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United States General Accounting Office
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Comptroller General of the United States
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GAO
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June 1996
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Executive Guide
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Effectively Implementing the Government Performance and Results
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Act
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G AO
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years
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1921 - 1996
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Preface
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In recent years, an understanding has emerged that the federal
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government needs to be run in a more businesslike manner than in
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the past. As companies are accountable to shareholders, the federal
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government is accountable to taxpayers, and taxpayers are demanding
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as never before that the dollars they invest in their government be
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managed and spent responsibly.
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As countless studies by GAO have long noted, federal agencies
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often fail to appropriately manage their finances, identify clearly
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what they intend to accomplish, or get the job done effectively and
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with a minimum of waste. After decades of seeing these problems
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recur in agency after agency, Congress moved to address this
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endemic situation on a governmentwide basis. Major statutes now in
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their first years of implementation hold substantial promise for
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creating a more accountable and effective federal government.
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The Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act of 1990 provided for
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chief financial officer positions in 24 major agencies and required
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annual reports on the financial condition of government entities
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and the status of management controls. Under the CFO Act, federal
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agencies will be subject to the same kinds of financial reporting
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that have long been required in the private sector and by state and
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local governments.
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The Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996
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requires, among other things, that agencies set goals, measure
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performance, and report on progress in improving the efficiency and
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effectiveness of operations through the use of information
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technology.
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And, most fundamentally, under the Government Performance and
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Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), every major federal agency must now ask
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itself some basic questions: What is our mission? What are our
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goals and how will we achieve them? How can we measure our
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performance? How will we use that information to make improvements?
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GPRA forces a shift in the focus of federal agencies-away from such
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traditional concerns as staffing and activity levels and toward a
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single overriding issue: results. GPRA requires agencies to set
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goals, measure performance, and report on their
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accomplishments.
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This will not be an easy transition, nor will it be quick. And
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for some agencies, GPRA will be difficult to apply. But GPRA has
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the potential for adding greatly to government performance-a
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particularly vital goal at a time when resources are limited and
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public demands are high. To help
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Page 1 GAO/GGD-96-118 Government Performance and Results Act
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Congress and federal managers put GPRA into effect, we have
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identified key steps that agencies need to take toward its
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implementation, along with a set of practices that can help make
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that implementation a success. We learned of these practices from
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organizations that successfully have taken initiatives similar to
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the ones required by the act. Several federal agencies that have
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already put these practices to use are represented in the case
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illustrations that are part of this guide.
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This guide is a companion to our Executive Guide: Improving
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Mission
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Performance Through Strategic Information Management and
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Technology, which outlined a number of information management
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approaches that federal agencies can take to improve their overall
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performance. Improving the management of federal agencies will
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require responsible actions in several areas at once. Success will
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demand concerted effort and long-term commitment, but the returns
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should be considerable. And American taxpayers deserve no less for
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their investment.
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Charles A. Bowsher Comptroller General of the United States
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Contents
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Preface
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Introduction
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Page 4 GAO/GGD-96-118 Government Performance and Results Act
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Abbreviations
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Introduction
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A Changing Environment Demands Federal Management Reform
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Over the past several years, Congress has taken steps to
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fundamentally change the way federal agencies go about their work.
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Congress took these steps in response to management problems so
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common among federal agencies that they demanded governmentwide
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solutions. In addition, two contemporary forces converged to spur
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congressional action: year-in, year-out budget deficits that had to
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be brought down and a public now demanding not only that federal
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agencies do their jobs more effectively, but that they do so with
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fewer people and at lower cost.
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This was-and remains-an enormous challenge. For one thing, many
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of the largest federal agencies find themselves encumbered with
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structures and processes rooted in the past, aimed at the demands
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of earlier times, and designed before modern information and
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communications technology came into being. These agencies are
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poorly positioned to meet the demands of the 1990s.1 Moreover, many
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of these agencies find themselves without a clear understanding of
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who they are or where they are headed. Over the years, as new
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social or economic problems emerged, Congress assigned many
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agencies new and unanticipated program responsibilities. These
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additions may have made sense when they were made, but their
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cumulative effect has been to create a government in which many
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agencies cannot say just what business they are in.
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In some cases, agencies' legislative mandates have grown so
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muddled that Congress, the executive branch, and other agency
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stakeholders and customers cannot agree on program goals,
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worthwhile strategies, or appropriate measures of success. Our work
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has shown that the effectiveness of federal program areas as
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diverse as employment assistance and training, rural development,
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early childhood development, and food safety has been plagued by
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fragmented or overlapping efforts.2 A frequently cited example of
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overlap and ineffectiveness is the federal food safety system,
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which took shape under as many as 35 laws and was administered by
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12 different agencies yet had not effectively protected the public
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from major foodborne illnesses.3
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Traditionally, federal agencies have used the amount of money
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directed toward their programs, or the level of staff deployed, or
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even the number of tasks completed as some of the measures of their
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performance. But at a
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1Improving Government: Need to Reexamine Organization and
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Performance (GAO/T-GGD-93-9,
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Mar. 11, 1993). 2Government Reorganization: Issues and
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Principles (GAO/T-GGD/AIMD-95-166, May 17, 1995).
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3Food Safety: A Unified, Risk-Based Safety System Needed to
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Enhance Food Safety
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(GAO/T-RCED-94-71, Nov. 4, 1993).
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Legislative Requirements Support Managing for Results
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time when the value of many federal programs is undergoing
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intense public scrutiny, an agency that reports only these measures
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has not answered the defining question of whether these programs
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have produced real results. Today's environment is
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results-oriented. Congress, the executive branch, and the public
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are beginning to hold agencies accountable less for inputs and
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outputs than for outcomes, by which is meant the results of
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government programs as measured by the differences they make, for
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example, in the economy or program participants' lives. A federal
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employment training program can report on the number of
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participants. That number is an output. Or it can report on the
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changes in the real wages of its graduates. That number is an
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outcome. The difference between the two measures is the key to
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understanding government performance in a results-oriented
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environment.
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Congress' determination to make agencies accountable for their
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performance lay at the heart of two landmark reforms of the 1990s:
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the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act of 1990 and the Government
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Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA). With these two laws,
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Congress imposed on federal agencies a new and more businesslike
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framework for management and accountability. In addition, GPRA
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created requirements for agencies to generate the information
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congressional and executive branch decisionmakers need in
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considering measures to improve government performance and reduce
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costs.
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The CFO Act was designed to remedy decades of serious neglect in
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federal financial management operations and reporting. It provided
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for chief financial officers in the 24 largest federal departments
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and agencies, which together account for about 98 percent of the
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government's gross budget authority. In 1994, Congress followed up
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on the CFO Act with the Government Management Reform Act of 1994.
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The latter extended to all 24 CFO Act agencies the requirement,
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beginning with fiscal year 1996, to prepare and have audited
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financial statements for their entire operations.
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While the CFO Act established the foundation for improving
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management and financial accountability among the agencies, GPRA is
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aimed more directly at improving their program performance. GPRA
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requires first that agencies consult with Congress and other
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stakeholders to clearly define their missions. It requires that
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they establish long-term strategic goals, as well as annual goals
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that are linked to them. They must then measure their performance
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against the goals they have set and report publicly on how
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Page 7 GAO/GGD-96-118 Government Performance and Results Act
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Experiences of Leading Organizations Show a Way
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well they are doing.4 Federal agencies also are to apply these
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principles-goal setting, performance measurement, and reporting-to
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their information technology efforts, under the Information
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Technology Management Reform Act of 1996. For example, agencies are
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to establish performance measures to gauge how well their
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information technology supports their program efforts.
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At the request of Congress, we studied a number of leading
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public sector organizations that were successfully pursuing
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management reform initiatives and becoming more results-oriented.5
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We studied state governments, such as Florida, Oregon, Minnesota,
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North Carolina, Texas, and Virginia; and foreign governments, such
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as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. Many of
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these organizations found themselves in an environment similar to
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the one confronting federal managers today-one in which they were
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called upon to improve performance while simultaneously reducing
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costs. Congress asked whether the experiences of these
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organizations could yield worthwhile lessons for federal agencies
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as they attempt to implement GPRA.
