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A Preliminary Version of this Paper was Presented at
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The Evolving Structure of Postal and Delivery Industries June
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11-14, 1997, Helsingør, Denmark
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Sponsored by Center for Research in Regulated Industries at
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Rutgers University
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AN ANALYSIS OF THE POTENTIAL FOR CREAM SKIMMING IN THE U.S.
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RESIDENTIAL DELIVERY MARKET
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Robert H. Cohen William W. Ferguson John D. Waller Spyros S.
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Xenakis
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Office of Rates, Analysis and Planning
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U.S. Postal Rate Commission
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October 1998
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Published in Emerging Competition in Postal and Delivery
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Systems, edited by M.A. Crew and
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P.R. Kleindorfer. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999.
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An Analysis of the Potential for Cream Skimming in the U.S.
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Residential Delivery Market
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A. Introduction
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Postal administrations often claim that without a legal
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monopoly1 to protect them from cream skimming, they would not be
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able to continue providing universal service at uniform and
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affordable prices. Because they serve delivery points with a range
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of profitability, postal administrations fear that without monopoly
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protection cream skimmers would capture their high profit routes,
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leaving them with their less profitable routes. The question is,
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would cream skimming divert so much volume that universal service
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at affordable prices becomes infeasible?
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Sweden is the only industrial nation which actually has had
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competition in its letter mail market after abolishing its
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monopoly.2 A competitor, City Mail, has served selected portions of
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the country but was twice forced into bankruptcy.3 City Mail has
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again emerged from bankruptcy and is competing with Sweden Post.
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Perhaps on City Mail's third attempt, we will finally have a valid
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test of whether Sweden Post actually needs monopoly protection in
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order to provide universal service at reasonable prices. As far as
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the authors know, the economics of the competition between Sweden
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Post and its competitor has not been studied. If City Mail finally
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succeeds in avoiding bankruptcy, such a study might determine the
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reasons why Sweden Post was vulnerable to cream skimming. In
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addition, it might describe the impact that a viable competitor has
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had on
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1
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In the U.S., as in most industrial nations, the postal monopoly
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extends only to letter mail (including addressed advertising).
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2
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Finland has abolished its monopoly and in so doing created a
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licensing system for competitors to Finland Post. No other operator
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has yet begun to offer service in competition with Finland Post.
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New Zealand has also just recently abolished its monopoly, but it
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is too early to know if competitors will emerge and be
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successful.
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3
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A recent study found that the Swedish Postal Service had engaged
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in a variety of anti-competitive practices with respect to its
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competitor. See "Deregulation of the Postal Service's Market;
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report on the abuse by the Postal Office of Its dominant market
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position and on the Competition Authority's handling of the
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question of competition in relation to the Post Office," Professor
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Erik Nerep (Stockholm School of Economics), February 1995.
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the dominant provider. It should be noted that the presence of
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City Mail has already prompted Sweden Post to lower prices for
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large volume mailers in areas served by its competitor.4
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Cream skimmers take advantage of an incumbent's price when it is
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based on an average of heterogeneous costs. They serve the low cost
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portion of the market and price below the incumbent. Conceptually
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cream skimming has two basic dimensions - product and geography.
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Product cream skimming is where a competitor tries to capture the
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most profitable portion of the market for a product with
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heterogeneous costs. Geographic cream skimming is where a
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competitor tries to provide a service only to selected, low cost
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areas.5 City Mail is an example of geographic cream skimming. Its
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carriers provide twice weekly delivery to various areas in Sweden
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for large volume customers.6 This paper addresses only geographic
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cream skimming. 7
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Postal monopolies, like most other legal monopolies, are thought
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by many observers (1) to be technically inefficient, and (2) to
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have delivery functions which exhibit economies of scale.8 This
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paper addresses several questions which arise from these two points
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under the assumption that the monopoly and any other barriers to
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entry were to be removed. It asks how much more efficient would a
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potential competitor have to be to overcome the scale economies of
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the U.S. Postal Service? Assuming potential competitors are able to
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achieve the necessary level of efficiency, it then asks how much
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volume might they be able to capture and in which markets? Finally,
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it asks what effect
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4
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It would be interesting to learn: How much it cost Sweden Post
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to serve the areas where it lowered prices relative to its average
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cost, how important the abandonment of universal pricing is to
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Sweden Post's competitive position, and are the circumstances in
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Sweden applicable to the U.S.? Section J of this paper examines
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this issue further.
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5
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Cream skimming may have a third dimension having to do with
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transactions costs. In practice cream skimmers may restrict
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themselves to large volume customers since the transaction costs of
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dealing with smaller volume customers and individuals may be
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prohibitive.
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6
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Sweden Post delivers five days per week.
