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Address your e-mail to
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the editors to [email protected].
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The
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Large Curd Giveth and the Small Curd Taketh Away
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Jacob Weisberg couldn't have
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been more wrong when, in his Feb. 15 column, "Corporate-Welfare NIMBYs," he implies, with no supporting
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documentation, that I am selective in my commitment to deficit reduction and
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eliminating corporate welfare.
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Weisberg correctly notes I
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am a Democratic co-sponsor of S. 206, a bill to establish an independent
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commission to review and recommend termination of corporate-welfare subsidies.
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However, he is incorrect when he states, four sentences later, "Feingold, who
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is up for re-election in 1998, carries a different tune when it comes to aid to
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families with dependent cheese."
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Weisberg also poses a
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rhetorical question in his column, asking if my commitment to reducing
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corporate welfare "would ... include, say, federal dairy supports and marketing
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orders for the milk industry, which somehow escaped being scaled back in the
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1996 Farm Bill?"
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I voted against the 1996
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Farm Bill, in large measure because it did so little to eliminate market
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distortions and bring needed reform to the antiquated Milk Marketing Order
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system, or MMO, to make it more reflective of supply and demand. The current
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system, instituted in the 1930s, distorts the market, discriminates against the
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dairy farmers of the Upper Midwest by providing higher prices (called "distance
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differentials") to farmers who live far from Eau Claire, Wis., (the city from
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which these "distance differentials" are calculated) and puts Wisconsin
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producers at an artificial competitive disadvantage. The current MMO system
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survives because it is defended by powerful interests who are its
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beneficiaries.
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I have, in fact, worked hard
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to create dairy-policy reform, including introducing two bills in the
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105 th Congress: S. 52, which would eliminate the distance
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differential in dairy pricing, and S. 322, which would repeal the creation of
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the Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact, a dairy cartel created last year that
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allows six Northeastern states to fix higher prices for milk in their
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region.
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I have often stated that if
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the MMO system cannot be reformed, it should be eliminated, and Wisconsin
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farmers have probably been more active than farmers in any other part of the
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country in calling for deregulation of this system.
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Weisberg's assertion that
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"federal dairy supports ... somehow escaped being scaled back in the 1996 Farm
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Bill" is also incorrect. Federal dairy supports have, in fact, been cut
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dramatically. In 1983, the price support was $13.10 per hundredweight (about 11
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gallons of milk), and the program cost taxpayers about $2.6 billion. By 1995,
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the price support had been reduced to $10.10 per hundredweight, and, while the
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myth persists that the dairy program costs billions, the facts are that, in
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1996, the program operated at no cost to the taxpayers. Moreover, the 1996 Farm
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Bill completely eliminates the dairy price support by the end of 1999. The
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dairy industry is the only commodity group to have its support terminated by
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the most recent Farm Bill. Some other commodities, such as wheat and feed
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grains, were provided with hefty annual guaranteed government subsidies in that
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same legislation.
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So exactly what is the
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corporate welfare Weisberg is talking about?
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Deficit
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reduction and balancing the federal budget are serious, complex, and demanding
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tasks, and the policy implications of our efforts reach across the nation, even
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around the world. These efforts are not advanced by unsupported suggestions of
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hypocrisy, such as are contained in Weisberg's column.
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--Sen. Russell D.
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Feingold
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Jacob
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Weisberg Replies
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Read Sen.
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Feingold's letter carefully. He does not say he wants to end corporate welfare
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for dairy farmers. He says he wants Wisconsin farmers to get a better deal.
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Feingold wants to "reform," not eliminate, the Milk Marketing Order system,
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though he acknowledges that it constitutes a "cartel" designed to keep dairy
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prices high. Sounds a lot like NIMBYism to me. I should add that I would have
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been in a better position to reflect the subtleties in Feingold's position if
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his press office had returned repeated calls asking about it.
