OANC_GrAF / data / written_2 / technical / government / Post_Rate_Comm / Cohenetal_CreamSkimming.txt
29547 views1234A Preliminary Version of this Paper was Presented at5The Evolving Structure of Postal and Delivery Industries June611-14, 1997, Helsingør, Denmark7Sponsored by Center for Research in Regulated Industries at8Rutgers University91011AN ANALYSIS OF THE POTENTIAL FOR CREAM SKIMMING IN THE U.S.12RESIDENTIAL DELIVERY MARKET13Robert H. Cohen William W. Ferguson John D. Waller Spyros S.14Xenakis15Office of Rates, Analysis and Planning16U.S. Postal Rate Commission17October 199818Published in Emerging Competition in Postal and Delivery19Systems, edited by M.A. Crew and20P.R. Kleindorfer. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999.21An Analysis of the Potential for Cream Skimming in the U.S.22Residential Delivery Market2324A. Introduction25Postal administrations often claim that without a legal26monopoly1 to protect them from cream skimming, they would not be27able to continue providing universal service at uniform and28affordable prices. Because they serve delivery points with a range29of profitability, postal administrations fear that without monopoly30protection cream skimmers would capture their high profit routes,31leaving them with their less profitable routes. The question is,32would cream skimming divert so much volume that universal service33at affordable prices becomes infeasible?34Sweden is the only industrial nation which actually has had35competition in its letter mail market after abolishing its36monopoly.2 A competitor, City Mail, has served selected portions of37the country but was twice forced into bankruptcy.3 City Mail has38again emerged from bankruptcy and is competing with Sweden Post.39Perhaps on City Mail's third attempt, we will finally have a valid40test of whether Sweden Post actually needs monopoly protection in41order to provide universal service at reasonable prices. As far as42the authors know, the economics of the competition between Sweden43Post and its competitor has not been studied. If City Mail finally44succeeds in avoiding bankruptcy, such a study might determine the45reasons why Sweden Post was vulnerable to cream skimming. In46addition, it might describe the impact that a viable competitor has47had on48149In the U.S., as in most industrial nations, the postal monopoly50extends only to letter mail (including addressed advertising).51252Finland has abolished its monopoly and in so doing created a53licensing system for competitors to Finland Post. No other operator54has yet begun to offer service in competition with Finland Post.55New Zealand has also just recently abolished its monopoly, but it56is too early to know if competitors will emerge and be57successful.58359A recent study found that the Swedish Postal Service had engaged60in a variety of anti-competitive practices with respect to its61competitor. See "Deregulation of the Postal Service's Market;62report on the abuse by the Postal Office of Its dominant market63position and on the Competition Authority's handling of the64question of competition in relation to the Post Office," Professor65Erik Nerep (Stockholm School of Economics), February 1995.66the dominant provider. It should be noted that the presence of67City Mail has already prompted Sweden Post to lower prices for68large volume mailers in areas served by its competitor.469Cream skimmers take advantage of an incumbent's price when it is70based on an average of heterogeneous costs. They serve the low cost71portion of the market and price below the incumbent. Conceptually72cream skimming has two basic dimensions - product and geography.73Product cream skimming is where a competitor tries to capture the74most profitable portion of the market for a product with75heterogeneous costs. Geographic cream skimming is where a76competitor tries to provide a service only to selected, low cost77areas.5 City Mail is an example of geographic cream skimming. Its78carriers provide twice weekly delivery to various areas in Sweden79for large volume customers.6 This paper addresses only geographic80cream skimming. 781Postal monopolies, like most other legal monopolies, are thought82by many observers (1) to be technically inefficient, and (2) to83have delivery functions which exhibit economies of scale.8 This84paper addresses several questions which arise from these two points85under the assumption that the monopoly and any other barriers to86entry were to be removed. It asks how much more efficient would a87potential competitor have to be to overcome the scale economies of88the U.S. Postal Service? Assuming potential competitors are able to89achieve the necessary level of efficiency, it then asks how much90volume might they be able to capture and in which markets? Finally,91it asks what effect92493It would be interesting to learn: How much it cost Sweden Post94to serve the areas where it lowered prices relative to its average95cost, how important the abandonment of universal pricing is to96Sweden Post's competitive position, and are the circumstances in97Sweden applicable to the U.S.? Section J of this paper examines98this issue further.995100Cream skimming may have a third dimension having to do with101transactions costs. In practice cream skimmers may restrict102themselves to large volume customers since the transaction costs of103dealing with smaller volume customers and individuals may be104prohibitive.1056106Sweden Post delivers five days per week.1077108A report by the