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Clinton and Blair: What's Left?
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America's next president has
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much in common with Britain's next prime minister. Both Bill Clinton and Tony
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Blair are comparatively young (and make a lot of it); suffused with energy and
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conviction; and superbly effective on television, in front of a crowd, or face
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to face. The likeness goes deeper. Clinton and Blair proclaim essentially the
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same political philosophy, in essentially the same terms. They are champions of
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a "new" left: reconciled to the central role of markets in the modern economy,
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committed nonetheless to an active role for government, keen to foster new
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forms of social cooperation. The closeness is no accident. Blair, much the most
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effective of Labor's recent modernizers, has modeled his electoral strategy, in
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substance and in style, on Clinton's.
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Something else they have in
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common is a reluctance to admit what this strategy implies. Both seem unaware
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of the price they have paid for their electoral strength--namely that, far from
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reviving the left, they have realigned it out of any meaningful existence. For
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modern anti-conservatives, the price of success has been moral and intellectual
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evisceration. In both the United States and Britain, where there was once a
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coherent (albeit often unpopular) alternative to conservatism, there is now
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merely a tepid version of the same, with added self-righteousness.
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Evidently, this is exactly what many voters want. A Clinton campaign button
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puts it nicely: "At least he cares." In Britain, likewise, those who vote for
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New Labor in the forthcoming election may expect little to change when Blair
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and his team come to power. The party's program consists largely of assurances
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to that effect. But to say this misses the point. What matters is that the
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Tories seem a callous lot, and Tony Blair is a really nice chap.
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Clinton and Blair don't appear to be faking it. What makes
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them such exceptionally effective politicians is that they really do care. It
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would be wrong to say they have cynically repackaged what they affect to
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deplore. They radiate genuine conviction. If Clinton and Blair seem
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unaware of where their success leaves "liberalism" in the United States or
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"socialism" in Britain, it is not because they are hiding something but because
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they really are unaware. They are moderate conservatives deluding themselves
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that they are something else.
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In 1992,
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Clinton would have been harder to dismiss as a conservative in denial. In his
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first presidential campaign he promised a lot, not the least of which was
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radical reform of welfare and health care. Nothing came of it. The health-care
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reform fell apart, and Clinton recently signed a welfare-reform law that,
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measured against what he first hoped to do, was a step in the wrong direction.
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Despite these failures, Clinton's presidency has been pretty successful. But
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the main successes--curbing the budget deficit, presiding over steady growth
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with low inflation, shrinking the government work force, passing the North
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American Free-Trade Agreement--are achievements of which any moderate
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conservative could be proud. Unlike his failures, there is nothing very liberal
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about Clinton's successes.
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Clinton has learned on the job. This time, his
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campaign agenda is more modest, defined less by what he stands for than by what
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he stands against (immoderate republicanism). Blair's strategy is the same,
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only more so. New Labor defines itself in opposition to two enemies: old Labor
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and the Tories. Given the Tory government's unpopularity, the attack on old
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Labor matters more. Blair therefore renounces the policies that he and his
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parliamentary colleagues supported until recently. New Labor will not increase
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taxes, will not increase public spending, will not renationalize the companies
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privatized by the Tories, will not restore trade-union power, and so on.
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Now that Labor's policies,
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as far as one can tell, are all but identical to the Tories', Blair's attack on
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the second enemy, the Tories themselves, has to be handled with care. There is
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a strand of Gingrich extremism in British conservatism, but it is not yet
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dominant, so assaulting it as Clinton has done in America would serve little
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electoral purpose. (This may change once the Tories have lost the election.)
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Blair cannot attack the substance of Tory policies without attacking his own,
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so he must attack the government's rhetoric instead. New Labor deplores the
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Tories' introduction of market forces within the National Health Service, for
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instance. Judging by their various policy documents, however, Labor will not
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reverse the Tory reforms. Instead, where the Tories talk of an "internal
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market" (so conservative), Labor promises "proper accountability to patients"
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(absolutely New Labor). On education, labor laws, and many other matters, Labor
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seeks far-reaching reform of vocabulary, while leaving policies by and large
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unchanged.
