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No Medicare Scare
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Who'd have thought seniors
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would be clamoring to Congress, "Please don't take my HMO away"? Only a year
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ago, politicians were being castigated for "herding the elderly into HMOs." But
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now, as health maintenance organizations are suddenly pulling out of dozens of
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Medicare markets, 400,000 elderly customers are scrambling to find insurance
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coverage beyond the end of the year and demanding that Congress do something
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about it. News reports raise the specter of an HMO stampede to the door that
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could unravel the entire 6 million member Medicare HMO system.
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The
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HMOs say it's all because the government pays too little. The government has
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fired back, saying that if anything, HMOs are paid too much. The Health Care
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Financing Administration has refused to renegotiate rates or to allow the HMOs
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to drop benefits on established contracts. And politicians, including the
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president, are pounding the HMOs for "breaking their promises" of coverage for
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the elderly. Sen. Chris Dodd, D-Conn., has announced that he will introduce
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legislation that will block the HMOs from dropping out for six months.
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Health policy debates tend to be eye-glazing,
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but there are two reasons why casual observers should care about what's going
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on here.
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First, the Medicare HMO
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program is a critical test case for Clintonian "Third Way" thinking. Under
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policy changes passed last year, Medicare has been transformed into an enormous
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voucher system. It is the prototype of a still new and controversial idea:
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Government should finance a generous safety net, but competing, private
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organizations should do the work. The government now allocates to each senior
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in Medicare a fixed amount of money that will buy coverage from either a
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private HMO or the traditional government-run Medicare program--thus fostering
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competition. If HMOs refuse to participate, however, the whole reform plan is
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dead.
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Second,
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Medicare savings are supposed to provide the major part of the much-heralded
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deficit reduction projected for the next few years--$102 billion out of a total
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$127 billion from 1998 through 2002. And $50 billion of that is to come from
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savings expected in the Medicare HMO program. If the HMO program fails, it will
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be an economic as well as a social disaster.
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All signs, however, suggest that the immediate problems in
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the program have been exaggerated.
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More HMOs are seeking to
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enter Medicare markets than are seeking to withdraw. The pullouts affect
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just 400,000 of 6 million Medicare HMO customers. Industry observers and HMO
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officials say that only a few more HMOs are expected to leave the program.
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Withdrawals are not
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proof that HMO payments are too low, as the HMOs claim. In fact, if next
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year's payment rates were high enough to keep all the 450 contracting HMOs
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profitable, then Medicare would clearly be paying too much. As Harvard
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economist Joseph Newhouse points out, the optimal rate of exit is unlikely to
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be zero. Presumably, at least some of the plans are inefficient. We don't know
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precisely what an optimal rate would be, but the anticipated withdrawal rate
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among HMOs (plans covering about 7 percent of enrollees) is probably not
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unreasonable.
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HMO payments have, in
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fact, been too high. The HMO pullouts seemed so unexpected because until
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recently HMOs were pushing to expand their Medicare business. The reason
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was simple: The government was overpaying them. Before this year, under a
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formula that even the HMO industry admits was "rather robust," HMO payments
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were derived from the traditional Medicare program, which had a much sicker
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population and costs that rose 10 percent a year. The overpayment was estimated
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to be 8 percent, so last year Congress put in a new formula that essentially
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cut the increase for 1999 to 2 percent. Given the tightened payments and a
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major downturn in HMO stocks, some marginal markets--especially rural
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areas--started to look unprofitable. HMOs were allowed to drop them up to this
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month. So with the deadline looming, a bunch did.
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Nearly 90 percent of dropped enrollees are in areas where they can choose
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another HMO , according to the Department of Health and Human Services. So
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the effects of the announced withdrawals will be limited.
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To be sure, people who have to switch HMOs may
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have to change doctors. And those who lose all HMO coverage may suffer
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substantial financial loss. Standard Medicare coverage pays only 80 percent of
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doctor and hospital bills and nothing for drugs. The HMOs pay all medical bills
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except for a small copayment and generally provide generous drug coverage,
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often at no extra cost--except giving up one's choice of doctor or hospital.
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According to the American Association of Retired Persons, a senior enrolling in
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an HMO saves $1,200 per year--about 10 percent of average income--compared with
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those with the standard coverage and some supplemental insurance. No wonder
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HMOs sign up 50,000 new Medicare customers every month.
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What
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Medicare is now suffering is not a calamity. It is the inevitable turbulence
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and messiness of introducing choice and competition to a major social program.
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In a voucher system, seniors have a choice of plans, but the plans have
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choices, too. They aren't breaking any promises if they decide to take their
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ball and go home. The benefits, however, may still be worth this downside.
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After all, regulations failed to control Medicare's costs adequately. The hope
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and the logic is that competing HMOs might have better success.
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It would be a big mistake for Congress to
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respond to irate seniors by punishing the HMOs. Dodd's proposal to block the
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pullouts is crazy. Forcing HMOs to stay in a failing business cannot be good
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for seniors and would chill entry by others. Nor should Congress heed HMO
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lobbyists and force Medicare officials to renegotiate the 1999 contracts. The
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HMOs knew the rules, and the number of dropouts does not seem excessive.
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The real cause for concern
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is that HMOs may fail to control costs in the long term. Over half of managed
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care plans are now losing money, and a major shakeout is underway. After
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several years of remarkable success, insurers are having serious trouble
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controlling the costs generated by doctors like me, and not just for the senior
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population. New drugs, diagnostics, and other technologies have accelerated
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costs far beyond the pace of inflation. Insurers are seeking double-digit
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increases in premiums from employers, who will then cut health benefits, wages,
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or both. The government will face intense pressure to raise Medicare HMO
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payments in future years. Suddenly, the current budget surplus looks
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short-lived indeed.
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If HMOs, like regulators in
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the 1980s, fail to tame health costs, we will be left with an ugly choice. Do
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we let the new technologies--with their promise of a longer and better
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life--consume ever more of the nation's wealth and productivity? Or do we
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ration them? More than anything, the current HMO troubles are evidence that
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this could be the major domestic policy debate of the coming decade.
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