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Revolted
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I was
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revolted by the reference to JonBenet Ramsay in "Thank Heaven for Little
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Girls," by Larissa MacFarquhar. I felt that you were trying to capitalize
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on the savage bestiality committed on a small child by whoever strangled her,
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as well as the abuse committed by her parents, who put her on display in a
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manner no 6-year-old should be forced to endure. When will publications such as
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yours manage to develop some sense of human moral responsibility?
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--Oakes
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Ames
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Michael
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Kinsley, Socialist
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Michael Kinsley's recent
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article "Eight
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Reasons Not to Cut the Capital-Gains Tax" truly proves the adage that
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liberals cannot stand success.
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Using Kinsley's analogy, if
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we observe that we have too many bakers and not enough butchers, it is
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reasonable to suggest that we ought to reduce the tax on butchers. Our rates of
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saving and investment are staggeringly low, in both historical and
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contemporaneous contexts. There is ample reason to believe that increasing the
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rates of saving and investment would be beneficial to the economy. Hence,
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reducing disincentives to save and invest (e.g., the capital-gains tax) seems
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to make sense.
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The evidence that a
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capital-gains tax would pay for itself is a bit stronger than Kinsley would
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care to admit. First of all, people are going to do something with the money
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they have made as a result of realized capital gains. Either they will spend
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it, in which case local sales-tax receipts will increase, or they will move it
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into some other form of investment, which will be taxed in turn. Having the
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government take nearly one-third of the amount of your investment earnings is
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way too much.
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The
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purpose of tax policy should be to generate income for the government, so that
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it can perform its necessary and essential functions, with the least distortion
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and effect on the overall economy as possible. Kinsley seeks to remedy, through
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the coercive power of government, those circumstances and conditions in society
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that he finds troubling. I would respectfully suggest that this makes him much
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more of a socialist than his Republican critics.
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--Stephen J.
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Konig
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Master of
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Deceit
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It astonishes me that Ann
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Douglas, in "Psycho Dramas," her review of the Sam Tanenhaus biography of
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Whittaker Chambers, acknowledges that Chambers was right about everything, but
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still maintains the old liberal condescension for this perennially maligned
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figure. She recognizes that Chambers' Witness is "one of the great
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American autobiographies," even a "masterpiece," yet still regards it as
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"torrential" and "lurid." She notes Chambers' "susceptibility to ridicule and
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parody," and concludes that "he was a pulp-fiction Dostoyevsky, an author he
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admired above all others."
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Douglas writes as if Chambers
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was not really involved in the Communist conspiracy inside this country, but
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somehow fictionalized it. She implies that he was ridiculous for admiring
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Dostoyevsky. Finally, and worst of all, Douglas prides herself for being able
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to "believe ... Chambers' testimony against Hiss without accepting his
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interpretation of the Soviet-American confrontation." She faults the
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biographer, Tanenhaus, for sharing his subject's viewpoint and not doubting
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"the Soviets' more or less total culpability for the long disaster we call the
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Cold War." She recommends that Tanenhaus should read some revisionist works
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that challenge such an assumption.
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But what is her assumption?
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That there was a chance for meaningful cooperation with the Soviet
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dictatorship? That its recruitment of Alger Hiss, a top official present at the
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Yalta conference (which set the conditions for the Cold War by selling out
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Eastern Europe) and an architect of the United Nations (which granted
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independent votes to Soviet subject states of Eastern Europe), was an
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exception, or a trifle? That the Communists in America were really grand old
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troopers with a different vision of the future?
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She should
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take time from reading revisionist works to look at the revelations of the
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VENONA files, those hundreds of intercepted telegrams from Soviet agents in
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America that reveal the tip of an enormous iceberg of espionage and subversion.
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She characterizes Chambers as a Dostoyevskian figure, "trying to break what he
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saw as the 'invincible ignorance' of a nation blinded to the 'crisis of
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history' by its prosperity and misguided generous-mindedness." Here she is
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right: The ignorance does indeed appear to be invincible.
