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The Temptation of Bob Dole
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Dole is sorely tempted to
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forget everything he knows about the 1980s tax cuts. Here's a reminder.
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(1648 words, plus
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links)
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By Jodie T.
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Allen
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All his career, Bob Dole
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has stood for fiscal conservatism and balanced budgets. Most famously, he was
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almost alone among Republican leaders in his caustic skepticism about the
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supply-side economics of the 1980s. Now, political and economic advisers are
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urging the Republican presidential candidate to take off his green eyeshade,
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push aside that unappetizing bowl of budget cuts, and scarf down a tasty dose
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of tax-cut rejuvenator. Just the tonic for anemic poll numbers. And Dole is
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tempted. He reportedly will endorse some kind of broad-based tax cut in
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July.
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Like Dole, the voters know
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better. But like Dole, they are tempted, too. A persistent majority of
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Americans piously tells pollsters that budget-deficit reduction is more
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important than tax cuts. "Yet," says Brookings Institution economist Barry
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Bosworth, "the politicians clearly believe that people are lying--and the
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election results tend to support the fact that they are lying. When they
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vote, they want a tax cut."
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Of course, nobody is out
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there urging tax cuts instead of deficit reduction. And certainly no
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enthusiast is presenting tax cuts as a deficit booster . On the other
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hand, few (outside the Wall Street Journal editorial page) are still
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brash enough to claim that tax cuts could actually raise tax revenues. Many
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"old school" supply-side economists, such as Ronald Reagan's first Council of
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Economic Advisers chairman, Martin Feldstein, never did endorse the so-called
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Laffer Curve, that cocktail-napkin art purporting to show that big tax cuts
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would soon pay for themselves. The "loose talk of the supply-side extremists
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gave fundamentally good policies a bad name," Feldstein complained in 1986.
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Now,
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though, Feldstein is reported to be among a group of well-known economists
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urging Dole to adopt a so-called "pro-growth" tax strategy, meaning substantial
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tax cuts. How they are to be paid for is unclear. The promise of painless
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redemption is there--if not quite explicit. But, unlike the last time we had
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this argument, in 1981, there is the record of the 1980s to show what happens
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when the supply-siders get their way.
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Sen. Spencer Abraham, R-Mich., is an ardent advocate of a
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15-percent across-the-board cut in tax rates. "Can we reconcile the seemingly
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contradictory notions of cutting tax rates and balancing the budget?" he asked
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in (where else?) a Wall Street Journal article last month. "The answer
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is yes," the senator revealed, if only we ignore the claims of "conventional
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thinkers" and focus instead on the fact that "from 1982 to 1989, federal
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revenues, adjusted for inflation, expanded by an average of 3.8 percent per
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year despite a sharp reduction in tax rates."
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Abraham picked his years
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with care. Shortly after passage of the supposedly rejuvenating Reagan tax cut
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of 1981, the U.S. economy plunged into the deepest economic downturn since the
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Great Depression. The years 1982 through 1989 cover the recovery period from
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the pit of that recession to the beginning of the next one. If you believe that
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Reagan's 1981 tax cut was responsible for all those growth years--that
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otherwise we would have wallowed in stagnation for seven years--Abraham's
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choice may be fair enough. If you doubt it, you might prefer the traditional
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economists' method of measuring long-term trends from equivalent places in the
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business cycle.
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Even so, Abraham's
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trough-to-peak comparison does not support his point. Official budget numbers
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do show total federal revenue growing at an inflation-adjusted rate of 3.1
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percent over the period, reasonably close to Abraham's 3.8. But the components
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of that growth tell the real story. Individual income taxes--which, by
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supply-side theory, should have spurted since rates were cut--grew at only a
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2.1-percent rate. What boosted federal revenues most was the 4.3-percent
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average growth in payroll taxes. This was mainly the result of rate
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hikes-- not cuts--legislated in the Social Security Reform act of
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1983.
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Corporate taxes also were
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cut substantially in 1981. Corporate-tax revenues took a nose dive in 1982 and
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1983, regained some ground with the economic recovery, but then surged
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following passage of the 1986 tax reform--which deliberately raised taxes on
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corporations to pay for tax breaks for individuals.
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A
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"conventional thinker" might be forgiven for concluding from this record that
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what raises revenues is raising taxes, not cutting them.
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The campaign to convert Bob Dole, and to prepare the public
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for his imminent conversion, is resurrecting many golden-oldie rhetorical
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points from circa 1981. For example, Abraham asserts that marginal tax rates
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are what determine "whether a worker works overtime or goes home for the day
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... whether Americans save and invest their income or spend it." No question,
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taxes can affect behavior. Reducing very high tax rates can, at the very least,
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encourage less tax evasion and avoidance. And restructuring taxes should, at
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least in theory, encourage desirable types of economic behavior such as hard
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work, saving, and investment.