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7
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A report by the General Accounting Office (GAO) at least
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partially analyzed the effect product cream skimming would have on
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the U.S. Postal Service. Its assessment was as follows: Priority
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Mail (First Class over 11 ounces) - high risk of loss of
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significant volumes, but a low financial impact, if it did occur;
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First Class - low risk of loss of significant volumes, but a high
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financial impact, if it did occur; Advertising Mail low risk of
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loss and a medium financial impact, if it did occur. See "Postal
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Service Reform; Issues Relevant to Changing Restrictions on Private
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Letter Delivery," General Accounting Office, September 1996.
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8
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In the U.S., legal monopolies include the local delivery of
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electricity, gas, water and until recently telephone.
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would the loss of volume to cream skimmers have on the resulting
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prices the Postal Service would have to charge in order to maintain
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universal service?
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Many observers believe that cream skimmers in the United States
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would serve cities and leave rural areas to the universal service
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provider because they assume that the cost of delivery to rural
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areas is much higher than the cost of delivery to cities. An
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earlier study9 challenged that assumption. It estimated that in
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1989 city delivery cost per piece was only 8 percent lower than
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rural delivery, but that city delivery cost per delivery point was
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actually 7 percent higher than rural delivery cost. It concluded
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that there was no cross subsidy of rural delivery by city delivery.
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In theory, cream skimming of residential service could occur in
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either city or rural areas. This paper focuses on city delivery
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because of the more detailed data available on this type of
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delivery.
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We first provide a brief description of the current competition
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in delivery. We then describe the data used in our analysis and the
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costs and profitability of the Postal Service's city residential
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delivery routes. We next examine the volume vulnerable to capture
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by potential cream skimmers. We describe characteristics of routes
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most likely to be profitable to competitors and provide a range of
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estimates for the cost of cream skimmers. After examining the
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consequences of successful cream skimming on Postal Service rates,
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we explain why cream skimming is not likely to be successful on
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business routes in the U.S. Finally, we provide some observations
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on the relevance this analysis may have for other countries.
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150
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B. Current Competition In Delivery
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Competitors of the U.S. Postal Service may legally deliver only
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periodicals, catalogues over 24 pages, parcels, and unaddressed
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letters.10 Alternative delivery is particularly difficult because
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of the so called mail box law which prohibits any one but the
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9 See Cohen, Ferguson & Xenakis, "Rural Delivery and the
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Universal Service Obligation: A Quantitative Investigation."
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Regulation and the Nature of Postal Delivery Services, Ed. Crew
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& Kleindorfer, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993.
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Technically, the U.S. monopoly is primarily a revenue monopoly.
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A third party may deliver a letter if proper postage is affixed and
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canceled. The monopoly also has an urgent mail exception for
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letters which are charged twice normal First-Class postage with a
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minimum of $3.00. Unlike most industrial nations, there is no
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exemption from the monopoly based on weight or price.
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Postal Service from accessing a private mail box.11 The U.S.
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Postal Service broadly interprets "letter" to include any addressed
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information recorded on a physical object. Thus, for example, it
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considers an addressed grocery store advertisement to be a
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letter.
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In 1989, Publishers Express was founded by Time Inc., Meredith
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Corp., American Express Publishing, New York Times Co., Times
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Mirror Co., and R. R. Donnelley, among others, to provide
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alternative delivery.12 In spite of its prestigious sponsorship,
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the company ceased operations in 1996. Many other small
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entrepreneurs provide alternative delivery, but they have a very
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small share of the market. They are scattered around the country
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and mostly deliver unaddressed "saturation" advertisements and
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small quantities of periodicals and small parcels.
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The real alternative delivery system in the United States is the
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newspaper industry which delivers advertising preprints or
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inserts.13 The Postal Service has the advantage of being able to
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deliver these advertisements to all addresses, while newspapers
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usually (but not always) deliver inserts just to their subscribers.
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A typical newspaper in the U.S. has less than 50 percent coverage
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in its service area. This puts it at a disadvantage vis a vis the
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Postal Service, which delivers to all households. Newspapers, on
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the other hand, have the advantage of charging lower prices.
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Because marginal costs are very low, a newspaper price for
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preprints might be as low as 5 or 6 cents per piece. The lowest
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rate currently charged by the Postal Service is 11.0 to 11.4 cents
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for saturation mail weighing up to 3.3 ounces and drop shipped at
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the delivery office.14 Newspapers deliver about 86 billion inserts
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annually,15 while the U.S. Postal Service delivers at least 11
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billion competing items.16
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11
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As far as we know, the U.S. is the only country that has a mail
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box rule.
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12
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For a more comprehensive discussion of alternative delivery in
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the United States, see the General Accounting Office Study, n. 7,
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supra.
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13
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Newspapers also deliver product samples.
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14
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The Postal Service has an additional disadvantage because city
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carriers deliver only addressed advertising mail. This requires the
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mailer to have an address list kept in delivery sequence and to
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have address labels for each piece.
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15
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Newspaper Association of America's WEB Site;
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www.naa.org/marketscope/databank/preppriyr.htm.
