threats and planned attacks increased dramatically to its
highest level since the millennium alert. At the end of March, the intelligence
community disseminated a terrorist threat advisory, indicating a heightened threat
of Sunni extremist terrorist attacks against U.S. facilities, personnel, and other
interests.
On March 23, in connection with discussions about possibly reopening Pennsylvania
Avenue in front of the White House, Clarke warned National Security Advisor
Condoleezza Rice that domestic or foreign terrorists might use a truck bomb-their
"weapon of choice"-on Pennsylvania Avenue. That would result, he said, in the
destruction of the West Wing and parts of the residence. 5 He also told her that he
thought there were terrorist cells within the United States, including al Qaeda.
The next week, Rice was briefed on the activities of Abu Zubaydah and on CIA efforts
to locate him. As pointed out in chapter 6, Abu Zubaydah had been a major figure in
the millennium plots. Over the next few weeks, the CIA repeatedly issued
warnings-including calls from DCI Tenet to Clarke-that Abu Zubaydah was planning an
operation in the near future. One report cited a source indicating that Abu Zubaydah
was planning an attack in a country that CIA analysts thought might be Israel, or
perhaps Saudi Arabia or India. Clarke relayed these reports to Rice.
In response to these threats, the FBI sent a message to all its field offices on
April 13, summarizing reporting to date. It asked the offices to task all resources,
including human sources and electronic databases, for any information pertaining to
"current operational activities relating to Sunni extremism." It did not suggest
that there was a domestic threat.
The interagency Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) that Clarke chaired discussed
the Abu Zubaydah reports on April 19. The next day, a briefing to top officials
reported "Bin Ladin planning multiple operations." When the deputies discussed al
Qaeda policy on April 30, they began with a briefing on the threat.
In May 2001, the drumbeat of reporting grew louder with reports to top officials that
"Bin Ladin public profile may presage attack" and "Bin Ladin network's plans
advancing." In early May, a walk-in to the FBI claimed there was a plan to launch
attacks on London, Boston, and New York. Attorney General John Ashcroft was briefed
by the CIA on May 15 regarding al Qaeda generally and the current threat reporting
specifically. The next day brought a report that a phone call to a U.S. embassy had
warned that Bin Ladin supporters were planning an attack in the United States using
"high explosives." On May 17, based on the previous day's report, the first item on
the CSG's agenda was "UBL: Operation Planned in U.S." The
anonymous caller's tip could not be corroborated.
Late May brought reports of a possible hostage plot against Americans abroad to force
the release of prisoners, including Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, the "Blind Sheikh,"
who was serving a life sentence for his role in the 1993 plot to blow up sites in
New York City. The reporting noted that operatives might opt to hijack an aircraft
or storm a U.S. embassy. This report led to a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
information circular to airlines noting the potential for "an airline hijacking to
free terrorists incarcerated in the United States." Other reporting mentioned that
Abu Zubaydah was planning an attack, possibly against Israel, and expected to carry
out several more if things went well. On May 24 alone, counterterrorism officials
grappled with reports alleging plots in Yemen and Italy, as well as a report about a
cell in Canada that an anonymous caller had claimed might be planning an attack
against the United States.
Reports similar to many of these were made available to President Bush in morning
intelligence briefings with DCI Tenet, usually attended by Vice President Dick
Cheney and National Security Advisor Rice. While these briefings discussed general
threats to attack America and American interests, the specific threats mentioned in
these briefings were all overseas.
On May 29, Clarke suggested that Rice ask DCI Tenet what more the United States could
do to stop Abu Zubaydah from launching"a series of major terrorist attacks,"
probably on Israeli targets, but possibly on U.S. facilities. Clarke wrote to Rice
and her deputy, Stephen Hadley, "When these attacks occur, as they likely will, we
will wonder what more we could have done to stop them." In May, CIA Counterterrorist
Center (CTC) Chief Cofer Black told Rice that the current threat level was a 7 on a
scale of 1 to 10, as compared to an 8 during the millennium.
High Probability of Near-Term "Spectacular" Attacks
Threat reports surged in June and July, reaching an even higher peak of urgency. The
summer threats seemed to be focused on Saudi Arabia, Israel, Bahrain, Kuwait, Yemen,
and possibly Rome, but the danger could be anywhere- including a possible attack on
the G-8 summit in Genoa. A June 12 CIA report passing along biographical background
information on several terrorists mentioned, in commenting on Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed, that he was recruiting people to travel to the United States to meet with
colleagues already there so that they might conduct terrorist attacks on Bin Ladin's
behalf. On June 22, the CIA notified all its station chiefs about intelligence
suggesting a possible al Qaeda suicide attack on a U.S. target over the next few
days. DCITenet asked that all U.S. ambassadors be briefed.
That same day, the State Department notified all embassies of the terrorist threat
and updated its worldwide public warning. In June, the State Department initiated
the Visa Express program in Saudi Arabia as a security measure, in order to keep
long lines of foreigners away from vulnerable embassy spaces. The program permitted
visa applications to be made through travel agencies, instead of directly at the
embassy or consulate.
A terrorist threat advisory distributed in late June indicated a high probability of
near-term "spectacular" terrorist attacks resulting in numerous casualties. Other
reports' titles warned,"Bin Ladin Attacks May be Imminent" and "Bin Ladin and
Associates Making Near-Term Threats." The latter reported multiple attacks planned
over the coming days, including a "severe blow" against U.S. and Israeli "interests"
during the next two weeks.
On June 21, near the height of the threat reporting, U.S. Central Command raised the
force protection condition level for U.S. troops in six countries to the highest
possible level, Delta. The U.S. Fifth Fleet moved out of its port in Bahrain, and a
U.S. Marine Corps exercise in Jordan was halted.U.S. embassies in the Persian Gulf
conducted an emergency security review, and the embassy in Yemen was closed. The CSG
had foreign emergency response teams, known as FESTs, ready to move on four hours'
notice and kept up the terrorism alert posture on a "rolling 24 hour basis."
On June 25, Clarke warned Rice and Hadley that six separate intelligence reports
showed al Qaeda personnel warning of a pending attack. An Arabic television station
reported Bin Ladin's pleasure with al Qaeda leaders who were saying that the next
weeks "will witness important surprises" and that U.S. and Israeli interests will be
targeted. Al Qaeda also released a new recruitment and fund-raising tape. Clarke
wrote that this was all too sophisticated to be merely a psychological operation to
keep the United States on edge, and the CIA agreed. The intelligence reporting
consistently described the upcoming attacks as occurring on a calamitous level,
indicating that they would cause the world to be in turmoil and that they would
consist of possible multiple-but not necessarily simultaneous-attacks.
