NOTES
For simplicity, we have adopted the following citation conventions in these endnotes.
Dozens of government agencies and other entities provided the Commission with more
than 2.5 million pages of documents and other materials, including more than 1,000
hours of audiotapes. In general, we cite documents and other materials by providing
the agency or entity of origin, the type of document (e.g., memo, email, report, or
record), the author and recipient, the title (in quotes) or a description of the
subject, and the date. We use the following abbreviations for the agencies and
entities that produced the bulk of these documents: AAL-American Airlines;
CIA-Central Intelligence Agency; DCI-Director of Central Intelligence;
DHS-Department of Homeland Security; DOD-Department of Defense; DOJ-Department of
Justice; DOS-Department of State; DOT-Department of Transportation;
EPA-Environmental Protection Agency; FAA-Federal Aviation Administration;
FBI-Federal Bureau of Investigation; FDNY-Fire Department of New York; GAO-General
Accounting Office; INS-Immigration and Naturalization Service; NEADS-Northeast Air
Defense Sector; NSA-National Security Agency; NSC-National Security Council;
NTSB-National Transportation Safety Board; NYPD-New York Police Department;
OEM-Office of Emergency Management, City of New York; PANYNJ or Port Authority-Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey; PAPD-Port Authority Police Department;
SEC-Securities and Exchange Commission; Treasury-Department of Treasury;
TSA-Transportation Security Administration; UAL-United Air Lines; USSS-United States
Secret Service.
Interviews, meetings, briefings, and site visits conducted by Commissioners or by
members of the Commission staff are cited, for example, as "George Tenet interview
(Jan. 22, 2004)." Testimony by witnesses at one of the Com- mission's 12 public
hearings is cited as "Condoleezza Rice testimony, Apr. 8, 2004." Written statements
for the record provided by witnesses at one of our public hearings are cited as
"Thomas Ridge prepared statement, May 19, 2004."
At the request of intelligence community agencies (including the FBI), we use the
first name and last initial, only the first name, or in a few instances an alias or
title when referring to working-level employees in those agencies. At the request of
several intelligence agencies, we cite most reports from the CIA and other
intelligence agencies generically as "Intelligence report," followed by a
description of the subject and date. In a few instances in which we were given
access to highly sensitive documents or information, we cite generically to
documents or information provided to the Commission.
Our investigation built on the work of many others, including the Joint Inquiry of
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After theTerrorist
Attacks of September 11,2001, which we refer to as the "Joint Inquiry." We cite as
"Joint Inquiry report, Dec. 2002" the Report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence and U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, S. Rep. No.
107-351, H.R. Rep. No. 107-792, 107th Cong., 2d sess. (2002), indicating "classified
version" where appropriate. Testimony presented during hearings conducted by the
Joint Inquiry is cited as "Joint Inquiry testimony of GeorgeTenet, Oct. 17, 2002,"
indicating "closed hearing" where appropriate. We cite interviews conducted by the
Joint Inquiry staff as "Joint Inquiry interview of Cofer Black," with the date of
the interview.
Another major source for our investigation were the thousands of interviews conducted
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation during its investigation of the 9/11 attacks,
which it refers to as "Penttbom." FBI agents write up their interviews on forms
called 302s, which we cite as "FBI report of investigation, interview of John Smith,
Oct. 4, 2001," using the date of the interview. We cite interviews conducted by
other agencies by agency name and date of the interview; for example, an interview
conducted by the Department of Justice Office of Inspector General is cited as "DOJ
Inspector General interview of Mary Jones, July 9, 2002."
1 "We Have Some Planes"
1. No physical, documentary, or analytical evidence provides a convincing explanation
of why Atta and Omari drove to Portland, Maine, from Boston on the morning of
September 10, only to return to Logan on Flight 5930 on the morning of September 11.
However, Atta reacted negatively when informed in Portland that he would have to
check in again in Boston. Michael Touhey interview (May 27, 2004). Whatever their
reason, the Portland Jetport was the nearest airport to Boston with a 9/11 flight
that would have arrived at Logan in time for the passengers to transfer to American
Airlines Flight 11, which had a scheduled departure time of 7:45 A.M. See Tom Kinton
interview (Nov. 6, 2003); Portland International Jetport site visit (Aug. 18, 2003).
Like the other two airports used by the 9/11 hijackers (Newark Liberty International
Airport and Washington Dulles International Airport), Boston's Logan International
Airport was a "Category X" airport: i.e., among the largest facilities liable to
highest threat, and generally subject to greater security requirements. See FAA
report,"Civil Aviation Security Reference Handbook,"May 1999, pp.117-118. Though
Logan was selected for two of the hijackings (as were both American and United
Airlines), we found no evidence that the terrorists targeted particular airports or
airlines. Nothing stands out about any of them with respect to the only security
layer that was relevant to the actual hijackings: checkpoint screening. See FAA
briefing materials, "Assessment and Testing Data for BOS, EWR, and IAD," Oct. 24,
2001. Despite security problems at Logan (see, e.g., two local Fox 25 television
investigative reports in February and April 2001, and an email in August 2001 from a
former FAA special agent to the agency's leadership regarding his concerns about lax
security at the airport), no evidence suggests that such issues entered into the
terrorists' targeting: they simply booked heavily fueled east-to-west
transcontinental flights of the large Boeing aircraft they trained to fly that were
scheduled to take off at nearly the same time. See Matt Carroll, "Fighting Terror
Sense of Alarm; Airlines Foiled Police Logan Probe," Boston Globe, Oct. 17, 2001, p.
B1.
2. CAPPS was an FAA-approved automated system run by the airlines that scored each
passenger's profile to identify those who might pose a threat to civil aviation. The
system also chose passengers at random to receive additional security scrutiny. Ten
out of the 19 hijackers (including 9 out of 10 on the two American Airlines flights)
were identified via the CAPPS system. According to the procedures in place on 9/11,
in addition to those flagged by the CAPPS algorithm, American's ticket agents were
to mark as "selectees" those passengers who did not provide correct responses to the
required security questions, failed to show proper identification, or met other
criteria. See FAA report,"Air Carrier Standard Security Program,"May 2001, pp.75-76;
FAA record of interview, Donna Thompson, Sept. 23, 2001; Chuck Severance interview
(Apr. 15, 2004); Jim Dillon interview (Apr. 15, 2004); Diane Graney interview (Apr.
16, 2004). It appears that Atta was selected at random. See Al Hickson briefing
(June 8, 2004).
3. The call was placed from a pay phone in Terminal C (between the screening
checkpoint and United 175's boarding gate). We presume Shehhi made the call, but we
cannot be sure. Logan International Airport site visit (Aug. 15, 2003); see also FBI
response to Commission briefing request no. 6, undated (topic 11).
4. Flight 11 pushed back from Gate 32 in Terminal B at 7:40. See AAL response to the
Commission's February 3, 2004, requests, Mar. 15, 2004.
5. See UAL letter, "Flight 175-11Sep01 Passenger ACI Check-in History," July 11,
2002. Customer service representative Gail Jawahir recalled that her encounter with
the Ghamdis occurred at "shortly before 7 A.M.," and when shown photos of the
hijackers, she indicated that Mohand al Shehri resembled one of the two she checked
in (suggesting they were Banihammad and Shehri). However, she also recalled that the
men had the same last name and had assigned seats on row 9 (i.e., the Ghamdis), and
that account has been adopted here. In either case, she almost certainly was dealing
with one set of the Flight 175 hijackers. See FBI reports of investigation,
interviews of Gail Jawahir, Sept. 21, 2001; Sept. 28, 2001. Even had the hijackers
been unable to understand and answer the two standard security questions, the only
consequence would have been the screening of their carry-on and checked bags for
explosives. See FAA report,"Air Carrier Standard Security Program," May 2001, p. 76.
6. For Flight 11, two checkpoints provided access to the gate. The second was opened
at 7:15 A.M. The FAA conducted many screener evaluations between September 11,1999,
and September 11,2001. At the primary checkpoints, in aggregate, screeners met or
exceeded the average for overall, physical search, and X-ray detection, while
falling below the norm for metal detection. No FAA Special Assessments (by "red
teams") were done at Logan security checkpoints during the two years prior to
September 11, 2001. See FAA briefing materials,"Assessment and Testing Data for BOS,
EWR, and IAD," Oct. 24, 2001.
7. See Air Transport Association/Regional Airlines Association (ATA/RAA) report, "Air
Carriers Checkpoint Operations Guide,"Aug. 1999; FAA report,"Air Carrier Standard
Security Program,"May 2001, appendix VI.
8. Mary Carol Turano interview (Mar. 11, 2004); FBI reports of investigation,
interview of Nilda Cora, Oct. 4, 2001; interview of William Thomas, Sept. 14, 2001;
interview of Jennifer Gore, Sept. 12, 2001; interview of Claudia Richey, Sept. 15,
2001; interview of Rosarito Rivera, Sept. 25, 2001.
9. See TSA report, "Selectee Status of September 11th Hijackers," undated. For
boarding and seating information, see AAL record, SABRE information on Flight 11,
Sept. 11, 2001. These boarding times from the American system are approximate only;
for Flight 11, they indicated that some passengers "boarded" after the aircraft had
pushed back from the gate. See AAL response to the Commission's February 3, 2004,
requests, Mar. 15, 2004. 452 NOTES TO CHAPTER 1
10. See TSA report, "Selectee Status of September 11th Hijackers," undated; see also
UAL letter,"Flight 175- 11 Sep01 Passenger ACI Check-in History," July 11, 2002.
11. The Hazmis checked in at 7:29; the airline has not yet been able to confirm the
time of Hanjour's checkin. However, it had to have taken place by 7:35, when he
appears on the checkpoint videotape. See AAL record, SABRE information for Flight
77, Sept. 11, 2001; AAL response to the Commission's February 3, 2004, requests,
Mar. 15, 2004; Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority videotape, Dulles main
terminal checkpoints, Sept. 11, 2001.
12. See TSA report, "Selectee Status of September 11th Hijackers," undated; see also
FAA report,"Selectee List AALA #77," undated; FBI report of investigation, interview
of Vaughn Allex, Sept. 12, 2001; Vaughn Allex interview (July 13, 2004).
13. The FAA conducted many screener evaluations at Dulles between September 11, 1999,
and September 11, 2001. While the test results for physical search exceeded the
national average, both the metal detector and X-ray results were below average. See
FAA briefing materials, "Assessment and Testing Data for BOS, EWR, and IAD," Oct.
24, 2001.
14. Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority videotape, Dulles main terminal
checkpoints, Sept. 11, 2001; see also Tim Jackson interview (Apr. 12, 2004).
15. Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority videotape, Dulles main terminal
checkpoints, Sept. 11, 2001; see also Tim Jackson interview (Apr. 12, 2004).
16. For investigation findings, see FAA report, "American Airlines Flight #77:
Hijacking and Crash into the Pentagon, Sept. 11, 2001," undated. For screener
evaluations, see Tim Jackson interview (Apr. 12, 2004).
17. See AAL record, SABRE information for Flight 77, Sept. 11, 2001; AAL response to
the Commission's February 3, 2004, requests, Mar. 15, 2004.