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16
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This was the saturation and 125-piece walk sequence Enhanced
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Carrier Route mail volume in 1996. Many of these items are so
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called "marriage mail" pieces which contain several individual
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advertisements combined into a single piece. These individual
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advertisements could each be a stand-alone insert. Thus, 11 billion
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pieces is an extreme lower bound on the number of preprints carried
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by the Postal Service.
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C. City Carrier Data
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Each year the Postal Service conducts a City Carrier Survey
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(CCS) of delivered mail volume by route. Between 1993 and 1996, the
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Postal Service conducted the survey using a relatively small panel
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of about 400 routes.17 Prior to that, the Postal Service randomly
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sampled a much larger cross section of its routes over the course
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of a year. The last set of cross sectional data filed with the
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Postal Rate Commission in 1989 consisted of a sample of 16,092
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different routes.18 Because of the large sample size, these data
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are far more useful for our analysis than the subsequent panel
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data.19
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Each record in the 1989 CCS contains the date of the
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observation, the 5-Digit ZIP Code in which the route is located,
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the route type,20 the number of pieces (by subclass and by shape)
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per stop, the number of possible deliveries and actual deliveries
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per stop, and the stop type ("single delivery residential,"
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"multi-delivery residential," and "business-and-mixed"). Generally,
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data are recorded for every tenth stop on a route. The authors were
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able to make use of the records for 14,884 routes.21 This analysis
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is based on the data set of 13,212 usable residential routes22 and
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476,953 stops. 23 About 89 percent of all city routes are
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residential routes. The rest are business or mixed (residential and
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business).
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D. Postal Service Delivery Cost And Profitability
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This analysis uses delivery data from 1989, but uses 1996 cost
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levels for wages, fringe benefits, and other associated delivery
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costs. Total volume grew 13.5 percent
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17
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A panel survey collects data repeatedly from the same
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sample.
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18
256
There were 157 thousand city delivery routes in FY 1989. There
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were also 46 thousand rural routes, most of which had costs
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comparable to city delivery routes. See Cohen, Ferguson &
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Xenakis, n. 9, supra.
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19
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The 1997 CCS data were not available when the analysis for this
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paper was conducted.
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20
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Business foot, business motorized, residential foot, residential
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park and loop, residential curb, mixed foot, mixed park and loop,
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and mixed curb.
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21
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The data are organized by the 26 pay periods in a year. Portions
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of the data from a few pay periods were not usable. Comparisons
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with previously published summaries indicate that the missing data
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did not bias our results.
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22
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To a much lesser extent this analysis makes use of data from 717
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business routes.
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23
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Ninety-four percent (94%) of these stops are residential, while
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six percent (6%) are either business, or mixed
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business-and-residential stops. Not all stops on a residential
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route are residences. Some are business stops and some are mixed
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(business and residential).
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between 1989 and 1996, and the number of routes increased 7
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percent. We make no attempt to adjust for these increases.
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When calculating city delivery cost, we include the entire
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(fixed and volume variable) in-office and out-of-office cost24 for
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all city routes, plus the cost of overtime, supervision, space, and
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vehicles. Starting with a productive hourly rate of $25.25 for city
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carriers, we calculate a cost per residential delivery route of
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$266 per delivery day.25 The cost we calculate can be considered to
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be the avoided cost or the incremental cost of the city delivery
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function. Alternatively, it can be considered a lower bound on the
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stand-alone cost of city delivery.26
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We calculate the daily profit of residential delivery routes for
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the Postal Service by totaling the revenue minus collection,
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processing and transportation costs of the mail delivered on each
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route and subtracting the delivery cost of $266.
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Table 1 displays a variety of mean route statistics for
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residential routes separated into quartiles based on their profit.
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less As can be seen, the mean daily profit of each quartile ranges
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from positive $248 to negative $110. The average profit for all
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residential routes is $41 with 46.5 percent of the routes operating
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at a loss. The route cost per piece ranges from 7.6 cents to 23.5
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cents, and averages 12.5 cents. Route volume ranges from 3,485
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pieces to 1,131 pieces, and averages 2,128 pieces. The number of
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possible deliveries (which ranges from 670 to 411) is dependent on
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route terrain. 27 All the statistics presented are monotonic
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across28 quartiles except for route type. This is because of the
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close relationship between cost (per piece, delivery and stop),
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volume
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24
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"In-office" refers to the in the office activity of a letter
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carrier (primarily sequencing mail to be delivered),
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"out-of-office" refers to the activity of the carrier while on the
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street.
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25
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This is based on the city delivery carrier total cost of $33.20
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per hour. This, in turn, is based on a productive hourly rate (pay,
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overtime pay, and benefits for hours worked) increased to account
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for other costs that can be associated with carriers. These other
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costs include systemwide labor related costs (e.g., worker's
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compensation, civil service retirement unfunded liability),
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indirect labor such as carrier supervision, vehicle costs, and
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space related costs (rents, fuel, utilities, custodial
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maintenance). The standard work day for a city carrier is eight
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hours.