On June 28, Clarke wrote Rice that the pattern of al Qaeda activity indicating attack
planning over the past six weeks "had reached a crescendo.""A series of new reports
continue to convince me and analysts at State, CIA, DIA [Defense Intelligence
Agency], and NSA that a major terrorist attack or series of attacks is likely in
July," he noted. One al Qaeda intelligence report warned that something "very, very,
very, very" big was about to happen, and most of Bin Ladin's network was reportedly
anticipating the attack. In late June, the CIA ordered all its station chiefs to
share information on al Qaeda with their host governments and to push for immediate
disruptions of cells.
The headline of a June 30 briefing to top officials was stark:"Bin Ladin Planning
High-Profile Attacks." The report stated that Bin Ladin operatives expected
near-term attacks to have dramatic consequences of catastrophic proportions. That
same day, Saudi Arabia declared its highest level of terror alert. Despite evidence
of delays possibly caused by heightened U.S. security, the planning for attacks was
continuing.
On July 2, the FBI Counterterrorism Division sent a message to federal agencies and
state and local law enforcement agencies summarizing information regarding threats
from Bin Ladin. It warned that there was an increased volume of threat reporting,
indicating a potential for attacks against U.S. targets abroad from groups "aligned
with or sympathetic to Usama Bin Ladin." Despite the general warnings, the message
further stated, "The FBI has no information indicating a credible threat of
terrorist attack in the United States." However, it went on to emphasize that the
possibility of attack in the United States could not be discounted. It also noted
that the July 4 holiday might heighten the threats. The report asked recipients
to"exercise extreme vigilance" and "report suspicious activities" to the FBI. It did
not suggest specific actions that they should take to prevent attacks.
Disruption operations against al Qaeda-affiliated cells were launched involving 20
countries. Several terrorist operatives were detained by foreign governments,
possibly disrupting operations in the Gulf and Italy and perhaps averting attacks
against two or three U.S. embassies. Clarke and others told us of a particular
concern about possible attacks on the Fourth of July. After it passed uneventfully,
the CSG decided to maintain the alert.
To enlist more international help, Vice President Cheney contacted Saudi Crown Prince
Abdullah on July 5. Hadley apparently called European counterparts, while Clarke
worked with senior officials in the Gulf. In late July, because of threats, Italy
closed the airspace over Genoa and mounted antiaircraft batteries at the Genoa
airport during the G-8 summit, which President Bush attended.
At home, the CSG arranged for the CIA to brief intelligence and security officials
from several domestic agencies. On July 5, representatives from the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), the FAA, the Coast Guard, the Secret Service, Customs,
the CIA, and the FBI met with Clarke to discuss the current threat. Attendees report
that they were told not to disseminate the threat information they received at the
meeting. They interpreted this direction to mean that although they could brief
their superiors, they could not send out advisories to the field. An NSC official
recalls a somewhat different emphasis, saying that attendees were asked to take the
information back to their home agencies and "do what you can" with it, subject to
classification and distribution restrictions. A representative from the INS asked
for a summary of the information that she could share with field offices. She never
received one.
That same day, the CIA briefed Attorney General Ashcroft on the al Qaeda threat,
warning that a significant terrorist attack was imminent. Ashcroft was told that
preparations for multiple attacks were in late stages or already complete and that
little additional warning could be expected. The briefing addressed only threats
outside the United States.
The next day, the CIA representative told the CSG that al Qaeda members believed the
upcoming attack would be "spectacular," qualitatively different from anything they
had done to date.
Apparently as a result of the July 5 meeting with Clarke, the interagency committee
on federal building security was tasked to examine security measures. This committee
met on July 9, when 37 officials from 27 agencies and organizations were briefed on
the "current threat level" in the United States. They were told that not only the
threat reports from abroad but also the recent convictions in the East Africa
bombings trial, the conviction of Ahmed Ressam, and the just-returned KhobarTowers
indictments reinforced the need to "exercise extreme vigilance." Attendees were
expected to determine whether their respective agencies needed enhanced security
measures.
On July 18, 2001, the State Department provided a warning to the public regarding
possible terrorist attacks in the Arabian Peninsula.
Acting FBI Director Thomas Pickard told us he had one of his periodic conference
calls with all special agents in charge on July 19. He said one of the items he
mentioned was the need, in light of increased threat reporting, to have evidence
response teams ready to move at a moment's notice, in case of an attack.
He did not task field offices to try to determine whether any plots were being
considered within the United States or to take any action to disrupt any such plots.
In mid-July, reporting started to indicate that Bin Ladin's plans had been delayed,
maybe for as long as two months, but not abandoned. On July 23, the lead item for
CSG discussion was still the al Qaeda threat, and it included mention of suspected
terrorist travel to the United States.
On July 31, an FAA circular appeared alerting the aviation community to "reports of
possible near-term terrorist operations . . . particularly on the Arabian Peninsula
and/or Israel." It stated that the FAA had no credible evidence of specific plans to
attack U.S. civil aviation, though it noted that some of the "currently active"
terrorist groups were known to "plan and train for hijackings"and were able to build
and conceal sophisticated explosive devices in luggage and consumer products.
Tenet told us that in his world "the system was blinking red." By late July, Tenet
said, it could not "get any worse." Not everyone was
convinced. Some asked whether all these threats might just be deception. On June 30,
the SEIB contained an article titled "Bin Ladin Threats Are Real." Yet Hadley told
Tenet in July that Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz questioned the
reporting. Perhaps Bin Ladin was trying to study U.S. reactions. Tenet replied that
he had already addressed the Defense Department's questions on this point; the
reporting was convincing. To give a sense of his anxiety at the time, one senior
official in the Counterterrorist Center told us that he and a colleague were
considering resigning in order to go public with their concerns.
The Calm Before the Storm
On July 27, Clarke informed Rice and Hadley that the spike in intelligence about a
near-term al Qaeda attack had stopped. He urged keeping readiness high during the
August vacation period, warning that another report suggested an attack had just
been postponed for a few months "but will still happen."
On August 1, the FBI issued an advisory that in light of the increased volume of
threat reporting and the upcoming anniversary of the East Africa embassy bombings,
increased attention should be paid to security planning. It noted that although most
of the reporting indicated a potential for attacks on U.S. interests abroad, the
possibility of an attack in the United States could not be discounted.
On August 3, the intelligence community issued an advisory concluding that the threat
of impending al Qaeda attacks would likely continue indefinitely. Citing threats in
the Arabian Peninsula, Jordan, Israel, and Europe, the advisory suggested that al
Qaeda was lying in wait and searching for gaps in security before moving forward
with the planned attacks.
During the spring and summer of 2001, President Bush had on several occasions asked
his briefers whether any of the threats pointed to the United States. Reflecting on
these questions, the CIA decided to write a briefing article summarizing its
understanding of this danger. Two CIA analysts involved in preparing this briefing
article believed it represented an opportunity to communicate their view that the
threat of a Bin Ladin attack in the United States remained both current and
serious.
