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Sorry Excuse
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Bill Clinton has been
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roundly denounced for his "apology tour" of Africa. House Majority Whip Rep.
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Tom DeLay, R-Texas, implied the president's expressions of regret about slavery
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were almost treasonous. "Here's a flower child with gray hairs doing exactly
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what he did back in the '60s: He's apologizing for the actions of the United
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States. ... It just offends me that the president of the United States is,
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directly or indirectly, attacking his own country in a foreign land." Pat
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Buchanan wrote that Clinton had "groveled" in Africa. Robert Novak called the
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apology for slavery "ridiculous." Others have charged that the president's
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contrition regarding the U.S. failure to prevent genocide in Rwanda in 1994 was
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cheap and hypocritical, since it was a considered decision, not (as he implied)
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some kind of oversight, and there is no reason to suppose the United States
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will decide differently if it happens again.
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Fair
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points? Not really. Once again, loathing for Clinton is making it hard for
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people to see straight. These objections conflate complaints about this
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president's personal shortcomings with the question of how any president should
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represent the United States abroad. Ought Clinton have gone to Africa and
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simply not mentioned slavery? Should he have noted it but offered no view? Can
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any world leader travel to Rwanda in 1998 and not discuss genocide? To do so
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would be heartless and insulting. It's hard to believe that even a primitive
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such as DeLay thinks the president should play emperor, never explaining or
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apologizing for his country's actions. Then again, that was George Bush's
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position. "I will never apologize for the United States of America, I don't
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care what the facts are," he said during the 1988 campaign, after a U.S.
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cruiser had mistakenly shot down an Iranian plane, killing 290 civilians.
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It's not just Clinton's sympathetic promiscuity that
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accounts for the recent boom in the atonement. Apologies for national failings,
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both domestic and foreign, are in fashion not just in the United States but
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also in Britain, Japan, and elsewhere. One reason is that honesty has become
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less costly since the end of the Cold War. The Soviet Union no longer has an
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enormous propaganda apparatus trained against us. Now the nations of the West
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can admit wrongdoing without the fear that they are giving ammunition to the
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enemies of freedom.
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But when
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are national apologies sensible? Offered casually or indiscriminately, they can
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look like sops to constituencies rather than expressions of genuine regret. No
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nation should want to turn into David Brock. I don't think Clinton has reached
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the point where saying he's sorry is an empty gesture, but he may be flirting
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with it. Two of his apologies in Africa meet the test. A third one doesn't.
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The best case for apology is a great and
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indisputable national misdeed. Ronald Reagan's apology to World War II-era
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Japanese internees falls into this category, as does the Vatican's apology to
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victims of the Holocaust. So also do Clinton's comments in Uganda about
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slavery. The objections--that Africans, too, dealt in slaves; that slaves came
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from West Africa, not Uganda; that American blacks, not Africans deserve the
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apology--are nit-picking. Here's what Clinton actually said: "Going back to the
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time before we were even a nation, European Americans received the fruits of
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the slave trade. And we were wrong in that." To say that white Americans
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wrongly benefited from the slave trade doesn't imply that white Americans were
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exclusively responsible.
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On the
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other hand, an apology can be justified without being required or even
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desirable. Clinton has decided, for a variety of reasons, that a domestic
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apology for slavery isn't a good idea. This does not require him to observe a
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taboo on the topic abroad.
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Somewhat more troubling was Clinton's apology for not
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intervening to prevent the Rwandan genocide. Here's what he said:
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The international
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community, together with nations in Africa, must bear its share of
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responsibility for this tragedy, as well. We did not act quickly enough after
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the killing began. We should not have allowed the refugee camps to become safe
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havens for the killers. We did not immediately call these crimes by their
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rightful name: genocide. We cannot change the past. But we can and must do
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everything in our power to help you build a future without fear, and full of
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hope. ... We owe to all the people in the world our best efforts to organize
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ourselves so that we can maximize the chances of preventing these events. And
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where they cannot be prevented, we can move more quickly to minimize the
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horror.
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This
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apology seems insincere, because Clinton did not offer any realistic sense of
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the obstacles to humanitarian military action involving the United States. At
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first Clinton may have wished, at some level, to intervene in Rwanda, Bosnia,
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and Haiti. But for practical and political reasons, he determined intervention
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was possible only in Haiti, then later in Bosnia. This was after the debacle in
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Somalia, remember, and at a time when his popularity was at low ebb. Clinton's
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judgment that he was in no position to send troops to Rwanda may not have been
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courageous. It may not even have been correct. But like a decision not to risk
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saving someone from a burning building, it is not morally culpable.
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So why apologize? I would defend Clinton's
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apology as a statement of aspiration. He delineates specific actions that he
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might plausibly have taken short of sending in the Marines. And there is reason
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to think that with more political capital, no re-election looming, and a
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heightened sense of horror, he would behave differently.
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What a
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country should not apologize for is a basically sound foreign policy. And
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Clinton unfortunately did that as well--though it drew less attention than his
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other comments. In his Uganda speech, before the part about slavery, Clinton
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said:
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In our
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own time, during the Cold War, when we were so concerned about being in
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competition with the Soviet Union, very often we dealt with countries in Africa
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and in other parts of the world based more on how they stood in the struggle
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between the United States and the Soviet Union than how they stood in the
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struggle for their own people's aspirations to live up to the fullest of their
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God-given abilities.
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The president speaks here as if the battle against
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communism were an overheated World Cup match, rather than itself a struggle for
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democracy and human rights. Even when Realpolitik led the United States
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to side with dictators and oppressors, it was in the service of maximizing
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democracy and human rights in the world at large--a goal we in fact achieved.
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Every Cold War decision to put U.S. interests ahead of "people's aspirations"
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in individual countries may not be defensible, but the general policy is one we
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needn't apologize for. And by the way, the Cold War did not always define
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American policy in Africa. Well before the fall of communism, Congress passed
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comprehensive sanctions against the apartheid regime in South Africa. We did
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this even though the white South African government was a staunch U.S. ally in
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the Cold War, while Nelson Mandela's African National Congress had extensive
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Communist and Soviet ties.
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As it happens, that subject
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came up during Clinton's stop in South Africa, when Mandela publicly refused to
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apologize for the ANC's Realpolitik alliances. It is debatable whether
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friendships with Libya and Cuba actually serve South Africa's interests today.
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But Mandela is right not to apologize for having accepted help from various
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malefactors, including the Soviet Union, during the liberation struggle--when
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actual support from the United States came very late. Like the U.S. in the Cold
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War, the ANC made reasonable choices under circumstances in which moral purity
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wasn't an option.
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