General Accounting Office (GAO) at least109partially analyzed the effect product cream skimming would have on110the U.S. Postal Service. Its assessment was as follows: Priority111Mail (First Class over 11 ounces) - high risk of loss of112significant volumes, but a low financial impact, if it did occur;113First Class - low risk of loss of significant volumes, but a high114financial impact, if it did occur; Advertising Mail low risk of115loss and a medium financial impact, if it did occur. See "Postal116Service Reform; Issues Relevant to Changing Restrictions on Private117Letter Delivery," General Accounting Office, September 1996.1188119In the U.S., legal monopolies include the local delivery of120electricity, gas, water and until recently telephone.121would the loss of volume to cream skimmers have on the resulting122prices the Postal Service would have to charge in order to maintain123universal service?124Many observers believe that cream skimmers in the United States125would serve cities and leave rural areas to the universal service126provider because they assume that the cost of delivery to rural127areas is much higher than the cost of delivery to cities. An128earlier study9 challenged that assumption. It estimated that in1291989 city delivery cost per piece was only 8 percent lower than130rural delivery, but that city delivery cost per delivery point was131actually 7 percent higher than rural delivery cost. It concluded132that there was no cross subsidy of rural delivery by city delivery.133In theory, cream skimming of residential service could occur in134either city or rural areas. This paper focuses on city delivery135because of the more detailed data available on this type of136delivery.137We first provide a brief description of the current competition138in delivery. We then describe the data used in our analysis and the139costs and profitability of the Postal Service's city residential140delivery routes. We next examine the volume vulnerable to capture141by potential cream skimmers. We describe characteristics of routes142most likely to be profitable to competitors and provide a range of143estimates for the cost of cream skimmers. After examining the144consequences of successful cream skimming on Postal Service rates,145we explain why cream skimming is not likely to be successful on146business routes in the U.S. Finally, we provide some observations147on the relevance this analysis may have for other countries.148149150B. Current Competition In Delivery151Competitors of the U.S. Postal Service may legally deliver only152periodicals, catalogues over 24 pages, parcels, and unaddressed153letters.10 Alternative delivery is particularly difficult because154of the so called mail box law which prohibits any one but the1559 See Cohen, Ferguson & Xenakis, "Rural Delivery and the156Universal Service Obligation: A Quantitative Investigation."157Regulation and the Nature of Postal Delivery Services, Ed. Crew158& Kleindorfer, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993.159Technically, the U.S. monopoly is primarily a revenue monopoly.160A third party may deliver a letter if proper postage is affixed and161canceled. The monopoly also has an urgent mail exception for162letters which are charged twice normal First-Class postage with a163minimum of $3.00. Unlike most industrial nations, there is no164exemption from the monopoly based on weight or price.165Postal Service from accessing a private mail box.11 The U.S.166Postal Service broadly interprets "letter" to include any addressed167information recorded on a physical object. Thus, for example, it168considers an addressed grocery store advertisement to be a169letter.170In 1989, Publishers Express was founded by Time Inc., Meredith171Corp., American Express Publishing, New York Times Co., Times172Mirror Co., and R. R. Donnelley, among others, to provide173alternative delivery.12 In spite of its prestigious sponsorship,174the company ceased operations in 1996. Many other small175entrepreneurs provide alternative delivery, but they have a very176small share of the market. They are scattered around the country177and mostly deliver unaddressed "saturation" advertisements and178small quantities of periodicals and small parcels.179The real alternative delivery system in the United States is the180newspaper industry which delivers advertising preprints or181inserts.13 The Postal Service has the advantage of being able to182deliver these advertisements to all addresses, while newspapers183usually (but not always) deliver inserts just to their subscribers.184A typical newspaper in the U.S. has less than 50 percent coverage185in its service area. This puts it at a disadvantage vis a vis the186Postal Service, which delivers to all households. Newspapers, on187the other hand, have the advantage of charging lower prices.188Because marginal costs are very low, a newspaper price for189preprints might be as low as 5 or 6 cents per piece. The lowest190rate currently charged by the Postal Service is 11.0 to 11.4 cents191for saturation mail weighing up to 3.3 ounces and drop shipped at192the delivery office.14 Newspapers deliver about 86 billion inserts193annually,15 while the U.S. Postal Service delivers at least 11194billion competing items.1619511196As far as we know, the U.S. is the only country that has a mail197box rule.19812199For a more comprehensive discussion of alternative delivery in200the United States, see the General Accounting Office Study, n. 7,201supra.20213203Newspapers