The result was an article in the August 6 Presidential Daily Brief titled "Bin Ladin
Determined to Strike in US." It was the 36th PDB item briefed so far that year that
related to Bin Ladin or al Qaeda, and the first devoted to the possibility of an
attack in the United States. The President told us the August 6 report was
historical in nature. President Bush said the article told him that al Qaeda was
dangerous, which he said he had known since he had become President. The President
said Bin Ladin had long been talking about his desire to attack America. He recalled
some operational data on the FBI, and remembered thinking it was heartening that 70
investigations were under way. As best he could recollect, Rice had mentioned that
the Yemenis' surveillance of a federal building in New York had been looked into in
May and June, but there was no actionable intelligence. He did not recall discussing
the August 6 report with the Attorney General or whether Rice had done so. He said
that if his advisers had told him there was a cell in the United States, they would
have moved to take care of it. That never happened.
Although the following day's SEIB repeated the title of this PDB, it did not contain
the reference to hijackings, the alert in New York, the alleged casing of buildings
in New York, the threat phoned in to the embassy, or the fact that the FBI had
approximately 70 ongoing bin Ladin-related investigations.
The following is the text of an item from the Presidential Daily Brief received by
President George W. Bush on August 6, 2001.37 Redacted material is indicated by
brackets.
Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in US Clandestine, foreign government, and media
reports indicate Bin Ladin since 1997 has wanted to conduct terrorist attacks in
the US. Bin Ladin implied in US television interviews in 1997 and 1998 that his
followers would follow the example of World Trade Center bomber Ramzi Yousef and
"bring the fighting to America." After US missile strikes on his base in
Afghanistan in 1998, Bin Ladin told followers he wanted to retaliate in
Washington, according to a [-] service.
An Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) operative told an [-] service at the same time
that Bin Ladin was planning to exploit the operative's access to the US to mount
a terrorist strike.
The millennium plotting in Canada in 1999 may have been part of Bin Ladin's first
serious attempt to implement a terrorist strike in the US. Convicted plotter
Ahmed Ressam has told the FBI that he conceived the idea to attack Los Angeles
International Airport himself, but that Bin Ladin lieutenant Abu Zubaydah
encouraged him and helped facilitate the operation. Ressam also said that in
1998 Abu Zubaydah was planning his own US attack.
Ressam says Bin Ladin was aware of the Los Angeles operation.
Although Bin Ladin has not succeeded, his attacks against the US Embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 demonstrate that he prepares operations years in
advance and is not deterred by setbacks. Bin Ladin associates surveilled our
Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam as early as 1993, and some members of the
Nairobi cell planning the bombings were arrested and deported in 1997.
Al-Qa'ida members-including some who are US citizens-have resided in or traveled
to the US for years, and the group apparently maintains a support structure that
could aid attacks. Two al-Qua' da members found guilty in the conspiracy to bomb
our embassies in East Africa were US citizens, and a senior EIJ member lived in
California in the mid-1990s. A clandestine source said in 1998 that a Bin Ladin
cell in New York was recruiting Muslim-American youth for attacks.
We have not been able to corroborate some of the more sensational threat
reporting, such as that from a [-] service in 1998 saying that Bin Ladin wanted
to hijack a US aircraft to gain the release of "Blind Shaykh" 'Umar 'Abd
al-Rahman and other US-held extremists.
Nevertheless, FBI information since that time indicates patterns of suspicious
activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings or other
types of attacks, including recent surveillance of federal buildings in New
York.
The FBI is conducting approximately 70 full field investigations throughout the
US that it considers Bin Ladin-related. CIA and the FBI are investigating a call
to our Embassy in the UAE in May saying that a group of Bin Ladin supporters was
in the US planning attacks with explosives.
No CSG or other NSC meeting was held to discuss the possible threat of a strike in
the United States as a result of this report.
Late in the month, a foreign service reported that Abu Zubaydah was considering
mounting terrorist attacks in the United States, after postponing possible
operations in Europe. No targets, timing, or method of attack were provided.
We have found no indication of any further discussion before September 11 among the
President and his top advisers of the possibility of a threat of an al Qaeda attack
in the United States. DCI Tenet visited President Bush in Crawford, Texas, on August
17 and participated in PDB briefings of the President between August 31 (after the
President had returned to Washington) and September 10. But Tenet does not recall
any discussions with the President of the domestic threat during this period.
Most of the intelligence community recognized in the summer of 2001 that the number
and severity of threat reports were unprecedented. Many officials told us that they
knew something terrible was planned, and they were desperate to stop it. Despite
their large number, the threats received contained few specifics regarding time,
place, method, or target. Most suggested that attacks were planned against targets
overseas; others indicated threats against unspecified "U.S. interests." We cannot
say for certain whether these reports, as dramatic as they were, related to the 9/11
attacks.
Government Response to the Threats
National Security Advisor Rice told us that the CSG was the "nerve center" for
running the crisis, although other senior officials were involved over the course of
the summer. In addition to his daily meetings with President Bush, and weekly
meetings to go over other issues with Rice, Tenet was speaking regularly with
Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. The
foreign policy principals routinely talked on the telephone every day on a variety
of topics.
Hadley told us that before 9/11, he and Rice did not feel they had the job of
coordinating domestic agencies. They felt that Clarke and the CSG (part of the NSC)
were the NSC's bridge between foreign and domestic threats.
There was a clear disparity in the levels of response to foreign versus domestic
threats. Numerous actions were taken overseas to disrupt possible attacks- enlisting
foreign partners to upset terrorist plans, closing embassies, moving military assets
out of the way of possible harm. Far less was done domestically- in part, surely,
because to the extent that specifics did exist, they pertained to threats overseas.
As noted earlier, a threat against the embassy in Yemen quickly resulted in its
closing. Possible domestic threats were more vague. When reports did not specify
where the attacks were to take place, officials presumed that they would again be
overseas, though they did not rule out a target in the United States. Each of the
FBI threat advisories made this point.
Clarke mentioned to National Security Advisor Rice at least twice that al Qaeda
sleeper cells were likely in the United States. In January 2001, Clarke forwarded a
strategy paper to Rice warning that al Qaeda had a presence in the United States. He
noted that two key al Qaeda members in the Jordanian cell involved in the millennium
plot were naturalized U.S. citizens and that one jihadist suspected in the East
Africa bombings had "informed the FBI that an extensive network of al Qida 'sleeper
agents' currently exists in the US." He added that Ressam's abortive December 1999
attack revealed al Qaeda supporters in the United States.
His analysis, however, was based not on new threat reporting but on past experience.
The September 11 attacks fell into the void between the foreign and domestic threats.
The foreign intelligence agencies were watching overseas, alert to foreign threats
to U.S. interests there. The domestic agencies were waiting for evidence of a
domestic threat from sleeper cells within the United States. No one was looking for
a foreign threat to domestic targets. The threat that was coming was not from
sleeper cells. It was foreign-but from foreigners who had infiltrated into the
United States.