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Each of the organizations we studied set its agenda for
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management reform according to its own environment, needs, and
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capabilities. Yet despite their differing approaches to reform, all
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these organizations were seeking to become more result-oriented,
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and they commonly took three key steps. These were to (1) define
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clear missions and desired outcomes,
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(2) measure performance to gauge progress, and (3) use
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performanceinformation as a basis for decisionmaking. Although the
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organizations we studied were not acting under GPRA, their three
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key steps were consistent with GPRA's requirements. That is, the
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first step-define mission and desired outcomes-corresponds to the
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requirement in GPRA for federal agencies to develop strategic plans
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containing mission statements and outcome-related strategic goals;
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the second step-measure performance-corresponds to the GPRA
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requirement for federal agencies to develop annual performance
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plans with annual performance goals and indicators to measure
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performance; and the third step-use performance
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4For a more detailed description of GPRA's requirements, see
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appendix I. 5See, for example, Transforming the Civil Service:
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Building the Workforce of The Future, Results Of A
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GAO-Sponsored Symposium (GAO/GGD-96-35, Dec. 26, 1995); Managing
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for Results: Experiences Abroad Suggest Insights for Federal
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Management Reform (GAO/GGD-95-120, May 2, 1995); Managing
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For Results: State Experiences Provide Insights for Federal
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Management Reforms (GAO/GGD-95-22,
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Dec. 21, 1994); Government Reform: Goal-Setting and Performance
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(GAO/AIMD/GGD-95-130R, Mar. 27,
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1995); Executive Guide: Improving Mission Performance Through
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Strategic Information Management
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and Technology (GAO/AIMD-94-115, May 1994). Also see our reports
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and testimonies included as footnotes and the Related GAO Products
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section of this guide.
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Page 8 GAO/GGD-96-118 Government Performance and Results Act
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information-although much broader, includes the requirement in
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GPRA for federal agencies to prepare annual performance reports
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with information on the extent to which the agency has met its
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annual performance goals.
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Along with each step, certain practices proved especially
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important to the success of their efforts. In addition to these
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steps, these organizations also found that certain top leadership
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practices were central to making the changes needed for the
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organizations to become more results-oriented.
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Taken together, the key steps and practices drawn from the
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organizations we studied provide a useful framework for federal
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agencies working to implement GPRA. The key steps and practices are
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shown in figure 1.
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In this executive guide, we discuss the three key steps and
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their relationship to GPRA, along with the practices associated
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with each step.6 In the final section of this executive guide, we
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discuss the role of top leadership and the practices it can follow
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if it hopes to make GPRA a driving force in an organization.
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Accompanying the discussion of each practice is a case illustration
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involving a federal agency that has made progress in incorporating
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the practice into its operations. The fact that an organization is
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profiled for a particular practice is not meant to imply success or
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lack of success in other dimensions. Moreover, underscoring the
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fact that implementing management changes required by GPRA will not
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come quickly, most of the agencies profiled began their
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results-oriented management before GPRA was enacted.
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The experiences of leading organizations suggest that the
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successful implementation of GPRA may be as difficult as it is
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important. For example, obtaining agreement among often competing
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stakeholders is never easy, particularly in an environment where
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available resources are declining. In addition, measuring the
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federal contribution to outcomes that require the coordinated
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effort of numerous public and private entities-such as improvements
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in education, employment, or health-can require sophisticated and
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costly program evaluations.
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To help ensure the success of GPRA, the CFO Council, which the
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CFO Act created to provide the leadership foundation necessary to
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effectively carry out the Chief Financial Officers'
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responsibilities, established a GPRA Implementation Committee. The
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Committee is providing guidance and information to Chief Financial
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Officers and managers in the 24 agencies covered by the CFO Act.
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The Committee recognized that uncertainty or fear of failure may
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immobilize an agency's efforts to implement GPRA and that its
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implementation is evolutionary in that proficiency comes with time
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and experience. To assist federal managers, the Committee published
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guiding principles and key issues for implementing GPRA.7 Our guide
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is intended to complement the Committee's work in assisting
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managers as they implement GPRA. Our work has shown that although
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the steps and practices discussed in this guide don't come quickly
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or easily, they can serve as the fundamental building blocks to
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creating a results-oriented organization.
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6For a detailed discussion of our objectives, scope, and
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methodology, see appendix II.
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7Implementation of the Government Performance and Results Act
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(GPRA), A Report on the Chief Financial Officer's Role and Other
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Issues Critical to the Governmentwide Success of GPRA, Chief
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Financial Officers Council, GPRA Implementation Committee, May
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1995.
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GPRA requires that federal agencies, no later than September 30,
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1997, develop strategic plans covering a period of at least 5 years
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and submit them to Congress and the Office of Management and Budget
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(OMB). OMB provided guidance on the preparation and submission of
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strategic plans as a new part of its Circular No. A-11-the basic
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instructions for preparing the President's Budget-to underscore the
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essential link between GPRA and the budget process. OMB required
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agencies to submit major parts of their strategic plans by June 7,
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1996.
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Strategic plans are intended to be the starting point for each
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agency's performance measurement efforts. Each plan must include a
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comprehensive mission statement based on the agency's statutory
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requirements, a set of outcome-related strategic goals, and a
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description of how the agency intends to achieve these goals. The
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mission statement brings the agency into focus. It explains why the
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agency exists, tells what it does, and describes how it does it.
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The strategic goals that follow are an outgrowth of this clearly
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stated mission. The strategic goals explain the purposes of the
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agency's programs and the results they are intended to achieve.
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In crafting GPRA, Congress recognized that federal agencies do
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not exist in a vacuum. As agencies develop their mission statements
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and establish their strategic goals, they are required by the act
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to consult with both Congress and their other stakeholders.
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Further, agencies must be alert to the environment in which they
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operate; in their strategic plans, they are required to identify
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the external factors that could affect their ability to accomplish
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what they set out to do.
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We found that leading results-oriented organizations
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consistently strive to ensure that their day-to-day activities
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support their organizational missions and move them closer to
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accomplishing their strategic goals. In practice, these
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organizations see the production of a strategic plan-that is, a
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particular document issued on a particular day-as one of the least
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important parts of the planning process. This is because they
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believe strategic planning is not a static or occasional event. It
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is, instead, a dynamic and inclusive process. If done well,
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strategic planning is continuous and provides the basis for
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everything the organization does each day.
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For strategic planning to have this sort of impact, three
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practices appear to be critical. Organizations must (1) involve
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their stakeholders; (2) assess their internal and external
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environments; and (3) align their activities, core processes, and
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resources to support mission-related outcomes.
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Page 13 GAO/GGD-96-118 Government Performance and Results
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Act
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Practice 1: Involve Stakeholders
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Successful organizations we studied based their strategic
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planning, to a large extent, on the interests and expectations of
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their stakeholders. These organizations recognize that stakeholders
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will have a lot to say in determining whether their programs
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succeed or fail. Among the stakeholders of federal agencies are
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Congress and the administration, state and local governments,
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third-party service providers, interest groups, agency employees,
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and, of course, the American public.
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In the federal government, stakeholder involvement is
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particularly important as federal agencies face a complex political
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environment in which legislative mandates are often ambiguous.
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Thus, the basic questions that must be answered in crafting a
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mission statement-what is our purpose, what products and services
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must we deliver to meet that purpose, and how will that be
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done-will present a significant challenge for many agencies. While
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statutory requirements are to be the starting point for agency
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mission statements, Congress, the executive branch, and other
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interested parties may all disagree strongly about a given agency's
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mission and goals. GPRA seeks to address such situations by
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requiring agencies to consult with Congress and other stakeholders
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to clarify their missions and reach agreement on their goals. Full
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agreement among stakeholders on all aspects of an agency's efforts
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is relatively uncommon because stakeholders' interests can differ
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often and significantly.