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26
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It is a lower bound because the cost includes no marketing or
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administrative costs which a stand-alone firm would normally
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incur.
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27
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By "physical terrain" we mean the physical proximity of the
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delivery points and whether they are most advantageously served by
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a curb, park & loop, or foot route.
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28
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A monotonic series is one whose every term is greater than (less
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than) or equal to the previous term. 6
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(per piece, delivery and stop), and the number of deliveries
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(stops) on a route. With respect to route type, we see that the
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percentage of curb routes is greatest in the most profitable
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quartile.29 These routes are largely a suburban phenomenon, they
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reach more stops in a day and hence, have more volume. The appendix
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(Table A1) presents demographic characteristics related to the
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quartiles in Table 1.
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Table 1
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SELECTED AVERAGES FOR RESIDENTIAL ROUTES WHEN ROUTES ARE SORTED
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BY PROFIT PER ROUTE
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Profit Cost (cents) Per (possible) Volume Pieces Per (possible)
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Quartile (dollars) Piece Delivery Stop (pieces) Deliverya Stop
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349
350
a
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In the paper referenced in n. 9, supra, pieces per possible
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delivery were weighed by stop and produced a slightly higher pieces
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per delivery. Here they are unweighted.
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The revenue for 46.5 percent of the routes (all of quartile 4
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and most of quartile 3) is not enough to cover the costs of the
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mail delivered on those routes. Thus, it might be argued that a
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monopoly is necessary to ensure service to those households. For
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several reasons, it would seem the burden of proof for this
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position should fall on its proponents. The routes which are
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unprofitable are dispersed across the country in a great number of
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cities. A competitive postal service that refused to serve
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households on unprofitable
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Curb routes deliver directly from the vehicle to a curbside mail
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receptacle. Park and loop routes involve parking, covering an area
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by foot, then parking the vehicle in a new area.
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routes would impose large transaction costs on its customers to
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separate mail and to secure suppliers to deliver its remaining
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mail. Such firms would be at a considerable disadvantage to those
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providing universal service. Larger transaction networks (be they
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mail, packages, overnight or telephone) are more valuable to
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customers and providers than smaller networks. It is for sound
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business reasons that Federal Express and United Parcel Service
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provide universal delivery service. A major business asset of the
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U.S. Postal Service and all other national posts is that they
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provide service to every address in the countries they serve. Thus,
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there is a business incentive for any postal provider (who is not
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simply a cream skimmer) to offer universal service within the
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territories it serves.
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Routes which are unprofitable when serviced six days per week
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would become profitable when serviced less frequently. In a
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competitive environment, the Postal Service could easily retain
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universal service, but perhaps not a universal service standard.30
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Delivery less than six days per week would certainly be preferable
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to abandoning delivery altogether. Of course, if the Postal Service
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were to simply abandon delivery to unprofitable routes, it would
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not have to refuse, return or destroy mail destined to these
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routes. Delivery firms with lower costs than the Postal Service
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would emerge to serve them and the Postal Service could hand off
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its unprofitable mail to them. 31 Under any foreseeable
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circumstances, universal delivery would not cease.32
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392
393
E. Volume Available For Cream Skimmers
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It is unlikely that cream skimmers would base their selection of
395
areas to serve on the Postal Service's delivery profits. Postal
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Service delivery profitability depends on the revenue for all mail
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delivered, and it is not likely that cream skimmers could capture
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all categories of mail.
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30
400
It is interesting to note that United Parcel Service recently
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began delivery less frequently than daily to certain residential
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areas.
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31
404
Costs would be lower by dint of lower wages and/or less frequent
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delivery.
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32
407
The concept of a universal service obligation may really mean
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more frequent delivery than economically warranted for households
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living on unprofitable routes. This, of course, is in addition to
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providing retail services to rural communities.
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Residential cream skimmers would serve bulk mailers with
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sufficient volumes of mail for the areas they serve. We assume that
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only mail that is presorted to the carrier route level would be
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vulnerable to cream skimming. If a bulk mailer did not have
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sufficient volume to sort to the carrier route level, the
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transaction costs for both mailer and cream skimmer would be
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prohibitive. Of course, third parties might become intermediaries
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between these bulk mailers and cream skimmers. Such parties would
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have to engage in processing and transportation. They would in
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effect be a parallel postal system for bulk mailers. An analysis of
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separate postal systems for bulk mailers is beyond the scope of
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this paper.
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The U.S. Postal Service requires First-Class and advertising
424
mail to have at least ten pieces for a carrier to qualify for a
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carrier route discount. Publications may qualify with as few as six
426
pieces for a carrier route. The amounts being presorted to the
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carrier route level in 1996 are shown in the right hand column:
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429
First-Class Mail is unzoned and receives no discount for being
430
deposited near its destination. Most First-Class carrier route
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volume is prepared by utilities and may be local depending on the
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billing operations of the utility. For purposes of this analysis we
433
assume that all First-Class carrier route mail is available to
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local cream skimmers.