A second cause of this disparity in response is that domestic agencies did not know
what to do, and no one gave them direction. Cressey told us that the CSG did not
tell the agencies how to respond to the threats. He noted that the agencies that
were operating overseas did not need direction on how to respond; they had
experience with such threats and had a "playbook." In contrast, the domestic
agencies did not have a game plan. Neither the NSC (including the CSG) nor anyone
else instructed them to create one.
This lack of direction was evident in the July 5 meeting with representatives from
the domestic agencies. The briefing focused on overseas threats. The domestic
agencies were not questioned about how they planned to address the threat and were
not told what was expected of them. Indeed, as noted earlier, they were specifically
told they could not issue advisories based on the briefing. 46 The domestic
agencies' limited response indicates that they did not perceive a call to action.
Clarke reflected a different perspective in an email to Rice on September 15, 2001.
He summarized the steps taken by the CSG to alert domestic agencies to the
possibility of an attack in the United States. Clarke concluded that domestic
agencies, including the FAA, knew that the CSG believed a major al Qaeda attack was
coming and could be in the United States.
Although the FAA had authority to issue security directives mandating new security
procedures, none of the few that were released during the summer of 2001 increased
security at checkpoints or on board aircraft. The information circulars mostly urged
air carriers to "exercise prudence" and be alert. Prior to 9/11, the FAA did present
a CD-ROM to air carriers and airport authorities describing the increased threat to
civil aviation. The presentation mentioned the possibility of suicide hijackings but
said that "fortunately, we have no indication that any group is currently thinking
in that direction." The FAA conducted 27 special security
briefings for specific air carriers between May 1, 2001, and September 11, 2001. Two
of these briefings discussed the hijacking threat overseas. None discussed the
possibility of suicide hijackings or the use of aircraft as weapons. No new security
measures were instituted.
Rice told us she understood that the FBI had tasked its 56 U.S. field offices to
increase surveillance of suspected terrorists and to reach out to informants who
might have information about terrorist plots. An NSC staff document at the time
describes such a tasking as having occurred in late June but does not indicate
whether it was generated by the NSC or the FBI. Other than the previously described
April 13 communication sent to all FBI field offices, however, the FBI could not
find any record of having received such a directive. The April 13 document asking
field offices to gather information on Sunni extremism did not mention any possible
threat within the United States and did not order surveillance of suspected
operatives. The NSC did not specify what the FBI's directives should contain and did
not review what had been issued earlier.
Acting FBI Director Pickard told us that in addition to his July 19 conference call,
he mentioned the heightened terrorist threat in individual calls with the special
agents in charge of field offices during their annual performance review
discussions. In speaking with agents around the country, we found little evidence
that any such concerns had reached FBI personnel beyond the New York Field
Office.
The head of counterterrorism at the FBI, Dale Watson, said he had many discussions
about possible attacks with Cofer Black at the CIA. They had expected an attack on
July 4. Watson said he felt deeply that something was going to happen. But he told
us the threat information was "nebulous." He wished he had known more. He wished he
had had "500 analysts looking at Usama Bin Ladin threat information instead of
two."
Attorney General Ashcroft was briefed by the CIA in May and by Pickard in early July
about the danger. Pickard said he met with Ashcroft once a week in late June,
through July, and twice in August. There is a dispute regarding Ashcroft's interest
in Pickard's briefings about the terrorist threat situation. Pickard told us that
after two such briefings Ashcroft told him that he did not want to hear about the
threats anymore. Ashcroft denies Pickard's charge. Pickard says he continued to
present terrorism information during further briefings that summer, but nothing
further on the "chatter" the U.S. government was receiving.
The Attorney General told us he asked Pickard whether there was intelligence about
attacks in the United States and that Pickard said no. Pickard said he replied that
he could not assure Ashcroft that there would be no attacks in the United States,
although the reports of threats were related to overseas targets. Ashcroft said he
therefore assumed the FBI was doing what it needed to do. He acknowledged that in
retrospect, this was a dangerous assumption. He did not ask the FBI what it was
doing in response to the threats and did not task it to take any specific action. He
also did not direct the INS, then still part of the Department of Justice, to take
any specific action.
In sum, the domestic agencies never mobilized in response to the threat. They did not
have direction, and did not have a plan to institute. The borders were not hardened.
Transportation systems were not fortified. Electronic surveillance was not targeted
against a domestic threat.
State and local law enforcement were not marshaled to augment the FBI's efforts. The
public was not warned.
The terrorists exploited deep institutional failings within our government. The
question is whether extra vigilance might have turned up an opportunity to disrupt
the plot. As seen in chapter 7, al Qaeda's operatives made mistakes. At least two
such mistakes created opportunities during 2001, especially in late August.
LATE LEADS-MIHDHAR, MOUSSAOUI, AND KSM
In chapter 6 we discussed how intelligence agencies successfully detected some of the
early travel in the planes operation, picking up the movements of Khalid al Mihdhar
and identifying him, and seeing his travel converge with someone they perhaps could
have identified but did not-Nawaf al Hazmi-as well as with less easily identifiable
people such as Khallad and Abu Bara. These observations occurred in December 1999
and January 2000. The trail had been lost in January 2000 without a clear
realization that it had been lost, and without much effort to pick it up again. Nor
had the CIA placed Mihdhar on the State Department's watchlist for suspected
terrorists, so that either an embassy or a port of entry might take note if Mihdhar
showed up again.
On four occasions in 2001, the CIA, the FBI, or both had apparent opportunities to
refocus on the significance of Hazmi and Mihdhar and reinvigorate the search for
them. After reviewing those episodes we will turn to the handling of the Moussaoui
case and some late leads regarding Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.
January 2001: Identification of Khallad
Almost one year after the original trail had been lost in Bangkok, the FBI and the
CIA were working on the investigation of the Cole bombing. They learned of the link
between a captured conspirator and a person called "Khallad." They also learned that
Khallad was a senior security official for Bin Ladin who had helped direct the
bombing (we introduced Khallad in chapter 5, and returned to his role in the Cole
bombing in chapter 6).55 One of the members of the FBI's investigative team in Yemen
realized that he had heard of Khallad before, from a joint FBI/CIA source four
months earlier. The FBI agent obtained from a foreign government a photo of the
person believed to have directed the Cole bombing. It was shown to the source, and
he confirmed that the man in that photograph was the same Khallad he had
described.
In December 2000, on the basis of some links associated with Khalid al Mihdhar, the
CIA's Bin Ladin unit speculated that Khallad and Khalid al Mihdhar might be one and
the same.
The CIA asked that a Kuala Lumpur surveillance photo of Mihdhar be shown to the joint
source who had identified Khallad. In early January 2001, two photographs from the
Kuala Lumpur meeting were shown to the source. One was a known photograph of
Mihdhar, the other a photograph of a then unknown subject. The source did not
recognize Mihdhar. But he indicated he was 90 percent certain that the other
individual was Khallad.