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Still, stakeholder involvement is important to help agencies
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ensure that their efforts and resources are targeted at the highest
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priorities. Just as important, involving stakeholders in strategic
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planning efforts can help create a basic understanding among the
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stakeholders of the competing demands that confront most agencies,
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the limited resources available to them, and how those demands and
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resources require careful and continuous balancing. Because of its
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power to create and fund programs, the involvement of Congress is
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indispensable to defining each agency's mission and establishing
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its goals.8 This may entail identifying legislative changes that
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are needed to clarify or modify Congress' intent and expectations
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or to address differing conditions and citizens' needs that have
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occurred since the initial statutory requirements were established.
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Congressional consultations also may include additional guidance on
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Congress' priorities in those frequent cases where agencies have
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more than one statutory mission.
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8Managing for Results: Achieving GPRA's Objectives Requires
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Strong Congressional Role
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(GAO/T-GGD-96-79, Mar. 6, 1996).
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Case Illustration: Environmental Protection Agency
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Involving customers is important as well. An agency's customers
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are the individuals or organizations that are served by its
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programs. This is not to say that contact between a federal agency
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and its customers is always direct. Many federally mandated or
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federally funded services are dispensed through third parties, such
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as state agencies, banks, or medical insurance providers. In such
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cases, federal agencies face the particularly challenging task of
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balancing the needs of customers, service providers, and other
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stakeholders, who at times may have differing or even competing
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goals.
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In our reviews of successful results-oriented organizations, we
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found numerous examples of organizations that achieved positive
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results by involving customers and other stakeholders in defining
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their missions and desired outcomes.9 Oregon, for one, developed
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consensus on its statewide strategic plan by bringing together such
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diverse stakeholders as legislators, state agency officials, county
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and local government officials, and community group
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representatives. The Minnesota Trade Office, for another, used
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surveys to obtain its stakeholders' views on the degree to which
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the office was contributing to its customers' export activities. On
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the basis of the data it obtained, the Trade Office made program
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changes and improved both its performance and its
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responsiveness.
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The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was established in
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1970 under a presidential reorganization plan in response to public
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concerns over unhealthy air, polluted rivers, unsafe drinking
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water, and haphazard waste disposal. Congress gave EPA
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responsibility for implementing federal environmental laws. From
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the start, however, EPA lacked an overarching legislative mission,
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and its environmental responsibilities have yet to be integrated
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with one another. As a result, EPA could not ensure that it was
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directing its efforts toward the environmental problems that were
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of greatest concern to citizens or posed the greatest risk to the
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health of the population or the environment itself. Therefore, EPA
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decided in 1992 to launch the National Environmental Goals Project,
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a long-range planning initiative under which it would involve its
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stakeholders in developing measurable goals for EPA to pursue in
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improving the quality of the nation's environment.
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EPA designed its National Environmental Goals Project to produce
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a set of long-range environmental goals, including milestones to be
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achieved by 2005. The agency recognized that while environmental
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goals should be
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9GAO/GGD-95-22, Dec. 21, 1994.
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Practice 2: Assess the Environment
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grounded in science and factual analysis, they should be based,
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as well, on the needs and expectations of the nation's citizens. In
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1994, EPA initiated a series of nine public meetings to hear their
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views. The meetings were held around the country and included
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environmental organizations, businesses, state and local
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governments, tribal governments, and other stakeholders. To provide
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a basis for discussion, EPA drafted and distributed to participants
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a set of goal statements and descriptive information on the 13
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broad environmental goal areas that its staff considered to be of
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the greatest national importance.
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EPA used the information it received at these public meetings to
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revise and better define these goals. For example, the agency added
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milestones for managing and cleaning up radioactive waste,
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restoring contaminated sites to productive use, and slowing habitat
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losses. Further, it added the goal of improving its dissemination
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of environmental information and its other education efforts. EPA
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found that its stakeholders' interests included how EPA does its
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core processes-for example, the amount of flexibility it can offer
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to the regulated community. EPA recognized these stakeholder
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interests in a summary report of its revised goals that it sent to
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Congress and its other stakeholders in February 1995.
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EPA continued to involve stakeholders in the National
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Environmental Goals Project by soliciting comments on the summary
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report. Many of EPA's stakeholders are businesses or other
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regulated entities that wanted the agency to address such matters
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as the procedural costs of environmental regulations. EPA responded
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with a discussion of the overall costs and benefits of controlling
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pollution. At its stakeholders' request, it provided trend data and
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laid out strategies for achieving its environmental milestones. EPA
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recognizes that involving stakeholders is an ongoing effort that
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needs to be continued. The proposed goals are to be sent again to
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federal, state, local, and tribal government stakeholders for
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another round of review later this year, and plans are being made
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for public review.
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Good managers have understood for a long time that many
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forces-both inside and outside their organizations-can influence
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their ability to achieve their goals. But even managers who try to
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stay alert to these forces often gather their information
491
anecdotally or informally. In contrast, the successful
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organizations we studied monitor their internal and external
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environments continuously and systematically. Organizations that do
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this have shown an ability to anticipate future challenges and to
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make
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497
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Case Illustration: United States Customs Service
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adjustments so that potential problems do not become crises.10
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By building environmental assessment into the strategic planning
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process, they are able to stay focused on their long-term goals
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even as they make changes in the way they intend to achieve
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them.
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Both the external and internal environments are important, and
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neither can be viewed independently of the other. Assessing the
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external environment is particularly important, in part because so
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many external forces that fall beyond an organization's influence
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can powerfully affect its chances for success. For organizations
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both public and private, external forces can include newly emerging
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economic, social, and technological trends and new statutory,
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regulatory, and judicial requirements. An organization's internal
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forces include its culture, its management practices, and its
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business processes. Today, federal agencies find that monitoring
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these internal forces is especially important, given the effects of
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funding reductions and reorganizations. The tools available to
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organizations assessing the internal environment include program
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evaluations, employee surveys, independent audits, and reviews of
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business processes.
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The missions of the Customs Service-the oldest federal
520
agency-are to ensure that goods and persons entering and exiting
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the United States comply with all U.S. laws and regulations, while
522
also facilitating the legitimate movement of goods and persons
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through U.S. ports. But long-standing management problems,
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including weaknesses in strategic planning, had threatened the
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agency's ability to adapt to changing demands. Customs' strategic
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planning efforts now focus on the dramatic changes occurring in its
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external and internal environments and on the equally dramatic
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changes the agency will need to make in response.
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Recognizing that the international trade environment has
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undergone many changes in recent years, the Customs Service
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identified the new challenges these changes brought it in its 1993
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strategic plan. The clearest challenge for Customs would be to
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manage a workload that was growing rapidly and that could not be
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expected to taper off. From fiscal year 1986 to 1995, for example,
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total import entries increased by 242 percent, from 11.1 million to
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38.0 million. During the same period, passenger arrivals increased
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by 42 percent, from 304 million to 431 million. Customs anticipated
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that world trade would also continue to accelerate. During 1995
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alone, approximately
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10For a discussion of environmental monitoring as a critical
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aspect of strategic thinking, see Henry Mintzberg, The Fall and
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Rise of Strategic Planning (New York: Free Press and Prentice Hall
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International, 1994).
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Act
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547
548
Practice 3: Align Activities, Core Processes, and
549
Resources
550
$761 billion in merchandise was imported into the United States.
551
For the rest of the decade, Customs expects that figure to grow by
552
more than 10 percent each year.
553
Customs anticipated that trade issues would assume greater
554
prominence in the coming years as developing countries continue to
555
industrialize, corporations continue to expand internationally, and
556
trade barriers continue to fall. Further, the proliferation of
557
international trade agreements, such as the U.S.-Canada Free Trade
558
Agreement of 1989, the North American Free Trade Agreement, and the
559
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, should lead to further
560
increases in trade and travel volume.
561
Internally, Customs anticipated that as public pressures to
562
reduce the federal deficit continued, no real growth would occur in
563
the agency's funding. Customs also anticipated attrition among its
564
staff and a loss of valuable expertise due to that attrition. It
565
determined that by 1998 about 10 percent, or about 2,000 employees,
566
would be eligible to retire.