435
Publications Mail. While only 3.2 billion pieces of the carrier
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route volume is entered locally or entered close enough to its
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destination to be available to cream skimmers, we assume that all
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4.5 billion pieces are available to cream skimmers.
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Advertising Mail. Eight-five (85) percent or 25.2 billion pieces
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of carrier route advertising mail are drop shipped or entered
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locally. Notwithstanding, we assume here that all carrier route
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advertising mail would be available to cream skimmers.
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To summarize, 37.7 billion pieces of carrier route volume are
444
potentially available to cream skimmers.33 This represents 20.6
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percent of the total volume of 182.7 billion pieces in 1996.
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Geographic cream skimmers would concentrate on areas with the most
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carrier route volume because their cost per piece would be lowest
448
and their potential profit would be the greatest.
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Table 2 displays mean daily route statistics for routes when
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divided into quartiles reflecting their volumes of carrier route
451
mail. We see a wide divergence in carrier route volume among the
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quartiles. The range is from 1,263 pieces to 87 pieces with an
453
average of 551. The first quartile routes have more than twice the
454
volume of carrier route mail as the second quartile. In fact, the
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first quartile has more than half of all carrier route volume
456
delivered on residential routes. Thus, the first quartile of routes
457
are much more attractive targets for cream skimmers than the other
458
routes. We again see a monotonic behavior of the other variables
459
across quartiles.34 Route profitability by quartile in Table 2
460
changes by a sizable amount as compared to route profitability in
461
Table 1. Less than half the routes in quartile 1, Table 1, are also
462
in quartile 1, Table 2. The appendix (Table A2) presents
463
demographic characteristics related to the quartiles in Table
464
2.
465
33
466
Some of this mail is delivered by rural carriers. For purpose of
467
this analysis, we assume that rural delivery is subject to the same
468
degree of cream skimming as city delivery. However, some carrier
469
route mail is delivered on business routes and some is delivered
470
via post office boxes and, thus, would not be available to cream
471
skimmers. Consequently, 37.7 billion represents an upper bound of
472
the volume available to cream skimmers.
473
34
474
The only deviation from the monotonic behavior in Table 2 occurs
475
for deliveries per route between quartiles 2 and 3.
476
Table 2
477
SELECTED AVERAGES FOR RESIDENTIAL ROUTES WHEN ROUTES ARE SORTED
478
BY VOLUME OF CARRIER ROUTE MAIL PER ROUTE
479
Profit Cost (cents) Per (possible) Quartile (dollars) Piece
480
Delivery Stop
481
Volume (pieces) All Carrier Pieces Per (possible) Mail Route
482
Delivery Stop
483
484
485
486
487
F. Estimating The Delivery Cost For Cream Skimmers
488
Cream skimmers undercut prices charged by an incumbent that has
489
heterogeneous costs but averaged prices. Cream skimmers profit by
490
selling low cost items at below the incumbents average price.
491
Delivery cream skimmers would attempt to serve those areas where
492
the cost to deliver carrier route pieces is the lowest (i.e., where
493
the volume of carrier route pieces is the highest). The first
494
quartile of routes in Table 2 would make the best targets. It is
495
this case we examine.
496
In an important sense, this is an unrealistic case since
497
quartile 1 represents 40,000 routes which are scattered over more
498
than half the 30,000 5-Digit ZIP Code areas in the U.S. It is
499
extremely unlikely that they constitute all the residential routes
500
in any 5-Digit ZIP Code nor is it likely that they make up the
501
entire suburban ring around cities. It is unrealistic for cream
502
skimmers to serve such a fragmented market. From both an
503
operational and marketing standpoint, cream skimmers would have to
504
serve markets with at best a large proportion of routes in quartile
505
1. Their markets would undoubtedly contain a large number of routes
506
in the other quartiles. Notwithstanding, for analytical purposes,
507
we assume the best possible case for cream skimmers; that they
508
would be able to serve only routes that fall within quartile 1.
509
A potential competitor must decide the level of service to
510
provide and this decision would affect the amount of volume that it
511
could actually capture. Many magazines, newspapers, and
512
advertisements must be delivered within a one, two or three day
513
window. A competitor delivering only one day a week would have to
514
forego much potential volume. On the other hand, delivery six days
515
a week would certainly raise the cost per delivered piece and make
516
it less likely that a cream skimmer would be viable.35 City Mail in
517
Sweden chose to deliver two days per week (Monday/Thursday in some
518
areas and Tuesday/Friday in other areas).