This meant that Khallad and Mihdhar were two different people. It also meant that
there was a link between Khallad and Mihdhar, making Mihdhar seem even more
suspicious.59Yet we found no effort by the CIA to renew the long-abandoned search
for Mihdhar or his travel companions.
In addition, we found that the CIA did not notify the FBI of this identification.
DCITenet and Cofer Black testified before Congress's Joint Inquiry into 9/11 that
the FBI had access to this identification from the beginning. But drawing on an
extensive record, including documents that were not available to the CIA personnel
who drafted that testimony, we conclude this was not the case. The FBI's primary
Cole investigators had no knowledge that Khallad had been in Kuala Lumpur with
Mihdhar and others until after the September 11 attacks. Because the FBI had not
been informed in January 2000 about Mihdhar's possession of a U.S. visa, it had not
then started looking for him in the United States. Because it did not know of the
links between Khallad and Mihdhar, it did not start looking for him in January
2001.
This incident is an example of how day-to-day gaps in information sharing can emerge
even when there is mutual goodwill. The information was from a joint FBI/CIA source
who spoke essentially no English and whose languages were not understood by the FBI
agent on the scene overseas. Issues of travel and security necessarily kept short
the amount of time spent with the source. As a result, the CIA officer usually did
not translate either questions or answers for his FBI colleague and friend.
For interviews without simultaneous translation, the FBI agent on the scene received
copies of the reports that the CIA disseminated to other agencies regarding the
interviews. But he was not given access to the CIA's internal operational reports,
which contained more detail. It was there-in reporting to which FBI investigators
did not have access-that information regarding the January 2001 identification of
Khallad appeared. The CIA officer does not recall this particular identification and
thus cannot say why it was not shared with his FBI colleague. He might not have
understood the possible significance of the new identification.
In June 2000, Mihdhar left California and returned to Yemen. It is possible that if,
in January 2001, the CIA had resumed its search for him, placed him on the State
Department's TIPOFF watchlist, or provided the FBI with the information, he might
have been found-either before or at the time he applied for a new visa in June 2001,
or when he returned to the United States on July 4.
Spring 2001: Looking Again at Kuala Lumpur
By mid-May 2001, as the threat reports were surging, a CIA official detailed to the
International Terrorism Operations Section at the FBI wondered where the attacks
might occur. We will call him "John." Recalling the episode about the Kuala Lumpur
travel of Mihdhar and his associates, "John" searched the CIA's databases for
information regarding the travel. On May 15, he and an official at the CIA
reexamined many of the old cables from early 2000, including the information that
Mihdhar had a U.S. visa, and that Hazmi had come to Los Angeles on January 15,
2000.
The CIA official who reviewed the cables took no action regarding them. "John,"
however, began a lengthy exchange with a CIA analyst, whom we will call "Dave," to
figure out what these cables meant. "John" was aware of how dangerous Khallad was-at
one point calling him a "major league killer." He concluded that "something bad was
definitely up." Despite the U.S. links evident in this traffic,"John" made no effort
to determine whether any of these individuals was in the United States. He did not
raise that possibility with his FBI counterpart. He was focused on Malaysia.
"John" described the CIA as an agency that tended to play a "zone defense." He was
worrying solely about Southeast Asia, not the United States. In contrast, he told
us, the FBI tends to play "man-to-man."
Desk officers at the CIA's Bin Ladin unit did not have "cases" in the same sense as
an FBI agent who works an investigation from beginning to end. Thus, when the trail
went cold after the Kuala Lumpur meeting in January 2000, the desk officer moved on
to different things. By the time the March 2000 cable arrived with information that
one of the travelers had flown to Los Angeles, the case officer was no longer
responsible for follow-up. While several individuals at the Bin Ladin unit opened
the cable when it arrived in March 2000, no action was taken.
The CIA's zone defense concentrated on "where,"not "who." Had its information been
shared with the FBI, a combination of the CIA's zone defense and the FBI's
man-to-man approach might have been productive.
June 2001: The Meeting in New York
"John's" review of the Kuala Lumpur meeting did set off some more sharing of
information, getting the attention of an FBI analyst whom we will call "Jane."
"Jane" was assigned to the FBI's Cole investigation. She knew that another terrorist
involved in that operation, Fahd al Quso, had traveled to Bangkok in January 2000 to
give money to Khallad.
"Jane" and the CIA analyst,"Dave," had been working together on Colerelated issues.
Chasing Quso's trail, "Dave" suggested showing some photographs to FBI agents in New
York who were working on the Cole case and had interviewed Quso.
"John" gave three Kuala Lumpur surveillance pictures to "Jane" to show to the New
York agents. She was told that one of the individuals in the photographs was someone
named Khalid al Mihdhar. She did not know why the photographs had been taken or why
the Kuala Lumpur travel might be significant, and she was not told that someone had
identified Khallad in the photographs. When "Jane" did some research in a database
for intelligence reports, Intelink, she found the original NSA reports on the
planning for the meeting. Because the CIA had not disseminated reports on its
tracking of Mihdhar, "Jane"did not pull up any information about Mihdhar's U.S. visa
or about travel to the United States by Hazmi or Mihdhar.
"Jane,""Dave," and an FBI analyst who was on detail to the CIA's Bin Ladin unit went
to New York on June 11 to meet with the agents about the Cole case. "Jane" brought
the surveillance pictures. At some point in the meeting she showed the photographs
to the agents and asked whether they recognized Quso in any of them. The agents
asked questions about the photographs- Why were they taken? Why were these people
being followed? Where are the rest of the photographs?
The only information "Jane" had about the meeting-other than the photographs-were the
NSA reports that she had found on Intelink. These reports, however, contained
caveats that their contents could not be shared with criminal investigators without
the permission of the Justice Department's Office of Intelligence Policy and Review
(OIPR). Therefore "Jane" concluded that she could not pass on information from those
reports to the agents. This decision was potentially significant, because the
signals intelligence she did not share linked Mihdhar to a suspected terrorist
facility in the Middle East. The agents would have established a link to the
suspected facility from their work on the embassy bombings case. This link would
have made them very interested in learning more about Mihdhar.
The sad irony is that the agents who found the source were being kept from obtaining
the fruits of their own work. "Dave," the CIA analyst, knew more about the Kuala
Lumpur meeting. He knew that Mihdhar possessed a U.S. visa, that his visa
application indicated that he intended to travel to New York, that Hazmi had
traveled to Los Angeles, and that a source had put Mihdhar in the company of
Khallad. No one at the meeting asked him what he knew; he did not volunteer
anything. He told investigators that as a CIA analyst, he was not authorized to
answer FBI questions regarding CIA information." Jane" said she assumed that if
"Dave" knew the answers to questions, he would have volunteered them. The New York
agents left the meeting without obtaining information that might have started them
looking for Mihdhar.