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But cultural attitudes,
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not taxes or other government policies, tend to swamp all other explanatory
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variables in international comparisons of savings and investment. This is
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especially so in the United States, where tax rates are low by international
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standards. So how much do tax rates matter? Not a whole lot, if the Reagan-era
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experience is any guide.
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Even by the supply-siders'
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own calculations, any offsetting behavioral response to the Reagan tax cuts was
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swamped by the direct revenue loss to the Treasury. For example, at a 1988
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Manhattan Institute meeting, Lawrence B. Lindsey, a leading supply-side
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flag-waver in the Reagan Treasury Department (now a governor of the Federal
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Reserve) whipped out a graph (see above/below) to show that tax revenues in
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1985 were some $13 billion higher than would have been predicted by "static"
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revenue models used by the Congressional Budget Office during the 1981 tax-cut
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debate. ("Static" is the supply-siders' pejorative term for thinking that
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doesn't acknowledge sufficiently the explosive power of tax cuts.) What didn't
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seem to attract Lindsey's attention in his own graph was that actual revenues
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were almost $100 billion lower in 1985 than they would have been if the 1981
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tax cut had not been passed. [NOTE: JODIE HAS SUPPLIED this graph]
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As for
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people working harder because of lower tax rates, the record of the 1980s is
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more complex than supply-side rhetoric predicted. Studying the effects of 1980s
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tax policy, Bosworth and his Brookings colleague Gary Burtless found that only
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one group--high-income women--substantially increased their hours of work in
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response to lower taxes. The group whose work effort increased most
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sharply was not the well-paid, whose tax rates declined most sharply. It was
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the poorly paid, whose marginal tax rates, thanks to Social Security tax hikes,
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actually went up. For these workers, higher taxes prompted harder work to make
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up for the lost income.
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Even more damaging to the supply-siders' case was the
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disappointing performance of the nation's savings behavior. The Reagan program
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provided numerous inducements: not just marginal rate cuts on income but
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capital-gains tax reductions, a variety of new tax-exempt investment vehicles,
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vast new opportunities for tax sheltering--plus the Federal Reserve's tight
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money policies which, along with financial deregulation, sent the interest
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rates available to savers soaring. The more sober-minded supply-siders figured
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that even if the tax cuts didn't pay for themselves, the increased savings they
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generated would make the resulting deficits easy to finance. (Even today,
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Feldstein says he still believes that while it's a "tall order," the right tax
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cuts can, "in some cases," raise saving by more than they raise the budget
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deficit.)
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But in the 1980s, savings
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did not cooperate. The national savings rate, which ran at close to 12 percent
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in the 1960s, and more than 9 percent in the 1970s, sank to only 5.8 percent in
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the 1980s. The swelling government deficit, which amounts to national
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dis saving, did much to drag down the 1980s figure. But even private
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savings in the 1980s ran well below their 1970s level.
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Still more perverse was
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the behavior of business investment. During the eight years of the
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business-friendly Reagan administration, business-equipment investment rose at
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an inflation-adjusted annual rate of only 4.4 percent while corporate
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before-tax profits grew at 4.7 percent. By contrast, during the presumably
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hostile Clinton years, business investment has grown at an annual real rate of
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10.6 percent while corporate pre-tax profits have climbed at a 13.2-percent
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rate.
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The
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overall national economic growth rate has been about 0.8 percentage points
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lower under Clinton than under Reagan. But, amusingly, that difference is
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totally accounted for by the shrinking government. While government spending
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grew by an average 3.6 percent annually under Reagan, it has
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shrunk at a 4.1-percent rate under Clinton. The way national economic
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growth is calculated, the expansion of government under Reagan adds to his
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growth total, while the contraction of government under Clinton reduces his
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growth total.
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In addition to supply-side arguments, there are the
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traditional demand-side arguments that a tax cut stimulates the economy by
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pouring more money into it. But this would be a very odd time for a demand-side
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tax cut. As former Congressional Budget Office Director Robert Reischauer
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notes: With unemployment well below the 1980s average and considerably lower
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labor-force growth, the economy seems to be operating near capacity--"or, at
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least the Federal Reserve thinks it is, which is what counts." Any
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deficit-increasing tax cut would surely prompt the Fed to tighten the money
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supply, curbing economic growth or even prompting a recession.
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Dole could, as Abraham
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counsels, offset part of the costs of a tax-rate cut by dumping other
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tax-reform plans--such as the child tax credit, once a key feature of the GOP's
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"pro-family" agenda. What would the Christian Coalition think about that? Or,
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he could propose to cut spending even more than his party has already
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promised--but that sounds like spinach, and the GOP seems to have lost its
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appetite for even the healthy serving it has promised to serve up over the next
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seven years.
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Or, of course, Bob Dole
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could resist temptation. After all, he really does know better.
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