519
In all probability, a cream skimmer could not prosper unless it
520
could deliver mail at a price less than the incumbent postal
521
administration. Its cost per delivered piece would be a function of
522
its cost of labor and productivity. It would be expected that a
523
cream skimmer would have a significant labor cost advantage. Its
524
productivity would be influenced by the in-office and out-of-office
525
technology it employed. In 1989, Postal Service carriers spent more
526
than 40 percent of their time in-office preparing for delivery on
527
the street. Many mailstreams must be merged and sorted into
528
delivery sequence.36 It is not clear what technology cream skimmers
529
would use. Moreover, we do not know whether the personnel of a
530
cream skimmer would be more productive on the street than
531
U.S. Postal Service carriers. This analysis will combine these
532
variables (labor cost, technology, in-office and out-of-office
533
productivity) into a single efficiency parameter.
534
35
535
In a sense, each piece of advertising mail competes with other
536
advertising mail for the recipient's attention. If a cream skimmer
537
could capture a large portion of the available carrier route
538
volume, its customers might prefer more frequent delivery to
539
minimize this type of competition.
540
36
541
This function is rapidly being automated for letter size mail in
542
the U.S. Delivery point barcoded mail is increasingly being
543
sequenced on sorting machines, saving significant in-office
544
delivery time. From 1989 to 1996, the percentage of in-office time
545
for city carriers has declined from 41 percent to 34 percent. It is
546
expected that this trend will continue. Unless a potential cream
547
skimmer had enough capital to employ sequencing automation, the
548
Postal Service might have a significant advantage in sequencing and
549
merging letter-shaped mail. First Class is almost all letter
550
shaped, publications are almost all flat shaped, and carrier route
551
advertising is 43 percent letter shaped.
552
553
554
G. Cream Skimmers Cost Per Piece
555
Table 3 has four matrices, each reflecting a different
556
percentage of available volume assumed to be captured by cream
557
skimmers. Each matrix presents cream skimmer unit or per piece
558
costs based on frequency of delivery and relative efficiency of the
559
cream skimmer. We measure relative efficiency in terms of cream
560
skimmers cost relative to the Postal Service's cost.
561
The shaded cell in the top matrix, 13.1 cents, is the Postal
562
Service cost per piece for delivering only carrier route presorted
563
mail in the least expensive quartile. This number is derived from
564
the 8.7 cent cost of the Postal Service delivering all mail in the
565
least expensive quartile shown in Table 2. If only the carrier
566
route mail is delivered, the average delivered volume decreases
567
from 3,051 to 1,263 in this quartile. The variable costs drop as
568
the volume drops, but the fixed costs are spread over less volume
569
which increases the fixed costs proportionately. The result is an
570
increase in the unit costs to
571
13.1 cents shown in Table 3. Going down that column, the costs
572
per piece are displayed assuming a cream skimmer had the same cost
573
as the U.S. Postal Service, but delivers fewer days per week. The
574
costs decrease by the amount of fixed costs in delivery. The
575
variable cost remains the same because the volume does not change.
576
Most other national postal administrations would have a greater
577
percentage of fixed costs because they have fewer pieces per
578
possible delivery.37
579
The columns display cream skimmers' costs as a function of U.S.
580
Postal Service efficiency, expressed as a percentage of the Postal
581
Service's delivery cost per piece. The 120 percent column displays
582
the cream skimmer's per piece cost if its cost were 120 percent of
583
the U.S. Postal Service.38 The 60 percent column displays the cream
584
skimmer's per piece cost if its cost were 60 percent of the U.S.
585
Postal Service.
586
Table 3
587
CREAM SKIMMER'S COST PER PIECE IN CENTS AS A FUNCTION OF
588
EFFICIENCY RELATIVE TO POSTAL SERVICE, DAYS OF DELIVERY AND PERCENT
589
OF CARRIER ROUTE MAIL
590
100% OF CARRIER ROUTE VOLUME CAPTURED
591
592
75% OF CARRIER ROUTE VOLUME CAPTURED
593
594
50% OF CARRIER ROUTE VOLUME CAPTURED
595
596
25% OF CARRIER ROUTE VOLUME CAPTURED
597
598
For all mail the Postal Service city carrier cost (fixed and
599
variable) is 12.5 cents per piece. (See Tables 1 and 2, cost per
600
piece all routes.) This is the cost for the delivery function. Each
601
postal product has a variable cost for mail processing,
602
transportation and delivery. Each product also has an average
603
incremental (avoidable) cost. In the case of advertising carrier
604
route mail, the average incremental cost is about 7 cents.39 If
605
threatened by cream skimmers, the Postal Service could respond by
606
lowering its price towards average incremental costs. If the Postal
607
Service maintained uniform prices but had competition only in
608
selected areas, it would sacrifice revenue in those areas without
609
competition. These circumstances would probably call for selective
610
discounts (with average incremental costs as a floor) to large
611
volume mailers40 who would otherwise become customers of cream
612
skimmers. Thus, cream skimmers would most likely have to have costs
613
no higher than approximately 7 cents per piece in order to compete
614
on a cost basis alone.41
615
The Postal Service's productive hourly wage of more than $25 may
616
make it likely that cream skimmers could obtain some cost advantage
617
on that basis alone. We do not know how reducing the frequency of
618
delivery would affect demand for alternative delivery. A two-day
619
frequency could satisfy a three-day window, but would miss many
620
delivery dates for time value publications. It should also be noted
621
that some customers may not be willing to leave the Postal Service
622
for a variety of reasons including the sense of security of dealing
623
with a government agency.