Mihdhar had been a weak link in al Qaeda's operational planning. He had left the
United States in June 2000, a mistake KSM realized could endanger the entire
plan-for to continue with the operation, Mihdhar would have to travel to the United
States again. And unlike other operatives, Mihdhar was not "clean": he had jihadist
connections. It was just such connections that had brought him to the attention of
U.S. officials.
Nevertheless, in this case KSM's fears were not realized. Mihdhar received a new U.S.
visa two days after the CIA-FBI meeting in New York. He flew to New York City on
July 4. No one was looking for him.
August 2001: The Search for Mihdhar and Hazmi Begins and Fails
During the summer of 2001 "John," following a good instinct but not as part of any
formal assignment, asked "Mary," an FBI analyst detailed to the CIA's Bin Ladin
unit, to review all the Kuala Lumpur materials one more time. She had been at the
New York meeting with "Jane" and "Dave" but had not looked into the issues yet
herself." John" asked her to do the research in her free time.
"Mary" began her work on July 24. That day, she found the cable reporting that
Mihdhar had a visa to the United States. A week later, she found the cable reporting
that Mihdhar's visa application-what was later discovered to be his first
application-listed New York as his destination. On August 21, she located the March
2000 cable that "noted with interest" that Hazmi had flown to Los Angeles in January
2000. She immediately grasped the significance of this information.
"Mary" and "Jane" promptly met with an INS representative at FBI headquarters. On
August 22, the INS told them that Mihdhar had entered the United States on January
15, 2000, and again on July 4, 2001. "Jane" and "Mary" also learned that there was
no record that Hazmi had left the country since January 2000, and they assumed he
had left with Mihdhar in June 2000. They decided that if Mihdhar was in the United
States, he should be found.
They divided up the work." Mary" asked the Bin Ladin unit to draft a cable requesting
that Mihdhar and Hazmi be put on the TIPOFF watchlist. Both Hazmi and Mihdhar were
added to this watchlist on August 24.
"Jane" took responsibility for the search effort inside the United States. As the
information indicated that Mihdhar had last arrived in New York, she began drafting
what is known as a lead for the FBI's New York Field Office. A lead relays
information from one part of the FBI to another and requests that a particular
action be taken. She called an agent in New York to give him a "headsup" on the
matter, but her draft lead was not sent until August 28. Her email told the New York
agent that she wanted him to get started as soon as possible, but she labeled the
lead as "Routine"-a designation that informs the receiving office that it has 30
days to respond.
The agent who received the lead forwarded it to his squad supervisor. That same day,
the supervisor forwarded the lead to an intelligence agent to open an intelligence
case-an agent who thus was behind "the wall" keeping FBI intelligence information
from being shared with criminal prosecutors. He also sent it to the Cole case agents
and an agent who had spent significant time in Malaysia searching for another
Khalid: Khalid Sheikh Mohammad.
The suggested goal of the investigation was to locate Mihdhar, determine his contacts
and reasons for being in the United States, and possibly conduct an interview.
Before sending the lead, "Jane" had discussed it with "John," the CIA official on
detail to the FBI. She had also checked with the acting head of the FBI's Bin Ladin
unit. The discussion seems to have been limited to whether the search should be
classified as an intelligence investigation or as a criminal one. It appears that no
one informed higher levels of management in either the FBI or CIA about the
case.
There is no evidence that the lead, or the search for these terrorist suspects, was
substantively discussed at any level above deputy chief of a section within the
Counterterrorism Division at FBI headquarters.
One of the Cole case agents read the lead with interest, and contacted "Jane" to
obtain more information." Jane"argued, however, that because the agent was
designated a "criminal" FBI agent, not an intelligence FBI agent, the wall kept him
from participating in any search for Mihdhar. In fact, she felt he had to destroy
his copy of the lead because it contained NSA information from reports that included
caveats ordering that the information not be shared without OIPR's permission. The
agent asked "Jane" to get an opinion from the FBI's National Security Law Unit
(NSLU) on whether he could open a criminal case on Mihdhar.
"Jane" sent an email to the Cole case agent explaining that according to the NSLU,
the case could be opened only as an intelligence matter, and that if Mihdhar was
found, only designated intelligence agents could conduct or even be present at any
interview. She appears to have misunderstood the complex rules that could apply to
this situation.
The FBI agent angrily responded:
Whatever has happened to this-someday someone will die-and wall or not-the
public will not understand why we were not more effective and throwing every
resource we had at certain "problems." Let's hope the National Security Law Unit
will stand behind their decisions then, especially since the biggest threat to
us now, UBL, is getting the most "protection."
"Jane" replied that she was not making up the rules; she claimed that they were in
the relevant manual and "ordered by the [FISA] Court and every office of the FBI is
required to follow them including FBI NY."
It is now clear that everyone involved was confused about the rules governing the
sharing and use of information gathered in intelligence channels. Because Mihdhar
was being sought for his possible connection to or knowledge of the Cole bombing, he
could be investigated or tracked under the existing Cole criminal case. No new
criminal case was needed for the criminal agent to begin searching for Mihdhar. And
as NSA had approved the passage of its information to the criminal agent, he could
have conducted a search using all available information. As a result of this
confusion, the criminal agents who were knowledgeable about al Qaeda and experienced
with criminal investigative techniques, including finding suspects and possible
criminal charges, were thus excluded from the search.
The search was assigned to one FBI agent, and it was his very first counterterrorism
lead. Because the lead was "routine," he was given 30 days to open an intelligence
case and make some unspecified efforts to locate Mihdhar. He started the process a
few days later. He checked local New York databases for criminal record and driver's
license information and checked the hotel listed on Mihdhar's U.S. entry form.
Finally, on September 11, the agent sent a lead to Los Angeles, because Mihdhar had
initially arrived in Los Angeles in January 2000.
We believe that if more resources had been applied and a significantly different
approach taken, Mihdhar and Hazmi might have been found. They had used their true
names in the United States. Still, the investigators would have needed luck as well
as skill to find them prior to September 11 even if such searches had begun as early
as August 23, when the lead was first drafted.
Many FBI witnesses have suggested that even if Mihdhar had been found, there was
nothing the agents could have done except follow him onto the planes. We believe
this is incorrect. Both Hazmi and Mihdhar could have been held for immigration
violations or as material witnesses in the Cole bombing case. Investigation or
interrogation of them, and investigation of their travel and financial activities,
could have yielded evidence of connections to other participants in the 9/11 plot.
The simple fact of their detention could have derailed the plan. In any case, the
opportunity did not arise.
