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Inside the Bradley-McCain Handshake
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At their joint
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appearance in Claremont, N.H., today, Bill Bradley and John McCain seemed to be
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saying much the same thing about campaign finance reform. Both see the present
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system as murderous to democracy. McCain said at the event what he has often
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said before: that reform is required in order to "give the government of this
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country back to its citizens." Bradley, using somewhat stronger language,
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described big money a "plague," an acid "eating away at the core of our
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democracy" and as "a great stone wall that comes between the people and their
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representatives." As the two men also explained in a Nightline forum
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taped before their "handshake," they both support an outright ban on soft
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money--the huge, unregulated contributions funneled into the general election
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by way of the political parties.
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But Bradley and McCain don't fully agree about campaign finance reform. Some
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of their differences are subtle ones grounded in their respective political
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orientations. For instance, Bradley the Democrat thinks that special-interest
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money works primarily to prevent the government from passing useful new laws,
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like health-care reform and regulation of handguns. McCain the Republican
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thinks that special-interest money causes the government to waste money on
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unnecessary programs and prevents it from cutting ones it should get rid
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of.
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Other distinctions visible today point up temperamental differences between
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the two men. McCain, who is more of a risk-taker, feels so strongly about soft
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money that he has promised not to accept it should he become the nominee no
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matter what his Democratic rival does. Bradley, more cautious by nature, has
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declined to take a pledge of unilateral disarmament. McCain is also more
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categorical about his moral indictment, saying at the press conference
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following today's event that special-interest money corrupts everyone in
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politics, himself included. Money, he said, buys access, and "access is
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influence." Bradley, by contrast, said no decision he had ever made was
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influenced by money, merely that he resented the suspicion--the appearance of
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impropriety--that is unavoidable under the present system.
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But when it comes to what sort of reform is necessary, Bradley and McCain
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actually have big disagreements that they didn't illuminate today. Basically it
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comes down to this: Bradley's idea of campaign finance reform is
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comprehensive . He wants to eliminate the role of private money from
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politics once and for all. McCain's approach, on the other hand, is
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incremental . He will be satisfied with reducing the role and power of
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special-interest money in Washington.
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Bradley believes that the entire system of financing campaigns needs to be
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overhauled. To do this, he thinks, will require not only banning soft money and
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providing free TV air time to candidates, but also full public financing of
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congressional elections and a constitutional amendment to overturn Buckley
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vs. Valeo , the 1976 Supreme Court decision that defines spending as speech.
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In Claremont, Bradley employed the metaphor he also uses in his book: "Money in
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politics is similar to the ants in your kitchen," he writes. "Just when you
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think you've got them blocked, they find another way to get in. Only
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hermetically sealing the kitchen off will work." We need to amend the
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Constitution and provide full public financing, he writes, because "anything
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less means that democracy can still be corrupted."
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McCain agrees with Bradley about how harmful special-interest money is. But
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his own solution is much more modest. McCain doesn't think it will be possible
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to eliminate the influence of private money from politics, or that doing so
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would even be desirable. He wants to stamp out the most pernicious abuses--the
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enormous contributions by corporations, labor unions, and wealthy individuals.
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And he hopes to level the playing field for challengers and incumbents by
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providing free airtime for candidates. But McCain does not favor public
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financing for congressional campaigns and doesn't think it's necessary to amend
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the Constitution to get meaningful reform.
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I'd give a lot of credit to both McCain and Bradley for trying to explain
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this complex problem and make it into a major issue in the campaign. But I
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think that McCain's less ambitious, piecemeal approach makes much more sense
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than Bradley's comprehensive one. Bradley's desire to solve the problem once
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and for all is understandable, but his approach is dangerous. Amending the
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Constitution should always be a last resort. And in this case, the alternatives
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haven't been exhausted. It's not clear that Buckley v. Valeo prevents
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genuine reform--or that even if it does, the corruption of the current system
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is severe enough to warrant tinkering with the Bill of Rights. And in practical
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terms, what's the point of even discussing a constitutional amendment--which
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requires a two-thirds vote in the Senate as well as ratification by the
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states--if you don't have a majority to pass a simple bill?
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Bradley's sweeping proposals also cut against the nature and history of the
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problem. Political reform in this country has never taken the form of systemic
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reengineering. Instead, it has always been a frustrating but productive
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process, one in which rising expectations and public outrage lead to
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ameliorative legislation and higher ethical standards. Bradley ought to
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understand this, not only because he's well-versed in the history of political
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reform--there's a chapter on the subject in his book--but because the challenge
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of campaign finance reform is so similar to that of tax reform, which was his
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own greatest legislative accomplishment as a Senator. Passed in 1986, tax
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reform was undone over the course of the following decade. The post-Watergate
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campaign finance reforms were unmade in a very similar way--smart lawyers and
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lobbyists opened loopholes. The loopholes expanded, and eventually got to the
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point where a fresh set of reforms was needed. Just like campaign finance
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today.
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