624
If a cream skimmer were to capture only 25 percent of the
625
available market, it would have difficulty succeeding. At that
626
level of market penetration, its costs would have to be 40 percent
627
of the Postal Service's at a two-day frequency in order to be below
628
Postal Service incremental costs. With 50 percent of the average
629
volume at a two-day frequency, a cream skimmer's costs would have
630
to be 60 percent or less of the Postal Service's in order to remain
631
below the Service's average incremental costs.
632
39
633
The variable cost of carrier route advertising mail comes
634
predominantly from the delivery function (in-office and
635
out-of-office). The delivery function is about 50 percent variable.
636
Thus, the variable cost of the advertising carrier route mail
637
product can be much lower than the average (fixed and variable)
638
cost of delivery. The average incremental cost of advertising
639
carrier route mail is only slightly higher than the variable cost
640
since we estimate it here to consist of variable costs plus single
641
subclass stop costs for 1996.
642
40
643
Except for a customer with a very high elasticity of demand,
644
there is no reason for a monopoly to grant volume based discounts
645
since customers have no alternative supplier. We understand this
646
was the case with UPS, which had a virtual monopoly in surface
647
parcel delivery in the U.S., and did not give discounts to surface
648
parcel customers until Roadway Package Service began to target its
649
most lucrative customers in the 1980s. UPS then began offering
650
discounts to certain large volume customers.
651
41
652
Some mailers currently use cream skimmers because of service
653
considerations.
654
655
656
H. Consequences Of Successful Cream Skimming
657
Table 4 shows the required increase in the U.S. Postal Service
658
rates based on the percentage of carrier route volume that would be
659
captured by cream skimmers targeting mail in quartile 1, Table 2.42
660
The maximum effect is an increase of about 1.2 cents in the
661
First-Class rate (with corresponding increases in the other
662
classes). This would be an increase of nearly 4 percent; a
663
significant but limited effect.
664
Lifting the letter mail monopoly and allowing cream skimming
665
would likely have an important impact on rate setting for the
666
Postal Service's large volume carrier route customers, if our
667
assumptions are correct concerning the amount of volume available
668
for capture by cream skimmers. The maximum impact on overall postal
669
rates is, however, likely to be limited. The negative impact on
670
Postal Service's finances would likely be offset to a great extent
671
by the effect of limited competition on the Postal Service's
672
efficiency, service performance and product innovation.
673
Table 4 IMPACT OF CREAM SKIMMING ON
674
675
676
677
I. Comparison Of Business And Residential Routes
678
We do not analyze cream skimming on business routes because only
679
7 percent of mail volume delivered on them is carrier route as
680
compared to 26 percent on residential routes. This makes them
681
unlikely candidates for cream skimming based on our analysis. We
682
compare several statistics for city residential and business routes
683
in Table 5.
684
Table 5 COSTS BY TYPE OF CITY DELIVERY ROUTE
685
686
It can be seen that business routes have slightly more pieces
687
per route with slightly higher cost per piece.43 The cost per
688
delivery point and stop on business routes is much higher, but the
689
profit per piece remains higher.44
690
We are not aware of any study that has identified the reasons
691
why business routes have a higher cost per piece and much higher
692
cost per stop than residential routes. Several factors may
693
contribute, including the high cost of serving each individual
694
business in office buildings. In contrast, residential apartment
695
houses generally have mail boxes in one central and convenient
696
location for carriers. Other factors include the larger proportion
697
of business mail requiring signatures and the greater difficulty of
698
getting around in congested business areas as opposed to
699
residential and suburban neighborhoods. Because business routes
700
have much higher cost per delivery point, they
701
43
702
Business routes get much more assistance from routers who
703
sequence the mail in the office, thus saving in-office time for the
704
carrier. The cost per piece and per delivery point reflects these
705
extra costs.
706
44
707
Profit is higher on business routes than on residential routes
708
because of greater volumes of high profit mail, such as on Priority
709
and Express. Cream skimming delivery networks might be developed
710
for such mail in business areas, but are beyond the scope of this
711
paper.
712
are unlikely candidates for geographic cream skimmers who could
713
be expected to have far fewer pieces over which to spread the cost
714
per delivery point.45
715
716
717
J. Some Differences Between the U.S. and Other Countries
718
The classification structures in industrial countries have
719
varying degrees of efficiency (defined as adherence to cost).46
720
Efficient classification discourages cream skimmers because it
721
leaves less cream to skim. The less efficient the classification
722
structure, the more the administration needs monopoly protection.