18. UAL record, Flight 93 EWR bag loading status, Sept. 11, 2001; UAL record, Flight
93 EWR ACI passenger history, Sept. 11, 2001; UAL record, Flight 93 EWR full bag
history, Sept. 11, 2001; TSA report, "Selectee Status of September 11th Hijackers,"
undated; FBI report,"The Final 24 Hours,"Dec. 8, 2003.
19. The FAA conducted many screener evaluations at Newark between September 11, 1999,
and September 11, 2001. Detection rates for metal detection, physical searches, and
X-rays all met or exceeded the national averages. See FAA briefing materials,
"Assessment and Testing Data for BOS, EWR, and IAD,"Oct. 24, 2001; see also FAA
report,"United Airlines Flight 93, September 11, 2001, Executive Report," Jan. 30,
2002.
20. UAL record, Flight 93 EWR ACI passenger history, Sept. 11, 2001; see also FBI
report, "The Final 24 Hours,"Dec. 8, 2003.
21. While Flights 11 and 77 were at or slightly above the average number of
passengers for the respective flights that summer, Flights 175 and 93 were well
below their averages. We found no evidence to indicate that the hijackers
manipulated the passenger loads on the aircraft they hijacked. Financial records did
not reveal the purchase of any tickets beyond those the hijackers used for
themselves. See FBI response to Commission briefing request no. 6, undated (topic
8); AAL report, "Average Load Factor by Day-of-Week," undated (for Flights 11 and 77
from June 11, 2001, to Sept. 9, 2001); AAL response to the Commission's supplemental
document requests, Jan. 20, 2004; UAL report, Flight 175 BOS-LAX Load Factors,
undated (from June 1, 2001, to Sept. 11, 2001); UAL report,"Explanation of Load
Factors," undated.
22. See AAL response to the Commission's February 3, 2004, requests, Mar. 15, 2004;
AAL record, Dispatch Environmental Control/Weekly Flight Summary for Flight 11,
Sept. 11, 2001; AAL report, "Flight Attendant Jump Seat Locations During Takeoff And
Flight Attendant Typical Cabin Positions During Start of Cabin Service," undated;
AAL report,"Passenger Name List, Flight 11/September 11," undated.
23. Commission analysis of NTSB and FAA air traffic control and radar data. See AAL
record, Dispatch Environmental Control/Weekly Flight Summary for Flight 11, Sept.
11,2001; NTSB report, "Flight Path Study-American Airlines Flight 11," Feb. 19,
2002; Bill Halleck and Peggy Houck interview (Jan. 8, 2004). The initial service
assignments for flight attendants on American 11 would have placed Karen Martin and
Bobbi Arestegui in first class; Sara Low and Jean Roger in business class; Dianne
Snyder in the midcabin galley; Betty Ong and Amy Sweeney in coach; and Karen Nicosia
in the aft galley. Jeffrey Collman would have been assigned to work in coach, but to
assist in first class if needed. See AAL report, "Flight Attendant Jump Seat
Locations During Takeoff And Flight Attendant Typical Cabin Positions During Start
of Cabin Service," undated; Bob Jordan briefing (Nov. 20, 2003).
24. NTSB report, Air Traffic Control Recording-American Airlines Flight 11, Dec. 21,
2001; NTSB report, Air Traffic Control Recording-United Airlines Flight 175, Dec.
21, 2001. Given that the cockpit crew of American 11 had been acknowledging all
previous instructions from air traffic control that morning within a matter of
seconds, and that when the first reporting of the hijacking was received a short
time later (the 8:19 call from Betty Ong) a number of actions had already been taken
by the hijackers, it is most likely that the hijacking occurred at 8:14 A.M.
25. An early draft of an executive summary prepared by FAA security staff for the
agency's leadership referred to an alleged report of a shooting aboard Flight 11. We
believe this report was erroneous for a number of reasons- there is no evidence that
the hijackers purchased firearms, use of a gun would be inconsistent with the
otherwise common tactics employed by the hijackers, the alleged shooting victim was
seated where witness accounts place the stabbing victim (9B), and, most important,
neither Betty Ong nor Amy Sweeney, the only two people who communicated to the
ground from aboard the aircraft, reported the presence of a gun or a shooting. Both
reported knives and stabbings. AAL transcript, telephone call from Betty Ong to
Nydia Gonzalez, Sept. 11, 2001; AAL transcript, telephone call from Nydia Gonzalez
to Craig Marquis, Sept. 11, 2001; AAL transcript, telephone call from Nancy Wyatt to
Ray Howland, Sept. 11, 2001; Michael Woodward interview (Jan. 25, 2004). The General
Accounting Office looked into the gun story and was unable to corroborate it. GAO
report, summary of briefing re investigation, Aug. 30, 2002.
26. Craig Marquis interview (Nov. 19, 2003); Michael Woodward interview (Jan. 25,
2004); Jim Dillon interview (Apr. 15, 2004). See also AAL transcript, telephone call
from Betty Ong to Nydia Gonzalez, Sept. 11, 2001. At the time of the hijacking,
American Airlines flight attendants all carried cockpit keys on their person. See
Craig Marquis, Craig Parfitt, Joe Bertapelle, and Mike Mulcahy interview (Nov. 19,
2003).
27. AAL transcript, telephone call from Nydia Gonzalez to Craig Marquis, Sept. 11,
2001; Obituary, "Daniel Lewin," Washington Post, Sept. 22, 2001, p. B7.
28. AAL transcript, telephone call from Betty Ong to Nydia Gonzalez, Sept. 11, 2001;
AAL transcript, telephone call from Nydia Gonzalez to Craig Marquis, Sept. 11, 2001.
Regarding the claim of a bomb, see Michael Woodward interview (Jan. 25, 2004).
29. Calls to American's reservations office are routed to the first open line at one
of several facilities, among them the center in Cary, N.C. See Nydia Gonzalez
interview (Nov. 19, 2003). On standard emergency training, see FAA report, "Air
Carrier Standard Security Program," May 2001, pp. 139j-139o; Don Dillman briefing
(Nov. 18, 2003); Bob Jordan briefing (Nov. 20, 2003). The call from Ong was received
initially by Vanessa Minter and then taken over by Winston Sadler; realizing the
urgency of the situation, he pushed an emergency button that simultaneously
initiated a tape recording of the call and sent an alarm notifying Nydia Gonzalez, a
supervisor, to pick up on the line. Gonzalez was paged to respond to the alarm and
joined the call a short time later. Only the first four minutes of the phone call
between Ong and the reservations center (Minter, Sadler, and Gonzalez) was recorded
because of the time limit on the recently installed system. See Nydia Gonzalez
interview (Nov. 19, 2003); Nydia Gonzalez testimony, Jan. 27, 2004.
30. AAL transcript, telephone call from Betty Ong to Nydia Gonzalez, Sept. 11, 2001.
31. See Nydia Gonzalez interview (Nov. 19, 2003); Craig Marquis interviews (Nov. 19,
2003; Apr. 26, 2004); AAL record, Dispatch Environmental Control/Weekly Flight
Summary for Flight 11, Sept. 11, 2001; AAL transcript, telephone call from Bill
Halleck to BOS ATC, Sept. 11, 2001. The Air Carrier Standard Security Program
required airlines to immediately notify the FAA and FBI upon receiving information
that an act or suspected act of airplane piracy was being committed.
32. See FAA recording, Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center, position 46R, at 8:25
A.M.; Air Traffic Control Recording-American Airlines Flight 11, Dec. 21, 2001.
Starting at 8:22, Amy Sweeney attempted by airphone to contact the American Airlines
flight services office at Logan, which managed the scheduling and operation of
flight attendants. Sweeney's first attempt failed, as did a second at 8:24. When she
got through to Nunez, the latter thought she had reported her flight number as 12.
Michael Woodward, supervisor at the Boston office, hearing that a problem had been
reported aboard an American airplane, went to American's gate area at Logan with his
colleague Beth Williams. Woodward noted that the morning bank of flights had all
departed Boston and the gate area was quiet. He further realized that Flight 12 had
not even departed yet, so he and Williams returned to the office to try to clarify
the situation. See FBI report, "American Airlines Airphone Usage," Sept. 20, 2001;
Michael Woodward interview (Jan. 25,2004). The phone call between Sweeney and
Woodward lasted about 12 minutes (8:32-8:44) and was not taped. See AAL email,
Woodward to Schmidt,"Flight 11 Account of events,"Sept. 19, 2001; AAL notes, Michael
Woodward handwritten notes, Sept. 11, 2001; FBI report of investigation, interview
of Michael Woodward, Sept. 13, 2001; AAL report, interview of Michael Woodward,
Sept. 11, 2001; AAL transcript, telephone call from Nancy Wyatt to Ray Howland,
Sept. 11, 2001.
33. See AAL transcript, telephone call from Nydia Gonzalez to Craig Marquis, Sept.
11, 2001; NTSB report, "Flight Path Study-American Airlines Flight 11," Feb. 19,
2002. AAL transcript, telephone call from Nydia Gonzalez to Craig Marquis, Sept. 11,
2001; AAL transcript, telephone call from Nancy Wyatt to Ray Howland, Sept. 11,
2001.
34. Michael Woodward interview (Jan. 25, 2004).
35. AAL transcript, telephone call from Nydia Gonzalez to Craig Marquis, Sept. 11,
2001; Michael Woodward interview (Jan. 25, 2004); AAL, Michael Woodward notes, Sept.
11, 2001. Also at this time American Airlines completed its "lockout" procedure for
Flight 11, which restricted access to information about a hijacked flight in
accordance with the Air Carrier Standard Security program. See FAA report,"Air
Carrier Standard Security Program," May 2001, p. 110.
36. AAL transcript, telephone call from Nancy Wyatt to Ray Howland, Sept. 11,2001;
Michael Woodward interview (Jan. 25, 2004).
37. AAL transcript, telephone call from Nydia Gonzalez to Craig Marquis, Sept. 11,
2001. 454 NOTES TO CHAPTER 1
38. Ibid.; Michael Woodward interview (Jan. 25, 2004).
39. NTSB report, "Flight Path Study-American Airlines Flight 11," Feb. 19, 2002.
40. The 56 passengers represented a load factor of 33.33 percent of the airplane's
seating capacity of 168, below the 49.22 percent for Flight 175 on Tuesdays in the
three-month period prior to September 11, 2001. See UAL report, Flight 175 BOS-LAX
Load Factors, undated (from June 1, 2001, to Sept. 11, 2001). Nine passengers
holding reservations for Flight 175 did not show for the flight. They were
interviewed and cleared by the FBI. FAA report, "Executive Summary," Sept. 12, 2001;
FAA report,"Executive Summary, Chronology of a Multiple Hijacking Crisis, September
11, 2001," Sept. 17, 2001; UAL record, Flight 175 ACARS report, Sept. 11, 2001; UAL
record, Flight 175 Flight Data Recap, Sept. 11, 2001.
41. FAA report, "Executive Summary,"Sept. 12,2001; FAA report,"Executive Summary,
Chronology of a Multiple Hijacking Crisis, September 11,2001,"Sept. 17,2001; NTSB
report,"Flight Path Study-United Airlines 175," Feb. 19,2002; NTSB report,
AirTraffic Control Recording-United Airlines Flight 175, Dec. 21,2001. At or around
this time, flight attendants Kathryn Laborie and Alfred Marchand would have begun
cabin service in first class; with Amy King and Robert Fangman in business class;
and with Michael Tarrou, Amy Jarret, and Alicia Titus in economy class. See UAL
report, "Flight 175 Flight Attendant Positions/Jumpseats," undated. United flight
attendants, unlike those at American, did not carry cockpit keys. Instead, such keys
were stowed in the cabin-on Flight 175, in the overhead bin above seats 1A and 1B in
first class. See Don Dillman briefing (Nov. 18, 2003); Bob Jordan briefing (Nov. 20,
2003).