also deliver product samples.20414205The Postal Service has an additional disadvantage because city206carriers deliver only addressed advertising mail. This requires the207mailer to have an address list kept in delivery sequence and to208have address labels for each piece.20915210Newspaper Association of America's WEB Site;211www.naa.org/marketscope/databank/preppriyr.htm.21216213This was the saturation and 125-piece walk sequence Enhanced214Carrier Route mail volume in 1996. Many of these items are so215called "marriage mail" pieces which contain several individual216advertisements combined into a single piece. These individual217advertisements could each be a stand-alone insert. Thus, 11 billion218pieces is an extreme lower bound on the number of preprints carried219by the Postal Service.220221222C. City Carrier Data223Each year the Postal Service conducts a City Carrier Survey224(CCS) of delivered mail volume by route. Between 1993 and 1996, the225Postal Service conducted the survey using a relatively small panel226of about 400 routes.17 Prior to that, the Postal Service randomly227sampled a much larger cross section of its routes over the course228of a year. The last set of cross sectional data filed with the229Postal Rate Commission in 1989 consisted of a sample of 16,092230different routes.18 Because of the large sample size, these data231are far more useful for our analysis than the subsequent panel232data.19233Each record in the 1989 CCS contains the date of the234observation, the 5-Digit ZIP Code in which the route is located,235the route type,20 the number of pieces (by subclass and by shape)236per stop, the number of possible deliveries and actual deliveries237per stop, and the stop type ("single delivery residential,"238"multi-delivery residential," and "business-and-mixed"). Generally,239data are recorded for every tenth stop on a route. The authors were240able to make use of the records for 14,884 routes.21 This analysis241is based on the data set of 13,212 usable residential routes22 and242476,953 stops. 23 About 89 percent of all city routes are243residential routes. The rest are business or mixed (residential and244business).245246247D. Postal Service Delivery Cost And Profitability248This analysis uses delivery data from 1989, but uses 1996 cost249levels for wages, fringe benefits, and other associated delivery250costs. Total volume grew 13.5 percent25117252A panel survey collects data repeatedly from the same253sample.25418255There were 157 thousand city delivery routes in FY 1989. There256were also 46 thousand rural routes, most of which had costs257comparable to city delivery routes. See Cohen, Ferguson &258Xenakis, n. 9, supra.25919260The 1997 CCS data were not available when the analysis for this261paper was conducted.26220263Business foot, business motorized, residential foot, residential264park and loop, residential curb, mixed foot, mixed park and loop,265and mixed curb.26621267The data are organized by the 26 pay periods in a year. Portions268of the data from a few pay periods were not usable. Comparisons269with previously published summaries indicate that the missing data270did not bias our results.27122272To a much lesser extent this analysis makes use of data from 717273business routes.27423275Ninety-four percent (94%) of these stops are residential, while276six percent (6%) are either business, or mixed277business-and-residential stops. Not all stops on a residential278route are residences. Some are business stops and some are mixed279(business and residential).280between 1989 and 1996, and the number of routes increased 7281percent. We make no attempt to adjust for these increases.282When calculating city delivery cost, we include the entire283(fixed and volume variable) in-office and out-of-office cost24 for284all city routes, plus the cost of overtime, supervision, space, and285vehicles. Starting with a productive hourly rate of $25.25 for city286carriers, we calculate a cost per residential delivery route of287$266 per delivery day.25 The cost we calculate can be considered to288be the avoided cost or the incremental cost of the city delivery289function. Alternatively, it can be considered a lower bound on the290stand-alone cost of city delivery.26291We calculate the daily profit of residential delivery routes for292the Postal Service by totaling the revenue minus collection,293processing and transportation costs of the mail delivered on each294route and subtracting the delivery cost of $266.295Table 1 displays a variety of mean route statistics for296residential routes separated into quartiles based on their profit.297less As can be seen, the mean daily profit of each quartile ranges298from positive $248 to negative $110. The average profit for all299residential routes is $41 with 46.5 percent of the routes operating300at a loss. The route cost per piece ranges from 7.6 cents to 23.5301cents, and averages 12.5 cents. Route volume ranges from 3,485302pieces to 1,131 pieces, and averages 2,128 pieces. The number of303possible deliveries (which ranges from 670 to 411) is dependent on304route terrain. 