723
The U.S. Postal Service's classification structure contains several
724
score of cost based discounts and rate differentials, probably more
725
than any other administration.47 This should tend to make the U.S.
726
less vulnerable to cream skimming. Moreover, the U.S. has more
727
pieces per capita than virtually any other country. Because the
728
delivery function has important economies of scale, ceteris
729
paribus, the U.S. should have lower per piece costs than virtually
730
every other country. This factor also makes the U.S. less
731
vulnerable to cream skimming. In addition, the proportion of fixed
732
cost in the delivery network is largely a function of volume per
733
capita (per delivery). The larger the volume per capita, the larger
734
the proportion of variable costs and the smaller the proportion of
735
fixed costs. Since virtually every other postal administration has
736
less volume per capita than the U.S., a larger proportion of their
737
delivery costs are fixed relative to the U.S. A cream skimmer can
738
reduce its fixed cost relative to an incumbent simply by reducing
739
the number of days of delivery. Thus, a cream skimmer would obtain
740
less cost advantage by cutting delivery frequency in the U.S. than
741
in countries with less per capita volume. This also tends to make
742
the U.S. less vulnerable to cream skimming than other
743
countries.48
744
45
745
Of course, messenger services are common in central business
746
districts, but this is for reasons of service and not cost.
747
46
748
The most efficient classification structure would be based on
749
costs alone and would offer worksharing discounts wherever
750
practical. These discounts would equal the cost savings. No postal
751
administration meets this standard nor do the authors recommend
752
that they do.
753
47
754
Advertising mail alone has over 60 different rate categories
755
with rate differentials based on shape and discounts for
756
presorting, barcoding and drop shipping.
757
48
758
A consequence of this is that an administration which delivers
759
five days per week, ceteris paribus, is a more difficult target for
760
cream skimmers than one which delivers six days per week.
761
On the other hand, some factors appear to make the U.S. Postal
762
Service more vulnerable than other postal administrations to cream
763
skimming. Few, if any, countries have as large a proportion of
764
carrier route volume as does the U.S. This is the mail most
765
susceptible to diversion. In addition, few postal administrations
766
pay their employees as large a wage premium as does the U.S. Postal
767
Service.49 A wage premium allows cream skimmers to obtain an
768
efficiency/cost advantage simply by paying the prevailing wage.
769
49 See Cohen, Chu, Ferguson & Xenakis, "A Cross Sectional
770
Comparison and Analysis of Productivity for 21 National Postal
771
Administrations." Managing Change in the Postal and Delivery
772
Industries, Ed. Crew & Kleindorfer, Kluwer Academic Publishers,
773
1997.
774
775
776
APPENDIX
777
This paper's analysis is based on volume and delivery statistics
778
from 13,212 residential carrier routes. These routes were extracted
779
from the Carrier Cost Survey (CCS), conducted by the U.S. Postal
780
Service in 1989. In addition to the volume and delivery statistics
781
for each of the 13,212 residential routes, CCS provides the
782
associated 5-Digit ZIP Code served by each route. A ZIP Code may be
783
served by many routes. The data presented in this appendix are
784
based on the demographic data for the 5-Digit ZIP Code for each
785
route in a quartile. Thus, the demographic data for the same
786
5-Digit ZIP Code could be averaged into the totals for two
787
different quartiles. This would happen if two routes from the same
788
5-Digit ZIP Code were in separate quartiles.
789
The United States Bureau of the Census has grouped the 1990
790
Census of Population and Housing data using 5-Digit ZIP Codes. The
791
file (STF 3B) is available in three CDs of about 1.4 gigabytes
792
(GBs) and contains socio-economic data for 29,467 5-Digit ZIP Codes
793
served by the U.S. Postal Service. The Puerto Rico ZIP Codes are
794
not included in STF 3B file.
795
By merging the STF 3B file with CCS data, we have obtained
796
economic and demographic data for the ZIP Codes in which 12,876
797
residential routes reside. We could not obtain any socio-economic
798
information for the ZIP Codes of 336 residential routes (most of
799
them in Puerto Rico) because their ZIP Codes were not included in
800
the STF 3B file.
801
Tables A1 through A3 provide statistics for age, household
802
income, and education attainment for the 5-Digit ZIP Code for the
803
12,876 residential routes in CCS. Table A1 presents the statistics
804
by quartile when routes are sorted by profitability. Tables A2 and
805
A3 present the statistics by quartile and decile respectively when
806
routes are sorted by carrier route volume. The statistics in Table
807
A1 show that, on average, routes in the more profitable quartiles
808
reside in ZIP Codes with higher income households and more educated
809
adults. Likewise, the statistics in Tables A2 and A3 show that
810
routes with high carrier route volume reside in ZIP Codes with
811
higher levels of household income and education attainment.
812
813
814
815
816
817
818
819
820