42. Asked by air traffic controllers at 8:37 to look for an American Airlines 767
(Flight 11), United 175 reported spotting the aircraft at 8:38. At 8:41, the flight
crew reported having "heard a suspicious transmission" from another aircraft shortly
after takeoff,"like someone keyed the mike and said everyone stay in your seats."
See NTSB report, Air Traffic Control Recording-United Airlines Flight 175, Dec. 21,
2001.
43. See Marc Policastro interview (Nov. 21, 2003); FBI reports of investigation,
interview of Lee Hanson, Sept. 11, 2001; interview of Marc Policastro, Sept. 11,
2001; interview of Louise Sweeney, Sept. 28, 2001; interview of Ronald May, Sept.
11, 2001. On both American 11 and United 175, Boeing 767 double-aisled aircraft, the
hijackers arrayed themselves similarly: two seated in first class close to the
cockpit door, the pilot hijacker seated close behind them, and at least one other
hijacker seated close behind the pilot hijacker. Hijackers were seated next to both
the left and right aisles. On American 77 and United 93, Boeing 757 single-aisle
aircraft, the pilot hijacker sat in the first row, closest to the cockpit door. See
FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, pp. 67-69; AAL
schematics for Flight 11 and Flight 77; UAL schematics for Flight 175 and Flight 93.
44. NTSB report, "Flight Path Study-United Airlines 175," Feb. 19, 2002; NTSB report,
Air Traffic Control Recording-United Airlines Flight 175, Dec. 21, 2001.
45. See FBI report of investigation, interview of Lee Hanson, Sept. 11, 2001.
46. Flight crew on board UAL aircraft could contact the United office in San
Francisco (SAMC) simply by dialing *349 on an airphone. See FBI report of
investigation, interview of David Price, Jan. 24, 2002. At some point before 9:00,
SAMC notified United's headquarters of the emergency call from the flight attendant.
See Marc Policastro interview (Nov. 21, 2003); FBI report of investigation,
interview of Marc Policastro, Sept.11,2001; Rich Miles interiew (Nov. 21, 2003).
47. NTSB report, "Flight Path Study-United Airlines 175," Feb. 19, 2002.
48. See FBI reports of investigation, interview of Julie Sweeney, Oct. 2, 2001;
interview of Louise Sweeney, Sept. 28, 2001.
49. See FBI report of investigation, interview of Lee Hanson, Sept. 11, 2001.
50. See ibid.; interview of Louise Sweeney, Sept. 28, 2001.
51. NTSB report, "Flight Path Study-United Airlines 175," Feb. 19, 2002.
52. AAL report, "Flight Attendant Jump Seat Locations During Takeoff And Flight
Attendant Typical Cabin Positions During Start of Cabin Service," undated; AAL
email, Young to Clark,"Flight Crews," Sept. 12, 2001; AAL record, Dispatch
Environmental Control/Weekly Flight Summary for Flight 11, Sept. 11, 2001.
53. AAL record, System Operations Command Center (SOCC) log, Sept. 11, 2001, p. 2;
NTSB report, "Flight Path Study-American Airlines Flight 77," Feb. 19, 2002. Flight
attendant Renee May would likely have started working in the first-class galley;
Michele Heidenberger would have been in the aft galley; Jennifer Lewis would have
been in first class; and Kenneth Lewis would have been in the main cabin. On cabin
service, see AAL report, "Flight Attendant Jump Seat Locations During Takeoff And
Flight Attendant Typical Cabin Positions During Start of Cabin Service," undated.
For cruising altitude, see NTSB report,"Flight Path Study-American Airlines Flight
77," Feb. 19, 2002. On events in the cabin, see FAA recording, Indianapolis Air
Traffic Control Center, position HNN R, Sept. 11, 2001; FBI report of investigation,
interview of Theodore Olson, Sept. 11, 2001; FBI report of investigation, interview
of Ronald and Nancy May, Sept. 12, 2001; AAL record, Dispatch Environmental
Control/Weekly Flight Summary for Flight 11, Sept. 11, 2001.
54. Air traffic control notified American's headquarters of the problem, and the
airline began attempts to contact the flight by 8:59 via ACARS. See NTSB report,
"Flight Path Study-American Airlines Flight 77," Feb. 19, 2002. On American 11, the
transponder signal was turned off at 8:21; on United 175, the code was changed at
8:47; on American 77, the signal was turned off at 8:56; and on United 93, the
signal was turned off at 9:41. See FAA report,"Summary of AirTraffic Hijack Events:
September 11, 2001,"Sept. 17, 2001; Richard Byard interview (Sept. 24, 2003); Linda
Povinelli interview (Sept. 24, 2003); see also NTSB report, Air Traffic Control
Recording-American Airlines Flight 77, Dec. 21, 2001; AAL record, Dispatch
Environmental Control/Weekly Flight Summary for Flight 11, Sept. 11, 2001.
55. Gerard Arpey interview (Jan. 8, 2004); Larry Wansley interview (Jan. 8, 2004);
AAL record, System Operations Command Center (SOCC) log, Sept. 11, 2001.
56. FBI report, "American Airlines Airphone Usage," Sept. 20, 2001; FBI report of
investigation, interview of Ronald and Nancy May, Sept. 12, 2001.
57. The records available for the phone calls from American 77 do not allow for a
determination of which of four "connected calls to unknown numbers" represent the
two between Barbara and Ted Olson, although the FBI and DOJ believe that all four
represent communications between Barbara Olson and her husband's office (all family
members of the Flight 77 passengers and crew were canvassed to see if they had
received any phone calls from the hijacked flight, and only Renee May's parents and
Ted Olson indicated that they had received such calls). The four calls were at
9:15:34 for 1 minute, 42 seconds; 9:20:15 for 4 minutes, 34 seconds; 9:25:48 for 2
minutes, 34 seconds; and 9:30:56 for 4 minutes, 20 seconds. FBI report,"American
Airlines Airphone Usage," Sept. 20, 2001; FBI report of investigation, interview of
Theodore Olson, Sept. 11, 2001; FBI report of investigation, interview of Helen
Voss, Sept. 14, 2001; AAL response to the Commission's supplemental document
request, Jan. 20, 2004.
58. FBI report, "American Airlines Airphone Usage," Sept. 20, 2001; FBI report of
investigation, interview of Theodore Olson, Sept. 11, 2001.
59. See FAA report, "Report of Aircraft Accident," Nov. 13, 2001; John Hendershot
interview (Dec. 22, 2003); FAA report, "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events:
September 11, 2001," Sept. 17, 2001; NTSB report, "Flight Path Study-American
Airlines Flight 77," Feb. 19, 2002; Commission analysis of radar data.
60. See FAA report, "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events: September 11, 2001,"Sept.
17, 2001; NTSB report, "Flight Path Study-American Airlines Flight 77," Feb. 19,
2002; FAA report,"Report of Aircraft Accident,"Nov. 13, 2001.
61. See NTSB report, "Flight Path Study-American Airlines Flight 77," Feb. 19, 2002;
TSA report,"Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation for 2001,"Aug. 20, 2002, p. 41.
62. The flight attendant assignments and seating included Chief Flight Attendant
Deborah Welsh (first class, seat J1 at takeoff); Sandra Bradshaw (coach, seat J5);
Wanda Green (first class, seat J4); Lorraine Bay (coach, seat J3); and CeeCee Lyles
(coach, seat J6). See UAL response to Commission questions for the record, Apr. 5,
2004; FAA report, "Chronology of the September 11 Attacks and Subsequent Events
Through October 24, 2001," undated; UAL records, copies of electronic boarding
passes for Flight 93, Sept. 11, 2001; Bob Varcadipane interview (May 4, 2004);
Newark Tower briefing (May 4, 2004).
63. Although the flight schedule indicates an 8:00 A.M. "departure," this was the
time the plane left the gate area. Taxiing from the gate to the runway normally took
about 15 minutes. Bob Varcadipane interview (May 4, 2004); Newark Tower briefing
(May 4, 2004).
64. Commission analysis of FAA air traffic control data. On the FAA's awareness of
multiple hijackings, see AAL transcript, telephone call from Nydia Gonzalez to Craig
Marquis, Sept. 11, 2001; Craig Marquis interview (Nov. 19, 2003); AAL record, System
Operations Command Center (SOCC) log, Sept. 11,2001; UAL System Operations Control
briefing (Nov. 20, 2003); Rich Miles interview (Nov. 21, 2003); UAL report,
"Timeline: Dispatch/SMFDO Activities-Terrorist Crisis," undated.
65. FAA audio file, Boston Center, position 46R, 8:24:38 and 8:24:56; Peter Zalewski
interview (Sept. 23, 2003).
66. On September 6, 1970, members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine hijacked a Pan American Boeing 747, a TWA Boeing 707, and a Swissair DC-8.
On September 9, a British airliner was hijacked as well. An attempt to hijack an
Israeli airliner was thwarted. The Pan American plane landed in Cairo and was blown
up after its passengers were released. The other three aircraft were flown to Dawson
Field, near Amman, Jordan; the passengers were held captive, and the planes were
destroyed. The international hijacking crisis turned into a civil war, as the
Jordanian government used force to restore its control of the country. See FAA
report, Civil Aviation Reference Handbook, May 1999, appendix D.
The FAA knew or strongly suspected that Flight 11 was a hijacking 11 minutes after it
was taken over; Flight 175, 9 minutes after it was taken over. There is no evidence
to indicate that the FAA recognized Flight 77 as a hijacking until it crashed into
the Pentagon.
67. FAA audio file, Herndon Command Center, line 5114, 9:07:13; FAA audio file,
Herndon Command Center, position 15, 9:19. At 9:07, Boston Air Traffic Control
Center recommended to the FAA Command Center that a cockpit warning be sent to the
pilots of all commercial aircraft to secure their cockpits. While Boston Center sent
out such warnings to the commercial flights in its sector, we could find no evidence
that a nationwide warning was issued by the ATC system.
68. Ellen King interview (Apr. 5, 2004). FAA air traffic control tapes indicate that
at 9:19 the FAA Air Traffic Control System Command Center in Herndon ordered
controllers to send a cockpit warning to Delta 1989 because, like American 11 and
United 175, it was a transcontinental flight departing Boston's Logan Airport.
69. For American Airlines' response, see AAL briefing (Apr. 26, 2004). For
Ballinger's warnings, see Ed Ballinger interview (Apr. 14, 2004). A companywide
order for dispatchers to warn cockpits was not issued until 9:21. See UAL report,
"Timeline: Dispatch/SMFDO Activities-Terrorist Crisis," undated. While one of
Ballinger's colleagues assisted him, Ballinger remained responsible for multiple
flights. See Ed Ballinger interview (Apr. 14, 2004). American Airlines' policy
called for the flight dispatcher to manage only the hijacked flight, relieving him
of responsibilities for all other flights. On American Airlines' policy, see Craig
Marquis, Craig Parfitt, Joe Bertapelle, and Mike Mulcahy interview (Nov. 19, 2003).