567
All of these forces-external and internal-have caused the
568
Customs Service to begin to reengineer its core processes,
569
including those related to the movement of people and cargo into
570
the United States and the movement of cargo out of the United
571
States. For example, the agency is undertaking a major
572
reorganization structured from the ground up, using its 301 ports
573
as its foundation. While headquarters staffing is to be
574
streamlined, the staffing levels at the ports are to be maintained
575
or increased. Under the reorganization, port directors are to be
576
given some of the authority previously exercised at the district or
577
regional levels.
578
It is too soon to tell how effective Customs' reorganization
579
will be in responding to the pressures it faces. But by assessing
580
its external and internal environments, the agency came to see that
581
its traditional ways of pursuing its mission were no longer viable
582
and that major changes would be needed.
583
Leading organizations recognize that sound planning is not
584
enough to ensure their success. An organization's activities, core
585
processes, and resources must be aligned to support its mission and
586
help it achieve its goals. Such organizations start by assessing
587
the extent to which their programs and activities contribute to
588
meeting their mission and desired outcomes. As the organizations
589
became more results-oriented, they often
590
Page 18 GAO/GGD-96-118 Government Performance and Results
591
Act
592
found it necessary to fundamentally alter activities and
593
programs so that they more effectively and efficiently produced the
594
services to meet customers' needs and stakeholders' interests. For
595
example, we have traced the management problems of many federal
596
agencies to organizational structures that are obsolete and
597
inadequate to modern demands.11 As federal agencies become more
598
outcome-oriented, they will find that outmoded organizational
599
structures must be changed to better meet customer needs and
600
address the interests of stakeholders.
601
As agencies align their activities to support mission-related
602
goals, they should also make better linkages between levels of
603
funding and their anticipated results. Under a series of
604
initiatives called Connecting Resources to Results, OMB is seeking
605
to adopt a greater focus on agencies' goals and performance in
606
making funding decisions. For example, OMB fiscal year 1996 budget
607
preparation guidance said agencies were to identify key features of
608
their streamlining plans (e.g., increased span of control, reduced
609
organizational layers, and/or milestones for full-time equivalents)
610
and encouraged agencies to include performance goals and indicators
611
in their budget justifications.12 Whereas the agencies' fiscal year
612
1995 documents discussed streamlining primarily in terms of the
613
number of positions to be eliminated, the fiscal year 1996 budget
614
documents included discussions about how proposed staff reductions
615
could affect the agencies' performance. Under OMB's guidance,
616
agencies' fiscal year 1997 budget requests were to contain a
617
significantly greater amount of performance information to help
618
define funding levels and projected program results. For the fiscal
619
year 1998 budget, OMB plans to continue to increase the role of
620
performance goals and information in guiding funding decisions.
621
We also have found that leading organizations strive to ensure
622
that their core processes efficiently and effectively support
623
mission-related outcomes. These organizations rely increasingly on
624
a well-defined mission to form the foundation for the key business
625
systems and processes they use to ensure the successful outcome of
626
their operations. For example, many successful public and private
627
organizations integrate their human resource management activities
628
into their organizational missions, rather than treating them as an
629
isolated support function.13 This sort of integrated approach may
630
include tying individual performance management, career
631
11Government Management Issues (GAO/OCG-93-3TR, Dec. 1992).
632
12Office of Management and Budget: Changes Resulting From the OMB
633
2000 Reorganization
634
(GAO/GGD/AIMD-96-50, Dec. 29, 1995). 13GAO/GGD-96-35, Dec. 26,
635
1995.
636
Page 19 GAO/GGD-96-118 Government Performance and Results
637
Act
638
639
640
Case Illustration: Federal Emergency Management Agency
641
development programs, and pay and promotion standards to
642
organizational mission, vision, and culture.
643
Information management is another activity that organizations
644
must address in aligning their activities and processes.14 Modern
645
information management approaches, coupled with new information
646
technology, can make success more or less likely-depending on the
647
way they are handled. We found that successful organizations pursue
648
something called strategic information management-that is,
649
comprehensive management of information and information technology
650
to maximize improvements in mission performance. Strategic
651
information management will be an important part of any federal
652
agency's attempt to implement GPRA successfully. Managing better
653
requires that agencies have, and rely upon, sound financial and
654
program information. Strategic information management would lead to
655
systems that would better provide federal agencies the data they
656
need in considering ways to realign their processes, reduce costs,
657
improve program effectiveness, and ensure consistent results with a
658
less bureaucratic organization. Lacking these data, the agencies
659
would be missing one of the indispensable ingredients of successful
660
management.
661
Established in 1979, the Federal Emergency Management Agency
662
(FEMA) is responsible for the coordination of civil emergency
663
planning and mitigation as well as the coordination of federal
664
disaster relief. FEMA is responsible for responding to floods,
665
hurricanes, earthquakes, and other natural disasters. Hurricane
666
Hugo and the Loma Prieta earthquake in 1989 generated intense
667
criticism of the federal response effort. Hurricane Andrew, which
668
leveled much of South Florida in 1992, raised further doubts as to
669
whether FEMA was capable of responding to disasters. In 1993,
670
FEMA's new Director refocused the agency on meeting its mission and
671
aligning its activities to better serve the public.
672
Since FEMA issued its mission statement in April 1993, it has
673
been reexamining its approach to limiting deaths and property
674
losses from disasters. Traditionally, FEMA had concentrated its
675
efforts on post-disaster assistance. But after taking a hard look
676
at its performance, FEMA concluded that it could better fulfill its
677
mission by addressing the range of activities available before,
678
during, and after disaster strikes.
679
14GAO/AIMD-94-115, May 1994.
680
As part of its first agencywide strategic planning effort, FEMA
681
comprehensively reviewed its programs and structures and initiated
682
a major reorganization in November 1993. FEMA concluded that all
683
emergencies share certain common traits, pose some common demands,
684
and ought to be approached functionally. FEMA's new, "all-hazard"
685
mission takes a multifaceted, sequential approach to managing
686
disasters: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery.
687
FEMA now focuses its disaster planning and response processes on
688
steps that need to be taken, not just during and after the event,
689
but in advance. To build preparedness, FEMA now seeks to build
690
partnerships with other federal, state, and local organizations.
691
For example, the agency is working with local governments and the
692
building industry to strengthen building codes so that structures
693
will be better able to withstand disasters. It has also launched an
694
effort to increase the number of flood insurance
695
policyholders-something that had not been a traditional focus of
696
the agency but that is now understood as being critical to helping
697
individuals recover from disasters. By more closely aligning its
698
activities, processes, and resources with its mission, FEMA appears
699
today to be better positioned to accomplish that mission.
700
701
The second key step that successful results-oriented
702
organizations we studied take-after defining their missions and
703
desired outcomes-is to measure their performance. Measuring
704
performance allows these organizations to track the progress they
705
are making toward their goals and gives managers crucial
706
information on which to base their organizational and management
707
decisions. Leading organizations recognize, as well, that
708
performance measures can create powerful incentives to influence
709
organizational and individual behavior.
710
GPRA incorporates performance measurement as one of its most
711
important features. Under the act, executive branch agencies are
712
required to develop annual performance plans that use performance
713
measurement to reinforce the connection between the long-term
714
strategic goals outlined in their strategic plans and the
715
day-to-day activities of their managers and staff. The annual
716
performance plans are to include performance goals for an agency's
717
program activities as listed in the budget, a summary of the
718
necessary resources to conduct these activities, the performance
719
indicators that will be used to measure performance, and a
720
discussion of how the performance information will be verified. For
721
the first time, GPRA requires that agencies' annual program
722
performance planning efforts be linked directly to their budget
723
estimates and obligations. This linkage is achieved by requiring
724
performance goals and measures for agencies' program activities
725
that are included in their budget requests. Congress recognized
726
that the activity structure in the budget of the United States
727
government is not consistent across various programs. As a result,
728
Congress expects agencies to consolidate, aggregate, or
729
disaggregate the lists of program activities appearing in the
730
budget accounts.
731
The first of these annual performance plans is to cover fiscal
732
year 1999; each agency is to submit its plan to OMB in the fall of
733
1997. However, OMB is requiring descriptions of the proposed
734
performance goals and indicators for fiscal year 1999 with the
735
agency's fiscal year 1998 budget request.