27 All the statistics presented are monotonic305across28 quartiles except for route type. This is because of the306close relationship between cost (per piece, delivery and stop),307volume30824309"In-office" refers to the in the office activity of a letter310carrier (primarily sequencing mail to be delivered),311"out-of-office" refers to the activity of the carrier while on the312street.31325314This is based on the city delivery carrier total cost of $33.20315per hour. This, in turn, is based on a productive hourly rate (pay,316overtime pay, and benefits for hours worked) increased to account317for other costs that can be associated with carriers. These other318costs include systemwide labor related costs (e.g., worker's319compensation, civil service retirement unfunded liability),320indirect labor such as carrier supervision, vehicle costs, and321space related costs (rents, fuel, utilities, custodial322maintenance). The standard work day for a city carrier is eight323hours.32426325It is a lower bound because the cost includes no marketing or326administrative costs which a stand-alone firm would normally327incur.32827329By "physical terrain" we mean the physical proximity of the330delivery points and whether they are most advantageously served by331a curb, park & loop, or foot route.33228333A monotonic series is one whose every term is greater than (less334than) or equal to the previous term. 6335(per piece, delivery and stop), and the number of deliveries336(stops) on a route. With respect to route type, we see that the337percentage of curb routes is greatest in the most profitable338quartile.29 These routes are largely a suburban phenomenon, they339reach more stops in a day and hence, have more volume. The appendix340(Table A1) presents demographic characteristics related to the341quartiles in Table 1.342Table 1343SELECTED AVERAGES FOR RESIDENTIAL ROUTES WHEN ROUTES ARE SORTED344BY PROFIT PER ROUTE345Profit Cost (cents) Per (possible) Volume Pieces Per (possible)346Quartile (dollars) Piece Delivery Stop (pieces) Deliverya Stop347348349a350In the paper referenced in n. 9, supra, pieces per possible351delivery were weighed by stop and produced a slightly higher pieces352per delivery. Here they are unweighted.353The revenue for 46.5 percent of the routes (all of quartile 4354and most of quartile 3) is not enough to cover the costs of the355mail delivered on those routes. Thus, it might be argued that a356monopoly is necessary to ensure service to those households. For357several reasons, it would seem the burden of proof for this358position should fall on its proponents. The routes which are359unprofitable are dispersed across the country in a great number of360cities. A competitive postal service that refused to serve361households on unprofitable362Curb routes deliver directly from the vehicle to a curbside mail363receptacle. Park and loop routes involve parking, covering an area364by foot, then parking the vehicle in a new area.365routes would impose large transaction costs on its customers to366separate mail and to secure suppliers to deliver its remaining367mail. Such firms would be at a considerable disadvantage to those368providing universal service. Larger transaction networks (be they369mail, packages, overnight or telephone) are more valuable to370customers and providers than smaller networks. It is for sound371business reasons that Federal Express and United Parcel Service372provide universal delivery service. A major business asset of the373U.S. Postal Service and all other national posts is that they374provide service to every address in the countries they serve. Thus,375there is a business incentive for any postal provider (who is not376simply a cream skimmer) to offer universal service within the377territories it serves.378Routes which are unprofitable when serviced six days per week379would become profitable when serviced less frequently. In a380competitive environment, the Postal Service could easily retain381universal service, but perhaps not a universal service standard.30382Delivery less than six days per week would certainly be preferable383to abandoning delivery altogether. Of course, if the Postal Service384were to simply abandon delivery to unprofitable routes, it would385not have to refuse, return or destroy mail destined to these386routes. Delivery firms with lower costs than the Postal Service387would emerge to serve them and the Postal Service could hand off388its unprofitable mail to them. 31 Under any foreseeable389circumstances, universal delivery would not cease.32390391392E. Volume Available For Cream Skimmers393It is unlikely that cream skimmers would base their selection of394areas to serve on the Postal Service's delivery profits. Postal395Service delivery profitability depends on the revenue for all mail396delivered, and it is not likely that cream skimmers could capture397all categories of mail.39830399It is interesting to note that United Parcel Service recently400began delivery less frequently than daily to certain residential401areas.40231403Costs would be lower by dint of lower wages and/or less frequent404delivery.40532406The concept of a universal service obligation may really mean407more frequent delivery than economically warranted for households408living on unprofitable routes. This, of course, is in addition to409providing retail services to rural communities.410Residential cream skimmers would serve bulk mailers with411sufficient volumes of mail for the areas they serve. We assume that412only mail that is presorted to the carrier route level would be413vulnerable to cream skimming. If a bulk mailer did not have414sufficient volume to sort to the carrier route level, the415transaction costs for both mailer and cream skimmer would be416prohibitive. Of course, third parties might become intermediaries417between these bulk mailers and cream skimmers. Such parties