United Airlines had no such "isolation" policy. UAL System Operations Control
briefing (Nov. 20, 2003).
70. On FDR, see NTSB report, "Specialist's Factual Report of Investigation-Digital
Flight Data Recorder" for United Airlines Flight 93, Feb. 15, 2002; on CVR, see FBI
report,"CVR from UA Flight #93,"Dec. 4, 2003; Commission review of Aircraft
Communication and Reporting System (ACARS) messages sent to and from Flight 93
(which indicate time of message transmission and receipt); see UAL record, Ed
Ballinger ACARS log, Sept. 11, 2001. At 9:22, after learning of the events at the
World Trade Center, Melody Homer, the wife of co-pilot Leroy Homer, had an ACARS
message sent to her husband in the cockpit asking if he was okay. See UAL record,
ACARS message, Sept. 11, 2001.
71. On FDR, see NTSB report, "Specialist's Factual Report of Investigation-Digital
Flight Data Recorder" for United Airlines Flight 93, Feb. 15, 2002; on CVR, see FBI
report,"CVR from UA Flight #93,"Dec. 4, 2003; FAA report,"Summary of Air Traffic
Hijack Events: September 11, 2001," Sept. 17, 2001; NTSB report, Air Traffic Control
Recording-United Airlines Flight 93, Dec. 21, 2001.
72. The 37 passengers represented a load factor of 20.33 percent of the plane's
seating capacity of 182, considerably below the 52.09 percent for Flight 93 on
Tuesdays in the three-month period prior to September 11 (June 11-September 4,
2001). See UAL report, Flight 93 EWR-SFO load factors, undated. Five passengers
holding reservations for Flight 93 did not show for the flight. All five were
interviewed and cleared by the FBI. FBI report, "Flight #93 'No Show' Passengers
from 9/11/01," Sept. 18, 2001.
73. INS record, Withdrawal of Application for Admission for Mohamed al Kahtani, Aug.
4, 2001.
74. See FAA regulations, Admission to flight deck, 14 C.F.R. � 121.547 (2001); UAL
records, copies of boarding passes for United 93, Sept. 11,2001. One passenger
reported that ten first-class passengers were aboard the flight. If that number is
accurate, it would include the four hijackers. FBI report of investigation,
interview of Lisa Jefferson, Sept. 11, 2001; UAL record, Flight 93 passenger
manifest, Sept. 11, 2001. All but one of the six passengers seated in the
first-class cabin communicated with the ground during the flight, and none mentioned
anyone from their cabin having gone into the cockpit before the hijacking. Moreover,
it is unlikely that the highly regarded and experienced pilot and co-pilot of Flight
93 would have allowed an observer into the cockpit before or after takeoff who had
not obtained the proper permission. See UAL records, personnel files of Flight 93
pilots. For jumpseat information, see UAL record, Weight and Balance Information for
Flight 93 and Flight 175, Sept. 11, 2001; AAL records, Dispatch Environmental
Control/Weekly Flight Summary for Flight 11 and Flight 77, Sept. 11, 2001.
75. Like Atta on Flight 11, Jarrah apparently did not know how to operate the
communication radios; thus his attempts to communicate with the passengers were
broadcast on the ATC channel. See FBI report, "CVR from UA Flight #93,"Dec. 4, 2003.
Also, by 9:32 FAA notified United's headquarters that the flight was not responding
to radio calls. According to United, the flight's nonresponse and its turn to the
east led the airline to believe by 9:36 that the plane was hijacked. See Rich Miles
interview (Nov. 21, 2003); UAL report, "United dispatch SMFDO activities-terrorist
crisis," Sept. 11, 2001.
76. In accordance with FAA regulations, United 93's cockpit voice recorder recorded
the last 31 minutes of sounds from the cockpit via microphones in the pilots'
headsets, as well as in the overhead panel of the flight deck. This is the only
recorder from the four hijacked airplanes to survive the impact and ensuing fire.
The CVRs and FDRs from American 11 and United 175 were not found, and the CVR from
American Flight 77 was badly burned and not recoverable. See FBI report, "CVR from
UA Flight #93,"Dec. 4, 2003; see also FAA regulations, 14 C.F.R. �� 25.1457, 91.609,
91.1045, 121.359; Flight 93 CVR data. A transcript of the CVR recording was prepared
by the NTSB and the FBI.
77. All calls placed on airphones were from the rear of the aircraft. There was one
airphone installed in each row of seats on both sides of the aisle. The airphone
system was capable of transmitting only eight calls at any one time. See FBI report
of investigation, airphone records for flights UAL 93 and UAL 175 on Sept. 11, 2001,
Sept. 18, 2001.
78. FAA audio file, Cleveland Center, position Lorain Radar; Flight 93 CVR data; FBI
report, "CVR from UA Flight #93," Dec. 4, 2003.
79. FBI reports of investigation, interviews of recipients of calls from Todd Beamer,
Sept. 11, 2001, through June 11, 2002; FBI reports of investigation, interviews of
recipients of calls from Sandy Bradshaw, Sept. 11, 2001, through Oct. 4, 2001. Text
messages warning the cockpit of Flight 93 were sent to the aircraft by Ed Ballinger
at 9:24. See UAL record, Ed Ballinger's ACARS log, Sept. 11, 2001.
80. We have relied mainly on the record of FBI interviews with the people who
received calls. The FBI interviews were conducted while memories were still fresh
and were less likely to have been affected by reading the accounts of others or
hearing stories in the media. In some cases we have conducted our own interviews to
supplement or verify the record. See FBI reports of investigation, interviews of
recipients of calls from Todd Beamer, Mark Bingham, Sandy Bradshaw, Marion Britton,
Thomas Burnett, Joseph DeLuca, Edward Felt, Jeremy Glick, Lauren Grandcolas, Linda
Gronlund, CeeCee Lyles, Honor Wainio.
81. FBI reports of investigation, interviews of recipients of calls from Thomas
Burnett, Sept. 11, 2001; FBI reports of investigation, interviews of recipients of
calls from Marion Britton, Sept. 14, 2001, through Nov. 8, 2001; Lisa Jefferson
interview (May 11, 2004); FBI report of investigation, interview of Lisa Jefferson,
Sept. 11, 2001; Richard Belme interview (Nov. 21, 2003).
82. See Jere Longman, Among the Heroes-United Flight 93 and the Passengers and Crew
Who Fought Back (Harper- Collins, 2002), p. 107; Deena Burnett interview (Apr. 26,
2004); FBI reports of investigation, interviews of recipients of calls from Jeremy
Glick, Sept. 11, 2001, through Sept. 12, 2001; Lyzbeth Glick interview (Apr. 22,
2004). Experts told us that a gunshot would definitely be audible on the CVR. The
FBI found no evidence of a firearm at the crash site of Flight 93. See FBI response
to Commission briefing request no. 6, undated (topic 11). The FBI collected 14
knives or portions of knives at the Flight 93 crash site. FBI report, "Knives Found
at the UA Flight 93 Crash Site," undated.
83. FBI response to Commission briefing request no. 6, undated (topic 11); FBI
reports of investigation, interviews of recipients of calls from Jeremy Glick, Sept.
11, 2001, through Sept. 12, 2001.
84. See FBI reports of investigation, interviews of recipients of calls from United
93.
85. FBI reports of investigation, interviews of recipients of calls from United 93.
For quote, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Philip Bradshaw, Sept. 11,
2001; Philip Bradshaw interview (June 15, 2004); Flight 93 FDR and CVR data. At
9:55:11 Jarrah dialed in the VHF Omni-directional Range (VOR) frequency for the VOR
navigational aid at Washington Reagan National Airport, further indicating that the
attack was planned for the nation's capital.
86. Flight 93 FDR and CVR data.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
89. Ibid. The CVR clearly captured the words of the hijackers, including words in
Arabic from the microphone in the pilot headset up to the end of the flight. The
hijackers' statements, the clarity of the recording, the position of the microphone
in the pilot headset, and the corresponding manipulations of flight controls provide
the evidence. The quotes are taken from our listening to the CVR, aided by an Arabic
speaker.
90. In 1993, a Lufthansa aircraft was hijacked from its Frankfurt to Cairo route and
diverted to JFK Airport in New York. The event lasted for 11 hours and was resolved
without incident. Tamara Jones and John J. Goldman, "11-Hour Hijack Ends Without
Injury in N.Y.," Los Angeles Times, Feb. 12, 1993, p. A1.
91. The second half of the twentieth century witnessed a tremendous growth of the air
transport industry, and the FAA's corresponding responsibilities grew enormously
from the 1960s through 2001. Throughout that time, the FAA focused on setting and
maintaining safety and efficiency standards. Since no plane had been hijacked inside
the United States since 1991, sabotage was perceived as the most significant threat
to civil aviation. For a broader discussion of the perception of the threat, see
section 3.3.
92. FAA report, "Administrator's Fact Book," July 2001; Benedict Sliney interview
(May 21, 2004); John McCartney interview (Dec. 17, 2003).
93. FAA regulations, AirTraffic Control transponder and altitude reporting equipment
and use, 14 CFR � 91.215 (2001).
94. DOD radar files, 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron, "9/11 Autoplay," undated;
Charles Thomas interview (May 4, 2004); John Thomas interview (May 4, 2004); Joseph
Cooper interview (Sept. 22, 2003); Tim Spence interview (Sept. 30, 2003). For
general information on approaching terminals, see FAA report,"Aeronautical
Information Manual," Feb. 19, 2004. Times assigned to audio transmissions were
derived by the Commission from files provided by the FAA and the Northeast Air
Defense Sector (NEADS) based on audio time stamps contained within the files
provided by the sender. FAA tapes are certified accurate to Universal Coordinated
Time by quality assurance specialists at FAA air traffic facilities. NEADS files are
time-stamped as accurate to the Naval Observatory clock. We also compared audio
times to certified transcripts when available.
95. FAA Boston Center site visit (Sept. 22-24, 2003).
96. NORAD's mission is set forth in a series of renewable agreements between the
United States and Canada. According to the agreement in effect on 9/11, the "primary
missions" of NORAD were "aerospace warning" and "aerospace control" for North
America. Aerospace warning was defined as "the monitoring of man-made objects in
space and the detection, validation, and warning of attack against North America
whether by aircraft, missiles, or space vehicles." Aerospace control was defined as
"providing surveillance and control of the airspace of Canada and the United
States." See DOS memo, Exchange of Notes Between Canada and the United States
Regarding Extension of the NORAD Agreement, Mar. 28, 1996; see also DOS press
release,"Extension of NORAD Agreement," June 16, 2000 (regarding the extension of
the 1996 Agreement unchanged). For NORAD's defining its job as defending against
external attacks, see Ralph Eberhart interview (Mar. 1, 2004).