736
In developing GPRA, Congress recognized that federal
737
agencies-unaccustomed as they are to the practice-may find that
738
developing performance measures is a difficult and time-consuming
739
task. As a result, it provided for selected agencies and programs
740
to pilot GPRA's goal-setting and performance measurement
741
requirements before these are applied governmentwide. Our work with
742
leading results-oriented organizations confirmed that many agencies
743
may need years to develop a sound set of performance measures.
744
Page 23 GAO/GGD-96-118 Government Performance and Results
745
Act
746
747
748
Practice 4: Produce a Set of Performance Measures at Each
749
Organizational Level That Demonstrate Results, Are Limited to the
750
Vital Few, Respond to Multiple Priorities, and Link to Responsible
751
Programs
752
We learned, as well, that agencies that were successful in
753
measuring their performance generally had applied two practices.
754
First, they developed performance measures based on four
755
characteristics. These measures were (1) tied to program goals and
756
demonstrated the degree to which the desired results were achieved,
757
(2) limited to a vital few that were considered essential for
758
producing data for decisionmaking, (3) responsive to multiple
759
priorities, and (4) responsibility-linked to establish
760
accountability for results. Second, recognizing that they must
761
balance their ideal performance measurement systems against
762
real-world considerations, such as the cost and effort involved in
763
gathering and analyzing data, the organizations we studied made
764
sure that the data they did collect were sufficiently complete,
765
accurate, and consistent to be useful in decisionmaking.
766
As the leading organizations we studied strive to align their
767
activities and resources to achieve mission-related goals, they
768
also seek to establish clear hierarchies of performance goals and
769
measures. Under these hierarchies, the organizations try to link
770
the goals and performance measures for each organizational level to
771
successive levels and ultimately to the organization's strategic
772
goals. They have recognized that without clear, hierarchically
773
linked performance measures, managers and staff throughout the
774
organization will lack straightforward roadmaps showing how their
775
daily activities can contribute to attaining organizationwide
776
strategic goals and mission. Federal agencies that are developing
777
such hierarchies for their organizations are finding that
778
organizationwide performance measurement efforts take time and
779
require the active involvement of staff at all organizational
780
levels.
781
The experiences of leading state, foreign, and federal
782
governments show that at least four characteristics are common to
783
successful hierarchies of performance measures.15 These
784
characteristics include the following:
785
Demonstrate results: Performance measures should tell each
786
organizational level how well it is achieving its goals. Yet,
787
simple as this principle may appear, it poses an especially
788
difficult challenge for federal managers, for whom the link between
789
federal efforts and desired outcomes is often difficult to
790
establish and may not, in fact, be apparent for years. Research
791
programs provide one example. So do many health and
792
15Managing for Results: Critical Actions for Measuring
793
Performance (GAO/T-GGD/AIMD-95-187,
794
June 20, 1995).
795
welfare programs that are delivered jointly with state and local
796
governments and third-party service deliverers.
797
Limited to the vital few: The number of measures for each goal
798
at a given organizational level should be limited to the vital few.
799
Those vital few measures should cover the key performance
800
dimensions that will enable an organization to assess
801
accomplishments, make decisions, realign processes, and assign
802
accountability. Organizations that seek to manage an excessive
803
number of performance measures may risk creating a confusing excess
804
of data that will obscure rather than clarify performance issues.
805
Limiting the number of performance measures to the vital few at
806
each organizational level will not only keep the focus where it
807
belongs, it will help ensure that the costs involved in collecting
808
and analyzing the data do not become prohibitive. As a result,
809
lower organizational levels may use different measures and goals
810
from those meaningfully or appropriately included in the
811
organization's annual performance plan. Likewise, agencies will
812
have more goals and measures than can be meaningfully or
813
appropriately included in the governmentwide performance plan OMB
814
will develop under GPRA. However, as performance plans are compiled
815
for higher organizational levels, the consolidation and possible
816
exclusion of some goals and measures does not mean that those goals
817
and measures are not important to guide the efforts of the lower
818
levels and should still be monitored.
819
Respond to multiple priorities: Government agencies often face a
820
variety of interests whose competing demands continually force
821
policymakers and managers to balance quality, cost, customer
822
satisfaction, stakeholder concerns, and other factors. Performance
823
measurement systems must take these competing interests into
824
account and create incentives for managers to strike the difficult
825
balance among competing demands. Performance measurement efforts
826
that overemphasize one or two priorities at the expense of the
827
others may skew the agency's performance and keep its managers from
828
seeing the whole picture.
829
Link to responsible programs: Performance measures should be
830
linked directly to the offices that have responsibility for making
831
programs work. A clear connection between performance measures and
832
program offices helps to both reinforce accountability and ensure
833
that, in their day-to-day activities, managers keep in mind the
834
outcomes their organization is striving to achieve. This connection
835
at the program office helps to lay the groundwork for
836
accountability as measures advance through the agency. By helping
837
to lay the groundwork for accountability, a connection between
838
Page 25 GAO/GGD-96-118 Government Performance and Results
839
Act
840
841
842
Case Illustration: National Oceanic and Atmospheric
843
Administration
844
performance measures and program offices also provides a basis
845
for determining the appropriate degree of operational authority for
846
various organizational levels. Managers must have the authority and
847
flexibility for achieving the results for which they are to be held
848
accountable.
849
The mission of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
850
Administration (NOAA) is to describe and predict changes in the
851
earth's environment, as well as to conserve and manage the nation's
852
coastal and marine resources to ensure sustainable economic
853
opportunities. NOAA concluded in its 1995 strategic plan that the
854
nation's ability to prepare for severe weather events, including
855
tornadoes, thunderstorms, hurricanes, and flash flooding, depends
856
on the quality and timeliness of the agency's observations,
857
assessments, and information delivery. Through strategic planning,
858
NOAA evaluated how best to accomplish its mission and then put into
859
place those performance measures essential to demonstrating the
860
extent to which it was attaining its desired outcomes.
861
NOAA determined that the most important business of its
862
short-term warning and forecast weather services was to predict the
863
time and location of weather events and to do so with accuracy.
864
Rather than simply count the number of forecasts it made-that is,
865
to simply gather data on its activity level-NOAA began to measure
866
the extent to which it could increase the lead time or advance
867
notice it gave the public prior to severe weather events. It
868
decided, in other words, to measure what counts.
869
NOAA reported that from fiscal year 1993 to fiscal year 1995,
870
its lead time for predicting tornadoes increased from 7 minutes to
871
9 minutes, and the accuracy of its predictions increased from 47
872
percent of the time to 60 percent of the time. For fiscal year
873
1996, NOAA has set targets of 10 minutes and 64 percent,
874
respectively.
875
NOAA also measured how accurately it could predict the range
876
where hurricanes would reach land, given a 24-hour lead time. From
877
fiscal year 1993 to fiscal year 1995, its accuracy improved from
878
185 kilometers (115 miles) to 134 kilometers (83 miles). It
879
credited the improvement to its installation in June 1995 of a new
880
hurricane tracking model. On the basis of fiscal year 1995
881
performance, NOAA revised its fiscal year 1996 target from 155
882
kilometers (96 miles) to 150 kilometers (93 miles). Although the
883
new fiscal year 1996 target of 150 kilometers is higher than the
884
fiscal year 1995 actual performance of 134 kilometers, NOAA wants
885
to test the new
886
Page 26 GAO/GGD-96-118 Government Performance and Results
887
Act
888
889
890
Practice 5: Collect Sufficiently Complete, Accurate, and
891
Consistent Data
892
model through at least another hurricane season before radically
893
revising its targets for future years.
894
The significance of earlier and more accurate hurricane warnings
895
is enormous. Most importantly, they help prevent deaths and
896
injuries. But they also save money, because earlier and more
897
accurate predictions of hurricane tracks and intensities can reduce
898
the size of the warning areas in which people are advised to
899
prepare for the event. NOAA calculated that for each hurricane, the
900
public's preparation and evacuation costs exceed $50 million, but
901
improved predictions can cut that cost by $5 million. In addition,
902
NOAA officials believe that the public takes more accurate
903
forecasts more seriously-which helps lessen loss of life and
904
property.