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--Gary
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Kern
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In
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Defense of Alexis
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Jacob Weisberg's article
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"Washington Swingers" was both inaccurate and unfair when it comes
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to Alexis Herman, President Clinton's nominee to be secretary of labor.
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Let's start with a simple,
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central factual error in the first substantive paragraph about Alexis: "After
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she left the Labor Department, she set up a firm to advise companies on how to
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comply with those [affirmative-action] regulations." Baloney. That was not why
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she set up her business. She set up her firm to provide advice to corporations,
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local governments, and nonprofits on dozens of aspects of labor and marketing
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issues.
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She started this business to
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see if she could make some money by making the workplace work better. This was
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what she was trained to do, and what she was accomplished at. Remember, this
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was at the dawn of the Reagan era. We of the policy-wonk elite were all
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a-titter about the theory of federalism, public-private partnership pablum was
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first beginning to gurgle from the mouth of a Massachusetts governor, and every
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program to help black kids get jobs with federal help was being axed. So Alexis
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hit the road, trying to help localities figure out how to get the most out of
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what was left and trying to help corporations make more progress on hiring
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minorities and marketing to African-Americans. Her first, most lucrative, and
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longest-standing client was Procter & Gamble--a contact she had made before
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she ever entered government.
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But wait--that's not the
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half of the misleading errors in Weisberg's paragraph. His accusation by
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innuendo when it comes to the Rev. Jackson needs to be spelled out. He implies
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Alexis funneled money to Jesse Jackson when she was at Labor, in exchange for
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being the beneficiary of Jackson's largess when she went to the private sector.
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Weisberg further implies that there's something wrong with Jackson's Operation
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Push negotiating agreements with corporations that included monitoring
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arrangements.
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Most of Alexis' business did
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not involve any relationship with Operation Push. But some contracts did, and
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here is how they worked. Jackson and others spotted in the early 1980s that
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there were no white-collar minority employees in lots of major companies, and
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no black franchises in major franchise businesses. The companies realized they
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had to do better or face marketplace consequences, so they set out to hire more
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minorities. They then turned to Alexis for help--sometimes at Jackson's
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suggestion, sometimes because other companies had recommended her firm. Her
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work ended up delivering radical reductions in turnover, and that made them
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more money, provided revenue for Alexis' business, and opened doors for women
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and minorities.
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Now we get to the
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"appearance of impropriety" card. Market Square: Alexis, as a private
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businessperson, provides valuable help to a developer. He gives her an
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ownership stake. Weisberg agrees nothing is illegal, but he elliptically
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implies there's a problem. He implies that Herman later helped Herb
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Miller--even though there is no evidence of it. He then adds in a passing shot
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at Vernon Jordan--as if Vernon needs Alexis' help.
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Alexis should be and is
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proud of her career before and after the Labor Department. Apparently with
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little or no knowledge of it, Weisberg chose to believe the smug, cynical
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view--odd that he didn't bother to check with her clients. He may dislike
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anyone who goes from government to business and back, but to make it sound like
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Alexis is at the head of the class for likely wrongdoing is unsupportable.
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This woman has 20 years of
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real experience making progress on the critical problem of diversity in the
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workplace, but Weisberg and others are making her sound as if she's been a
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product of Washington, D.C., all the time. That is unfair and harms her ability
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to help us all later. When she talks about teaching kids the "culture of work,"
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she isn't speaking dry corporate prose, nor is she speaking the
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fashion-sensitive policy prose. She's speaking with some actual experience.
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Alexis
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deserves full and fair reporting and an open hearing. The Senate committee
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needs to do its job and get these issues into a forum where the nominee can
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respond, rather than leeching them through repeated, incorrect media stories.
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Weisberg needs to do his and get a full picture of a person before he chooses
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to dismiss her life's work as a trip through the revolving door.
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--Mark Steitz
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Address
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your e-mail to the editors to [email protected].
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