97. DOD report, "NORAD Strategy Review: Final Report," July 1992, p. 55.
98. For assumptions of exercise planners, see Paul Goddard and Ken Merchant interview
(Mar. 4, 2004). For the authority to shoot down a commercial aircraft prior to 9/11,
granted to NORAD but not used against Payne Stewart's plane in 1999 after the pilot
and passengers lost consciousness, see Richard Myers interview (Feb. 17, 2004). A
1998 White House tabletop exercise chaired by Richard Clarke included a scenario in
which a terrorist group loaded a Learjet with explosives and took off for a suicide
mission to Washington. Military officials said they could scramble fighter jets from
Langley Air Force Base to chase the aircraft, but they would need "executive"orders
to shoot it down. Chuck Green interview (Apr. 21, 2004). For no recognition of this
threat, see Ralph Eberhart interview (Mar. 1, 2004).
99. Richard Myers interview (Feb. 17, 2004).
100. Donald Quenneville interview (Jan. 7, 2004); Langley Air Force Base 119th
Fighter Wing briefing (Oct. 6-7, 2003).
101. Collin Scoggins interviews (Sept. 22, 2003; Jan. 8, 2004); FAA report, "Crisis
Management Handbook for Significant Events," Feb. 15, 2000; DOD memo, CJCS
instruction,"Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destruction of Derelict Airborne
Objects," June 1, 2001.
102. See FAA regulations, Hijacked Aircraft, Order 7110.65M, para.10-2-6 (2001);
David Bottiglia interview (Oct. 1, 2003); FAA report, "Crisis Management Handbook
for Significant Events," Feb. 15, 2000. From interviews of controllers at various
FAA centers, we learned that an air traffic controller's first response to an
aircraft incident is to notify a supervisor, who then notifies the traffic
management unit and the operations manager in charge. The FAA center next notifies
the appropriate regional operations center (ROC), which in turn contacts FAA
headquarters. Biggio stated that for American 11, the combination of three
factors-loss of radio contact, loss of transponder signal, and course deviation-was
serious enough for him to contact the ROC in Burlington, Mass. However, without
hearing the threatening communication from the cockpit, he doubts Boston Center
would have recognized or labeled American 11 "a hijack." Terry Biggio interview
(Sept. 22, 2003); see also Shirley Miller interview (Mar. 30, 2004); Monte Belger
interview (Apr. 20, 2004).
103. FAA regulations, Special Military Operations, Requests for Service, Order
7610.4J, paras. 7-1-1, 7-1-2 (2001); DOD memo, CJCS instruction, "Aircraft Piracy
(Hijacking) and Destruction of Derelict Airborne Objects," June 1, 2001.
104. Ralph Eberhart interview (Mar.1, 2004); Alan Scott interview (Feb.4, 2004);
Robert Marr interview (Jan. 23, 2004); FAA regulations, Position Reports within
NORAD Radar Coverage, Order 7610.4J, para. 7-4-2 (2001); DOD memo, CJCS instruction,
"Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destruction of Derelict Airborne Objects," June 1,
2001.
105. FAA regulations, Air/Ground Communications Security, Order 7610.4J, para. 7-1-6
(2001); FAA regulations, Vectors, Order 7610.4J, para. 7-2-3 (2001).
106. Peter Zalewski interview (Sept. 22, 2003); Terry Biggio interviews (Sept. 22,
2003; Jan. 8, 2004); Collin Scoggins interview (Sept. 22, 2003); Daniel Bueno
interview (Sept. 22, 2003). For evidence of the numerous attempts by air traffic
control to raise American 11, see FAA memo, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident;
AAL11; New York, NY; September 11, 2001," Feb. 15, 2002, p. 7.
107. DOD radar files, 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron, "9/11 Autoplay," undated; Peter
Zalewski interview (Sept. 22, 2003); John Schippani interview (Sept. 22, 2003).
108. Peter Zalewski interview (Sept. 22, 2003); John Schippani interview (Sept. 22,
2003).
109. FAA memo, "FullTranscript; Aircraft Accident; AAL11; New York, NY; September
11,2001,"Feb.15, 2002, p. 11; Peter Zalewski interview (Sept. 23, 2003).
110. Peter Zalewski interview (Sept. 23, 2003); John Schippani interview (Sept. 22,
2003); Terry Biggio interviews (Sept. 22, 2003; Jan. 8, 2004); Robert Jones
interview (Sept. 22, 2003).
111. FAA memo, "FullTranscript; Aircraft Accident; AAL11; New York, NY; September
11,2001,"Apr. 19, 2002, p. 2; FAA record, Boston Center daily record of facility
operation, Sept. 11, 2001; Terry Biggio interviews (Sept. 22,2003; Jan. 8, 2004);
Daniel Bueno interview (Sept. 22, 2004). See also FAA memo,"Transcription of
9/11Tapes," Oct. 2, 2003, p. 2; FAA audio file, Herndon Command Center, line 4525,
8:32-8:33.
112. See FAA memo, "Transcription of 9/11 Tapes,"Oct. 2, 2003, pp. 2-3; FAA record,
New England Region Daily Log, Sept. 11, 2001; Daniel Bueno interview (Sept. 22,
2003); Terry Biggio interviews (Sept. 22, 2003; Jan. 8, 2004).
113. FAA memo, "FullTranscript; Aircraft Accident; AAL11; New York, NY; September
11,2001,"Feb.15, 2002, p. 12.
114. FAA memo, "FullTranscript; Aircraft Accident; AAL11; New York, NY; September
11,2001,"Jan. 28, 2002, p. 5.
115. FAA memo, "FullTranscript; Aircraft Accident; AAL11; New York, NY; September
11,2001,"Apr. 19, 2002, p. 5; Terry Biggio interview (Sept. 22, 2003); Collin
Scoggins interviews (Sept. 22, 2003; Jan. 8, 2004); Daniel Bueno interview (Sept.
22, 2003).
116. On 9/11, NORAD was scheduled to conduct a military exercise, Vigilant Guardian,
which postulated a bomber attack from the former Soviet Union. We investigated
whether military preparations for the large-scale exercise compromised the
military's response to the real-world terrorist attack on 9/11. According to General
Eberhart, " it took about 30 seconds" to make the adjustment to the real-world
situation. Ralph Eberhart testimony, June 17, 2004. We found that the response was,
if anything, expedited by the increased number of staff at the sectors and at NORAD
because of the scheduled exercise. See Robert Marr interview (Jan. 23, 2004).
117. For the distance between Otis Air Force Base and New York City, see William
Scott testimony, May 23, 2003. For the order from NEADS to Otis to place F-15s at
battle stations, see NEADS audio file, Weapons Director Technician position, channel
14, 8:37:15. See also interviews with Otis and NEADS personnel: Jeremy Powell
interview (Oct. 27, 2003); Michael Kelly interview (Oct. 14, 2003); Donald
Quenneville interview (Jan. 7, 2004), and interviews with Otis fighter pilots:
Daniel Nash interview (Oct. 14, 2003); Timothy Duffy interview (Jan. 7, 2004).
According to Joseph Cooper from Boston Center, "I coordinated with Huntress
["Huntress" is the call sign for NEADS]. I advised Huntress we had a hijacked
aircraft. I requested some assistance. Huntress requested and I supplied pertinent
information. I was advised aircraft might be sent from Otis." FAA record, Personnel
Statement of Joseph Cooper, Oct. 30, 2001.
118. Robert Marr interview (Jan. 23, 2004); Leslie Filson, Air War Over America
(First Air Force, 2003), p. 56; Larry Arnold interview (Feb. 3, 2004).
119. NEADS audio file, Weapons Director Technician position, channel 14; 8:45:54;
Daniel Nash interview (Oct. 14, 2003); Michael Kelly interview (Oct. 14, 2003);
Donald Quenneville interview (Jan. 7, 2004); Timothy Duffy interview (Jan. 7, 2004);
NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander position, channel 2, 8:44:58; NEADS audio
file, Identification Technician position, channel 5, 8:51:13.
120. FAA audio file, Boston Center, position 31R; NEADS audio file, Mission Crew
Commander position, channel 2, 8:58:00; NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander
position, channel 2, 8:54:55. Because of a technical issue, there are no NEADS
recordings available of the NEADS senior weapons director and weapons director
technician position responsible for controlling the Otis scramble. We found a single
communication from the weapons director or his technician on the Guard frequency at
approximately 9:11, cautioning the Otis fighters: "remain at current position
[holding pattern] until FAA requests assistance." See NEADS audio file, channel 24.
That corresponds to the time after the Otis fighters entered the holding pattern and
before they headed for New York. NEADS controllers were simultaneously working with
a tanker to relocate close to the Otis fighters. At 9:10, the senior director on the
NEADS floor told the weapons director,"I want those fighters closer in." NEADS audio
file, Identification Technician position, channel 5. At 9:10:22, the Otis fighters
were told by Boston Center that the second tower had been struck. At 9:12:54, the
Otis fighters told their Boston Center controller that they needed to establish a
combat air patrol over New York, and they immediately headed for New York City. See
FAA audio files, Boston Center, position 31R. This series of communications explains
why the Otis fighters briefly entered and then soon departed the holding pattern, as
the radar reconstruction of their flight shows. DOD radar files, 84th Radar
Evaluation Squadron,"9/11 Autoplay," undated.
121. In response to allegations that NORAD responded more quickly to the October 25,
1999, plane crash that killed Payne Stewart than it did to the hijacking of American
11, we compared NORAD's response time for each incident. The last normal
transmission from the Stewart flight was at 9:27:10 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time. The
Southeast Air Defense Sector was notified of the event at 9:55, 28 minutes later. In
the case of American 11, the last normal communication from the plane was at 8:13
A.M. EDT. NEADS was notified at 8:38, 25 minutes later. We have concluded there is
no significant difference in NORAD's reaction to the two incidents. See NTSB memo,
Aircraft Accident Brief for Payne Stewart incident, Oct. 25, 1999; FAA email, Gahris
to Myers, "ZJX Timeline for N47BA accident," Feb. 17, 2004.
122. FAA memo, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; UAL175; New York, NY; September
11, 2001," May 8, 2002, pp. 5-6.
123. FAA audio file, New York Center, position R42, 8:42-8:45; FAA memo, "Full
Transcript; Aircraft Accident; UAL175; New York, NY; September 11, 2001,"May 8,
2002, pp. 6-8; DOD radar files, 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron,"9/11
Autoplay,"undated. The FAA-produced timeline notes,"Based on coordination received
from [Boston Center] indicating a possible hijack, most of the controller's
attention is focused on AAL 11." See FAA report,"Summary of Air Traffic Hijack
Events September 11, 2001," Sept. 17, 2001; see also David Bottiglia interview (Oct.
1, 2003); FAA memo,"Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; UAL175; New York, NY;
September 11, 2001," May 8, 2002, p. 9.
124. FAA audio file, Herndon Command Center, New York Center position, line 5114,
8:48.
125. FAA memo, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; UAL175; New York, NY; September
11, 2001," May 8, 2002, pp. 12, 14.
126. Ibid., p. 15. At 8:57, the following exchange between controllers occurred:"I
got some handoffs for you. We got some incidents going over here. Is Delta 2433
going to be okay at thirty-three? I had to climb him for traffic. I let you United
175 just took off out of think we might have a hijack over here. Two of them." See
FAA memo, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; UAL175; New York, NY; September 11,
2001,"May 8, 2002.
127. See FAA report, "Summary of AirTraffic Hijack Events September 11,2001,"Sept.
17,2001; Evanna Dowis interview (Sept. 30, 2004); Michael McCormick interview (Dec.