905
As the organizations we examined developed their performance
906
measures, they paid special attention to issues relating to data
907
collection. Although they recognized that adequate and reliable
908
performance data are indispensable to decisionmaking, they were
909
also aware that collecting the data can be costly and difficult. As
910
a result, as agencies implement GPRA, they will have to balance the
911
cost of data collection efforts against the need to ensure that the
912
collected data are complete, accurate, and consistent enough to
913
document performance and support decisionmaking at various
914
organizational levels.
915
As the experiences of these organizations demonstrated, managers
916
striving to reach organizational goals must have information
917
systems in place to provide them with needed information.16 In
918
Texas, for example, officials said that the state restructured its
919
statewide information systems to include the missions and goals of
920
its agencies, specific strategies for achieving objectives, and
921
measures of progress. The system also linked budgeted expenditures,
922
accounting information, and performance data.
923
Our work has shown consistently that the federal government's
924
basic financial and information management systems are woefully out
925
of date and incapable of meeting modern needs for fast, reliable,
926
and accurate information-particularly as these needs relate to
927
financial reporting and program costs. As the leading organizations
928
we studied became more results-oriented, many of them made
929
significant investments in their information management systems.
930
Many federal agencies will need to do the same. But agencies can
931
keep costs down by applying the performance measurement principles
932
these leading organizations have employed and
933
16GAO/GGD-95-22, Dec. 21, 1994.
934
935
936
Case Illustration: National Highway Traffic Safety
937
Administration
938
also-where they can-by building performance data collection into
939
the processes that govern daily operations, rather than creating
940
entirely new and separate data collection systems.
941
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA)
942
mission is to reduce casualties and economic losses resulting from
943
motor vehicle crashes. To accomplish its mission, NHTSA pursues two
944
main strategies: setting and enforcing safety performance standards
945
for motor vehicles and promoting safe driving behavior. After it
946
was established in 1970, NHTSA concluded that reliable crash
947
statistics databases were needed. The need was twofold: to help in
948
identifying and analyzing traffic safety problems and for
949
evaluating the effectiveness of motor vehicle safety standards and
950
highway safety initiatives. To fill this need, NHTSA developed data
951
collection systems derived from existing data sources and has taken
952
steps to ensure the completeness, accuracy, and consistency of
953
these data.
954
NHTSA has developed two data systems that, taken together, serve
955
as a single source of motor vehicle crash statistics. The Fatal
956
Accident Reporting System has enabled NHTSA to document that the
957
rate for one of its desired outcomes-reduction in the fatality
958
rate-decreased from 2.3 to an estimated 1.7 per 100 million vehicle
959
miles of travel from 1988 to 1995.17 Also, NHTSA has used data from
960
the General Estimates System to document another one of its desired
961
outcomes-a reduction in injury rates-from 169 to an estimated 138
962
injuries per 100 million vehicle miles of travel from 1988 to
963
1995.
964
The Fatal Accident Reporting System contains accident data
965
provided by the 50 states, Puerto Rico, and the District of
966
Columbia. According to NHTSA documents, throughout the states,
967
Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia, trained state employees
968
gather and transmit these data to NHTSA's central computer database
969
in a standard format. State employees obtain data solely from each
970
state's existing documents-including police accident reports,
971
vehicle registration files, and vital statistics records-and then
972
enter them into a central computer database. NHTSA analysts
973
periodically review a sample of the cases.
974
The General Estimates System contains data from a nationally
975
representative sample of police-reported accidents. To compile
976
the
977
17Vehicle miles of travel is published by the Federal Highway
978
Administration, as reported by state highway agencies, and is based
979
on formal guidance provided by the Administration.
980
Page 28 GAO/GGD-96-118 Government Performance and Results
981
Act
982
database, NHTSA data collectors randomly sample about 48,000
983
reports each year from approximately 400 police jurisdictions in 60
984
sites across the country, according to NHTSA documents. NHTSA staff
985
then interpret and code the data directly from the reports into a
986
central electronic data file. The data are checked for consistency
987
during both coding and subsequent processing.
988
NHTSA has recognized that its data have limitations. For
989
example, the General Estimates System is based on police reports,
990
but various sources suggest that about half of the motor vehicle
991
crashes in the country are not reported to police, and the majority
992
of these unreported crashes involve only minor property damage and
993
no significant injury. A NHTSA study of the costs of motor vehicle
994
injuries estimated the total count of nonfatal injuries at over 5
995
million compared to the General Estimates System estimate for that
996
year of 3.2 million. NHTSA intends to study the unreported injury
997
problem.
998
999
The third key step in building successful results-oriented
1000
organizations- after establishing an organizational mission and
1001
goals and building a performance measurement system-is to put
1002
performance data to work. Managers should use performance
1003
information to continuously improve organizational processes,
1004
identify performance gaps, and set improvement goals.18
1005
When the CFO Act and GPRA are fully implemented, decisionmakers
1006
are to routinely receive the performance and cost information they
1007
need to assess their programs and make informed decisions.
1008
Congressional decisionmaking should also benefit. GPRA was
1009
intended, in part, to improve congressional decisionmaking by
1010
giving Congress comprehensive and reliable information on the
1011
extent to which federal programs are fulfilling their statutory
1012
intent. The act requires that each agency report annually to the
1013
President and to Congress on its performance-specifically, on the
1014
extent to which it is meeting its annual performance goals and the
1015
actions needed to achieve or modify those goals that have not been
1016
met. Annual performance reports are intended to provide important
1017
information to agency managers, policymakers, and the public on
1018
what each agency accomplished with the resources it was given. The
1019
first of these reports, covering fiscal year 1999, is due by March
1020
31, 2000.
1021
In crafting GPRA, Congress recognized that different information
1022
users would have differing information needs. Federal agencies must
1023
determine what information is both relevant and essential to
1024
different internal and external information users and include only
1025
the information the users require.19 Most important, agency
1026
managers need performance information to ensure that programs meet
1027
intended goals, assess the efficiency of processes, and promote
1028
continuous improvement. Congress needs information on whether and
1029
in what respects a program is working well or poorly to support its
1030
oversight of agencies and their budgets.20 Agencies' stakeholders
1031
need performance information to accurately judge program
1032
effectiveness.
1033
In short, we have found that leading organizations that
1034
progressed the farthest to results-oriented management did not stop
1035
after strategic planning and performance measurement. They applied
1036
their acquired knowledge and data to identify gaps in their
1037
performance, report on that
1038
18GAO/T-GGD/AIMD-95-187, June 20, 1995.
1039
19Chief Financial Officers Council, Streamlining Governmentwide
1040
Statutory Reports (Jan. 17, 1995).
1041
20Managing for Results: Status of the Government Performance and
1042
Results Act (GAO/T-GGD-95-193,
1043
June 27, 1995); and Program Evaluation: Improving the
1044
Information Flow to the Congress
1045
(GAO/PEMD-95-1, Jan. 30, 1995).
1046
1047
1048
Practice 6: Identify Performance Gaps
1049
performance, and finally use that information to improve their
1050
performance to better support their missions.
1051
Performance data can have real value only if they are used to
1052
identify the gap between an organization's actual performance level
1053
and the performance level it has identified as its goal. Once the
1054
performance gaps are identified for different program areas,
1055
managers can determine where to target their resources to improve
1056
overall mission accomplishment. When managers are forced to reduce
1057
their resources, the same analysis can help them target reductions
1058
to keep to a minimum the threat to their organization's overall
1059
mission.
1060
The leading organizations we studied recognized that improvement
1061
goals should flow from a fact-based performance analysis and be
1062
rooted in organizational missions.21 Such organizations typically
1063
assess which of their processes are in greatest need of improvement
1064
in terms of cost, quality, and timeliness. By analyzing the gap
1065
between where they are and where they need to be to achieve desired
1066
outcomes, management can target those processes that are in most
1067
need of improvement, set realistic improvement goals, and select an
1068
appropriate process improvement technique.22 One technique these
1069
organizations used is benchmarking-comparing their processes with
1070
those of private and public organizations that are thought to be
1071
the best in their fields. By benchmarking its own processes against
1072
those of the best in the business, an organization can learn how
1073
much change it needs to make and what changes might be the right
1074
ones.