would418have to engage in processing and transportation. They would in419effect be a parallel postal system for bulk mailers. An analysis of420separate postal systems for bulk mailers is beyond the scope of421this paper.422The U.S. Postal Service requires First-Class and advertising423mail to have at least ten pieces for a carrier to qualify for a424carrier route discount. Publications may qualify with as few as six425pieces for a carrier route. The amounts being presorted to the426carrier route level in 1996 are shown in the right hand column:427428First-Class Mail is unzoned and receives no discount for being429deposited near its destination. Most First-Class carrier route430volume is prepared by utilities and may be local depending on the431billing operations of the utility. For purposes of this analysis we432assume that all First-Class carrier route mail is available to433local cream skimmers.434Publications Mail. While only 3.2 billion pieces of the carrier435route volume is entered locally or entered close enough to its436destination to be available to cream skimmers, we assume that all4374.5 billion pieces are available to cream skimmers.438Advertising Mail. Eight-five (85) percent or 25.2 billion pieces439of carrier route advertising mail are drop shipped or entered440locally. Notwithstanding, we assume here that all carrier route441advertising mail would be available to cream skimmers.442To summarize, 37.7 billion pieces of carrier route volume are443potentially available to cream skimmers.33 This represents 20.6444percent of the total volume of 182.7 billion pieces in 1996.445Geographic cream skimmers would concentrate on areas with the most446carrier route volume because their cost per piece would be lowest447and their potential profit would be the greatest.448Table 2 displays mean daily route statistics for routes when449divided into quartiles reflecting their volumes of carrier route450mail. We see a wide divergence in carrier route volume among the451quartiles. The range is from 1,263 pieces to 87 pieces with an452average of 551. The first quartile routes have more than twice the453volume of carrier route mail as the second quartile. In fact, the454first quartile has more than half of all carrier route volume455delivered on residential routes. Thus, the first quartile of routes456are much more attractive targets for cream skimmers than the other457routes. We again see a monotonic behavior of the other variables458across quartiles.34 Route profitability by quartile in Table 2459changes by a sizable amount as compared to route profitability in460Table 1. Less than half the routes in quartile 1, Table 1, are also461in quartile 1, Table 2. The appendix (Table A2) presents462demographic characteristics related to the quartiles in Table4632.46433465Some of this mail is delivered by rural carriers. For purpose of466this analysis, we assume that rural delivery is subject to the same467degree of cream skimming as city delivery. However, some carrier468route mail is delivered on business routes and some is delivered469via post office boxes and, thus, would not be available to cream470skimmers. Consequently, 37.7 billion represents an upper bound of471the volume available to cream skimmers.47234473The only deviation from the monotonic behavior in Table 2 occurs474for deliveries per route between quartiles 2 and 3.475Table 2476SELECTED AVERAGES FOR RESIDENTIAL ROUTES WHEN ROUTES ARE SORTED477BY VOLUME OF CARRIER ROUTE MAIL PER ROUTE478Profit Cost (cents) Per (possible) Quartile (dollars) Piece479Delivery Stop480Volume (pieces) All Carrier Pieces Per (possible) Mail Route481Delivery Stop482483484485486F. Estimating The Delivery Cost For Cream Skimmers487Cream skimmers undercut prices charged by an incumbent that has488heterogeneous costs but averaged prices. Cream skimmers profit by489selling low cost items at below the incumbents average price.490Delivery cream skimmers would attempt to serve those areas where491the cost to deliver carrier route pieces is the lowest (i.e., where492the volume of carrier route pieces is the highest). The first493quartile of routes in Table 2 would make the best targets. It is494this case we examine.495In an important sense, this is an unrealistic case since496quartile 1 represents 40,000 routes which are scattered over more497than half the 30,000 5-Digit ZIP Code areas in the U.S. It is498extremely unlikely that they constitute all the residential routes499in any 5-Digit ZIP Code nor is it likely that they make up the500entire suburban ring around cities. It is unrealistic for cream501skimmers to serve such a fragmented market. From both an502operational and marketing standpoint, cream skimmers would have to503serve markets with at best a large proportion of routes in quartile5041. Their markets would undoubtedly contain a large number of routes505in the other quartiles. Notwithstanding, for analytical purposes,506we assume the best possible case for cream skimmers; that they507would be able to serve only routes that fall within quartile 1.508A potential competitor must decide the level of service to509provide and this decision would affect the amount of volume that it510could actually capture. Many magazines, newspapers, and511advertisements must be delivered within a one, two or three day512window. A competitor delivering only one day a week would have to513forego much potential volume. On the other hand, delivery six days514a week would certainly raise the cost per delivered piece