15, 2003); FAA record, Personnel Statement of Michael McCormick, Oct. 17, 2001. See
also FAA memo,"Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; UAL175; New York, NY; September
11, 2001," May 8, 2002, p. 17.
128. FAA memo, "Full Transcript; Command Center; NOM Operational Position; September
11, 2001,"Oct. 14, 2003, pp. 15-17.
129. FAA memo, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; UAL175; New York, NY; September
11, 2001," Jan. 17, 2002, p. 3.
130." N90 [New York Terminal Radar Approach] controller stated 'at approximately 9:00
a.m., I observed an unknown aircraft south of the Newark, New Jersey Airport,
northeast bound and descending out of twelve thousand nine hundred feet in a rapid
rate of descent, the radar target terminated at the World Trade Center.'" FAA
report,"Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events September 11, 2001," Sept. 17, 2001.
Former NORAD official Alan Scott testified that the time of impact of United 175 was
9:02. William Scott testimony, May 23, 2003. We have determined that the impact time
was 9:03:11 based on our analysis of FAA radar data and air traffic control software
logic.
131. FAA audio file, Herndon Command Center, New York Center position, line 5114,
9:02:34.
132. Ibid., 9:03; FAA audio file, Herndon Command Center, Cleveland/Boston position,
line 5115, 9:05; Michael McCormick interview (Oct. 1, 2003); David LaCates interview
(Oct. 2, 2003).
133. FAA Audio File, Herndon Command Center, Boston Center position, line 5115,
9:05-9:07.
134. Joseph McCain interview (Oct. 28, 2003); Robert Marr (Jan. 23, 2004); James Fox
interview (Oct. 29, 2003); Dawne Deskins interview (Oct. 30, 2003).
135. NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander position, channel 2, 9:07:32.
136. Daniel Nash interview (Oct. 14, 2003); Timothy Duffy interview (Jan. 7, 2004).
137. Because the Otis fighters had expended a great deal of fuel in flying first to
military airspace and then to New York, the battle commanders were concerned about
refueling. As NEADS personnel looked for refueling tankers in the vicinity of New
York, the mission crew commander considered scrambling the Langley fighters to New
York to provide backup for the Otis fighters until the NEADS Battle Cab (the command
area that overlooks the operations floor) ordered "battle stations only at Langley."
The alert fighters at Langley Air Force Base were ordered to battle stations at
9:09. Colonel Marr, the battle commander at NEADS, and General Arnold, the CONR
commander, both recall that the planes were held on battle stations, as opposed to
scrambling, because they might be called on to relieve the Otis fighters over New
York City if a refueling tanker was not located, and also because of the general
uncertainty of the situation in the sky. According to William Scott at the
Commission's May 23, 2003, hearing,"At 9:09, Langley F-16s are directed to battle
stations, just based on the general situation and the breaking news, and the general
developing feeling about what's going on." See NEADS audio file, Mission Crew
Commander, channel 2, 9:08:36; Robert Marr interview (Oct. 27, 2003); Larry Arnold
interview (Feb. 3, 2004). See also Colonel Marr's statement that "[t]he plan was to
protect New York City." Filson, Air War Over America, p. 60.
138. Commission analysis of FAA radar data and air traffic control transmissions.
139. The Indianapolis Center controller advised other Indianapolis Center personnel
of the developing situation. They agreed to "sterilize" the airspace along the
flight's westerly route so the safety of other planes would not be affected. John
Thomas interview (May 4, 2004).
140. John Thomas interview (Sept. 24, 2003). According to the FAA-produced timeline,
at 9:09 Indianapolis Center "notified Great Lakes Regional Operations Center a
possible aircraft accident of AMERICAN 77 due to the simultaneous loss of radio
communications and radar identification." FAA report,"Summary of AirTraffic Hijack
Events September 11, 2001," Sept. 17, 2001.
141. FAA audio file, Herndon Command Center, National Operations Manager position,
line 4525; FAA audio file, Herndon Command Center, National Traffic Management
Officer east position, line 4530; FAA memo, "Full Transcription; Air Traffic Control
System Command Center, National Traffic Management Officer, East Position; September
11, 2001," Oct. 21, 2003, p. 13.
142. Primary radar contact for Flight 77 was lost because the "preferred" radar in
this geographic area had no primary radar system, the "supplemental" radar had poor
primary coverage, and the FAA ATC software did not allow the display of primary
radar data from the "tertiary" and "quadrary" radars.
143. David Boone interview (May 4, 2004); Charles Thomas interview (May 4, 2004);
John Thomas interview (May 4, 2004); Commission analysis of FAA radar data and air
traffic control software logic.
144. John Thomas interview (May 4, 2004); Charles Thomas interview (May 4, 2004). We
have reviewed all FAA documents, transcripts, and tape recordings related to
American 77 and have found no evidence that FAA headquarters issued a directive to
surrounding centers to search for primary radar targets. Review of the same
materials also indicates that no one within FAA located American 77 until the
aircraft was identified by Dulles controllers at 9:32. For much of that time,
American 77 was traveling through Washington Center's airspace. The Washington
Center's controllers were looking for the flight, but they were not told to look for
primary radar returns.
145. John White interview (May 7, 2004); Ellen King interview (Apr.5, 2004); Linda
Schuessler interview (Apr. 6, 2004); Benedict Sliney interview (May 21, 2004); FAA
memo, "Full Transcription; Air Traffic Control System Command Center, National
Traffic Management Officer, East Position; September 11, 2001," Oct. 21, 2003, pp.
14, 27.
146. John Hendershot interview (Dec. 22, 2003).
147. FAA memo, "Partial Transcript; Aircraft Accident; AAL77; Washington, DC;
September 11, 2001," Sept. 20, 2001, p. 7.
148. NEADS audio file, Identification Technician position, channel 7, 9:21:10.
149. NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander, channel 2, 9:21:50; Kevin Nasypany
interview (Jan. 22-23, 2004).
150. NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander, Channel 2, 9:22:34. The mission
commander thought to put the Langley scramble over Baltimore and place a "barrier
cap" between the hijack and Washington, D.C. Kevin Nasypany interview (Jan. 22-23,
2004).
151. NEADS audio file, Identification Technician position, channel 5, 9:32:10; ibid.,
9:33:58.
152. For first quote, see NEADS audio file, Identification Technician position,
channel 5, 9:35:50. For second quote, see NEADS audio file, IdentificationTechnician
position, channel 7, 9:36:34; Kevin Nasypany interview (Jan. 22-23, 2004). For the
third quote, see NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander, channel 2, 9:39; 9:39:37;
Kevin Nasypany interview (Jan. 22-23, 2004).
153. Dean Eckmann interview (Dec.1, 2003); FAA memo, "PartialTranscript; Scramble
Aircraft; QUIT25; September 11, 2001," Sept. 4, 2003, pp. 2-4 (Peninsular Radar
position); FAA memo,"Partial Transcript; Scramble Aircraft; QUIT25; September 11,
2001," Sept. 4, 2003, pp. 2-5 (East Feeder Radar position).
154. NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander, channel 2, 9:38:02; Dawne Deskins
interview (Oct. 30, 2003). The estimated time of impact of Flight 77 into the
Pentagon is based on Commission analysis of FDR, air traffic control, radar, and
Pentagon elevation and impact site data.
155. Joseph Cooper interview (Sept. 22, 2003); NEADS audio file, Identification
Technician position, recorder 1, channel 7, 9:41.
156. NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander position, channel 2, 9:42:08.
157. FAA memo, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; N591UA (UAL93); Somerset, PA;
September 11, 2001," May 10, 2002, p. 10.
158. The United 93 timeline in FAA report, "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events
September 11, 2001," Sept. 17, 2001, states that at 9:28:17 "a radio transmission of
unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin was
heard over the ZOB [Cleveland Center] radio." See FAA memo,"Full Transcript;
Aircraft Accident; N591UA (UAL93); Somerset, PA; September 11, 2001," May 10, 2002,
p. 11.
159. The United 93 timeline in FAA report, "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events
September 11, 2001," Sept. 17, 2001, states that at 9:28:54 a "second radio
transmission, mostly unintelligible, again with sounds of possible screaming or a
struggle and a statement,'get out of here, get out of here' from an unknown origin
was heard over the ZOB [Cleveland Center] radio." FAA audio file, Cleveland Center,
Lorain Radar position; FAA memo, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; N591UA
(UAL93); Somerset, PA; September 11, 2001," May 10, 2002, p. 11. At 9:31:48, ExecJet
56 also called in, reporting that "we're just answering your call. We did hear that,
uh, yelling too." The FAA responded at 9:31:51,"Okay, thanks. We're just trying to
figure out what's going on." FAA memo,"Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; N591UA
(UAL93); Somerset, PA; September 11, 2001,"May 10, 2002, p. 15.
160. FAA memo, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; N591UA (UAL93); Somerset, PA;
September 11, 2001," May 10, 2002, p. 15.
161. FAA memo, "Full Transcription; Air Traffic Control System Command Center,
National Traffic Management Officer, East Position; September 11, 2001," Oct. 21,
2003, pp. 10, 13; FAA audio file, Herndon Command Center, New York Center position,
line 5154.
162. FAA memo, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; N591UA (UAL93); Somerset, PA;
September 11, 2001," May 10, 2002, p. 19.
163. Ibid., p. 23.
164. FAA memo, "Full Transcription; Air Traffic Control System Command Center,
National Traffic Management Officer, East Position; September 11,2001,"Oct.21,2003,
pp.16-17; FAA audio file, Cleveland Center, Lorain Radar position; FAA memo, "Full
Transcript; Aircraft Accident; N591UA (UAL93); Somerset, PA; September 11, 2001,"
May 10, 2002, pp. 26-32.
165. FAA memo, "Full Transcription; Air Traffic Control System Command Center,
National Traffic Management Officer, East Position; September 11, 2001," Oct. 21,
2003, pp. 17-19.
166. For 9:46 quotation, see ibid., pp. 19-20. For 9:49 discussion about military
assistance, see ibid., p. 21.
167. For 9:53 discussion about scrambling aircraft, see ibid., p. 23. Neither Monte
Belger nor the deputy director for air traffic services could recall this discussion
in their interviews with us. Monte Belger interview (Apr. 20, 2004); Peter Challan
interview (Mar. 26, 2004). Subsequently Belger told us he does not believe the
conversation occurred. Monte Belger, email to the Commission, July 12, 2004.
However, tapes from the morning reveal that at 9:53 a staff person from headquarters
told the Command Center "Peter's talking to Monte now about scrambling." FAA
memo,"Full Transcription; Air Traffic Control System Command Center, National
Traffic Management Officer, East Position; September 11, 2001,"Oct. 21, 2003, p. 23.
For discussions about the status of United 93, see ibid., pp. 24-27.
168. Ibid., pp. 23-27. We also reviewed a report regarding seismic observations on
September 11, 2001, whose authors conclude that the impact time of United 93 was
"10:06:05�5 (EDT)." Won-Young Kim and G. R. Baum, "Seismic Observations during
September 11, 2001, Terrorist Attack," spring 2002 (report to the Maryland
Department of Natural Resources). But the seismic data on which they based this
estimate are far too weak in signal-tonoise ratio and far too speculative in terms
of signal source to be used as a means of contradicting the impact time established
by the very accurate combination of FDR, CVR, ATC, radar, and impact site data sets.