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It's
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worth noting that the Tories' "market" reforms (successfully portrayed by
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critics as capitalism-run-rampant) leave Britain's health-care system far more
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nationalized than America's would have been under Clinton's plan (successfully
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portrayed by critics as a "government takeover"). In other words, the political
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spectrums of the two countries are, to some extent, different. But Clinton's
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and Blair's political journeys remain similar. In particular, to make good the
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lack of new left-of-center policies (which voters appear not to want), Clinton
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and Blair have pumped up the consoling left-of-center symbolism (which is still
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much in demand). In both cases, this comes in two main forms:
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First is the apologetic mode. As decent left-of-center
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types, Clinton and Blair implicitly say, "We would love to do all the things
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that left-of-center parties used to do--but we can't, because the world has
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changed." Capital markets, globalization, information superhighways, and
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whatnot compel us to modernize our policies, keep taxes and public spending
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low, pay attention to the needs of business, and so on.
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Then comes
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the bright, forward-looking, seizing-of-opportunities mode. Clinton's campaign
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proclaims a new "Age of Possibility" for America. Blair has just published a
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volume of speeches and articles titled New
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Britain : My
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Vision
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of a Young
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Country . As men of the future, Clinton
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and Blair say they transcend traditional left-right categories. Old labels and
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the conflicts they represent have become hopelessly outmoded. The tensions
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between, say, competition and compassion, or efficiency and equity, which
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blighted politics for so long, are sterile quarrels of yesteryear.
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There is little substance in any of this. Yes,
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the world has changed. It keeps doing that. But only in small respects have
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developments in technology and the global economy narrowed choices over policy.
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What really has changed is that many voters in many countries have decided that
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traditional left-of-center policies (e.g., higher taxes, more generous
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provisions for the poor) are not what they want. Many also wish to be spared
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any guilt that might arise on that account--which is why Clinton and Blair are
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on to such a good thing with, "We'd love to do that, but it's no longer
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feasible." What about new politics, transcended categories, and all that? In
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the future, Clinton and Blair say, false oppositions between competition and
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compassion, efficiency and equity, will be resolved. That would be good, but
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how is it to be done? Simply by saying, again and again, "We must have
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competition with compassion, efficiency with equity." If only this had been
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understood before, we could all have become conservatives much sooner.
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The
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clearest proof of the new left's poverty is what Clinton and Blair have to say
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about the "middle class." In both Britain and America, the term covers nearly
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everybody. In the age of possibility that beckons, one thing that apparently
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will not be possible is a policy that imposes a fiscal burden on this group.
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Not content to rule out policies (however worthy) that impose a cost on most
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taxpayers, Clinton and Blair often go further, saying that their main fiscal
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goal is to improve the position of the middle class. Since "the rich" are a
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tiny proportion of taxpayers, the only thing this could mean in practice would
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be an improvement relative to the position of the poor--an extraordinary idea
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for supposedly left-of-center leaders, however modern or forward-looking, to
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adopt.
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Any party expecting its program to be taken seriously as a
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left-of-center alternative to conservatism must surely propose one of two
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things: Either it must promise to increase in the aggregate the quantity and
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quality of public services (and the taxes needed to pay for them), or else it
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must promise, within an unchanged total of taxes and spending, to redirect the
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flow of resources so that the less well-off get more. In either case, stripped
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to its essentials, a left-of-center program seeks to help the less prosperous
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at the expense of everybody else (i.e., at the expense of the middle
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class).
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It may well be, as
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conservatives would argue, that policies of this kind are a bad idea for one
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reason or another. Perhaps they would fail. Conceivably, they would fail so
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badly that they would even make the intended beneficiaries worse off. This is
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exactly the argument that the left should be having with the right, just as in
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the old days. For the moment, most strikingly in America and Britain, the left
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has simply capitulated. In order to win power, it promises to make no
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difference. Clinton and Blair won't do anything a conservative wouldn't. But at
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least they care.
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