and make515it less likely that a cream skimmer would be viable.35 City Mail in516Sweden chose to deliver two days per week (Monday/Thursday in some517areas and Tuesday/Friday in other areas).518In all probability, a cream skimmer could not prosper unless it519could deliver mail at a price less than the incumbent postal520administration. Its cost per delivered piece would be a function of521its cost of labor and productivity. It would be expected that a522cream skimmer would have a significant labor cost advantage. Its523productivity would be influenced by the in-office and out-of-office524technology it employed. In 1989, Postal Service carriers spent more525than 40 percent of their time in-office preparing for delivery on526the street. Many mailstreams must be merged and sorted into527delivery sequence.36 It is not clear what technology cream skimmers528would use. Moreover, we do not know whether the personnel of a529cream skimmer would be more productive on the street than530U.S. Postal Service carriers. This analysis will combine these531variables (labor cost, technology, in-office and out-of-office532productivity) into a single efficiency parameter.53335534In a sense, each piece of advertising mail competes with other535advertising mail for the recipient's attention. If a cream skimmer536could capture a large portion of the available carrier route537volume, its customers might prefer more frequent delivery to538minimize this type of competition.53936540This function is rapidly being automated for letter size mail in541the U.S. Delivery point barcoded mail is increasingly being542sequenced on sorting machines, saving significant in-office543delivery time. From 1989 to 1996, the percentage of in-office time544for city carriers has declined from 41 percent to 34 percent. It is545expected that this trend will continue. Unless a potential cream546skimmer had enough capital to employ sequencing automation, the547Postal Service might have a significant advantage in sequencing and548merging letter-shaped mail. First Class is almost all letter549shaped, publications are almost all flat shaped, and carrier route550advertising is 43 percent letter shaped.551552553G. Cream Skimmers Cost Per Piece554Table 3 has four matrices, each reflecting a different555percentage of available volume assumed to be captured by cream556skimmers. Each matrix presents cream skimmer unit or per piece557costs based on frequency of delivery and relative efficiency of the558cream skimmer. We measure relative efficiency in terms of cream559skimmers cost relative to the Postal Service's cost.560The shaded cell in the top matrix, 13.1 cents, is the Postal561Service cost per piece for delivering only carrier route presorted562mail in the least expensive quartile. This number is derived from563the 8.7 cent cost of the Postal Service delivering all mail in the564least expensive quartile shown in Table 2. If only the carrier565route mail is delivered, the average delivered volume decreases566from 3,051 to 1,263 in this quartile. The variable costs drop as567the volume drops, but the fixed costs are spread over less volume568which increases the fixed costs proportionately. The result is an569increase in the unit costs to57013.1 cents shown in Table 3. Going down that column, the costs571per piece are displayed assuming a cream skimmer had the same cost572as the U.S. Postal Service, but delivers fewer days per week. The573costs decrease by the amount of fixed costs in delivery. The574variable cost remains the same because the volume does not change.575Most other national postal administrations would have a greater576percentage of fixed costs because they have fewer pieces per577possible delivery.37578The columns display cream skimmers' costs as a function of U.S.579Postal Service efficiency, expressed as a percentage of the Postal580Service's delivery cost per piece. The 120 percent column displays581the cream skimmer's per piece cost if its cost were 120 percent of582the U.S. Postal Service.38 The 60 percent column displays the cream583skimmer's per piece cost if its cost were 60 percent of the U.S.584Postal Service.585Table 3586CREAM SKIMMER'S COST PER PIECE IN CENTS AS A FUNCTION OF587EFFICIENCY RELATIVE TO POSTAL SERVICE, DAYS OF DELIVERY AND PERCENT588OF CARRIER ROUTE MAIL589100% OF CARRIER ROUTE VOLUME CAPTURED59059175% OF CARRIER ROUTE VOLUME CAPTURED59259350% OF CARRIER ROUTE VOLUME CAPTURED59459525% OF CARRIER ROUTE VOLUME CAPTURED596597For all mail the Postal Service city carrier cost (fixed and598variable) is 12.5 cents per piece. (See Tables 1 and 2, cost per599piece all routes.) This is the cost for the delivery function. Each600postal product has a variable cost for mail processing,601transportation and delivery. Each product also has an average602incremental (avoidable) cost. In the case of advertising carrier603route mail, the average incremental cost is about 7 cents.39 If604threatened by cream skimmers, the Postal Service could respond by605lowering its price towards average incremental costs. If the Postal606Service maintained uniform prices but had competition only in607selected areas, it would sacrifice revenue in those areas without608competition. These circumstances would probably call for selective609discounts (with average incremental costs as a floor) to large610volume mailers40 who would otherwise become customers of cream611skimmers. Thus, cream skimmers would most likely have to have costs612no higher than approximately 7 cents per