Phoenix Memo
The Phoenix memo was investigated thoroughly by the Joint Inquiry and the Department
of Justice Inspector General.86We will recap it briefly here. In July 2001, an FBI
agent in the Phoenix field office sent a memo to FBI headquarters and to two agents
on international terrorism squads in the New York Field Office, advising of the
"possibility of a coordinated effort by Usama Bin Ladin" to send students to the
United States to attend civil aviation schools. The agent based his theory on the
"inordinate number of individuals of investigative interest" attending such schools
in Arizona.
The agent made four recommendations to FBI headquarters: to compile a list of civil
aviation schools, establish liaison with those schools, discuss his theories about
Bin Ladin with the intelligence community, and seek authority to obtain visa
information on persons applying to flight schools. His recommendations were not
acted on. His memo was forwarded to one field office. Managers of the Usama Bin
Ladin unit and the Radical Fundamentalist unit at FBI headquarters were addressees,
but they did not even see the memo until after September 11. No managers at
headquarters saw the memo before September 11, and the New York Field Office took no
action.
As its author told investigators, the Phoenix memo was not an alert about suicide
pilots. His worry was more about a Pan Am Flight 103 scenario in which explosives
were placed on an aircraft. The memo's references to aviation training were broad,
including aeronautical engineering.
If the memo had been distributed in a timely fashion and its recommendations acted on
promptly, we do not believe it would have uncovered the plot. It might well,
however, have sensitized the FBI so that it might have taken the Moussaoui matter
more seriously the next month.
Zacarias Moussaoui
On August 15, 2001, the Minneapolis FBI Field Office initiated an intelligence
investigation on Zacarias Moussaoui. As mentioned in chapter 7, he had entered the
United States in February 2001, and had begun flight lessons at Airman Flight School
in Norman, Oklahoma. He resumed his training at the Pan Am International Flight
Academy in Eagan, Minnesota, starting on August 13. He had none of the usual
qualifications for flight training on Pan Am's Boeing 747 flight simulators. He said
he did not intend to become a commercial pilot but wanted the training as an "ego
boosting thing." Moussaoui stood out because, with little knowledge of flying, he
wanted to learn how to "take off and land" a Boeing 747.
The agent in Minneapolis quickly learned that Moussaoui possessed jihadist beliefs.
Moreover, Moussaoui had $32,000 in a bank account but did not provide a plausible
explanation for this sum of money. He had traveled to Pakistan but became agitated
when asked if he had traveled to nearby countries while in Pakistan (Pakistan was
the customary route to the training camps in Afghanistan). He planned to receive
martial arts training, and intended to purchase a global positioning receiver. The
agent also noted that Moussaoui became extremely agitated whenever he was questioned
regarding his religious beliefs. The agent concluded that Moussaoui was "an Islamic
extremist preparing for some future act in furtherance of radical fundamentalist
goals." He also believed Moussaoui's plan was related to his flight training.
Moussaoui can be seen as an al Qaeda mistake and a missed opportunity. An apparently
unreliable operative, he had fallen into the hands of the FBI. As discussed in
chapter 7, Moussaoui had been in contact with and received money from Ramzi
Binalshibh. If Moussaoui had been connected to al Qaeda, questions should instantly
have arisen about a possible al Qaeda plot that involved piloting airliners, a
possibility that had never been seriously analyzed by the intelligence community.
The FBI agent who handled the case in conjunction with the INS representative on the
Minneapolis Joint Terrorism Task Force suspected that Moussaoui might be planning to
hijack a plane. Minneapolis and FBI headquarters debated whether Moussaoui should be
arrested immediately or surveilled to obtain additional information. Because it was
not clear whether Moussaoui could be imprisoned, the FBI case agent decided the most
important thing was to prevent Moussaoui from obtaining any further training that he
could use to carry out a potential attack.
As a French national who had overstayed his visa, Moussaoui could be detained
immediately. The INS arrested Moussaoui on the immigration violation. A deportation
order was signed on August 17, 2001.
The agents in Minnesota were concerned that the U.S. Attorney's Office in Minneapolis
would find insufficient probable cause of a crime to obtain a criminal warrant to
search Moussaoui's laptop computer.
Agents at FBI headquarters believed there was insufficient probable cause.
Minneapolis therefore sought a special warrant under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act to conduct the search (we introduced FISA in chapter 3).
To do so, however, the FBI needed to demonstrate probable cause that Moussaoui was an
agent of a foreign power, a demonstration that was not required to obtain a criminal
warrant but was a statutory requirement for a FISA warrant.
The case agent did not have sufficient information to connect Moussaoui to a "foreign
power,"so he reached out for help, in the United States and overseas.
The FBI agent's August 18 message requested assistance from the FBI legal attach� in
Paris. Moussaoui had lived in London, so the Minneapolis agent sought assistance
from the legal attach� there as well. By August 24, the Minneapolis agent had also
contacted an FBI detailee and a CIA desk officer at the Counterterrorist Center
about the case.
The FBI legal attach�'s office in Paris first contacted the French government on
August 16 or 17, shortly after speaking to the Minneapolis case agent on the
telephone. On August 22 and 27, the French provided information that made a
connection between Moussaoui and a rebel leader in Chechnya, Ibn al Khattab. This
set off a spirited debate between the Minneapolis Field Office, FBI headquarters,
and the CIA as to whether the Chechen rebels and Khattab were sufficiently
associated with a terrorist organization to constitute a "foreign power" for
purposes of the FISA statute. FBI headquarters did not believe this was good enough,
and its National Security Law Unit declined to submit a FISA application.
After receiving the written request for assistance, the legal attach� in London had
promptly forwarded it to his counterparts in the British government, hand-delivering
the request on August 21. On August 24, the CIA also sent a cable to London and
Paris regarding "subjects involved in suspicious 747 flight training" that described
Moussaoui as a possible "suicide hijacker." On August 28, the CIA sent a request for
information to a different service of the British government; this communication
warned that Moussaoui might be expelled to Britain by the end of August. The FBI
office in London raised the matter briefly with British officials as an aside, after
a meeting about a more urgent matter on September 3, and sent the British service a
written update on September 5. The case was not handled by the British as a priority
amid a large number of other terrorist-related inquiries.
On September 4, the FBI sent a teletype to the CIA, the FAA, the Customs Service, the
State Department, the INS, and the Secret Service summarizing the known facts
regarding Moussaoui. It did not report the case agent's personal assessment that
Moussaoui planned to hijack an airplane. It did contain the FAA's comment that it
was not unusual for Middle Easterners to attend flight training schools in the
United States.
Although the Minneapolis agents wanted to tell the FAA from the beginning about
Moussaoui, FBI headquarters instructed Minneapolis that it could not share the more
complete report the case agent had prepared for the FAA. The Minneapolis supervisor
sent the case agent in person to the local FAA office to fill in what he thought
were gaps in the FBI headquarters teletype.
No FAA actions seem to have been taken in response.