These data sets constrain United 93's impact time to within 1 second, are airplane-
and crash-site specific, and are based on time codes automatically recorded in the
ATC audiotapes for the FAA centers and correlated with each data set in a process
internationally accepted within the aviation accident investigation community.
Furthermore, one of the study's principal authors now concedes that "seismic data is
not definitive for the impact of UA 93." Email from Won-Young Kim to the
Commission,"Re: UA Flight 93," July 7, 2004; see also Won-Young Kim,"Seismic
Observations for UA Flight 93 Crash near Shanksville, Pennsylvania during September
11, 2001," July 5, 2004.
169. FAA memo, "Full Transcription; Air Traffic Control System Command Center,
National Traffic Management Officer, East Position; September 11, 2001," Oct. 21,
2003, p. 31.
170. For 10:17 discussion, see ibid., p. 34. For communication regarding "black
smoke," see FAA memo,"Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; N591UA (UAL93) Somerset,
PA; September 11, 2001," May 10, 2002, pp. 16-18 (Cleveland Center, Imperial Radar
position). This report from the C-130H was recorded on ATC audio about 1 minute and
37 seconds after the impact time of United 93 as established by NTSB and Commission
analysis of FDR, CVR, radar, and impact data sets-more than a minute before the
earliest impact time originally posited by the authors of the seismic data report.
171. NEADS audio file, Identification Technician, channel 5, 10:07.
172. NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander, channel 2, 10:10.
173. NEADS audio file, Identification Technician, channel 4, 10:14.
174. DOD record, NEADS MCC/T Log Book, Sept. 11, 2001.
175. William Scott testimony, May 23, 2003.
176. Larry Arnold testimony, May 23, 2003.
177. See DOD record, NEADS MCC/T Log Book, Sept. 11, 2001. The entry in this NEADS
log records the tail number not of American 77 but of American 11:"American Airlines
#N334AA hijacked." See also DOD record, Surveillance Log Book, Sept. 11, 2001.
178. William Scott testimony, May 23, 2003; DOD briefing materials, "Noble Eagle;
9-11 Timeline," undated.
179. For lack of knowledge about the hijacking, see, e.g., White House transcript,
Card interview with Ron Fournier of the Associated Press, Aug. 7, 2002. For
information on the hijacking within the FAA, see the discussion of American 11 in
section 1.2.
180. See White House record, Situation Room Log, Sept. 11, 2001; White House record,
Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) Watch Log, Sept. 11, 2001; DOD
record, Senior Operations Officer log, Sept. 11, 2001.
181. Jane Garvey interview (Jun. 30, 2004); Monte Belger interview (Apr. 20, 2004).
182. For notifications, see DOD record, Assistant Deputy Director Operations Passdown
Log, Sept. 11, 2001. For the call to the FAA, see DOD record, Senior Operations
Officer log, Sept. 11, 2001 ("9:00 NMCC called FAA, briefed of explosion at WTC
possibly from aircraft crash. Also, hijacking of American Flight 11 from Boston to
LA, now enroute to Kennedy"). For the scrambling of jets not being discussed, see
Ryan Gonsalves interview (May 14, 2004).
183. Secret Service records show the motorcade arriving between 8:50 and 8:55. USSS
record, shift log, Sept. 11, 2001 (8:55); USSS record, Command Post Protectee Log,
Sept. 11, 2001 (8:50). For Andrew Card's recollection, see Andrew Card meeting (Mar.
31, 2004). For the President's reaction, see Andrew Card meeting (Mar. 31, 2004);
White House transcript, President Bush interview with Bob Schieffer of CBS News,
Apr. 17, 2002.
184. White House transcript, Rice interview with Evan Thomas of Newsweek, Nov. 1,
2001, p. 2; see also White House record, President's Daily Diary, Sept. 11, 2001.
185. White House transcript, Vice President Cheney interview with Newsweek, Nov. 19,
2001, p. 1.
186. For Rice's meeting, see White House transcript, Rice interview with Bob Woodward
of the Washington Post, Oct. 24, 2001, pp. 360-361. For White House staff monitoring
the news, see, e.g., White House transcript, Rice interview with Evan Thomas, Nov.
11, 2001, p. 388.
187. On White House staff reaction, see White House transcript, Rice interview with
Bob Woodward, Oct. 24, 2001, p. 361; Andrew Card meeting (Mar. 31, 2004). On
security enhancements, see USSS memo, interview with Carl Truscott, Oct. 1, 2001, p.
1. On security measures being precautionary, see Carl Truscott interview (Apr. 15,
2004).
188. For the time of the teleconference, see FAA record, Chronology ADA-30, Sept. 11,
2001. For recollections of the NMCC officer, see Charles Chambers interview (Apr.
23, 2004). For recollections of the FAA manager, see Michael Weikert interview (May
7, 2004). For Belger's reaction, see Monte Belger testimony, June 17, 2004.
189. For the times of the video teleconference, see White House record, Situation
Room Communications Log, Sept. 11, 2001 (9:25 start); CIA notes, Cofer Black
timeline, Sept. 11, 2001 (CIA representatives joining at 9:40); FAA record,
Chronology ADA-30, Sept. 11, 2001 (FAA representatives joining at 9:40).
190. Patrick Gardner interview (May 12, 2004). For participants, see Jane Garvey
interview (Oct. 21, 2003); Monte Belger interview (Apr. 20, 2004); Jeff Griffith
interview (Mar. 31, 2004). On the absence of Defense officials, see John Brunderman
interview (May 17, 2004). The White House video teleconference was not connected
into the area of the NMCC where the crisis was being managed. Thus the director of
the operations team-who was on the phone with NORAD-did not have the benefit of
information being shared on the video teleconference. See, e.g., Charles Leidig
interview (Apr. 29, 2004); Montague Winfield interview (Apr. 26, 2004); Patrick
Gardner interview (May 12, 2004). Moreover, when the Secretary and Vice Chairman
later participated in the White House video teleconference, they were necessarily
absent from the NMCC and unable to provide guidance to the operations team. See DOD
report, OT-2 Analysis of NMCC Response to Terrorist Attack on 11 SEP 01, Oct. 4,
2001; John Brunderman interview (May 17, 2004).
191. NSC notes, Paul Kurtz notes, Sept. 11, 2001; Paul Kurtz meeting (Dec. 22, 2003).
For shootdown authority having already been conveyed, see DOD transcript, Air Threat
Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001.
192. Charles Leidig interview (Apr. 29, 2004). For the job of the NMCC in an
emergency, see NMCC briefing (July 21, 2003).
193. For the Secretary's activities, see DOD memo, interview of Donald Rumsfeld, Dec.
23, 2002; Stephen Cambone interview (July 8, 2004).
194. Charles Leidig interview (Apr. 29, 2004). Secure teleconferences are the NMCC's
primary means of coordinating emergencies, and they fall into two categories:"event"
and "threat." Event conferences seek to gather information. If the situation
escalates, a threat conference may be convened. On 9/11, there was no preset
teleconference for a domestic terrorist attack. NMCC and National Military Joint
Intelligence Center (NMJIC) briefing (July 21, 2003). For the content of the
conferences on 9/11, see DOD transcript, Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001.
195. See DOD transcript, Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001; see also White
House notes, Thomas Gould notes, Sept. 11, 2001.
196. On difficulties in including the FAA, see NMCC and NMJIC briefing (July 21,
2003); John Brunderman interview (May 17, 2004). On NORAD and the time of the FAA's
joining, see DOD transcript, Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001. For the FAA
representative, see Rayford Brooks interview (Apr. 15, 2004).
197. Richard Myers interview (Feb. 17, 2004); Charles Leidig interview (Apr. 29,
2004).
198. DOD transcript, Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001.
199. On the briefing, see ibid. The Vice Chairman was on Capitol Hill when the
Pentagon was struck, and he saw smoke as his car made its way back to the building.
Richard Myers interview (Feb. 17, 2004). For the Chairman being out of the country,
see DOD record, Deputy Director for Operations Passdown Log, Sept. 11, 2001.
200. DOD transcript, Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001.
201. Ibid.
202. Ibid.
203. For the President being informed at 9:05, see White House record, President's
Daily Diary, Sept. 11, 2001. For Card's statement, see White House transcript, Card
interview with Ron Fournier, Aug. 7, 2002. For the President's reaction, see
President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004).
204. For the President's activities, see Education Channel videotape, "Raw Footage of
President Bush at Emma E. Booker Elementary School," Sept. 11, 2001 (remaining in
classroom); Deborah Loewer meeting (Feb. 6, 2004) (in the holding room). For his
calls, see White House record, President's Daily Diary, Sept. 11, 2001 (9:15 call to
Vice President); Deborah Loewer meeting (Feb. 6, 2004) (call to Rice); President
Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004) (call to Pataki); White House
record, Secure Switchboard Log, Sept. 11, 2001 (call to Mueller). For the decision
to make a statement, see Ari Fleischer interview (Apr. 22, 2004). For the Secret
Service's perspective, see Edward Marinzel interview (Apr. 21, 2004).
205. On the return to Washington, see Deborah Loewer meeting (Feb. 6, 2004); Andrew
Card meeting (Mar. 31, 2004). On consulting with senior advisers, see Ari Fleischer
interview (Apr. 22, 2004). On information about additional aircraft, see, e.g.,
Andrew Card meeting (Mar. 31, 2004). On decisions and the focus on the President's
speech, see President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004); Ari
Fleischer interview (Apr. 22, 2004); Andrew Card meeting (Mar. 31, 2004).
206. On the motorcade, see USSS record, shift log, Sept. 11, 2001 (departing 9:35,
arriving 9:45); USSS record, Command Post Protectee Log, Sept. 11, 2001 (departing
9:36, arriving 9:42). Fleischer deduced from his notes that the President learned
about the Pentagon while in the motorcade. Ari Fleischer interview (Apr. 22, 2004).
For the President's actions and statements to the Vice President, see Ari Fleischer
interview (Apr. 22, 2004); White House notes, Ari Fleischer notes, Sept. 11, 2001.
207. On not returning to Washington, see Edward Marinzel interview (Apr. 21, 2004);
USSS memo, interview of Edward Marinzel, Oct. 3, 2001; Andrew Card meeting (Mar. 31,
2004). For additional sources on the President's desire to return, see White House
transcript, Vice President Cheney interview with Newsweek, Nov. 19, 2001, p. 5. For
the Vice President's recollection, see President Bush and Vice President Cheney
meeting (Apr. 29, 2004). For time of departure, see USSS record, Command Post
Protectee Log, Sept. 11, 2001. On Air Force One's objectives on takeoff, see Edward
Marinzel interview (Apr. 21, 2004).
208. USSS memo, interview of Gregory LaDow, Oct. 1, 2001, p. 1. Shortly after the
second attack in New York, a senior Secret Service agent charged with coordinating
the President's movements established an open line with his counterpart at the FAA,
who soon told him that there were more planes unaccounted for-possibly hijacked- in
addition to the two that had already crashed. Though the senior agent told someone
to convey this information to the Secret Service's operations center, it either was
not passed on or was passed on but not disseminated; it failed to reach agents
assigned to the Vice President, and the Vice President was not evacuated at that
time. See Nelson Garabito interview (Mar. 11, 2004); USSS memo, interview of Nelson
Garabito, Oct. 1, 2001; see also Terry Van Steenbergen interview (Mar. 30, 2004).