piece in order to compete613on a cost basis alone.41614The Postal Service's productive hourly wage of more than $25 may615make it likely that cream skimmers could obtain some cost advantage616on that basis alone. We do not know how reducing the frequency of617delivery would affect demand for alternative delivery. A two-day618frequency could satisfy a three-day window, but would miss many619delivery dates for time value publications. It should also be noted620that some customers may not be willing to leave the Postal Service621for a variety of reasons including the sense of security of dealing622with a government agency.623If a cream skimmer were to capture only 25 percent of the624available market, it would have difficulty succeeding. At that625level of market penetration, its costs would have to be 40 percent626of the Postal Service's at a two-day frequency in order to be below627Postal Service incremental costs. With 50 percent of the average628volume at a two-day frequency, a cream skimmer's costs would have629to be 60 percent or less of the Postal Service's in order to remain630below the Service's average incremental costs.63139632The variable cost of carrier route advertising mail comes633predominantly from the delivery function (in-office and634out-of-office). The delivery function is about 50 percent variable.635Thus, the variable cost of the advertising carrier route mail636product can be much lower than the average (fixed and variable)637cost of delivery. The average incremental cost of advertising638carrier route mail is only slightly higher than the variable cost639since we estimate it here to consist of variable costs plus single640subclass stop costs for 1996.64140642Except for a customer with a very high elasticity of demand,643there is no reason for a monopoly to grant volume based discounts644since customers have no alternative supplier. We understand this645was the case with UPS, which had a virtual monopoly in surface646parcel delivery in the U.S., and did not give discounts to surface647parcel customers until Roadway Package Service began to target its648most lucrative customers in the 1980s. UPS then began offering649discounts to certain large volume customers.65041651Some mailers currently use cream skimmers because of service652considerations.653654655H. Consequences Of Successful Cream Skimming656Table 4 shows the required increase in the U.S. Postal Service657rates based on the percentage of carrier route volume that would be658captured by cream skimmers targeting mail in quartile 1, Table 2.42659The maximum effect is an increase of about 1.2 cents in the660First-Class rate (with corresponding increases in the other661classes). This would be an increase of nearly 4 percent; a662significant but limited effect.663Lifting the letter mail monopoly and allowing cream skimming664would likely have an important impact on rate setting for the665Postal Service's large volume carrier route customers, if our666assumptions are correct concerning the amount of volume available667for capture by cream skimmers. The maximum impact on overall postal668rates is, however, likely to be limited. The negative impact on669Postal Service's finances would likely be offset to a great extent670by the effect of limited competition on the Postal Service's671efficiency, service performance and product innovation.672Table 4 IMPACT OF CREAM SKIMMING ON673674675676I. Comparison Of Business And Residential Routes677We do not analyze cream skimming on business routes because only6787 percent of mail volume delivered on them is carrier route as679compared to 26 percent on residential routes. This makes them680unlikely candidates for cream skimming based on our analysis. We681compare several statistics for city residential and business routes682in Table 5.683Table 5 COSTS BY TYPE OF CITY DELIVERY ROUTE684685It can be seen that business routes have slightly more pieces686per route with slightly higher cost per piece.43 The cost per687delivery point and stop on business routes is much higher, but the688profit per piece remains higher.44689We are not aware of any study that has identified the reasons690why business routes have a higher cost per piece and much higher691cost per stop than residential routes. Several factors may692contribute, including the high cost of serving each individual693business in office buildings. In contrast, residential apartment694houses generally have mail boxes in one central and convenient695location for carriers. Other factors include the larger proportion696of business mail requiring signatures and the greater difficulty of697getting around in congested business areas as opposed to698residential and suburban neighborhoods. Because business routes699have much higher cost per delivery point, they70043701Business routes get much more assistance from routers who702sequence the mail in the office, thus saving in-office time for the703carrier. The cost per piece and per delivery point reflects these704extra costs.70544706Profit is higher on business routes than on residential routes707because of greater volumes of high profit mail, such as on Priority708and Express. Cream skimming delivery networks might be developed709for such mail in business areas, but are beyond the scope of this710paper.711are unlikely candidates for geographic cream skimmers who could712be expected to have far fewer pieces over which to spread the cost713per delivery point.45714715716J. Some Differences Between the U.S. and Other Countries717The