There was substantial disagreement between Minneapolis agents and FBI headquarters as
to what Moussaoui was planning to do. In one conversation between a Minneapolis
supervisor and a headquarters agent, the latter complained that Minneapolis's FISA
request was couched in a manner intended to get people "spun up." The supervisor
replied that was precisely his intent. He said he was "trying to keep someone from
taking a plane and crashing into the World Trade Center." The headquarters agent
replied that this was not going to happen and that they did not know if Moussaoui
was a terrorist.
There is no evidence that either FBI Acting Director Pickard or Assistant Director
for Counterterrorism Dale Watson was briefed on the Moussaoui case prior to 9/11.
Michael Rolince, the FBI assistant director heading the Bureau's
InternationalTerrorism Operations Section (ITOS), recalled being told about
Moussaoui in two passing hallway conversations but only in the context that he might
be receiving telephone calls from Minneapolis complaining about how headquarters was
handling the matter. He never received such a call. Although the acting special
agent in charge of Minneapolis called the ITOS supervisors to discuss the Moussaoui
case on August 27, he declined to go up the chain of command at FBI headquarters and
call Rolince.
On August 23, DCI Tenet was briefed about the Moussaoui case in a briefing titled
"Islamic Extremist Learns to Fly." Tenet was also told
that Moussaoui wanted to learn to fly a 747, paid for his training in cash, was
interested to learn the doors do not open in flight, and wanted to fly a simulated
flight from London to New York. He was told that the FBI had arrested Moussaoui
because of a visa overstay and that the CIA was working the case with the FBI. Tenet
told us that no connection to al Qaeda was apparent to him at the time. Seeing it as
an FBI case, he did not discuss the matter with anyone at the White House or the
FBI. No connection was made between Moussaoui's presence in the United States and
the threat reporting during the summer of 2001.
On September 11, after the attacks, the FBI office in London renewed their appeal for
information about Moussaoui. In response to U.S. requests, the British government
supplied some basic biographical information about Moussaoui. The British government
informed us that it also immediately tasked intelligence collection facilities for
information about Moussaoui. On September 13, the British government received new,
sensitive intelligence that Moussaoui had attended an al Qaeda training camp in
Afghanistan. It passed this intelligence to the United States on the same day. Had
this information been available in late August 2001, the Moussaoui case would almost
certainly have received intense, high-level attention.
The FBI also learned after 9/11 that the millennium terrorist Ressam, who by 2001 was
cooperating with investigators, recognized Moussaoui as someone who had been in the
Afghan camps.
As mentioned above, before 9/11 the FBI agents in Minneapolis had failed to persuade
supervisors at headquarters that there was enough evidence to seek a FISA warrant to
search Moussaoui's computer hard drive and belongings. Either the British
information or the Ressam identification would have broken the logjam.
A maximum U.S. effort to investigate Moussaoui conceivably could have unearthed his
connections to Binalshibh. Those connections might have brought investigators to the
core of the 9/11 plot. The Binalshibh connection was recognized shortly after 9/11,
though it was not an easy trail to find. Discovering it would have required quick
and very substantial cooperation from the German government, which might well have
been difficult to obtain. However, publicity about Moussaoui's arrest and a possible
hijacking threat might have derailed the plot.107With time, the search for Mihdhar
and Hazmi and the investigation of Moussaoui might also have led to a breakthrough
that would have disrupted the plot.
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed
Another late opportunity was presented by a confluence of information regarding
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed received by the intelligence community in the summer of 2001.
The possible links between KSM, Moussaoui, and an individual only later identified
as Ramzi Binalshibh would remain undiscovered, however.
Although we readily equate KSM with al Qaeda today, this was not the case before
9/11. KSM, who had been indicted in January 1996 for his role in the Manila air
plot, was seen primarily as another freelance terrorist, associated with Ramzi
Yousef. Because the links between KSM and Bin Ladin or al Qaeda were not recognized
at the time, responsibility for KSM remained in the small Islamic Extremist Branch
of the Counterterrorist Center, not in the Bin Ladin unit.
Moreover, because KSM had already been indicted, he became targeted for arrest. In
1997, the Counterterrorist Center added a Renditions Branch to help find wanted
fugitives. Responsibility for KSM was transferred to this branch, which gave the CIA
a "man-to-man" focus but was not an analytical unit. When subsequent information
came, more critical for analysis than for tracking, no unit had the job of following
up on what the information might mean.
For example, in September 2000, a source had reported that an individual named Khalid
al-Shaykh al-Ballushi was a key lieutenant in al Qaeda. Al- Ballushi means "from
Baluchistan," and KSM is from Baluchistan. Recognizing the possible significance of
this information, the Bin Ladin unit sought more information. When no information
was forthcoming, the Bin Ladin unit dropped the matter.
When additional pieces of the puzzle arrived in the spring and summer of 2001, they
were not put together.
The first piece of the puzzle concerned some intriguing information associated with a
person known as "Mukhtar" that the CIA had begun analyzing in April 2001. The CIA
did not know who Mukhtar was at the time-only that he associated with al Qaeda
lieutenant Abu Zubaydah and that, based on the nature of the information, he was
evidently involved in planning possible terrorist activities.
The second piece of the puzzle was some alarming information regarding KSM. On June
12, 2001, a CIA report said that "Khaled"was actively recruiting people to travel
outside Afghanistan, including to the United States where colleagues were reportedly
already in the country to meet them, to carry out terrorist-related activities for
Bin Ladin. CIA headquarters presumed from the details of the reporting that this
person was Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. In July, the same source was shown a series of
photographs and identified a photograph of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed as the Khaled he
had previously discussed.
The final piece of the puzzle arrived at the CIA's Bin Ladin unit on August 28 in a
cable reporting that KSM's nickname was Mukhtar. No one made the connection to the
reports about Mukhtar that had been circulated in the spring. This connection might
also have underscored concern about the June reporting that KSM was recruiting
terrorists to travel, including to the United States. Only after 9/11 would it be
discovered that Muhktar/KSM had communicated with a phone that was used by
Binalshibh, and that Binalshibh had used the same phone to communicate with
Moussaoui, as discussed in chapter 7. As in the Moussaoui situation already
described, the links to Binalshibh might not have been an easy trail to find and
would have required substantial cooperation from the German government. But time was
short, and running out.
Time Runs Out
As Tenet told us, "the system was blinking red" during the summer of 2001. Officials
were alerted across the world. Many were doing everything they possibly could to
respond to the threats.
Yet no one working on these late leads in the summer of 2001 connected the case in
his or her in-box to the threat reports agitating senior officials and being briefed
to the President. Thus, these individual cases did not become national priorities.
As the CIA supervisor "John" told us, no one looked at the bigger picture; no
analytic work foresaw the lightning that could connect the thundercloud to the
ground.
We see little evidence that the progress of the plot was disturbed by any government
action. The U.S. government was unable to capitalize on mistakes made by al Qaeda.
Time ran out.