209. American 77's route has been determined through Commission analysis of FAA and
military radar data. For the evacuation of the Vice President, see White House
transcript, Vice President Cheney interview with Newsweek, Nov. 19, 2001, p. 2; USSS
memo, interview of Rocco Delmonico, Oct. 1, 2001 (evacuation of the White House);
see also White House notes, Mary Matalin notes, Sept. 11, 2001. On the time of
entering the tunnel, see USSS report, "Executive Summary: U.S. Secret Service
Timeline of Events, September 11-October 3, 2001," Oct. 3, 2001, p. 2. Secret
Service personnel told us that the 9:37 entry time in their timeline was based on
alarm data, which is no longer retrievable. USSS briefing (Jan. 29, 2004).
210. White House transcript, Vice President Cheney interview with Newsweek, Nov. 19,
2001, p. 4; President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004).
211. On Mrs. Cheney, see USSS report, "Executive Summary: U.S. Secret Service
Timeline of Events, September 11-October 3, 2001," Oct. 3, 2001, p. 2 (time of
arrival); White House transcript, Lynne Cheney interview with Newsweek, Nov. 9,
2001, p. 2 (joining the Vice President). For the contemporaneous notes, see White
House notes, Lynne Cheney notes, Sept. 11, 2001. On the content of the Vice
President's call, see White House transcript, Vice President Cheney interview with
Newsweek, Nov. 19, 2001, p. 5. According to the Vice President, there was "one phone
call from the tunnel. And basically I called to let him know that we were a target
and I strongly urged him not to return to Washington right away, that he delay his
return until we could find out what the hell was going on." For their subsequent
movements, see White House transcript, Vice President Cheney interview with
Newsweek, Nov. 19, 2001, p. 5; White House transcript, Lynne Cheney interview with
Newsweek, Nov. 9, 2001, p. 2.
212. On communications problems, see, e.g., President Bush and Vice President Cheney
meeting (Apr. 29, 2004). On lack of an open line, see, e.g., Deborah Loewer meeting
(Feb. 6, 2004).
213. On the Vice President's call, see President Bush and Vice President Cheney
meeting (Apr. 29, 2004). For the Vice President's time of arrival in the shelter
conference room, see White House record, PEOC Shelter Log, Sept. 11, 2001 (9:58);
USSS memo, OVP 9/11 Timeline, Nov. 17, 2001 (9:52; Mrs. Cheney arrived White House
and joined him in tunnel); White House notes, Lynne Cheney notes (9:55; he is on
phone with President); White House transcript, Lynne Cheney interview with Newsweek,
Nov. 9, 2001, p. 2 ("And when I got there, he was on the phone with the President .
. . But from that first place where I ran into him, I moved with him into what they
call the PEOC"); White House transcript, Vice President Cheney interview with
Newsweek, Nov. 19, 2001, p. 4 (9:35 or 9:36 arrival; he estimated a 15-minute stay);
Carl Truscott interview (Apr. 15, 2004) (arrived with Rice and the Vice President in
conference room; called headquarters immediately; call logged at 10:00); President
Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting, Apr. 29, 2004 (Vice President viewed
television footage of Pentagon ablaze in tunnel); White House transcript, Rice
interview with Evan Thomas, Nov. 1, 2001, p. 388 (Rice viewed television footage of
Pentagon ablaze in Situation Room). For the Vice President's recollection about the
combat air patrol, see President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29,
2004); White House transcript, President Bush interview with Bob Woodward and Dan
Balz, Dec. 17, 2001, p. 16.
214. President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004); see also White
House transcript, Vice President Cheney interview with Newsweek, Nov. 19, 2001, pp.
7-8.
215. Douglas Cochrane meeting (Apr. 16, 2004); Condeleeza Rice meeting (Feb. 7,
2004). For Rice entering after the Vice President, see USSS report, "Executive
Summary: U.S. Secret Service Timeline of Events, September 11-October 3, 2001," Oct.
3, 2001, p. 2; Carl Truscott interview (Apr. 15, 2004).
216. In reconstructing events that occurred in the PEOC on the morning of 9/11, we
relied on (1) phone logs of the White House switchboard; (2) notes of Lewis Libby,
Mrs. Cheney, and Ari Fleischer; (3) the tape (and then transcript) of the air threat
conference call; and (4) Secret Service and White House Situation Room logs, as well
as four separate White House Military Office logs (the PEOC Watch Log, the PEOC
Shelter Log, the Communications Log, and the 9/11 Log).
217. DOD transcript, Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001. For one open line
between the Secret Service and the FAA, see note 208. At Secret Service
headquarters, personnel from the intelligence division were also on a phone
conference with FAA headquarters. Chuck Green interview (Mar. 10, 2004). For
notification of an inbound aircraft at 10:02, see USSS record, Intelligence Division
timeline, Sept. 11, 2001; USSS record, Crisis Center Incident Monitor, Sept. 11,
2001. For the FAA's projection, seeTim Grovack interview (Apr.8, 2004). For Secret
Service updates, see DOD transcript, Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001.
218. White House notes, Lynne Cheney notes, Sept. 11, 2001; White House notes, Lewis
Libby notes, Sept. 11, 2001.
219. For Libby's characterization, see White House transcript, Scooter Libby
interview with Newsweek, Nov. 2001. For the Vice President's statement, see
President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004). For the second
authorization, see White House notes, Lynne Cheney notes, Sept. 11, 2001; White
House notes, Lewis Libby notes, Sept. 11, 2001.
220. Joshua Bolten meeting (Mar. 18, 2004); see also White House notes, Lewis Libby
notes, Sept. 11, 2001 ("10:15-18: Aircraft 60 miles out, confirmed as hijack-engage?
VP: Yes. JB [Joshua Bolten]: Get President and confirm engage order").
221. For the Vice President's call, see White House record, Secure Switchboard Log,
Sept. 11,2001; White House record, President's Daily Diary, Sept. 11, 2001; White
House notes, Lewis Libby notes, Sept. 11, 2001. Fleischer's 10:20 note is the first
mention of shootdown authority. See White House notes, Ari Fleischer notes, Sept.
11, 2001; see also Ari Fleischer interview (Apr. 22, 2004).
222. DOD transcript, Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001.
223. On reports of another plane, see White House notes, Lynne Cheney notes, Sept.
11, 2001; White House notes, Lewis Libby notes, Sept. 11, 2001. On the Vice
President's authorization, see ibid.; DOD transcript, AirThreat Conference Call,
Sept. 11, 2001. For Hadley's statement, see DOD transcript, Air Threat Conference
Call, Sept. 11, 2001.
224. For the quotation, see White House transcript, Libby interview with Newsweek,
Nov. 2001. On the aircraft's identity, see White House record, White House Military
Office Log, Sept. 11, 2001.
225. On the NMCC, see DOD transcript, Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001. On
the Secret Service's contacts with the FAA, see notes 208, 217. On the Secret
Service conveying information to the White House, see DOD transcript, Air Threat
Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001; Nelson Garabito interview (Mar. 11, 2004).
226. DOD transcript, Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001.
227. Ibid.
228. Ralph Eberhart interview (Mar. 1, 2004). On the morning of 9/11, General
Eberhart was in his office at headquarters-roughly 30 minutes away from Cheyenne
Mountain, where the operations center is located.
229. DOD record, Continental Region chat log, Sept. 11, 2001.
230. NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander position, channel 2, 10:32:12. For the
text of the chat log message, see DOD record, Continental Region chat log, Sept. 11,
2001.
231. For the statements of NEADS personnel, see Robert Marr interview (Jan. 23, 2004)
(NEADS commander); Kevin Nasypany interview (Jan. 22, 2004) (mission commander);
James Fox interview (Oct. 29, 2004) (senior weapons director). On the understanding
of leaders in Washington, see DOD transcript, Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11,
2001. For the orders to Langley pilots, see NEADS audio file, Weapons Director
position, recorder 1, channel 2, 10:10-11.
232. For evidence of the President speaking to Rumsfeld, see White House notes, Ari
Fleischer notes, Sept. 11, 2001. On inability to recall this conversation, see
Donald Rumsfeld interview (Jan. 30, 2004).
233. DOD note, transcript of Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001.
234. Donald Rumsfeld interview (Jan. 30, 2004). At 11:15, Secretary Rumsfeld spoke to
the President and told him DOD was working on refining the rules of engagement so
pilots would have a better understanding of the circumstances under which an
aircraft could be shot down. See, e.g., DOD notes, Stephen Cambone notes, Sept. 11,
2001. DOD did not circulate written rules of engagement until sometime after 1:00
P.M. See DOD memo, rules of engagement, Sept. 11, 2001 (faxed to Andrews Air Force
Base at 1:45 P.M.).
235. David Wherley interview (Feb. 27, 2004).
236. The 113th Wing first learned from the FAA tower at Andrews that the Secret
Service wanted fighters airborne. The FAA tower had been contacted by personnel at
FAA headquarters, who were on an open line with senior agents from the President's
detail. See Nelson Garabito interview (Mar. 11, 2004); Terry Van Steenbergen
interview (Mar. 30, 2004). On the Secret Service agent relaying instructions, see
USSS memo, Beauchamp to ADInspection, September 11 experience, Feb. 23, 2004. On the
order to fly weapons free, see David Wherley interview (Feb. 27, 2004); DOD memo,
interview of David Wherley, Oct. 3, 2001, p. 12.
237. President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004).
238. These estimates are based on analysis of Boeing 757 maximum operating speed
data, FAA and military radar data, and assumptions regarding how the airplane would
be operated en route to the Washington, D.C., area. The shortest time frame assumes
maximum speed without regard to overspeed warnings, a straight-line path, and no
time allowed for maneuvering or slowing to aim and crash the airplane into its
target. The probable time frame allows for speeds consistent with the observed
operation of the airplane prior to its final maneuvers and crash, as well as for
maneuvers and slowing in the D.C. area to take aim. According to radar data, the
fighters from Langley Air Force Base arrived over Washington at about 10:00 A.M. Two
of the three Langley fighters were fully armed (i.e., with missiles and guns); the
third fighter carried only guns. Craig Borgstrom interview (Dec. 1, 2003).
239. For the pilots' awareness, see Dean Eckmann interview (Dec. 1, 2003); Bradley
Derrig interview (Dec. 1, 2003); Craig Borgstrom interview (Dec. 1, 2003). For the
quotation, see Dean Eckmann interview (Dec. 1, 2003).
240. For no authority at 10:10, see NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander, channel
2. For shootdown authority at 10:31, see DOD record, Continental Region chat log,
Sept. 11,2001. For possibility of ordering a shootdown, see Larry Arnold interview
(Feb. 2, 2004).
241. NEADS audio file, Identification Technician position, recorder 1, channel 4,
10:02:22. 2 The Foundation of the New Terrorism 1." Text of World Islamic Front's
Statement Urging Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders," Al Quds al Arabi, Feb. 23, 1998
(trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service), which was published for a large Arab
world audience and signed by Usama Bin Ladin, Ayman al Zawahiri (emir of the
Egyptian Islamic Jihad), Abu Yasir Rifa'i Ahmad Taha (leader of the Egyptian Islamic
Group), Mir Hamzah (secretary of the Jamiat ul Ulema e Pakistan), and Fazlul Rahman
(head of the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh).