classification structures in industrial countries have718varying degrees of efficiency (defined as adherence to cost).46719Efficient classification discourages cream skimmers because it720leaves less cream to skim. The less efficient the classification721structure, the more the administration needs monopoly protection.722The U.S. Postal Service's classification structure contains several723score of cost based discounts and rate differentials, probably more724than any other administration.47 This should tend to make the U.S.725less vulnerable to cream skimming. Moreover, the U.S. has more726pieces per capita than virtually any other country. Because the727delivery function has important economies of scale, ceteris728paribus, the U.S. should have lower per piece costs than virtually729every other country. This factor also makes the U.S. less730vulnerable to cream skimming. In addition, the proportion of fixed731cost in the delivery network is largely a function of volume per732capita (per delivery). The larger the volume per capita, the larger733the proportion of variable costs and the smaller the proportion of734fixed costs. Since virtually every other postal administration has735less volume per capita than the U.S., a larger proportion of their736delivery costs are fixed relative to the U.S. A cream skimmer can737reduce its fixed cost relative to an incumbent simply by reducing738the number of days of delivery. Thus, a cream skimmer would obtain739less cost advantage by cutting delivery frequency in the U.S. than740in countries with less per capita volume. This also tends to make741the U.S. less vulnerable to cream skimming than other742countries.4874345744Of course, messenger services are common in central business745districts, but this is for reasons of service and not cost.74646747The most efficient classification structure would be based on748costs alone and would offer worksharing discounts wherever749practical. These discounts would equal the cost savings. No postal750administration meets this standard nor do the authors recommend751that they do.75247753Advertising mail alone has over 60 different rate categories754with rate differentials based on shape and discounts for755presorting, barcoding and drop shipping.75648757A consequence of this is that an administration which delivers758five days per week, ceteris paribus, is a more difficult target for759cream skimmers than one which delivers six days per week.760On the other hand, some factors appear to make the U.S. Postal761Service more vulnerable than other postal administrations to cream762skimming. Few, if any, countries have as large a proportion of763carrier route volume as does the U.S. This is the mail most764susceptible to diversion. In addition, few postal administrations765pay their employees as large a wage premium as does the U.S. Postal766Service.49 A wage premium allows cream skimmers to obtain an767efficiency/cost advantage simply by paying the prevailing wage.76849 See Cohen, Chu, Ferguson & Xenakis, "A Cross Sectional769Comparison and Analysis of Productivity for 21 National Postal770Administrations." Managing Change in the Postal and Delivery771Industries, Ed. Crew & Kleindorfer, Kluwer Academic Publishers,7721997.773774775APPENDIX776This paper's analysis is based on volume and delivery statistics777from 13,212 residential carrier routes. These routes were extracted778from the Carrier Cost Survey (CCS), conducted by the U.S. Postal779Service in 1989. In addition to the volume and delivery statistics780for each of the 13,212 residential routes, CCS provides the781associated 5-Digit ZIP Code served by each route. A ZIP Code may be782served by many routes. The data presented in this appendix are783based on the demographic data for the 5-Digit ZIP Code for each784route in a quartile. Thus, the demographic data for the same7855-Digit ZIP Code could be averaged into the totals for two786different quartiles. This would happen if two routes from the same7875-Digit ZIP Code were in separate quartiles.788The United States Bureau of the Census has grouped the 1990789Census of Population and Housing data using 5-Digit ZIP Codes. The790file (STF 3B) is available in three CDs of about 1.4 gigabytes791(GBs) and contains socio-economic data for 29,467 5-Digit ZIP Codes792served by the U.S. Postal Service. The Puerto Rico ZIP Codes are793not included in STF 3B file.794By merging the STF 3B file with CCS data, we have obtained795economic and demographic data for the ZIP Codes in which 12,876796residential routes reside. We could not obtain any socio-economic797information for the ZIP Codes of 336 residential routes (most of798them in Puerto Rico) because their ZIP Codes were not included in799the STF 3B file.800Tables A1 through A3 provide statistics for age, household801income, and education attainment for the 5-Digit ZIP Code for the80212,876 residential routes in CCS. Table A1 presents the statistics803by quartile when routes are sorted by profitability. Tables A2 and804A3 present the statistics by quartile and decile respectively when805routes are sorted by carrier route volume. The statistics in Table806A1 show that, on average, routes in the more profitable quartiles807reside in ZIP Codes with higher income households and more educated808adults. Likewise, the statistics in Tables A2 and A3 show that809routes with high carrier route volume reside in ZIP Codes with810higher levels of household income and education attainment.811812813814815816817818819820