1075
1076
1077
Case Illustration: Veterans Health Administration
1078
The Veterans Health Administration (VHA) in the Department of
1079
Veterans Affairs runs one of the nation's largest medical care
1080
delivery systems, consisting of a network of medical centers,
1081
nursing homes, domiciliaries, and outpatient clinics that provide
1082
health care services to nearly 2.8 million patients each year. VHA
1083
recognizes that its ability to survive growing market pressures,
1084
answer criticisms of health care quality, and sustain and improve
1085
services to an aging veteran population depends on its ability to
1086
analyze data to pinpoint areas needing change and improvement. VHA
1087
has initiated numerous studies
1088
21Government Reform: Using Reengineering and Technology to
1089
Improve Government Performance
1090
(GAO/T-OCG-95-2, Feb. 2, 1995). 22GAO/T-GGD/AIMD-95-187, June
1091
20, 1995.
1092
Page 32 GAO/GGD-96-118 Government Performance and Results
1093
Act
1094
to identify performance gaps. With better data in hand, VHA is
1095
taking actions to improve its products and services.
1096
VHA has provided medical care to veterans for over 60 years.
1097
Traditionally, however, the agency has lacked the sort of data
1098
needed to assess the quality, cost, and effectiveness of its care.
1099
VHA's current data analysis efforts are structured to provide
1100
caregivers with improved data on medical outcomes. It has begun to
1101
use this performance information to improve service to
1102
veterans.
1103
An example is VHA's effort to benchmark the success of cardiac
1104
surgeries in VHA facilities. VHA's database, which contains over
1105
51,000 records on cardiac surgical outcomes, is risk-adjusted for
1106
severity of illness on the basis of 54 variables, including age and
1107
previous medical history, collected prior to surgery. VHA was able
1108
to identify the differences in surgical outcomes among the 43 VHA
1109
medical centers performing cardiac surgery. On the basis of these
1110
analyses, VHA recommended a number of techniques and processes for
1111
shortening the postoperative hospital stay, decreasing excessive
1112
diagnostic testing, and reducing the risk of postoperative
1113
infections or complications. According to VHA, because it adopted
1114
these and other techniques, the performance data show that cardiac
1115
teams lowered their mortality rates for all cardiac procedures over
1116
the last 8 years by an average of 13 percent.
1117
Another VHA data analysis effort is the External Peer Review
1118
Program. The program compares VHA medical centers' performances
1119
against established community standards. As part of the effort,
1120
panels composed of physicians not affiliated with VHA review
1121
medical records to determine if community standards have been met.
1122
One performance gap VHA identified through this benchmarking was
1123
the low vaccination rate of elderly and chronically ill VHA
1124
patients who are at high risk for contracting one type of
1125
potentially fatal pneumonia. VHA has worked with the National
1126
Institute on Aging in the Department of Health and Human Services
1127
and the American Lung Association to raise its pneumonia
1128
immunization rate for these patients from 19 percent to 29 percent
1129
over the past 2 years.
1130
VHA also is analyzing performance data to switch some of its
1131
focus from inpatient to ambulatory care. For example, according to
1132
VHA, after careful data analysis, its medical center in Little
1133
Rock, Arkansas, determined that only a small percentage of the
1134
patients admitted to its 28-day inpatient detoxification program
1135
needed acute medical attention. As a result, the program was
1136
converted in fiscal year 1995 to an outpatient program with
1137
Page 33 GAO/GGD-96-118 Government Performance and Results
1138
Act
1139
only a small inpatient capacity. The center reportedly now
1140
serves more patients with eight fewer full-time staff members and
1141
anticipates that savings from the first year of the new outpatient
1142
program will be $600,000-with no lessening in the quality of
1143
patient care.
1144
No picture of what the government is accomplishing with the
1145
taxpayers' money can be complete without adequate program cost and
1146
performance information. But this information must be presented in
1147
a way that is useful to the many audiences who rely on it to help
1148
them assess and manage federal programs.23 Viewing program
1149
performance in light of program costs-for instance, by establishing
1150
the unit cost per output or outcome achieved-can be important on at
1151
least two levels. First, it can help Congress make informed
1152
decisions. Second, it can give the taxpayers a better understanding
1153
of what the government is providing in return for their tax
1154
dollars.
1155
Consistent with GPRA's requirement that annual performance plans
1156
be tied to budget requests, the annual performance reports, which
1157
are to report progress toward achieving the goals established in
1158
the plans, are to link levels of performance to the budget
1159
expenditures. Directly calculating unit cost information will
1160
likely become more widespread when the Government Management Reform
1161
Act of 1994 (GMRA) is implemented. GMRA authorized OMB, upon proper
1162
notification to Congress, to consolidate and simplify management
1163
reports. The CFO Council has proposed that agencies prepare two
1164
annual reports: a Planning and Budgeting Report and an
1165
Accountability Report. The two consolidated reports would be used
1166
to present each agency's past financial and program performance and
1167
provide a roadmap for its future planning and budgeting actions. At
1168
present, OMB is having six agencies produce Accountability Reports
1169
on a pilot basis. The Accountability Report would eliminate the
1170
separate requirements under various laws-such as GPRA, the Federal
1171
Managers' Financial Integrity Act, the CFO Act, and the Prompt
1172
Payment Act.
1173
Practice 7: Report Performance Information
1174
1175
1176
Case Illustration: GPRA Pilot Projects' Fiscal Year 1994
1177
Performance Reports
1178
GPRA requires that each federal agency report annually on its
1179
performance-specifically, on the degree to which the agency is
1180
meeting its annual performance goals and on the actions needed to
1181
achieve those goals that have not been met. Under GPRA, OMB was
1182
required to select agencies to pilot GPRA performance planning and
1183
reporting
1184
23Financial Management: Continued Momentum Essential to Achieve
1185
CFO Act Goals
1186
(GAO/T-AIMD-96-10, Dec. 14, 1995).
1187
requirements. Forty-four pilot projects submitted reports for
1188
the first round of performance reporting in 1995. We identified
1189
some individual features that when viewed as a whole, appear to
1190
have the potential for enhancing the general usefulness of future
1191
performance reports in providing decisionmakers and the public with
1192
the information needed to assess progress.24 These features would
1193
also be appropriate for GMRA accountability reports.
1194
Our initial observations suggest that GPRA performance reports
1195
are likely to be more useful if they
1196
1197
1198
1199
describe the relationship between the agency's annual
1200
performance and its strategic goals and mission,
1201
1202
1203
1204
include cost information,
1205
1206
1207
1208
provide baseline and trend data,
1209
1210
1211
1212
explain the uses of performance information,
1213
1214
1215
1216
incorporate other relevant information, and
1217
1218
1219
1220
present performance information in a user-friendly
1221
manner.
1222
1223
1224
By describing how the annual performance information it has
1225
reported relates to its strategic goals and mission, an agency can
1226
help its customers and stakeholders understand the relationship
1227
between the year's accomplishments and the agency's long-range
1228
goals and reason for existence. By including cost
1229
information-ideally, unit cost per output or outcome-the agency can
1230
demonstrate the cost-effectiveness and productivity of its program
1231
efforts. In addition, by providing baseline and trend data-which
1232
show the agency's progress over time-the agency can give
1233
decisionmakers a more historical perspective within which to
1234
compare the year's performance with performance in past years.
1235
Similarly, by explaining the uses of the performance
1236
information-such as the actions the agency has taken or identified
1237
as needed, based on the data-the agency can help decisionmakers
1238
judge the reasonableness of its performance goals and decide upon
1239
actions they may need to take to improve the agency's performance.
1240
The report should include any other information that is
1241
relevant-such as the limitations in the quality of the reported
1242
data-that users of the report may need to help them better
1243
understand the performance data and its context. It is important,
1244
as well, that the text be understandable to the nontechnical
1245
reader-that it use clearly defined terms and appropriate,
1246
user-friendly tables and graphs to convey information as readily as
1247
possible.
1248
24GPRA Performance Reports (GAO/GGD-96-66R, Feb. 14, 1996).
1249
1250
1251
Practice 8: Use Performance Information to Support Mission
1252
As efforts continue to reduce federal spending, policymakers and
1253
the public alike are reexamining the federal government's spending
1254
priorities. Federal agencies are feeling the pressure to
1255
demonstrate that they are putting the taxpayers' money to sound
1256
use. They are expected to demonstrate improved performance even as
1257
they cut costs-two simultaneous demands that are driving the trend
1258
toward results-oriented government.
1259
As they focus on the outcomes they hope to achieve, federal
1260
managers increasingly are finding that the traditional ways they
1261
measured their success-and thus the traditional ways they did
1262
business and provided services-are no longer appropriate or
1263
practical. For example, the new focus on outcomes is prompting some
1264
federal agencies to alter the approach of their programs, including
1265
working more closely with states and local governments and
1266
businesses. As agencies create information systems to provide them
1267
with cost and performance data, they discover that having the facts
1268
gives them a basis for focusing their efforts and improving their
1269
performance.
1270
1271
1272
Case Illustration: Coast Guard
1273
The mission of the Coast Guard's Office of Marine Safety,
1274
Security and Environmental Protection is to protect the public, the
1275
environment, and
1276
U.S. economic interests through the prevention and mitigation
1277
ofmarine incidents. In the past, the Coast Guard's marine safety
1278
program concentrated on the physical condition of vessels, through
1279
activities such as inspections and certifications. The program
1280
focused less attention on the human factors that contribute to
1281
marine safety. But as the office became more outcome-oriented and
1282
made more extensive use of performance information, it began to
1283
redirect its safety efforts. Coast Guard data indicate that its
1284
mission-effectiveness is now dramatically improved.
1285
Traditionally, the Coast Guard based its marine safety efforts
1286
on inspections and certifications of vessels. It measured its
1287
performance by counting outputs, such as the number of prior
1288
inspections and outstanding inspection results. But the data on
1289
marine casualties indicated that accidents were often caused, not
1290
by deficiencies in the vessels or other factors, but by human
1291
error. For example, towing industry data for 1982 through 1991
1292
showed that 18 percent of reported casualties were caused by
1293
equipment and material failures, 20 percent by environmental and
1294
other factors, and 62 percent by human factors.
1295
Page 36 GAO/GGD-96-118 Government Performance and Results
1296
Act
1297
Putting this information to use, the Coast Guard changed the
1298
focus of its marine safety program from outputs to outcomes in its
1299
first business plan, dated January 1994. After all, it came to
1300
recognize, the mission of the marine safety program was not to do
1301
more and better inspections of vessels, but to save lives. As a
1302
result, the Coast Guard shifted its resources and realigned its
1303
processes away from inspections and toward other efforts to reduce
1304
marine casualties. In addition, it identified a significant role
1305
for the towing industry in the marine safety program and looked for
1306
opportunities to work with its stakeholders in the towing industry
1307
to reduce casualties in their field.
1308
The Coast Guard and the towing industry worked to build the
1309
knowledge and skills of entry-level crew members in the industry.
1310
The Coast Guard and the towing industry jointly developed training
1311
and voluntary guidelines to reduce the causes of fatalities. This
1312
joint effort contributed to a significant decline in the reported
1313
towing industry fatality rate: from 91 per 100,000 industry
1314
employees in 1990 to 27 per 100,000 in 1995.
1315
The marine safety program apparently not only improved its
1316
mission effectiveness, but did so with fewer people and at lower
1317
cost. Since the Coast Guard's marine safety program became a GPRA
1318
pilot program in fiscal year 1994, the number of direct program
1319
personnel declined and its budget was reduced by 2 percent.
1320
According to the Coast Guard, the program achieved its results by
1321
giving field commanders greater authority and by investing in
1322
activities and processes that went most directly to the goal of
1323
reducing risks on the water.
1324
1325
GPRA will not succeed without the strong commitment of the
1326
federal government's political and senior career leadership. Only
1327
they can ensure that each agency's strategic planning and
1328
performance measurement efforts will become the basis for its
1329
day-to-day operations. Moreover, only they can ensure that
1330
results-oriented management will endure despite the customarily
1331
high rate of turnover among political appointees.25 Some of the
1332
practices they can take to reinforce results-oriented management
1333
are to
1334
1335
1336
1337
devolve decisionmaking authority within a framework of
1338
mission-oriented processes in exchange for accountability for
1339
results,
1340
1341
1342
1343
create incentives to encourage a focus on
1344
outcomes,
1345
1346
1347
1348
build expertise in the necessary skills, and
1349
1350
1351
1352
integrate management reforms.
1353
1354
1355
If GPRA is to thrive over the long run, its concepts need to be
1356
made a part of organizational culture. For that to happen, the top
1357
leadership in each agency has to initiate results-oriented
1358
management, keep the agency focused on it, and embed its principles
1359
in the organization's basic approach to doing business.26
1360
1361
1362
Practice 9: Devolve Decisionmaking With Accountability
1363
Leading organizations we studied create a set of mission-related
1364
processes and systems within which to operate, but they then give
1365
their managers extensive authority to pursue organizational goals
1366
while using those processes and systems. These organizations invest
1367
the time and effort to understand their processes and how those
1368
processes contribute to or hamper mission accomplishment. They then
1369
seek to ensure their processes provide managers at each
1370
organizational level with the authority and flexibility they need
1371
to contribute to the organization's mission. Allowing managers to
1372
bring their judgment to bear in meeting their responsibilities,
1373
rather than having them merely comply with overly rigid rules and
1374
standards, can help them make the most of their talents and lead to
1375
more effective and efficient operations.
1376
In our work with foreign countries that have adopted
1377
results-oriented management, we found that two reforms in
1378
particular were aimed at enhancing accountability among line
1379
managers: simplifying the rules for such things as budgeting and
1380
human resource management while
1381
25Political Appointees: Turnover Rates in Executive Schedule
1382
Positions Requiring Senate Confirmation
1383
(GAO/GGD-94-115FS, Apr. 21, 1994). 26Organizational Culture:
1384
Techniques Companies Use to Perpetuate or Change Beliefs and
1385
Values
1386
(GAO/NSIAD-92-105, Feb. 27, 1992).
1387
1388
1389
Case Illustration: Army Corps of Engineers
1390
devolving decisionmaking authority.27 These two reforms were
1391
undertaken in exchange for managers assuming greater accountability
1392
for the results of their programs. Managers generally welcomed
1393
their new authority to make spending, personnel, and operational
1394
decisions that had formerly been made by central authorities. But
1395
although these countries were generally satisfied with the progress
1396
they had made, they continued to struggle with a number of
1397
important issues, such as the acceptable level of risk and the
1398
extent to which decisionmaking authority should be devolved to a
1399
given organizational level.
1400
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' Civil Works Directorate's
1401
Operation and Maintenance Program is responsible for the
1402
stewardship of dams, levees, and other parts of the water resources
1403
infrastructure constructed by the Corps. Operation and maintenance
1404
expenditures had become by fiscal year 1990 the single largest
1405
individual program item in the Corps' budget. In 1991, faced with
1406
rising budget pressures, a growing project inventory, and the need
1407
to become more results-oriented, the Corps initiated a
1408
comprehensive review of its civil operation and maintenance
1409
program.
1410
One major finding of the Corps' 1993 plan of improvement was the
1411
burdensome number of internal levels of review. At the majority of
1412
project sites, for example, procurement of items costing less than
1413
$25,000 required between one and five signatures; each approval
1414
beyond the first one added to the time required for the procurement
1415
and created inefficiency, revenue loss, and a potential danger to
1416
the staff and public when safety corrections were delayed.
1417
To remedy this situation, the Corps changed its processes by
1418
decentralizing its organizational structure and giving project
1419
managers new decisionmaking authority to help them achieve the
1420
desired outcomes. The intent of these changes was to put key
1421
operational decisions in the hands of the managers who were closest
1422
to the point of customer service. These managers could now focus
1423
on, and be held accountable for, achieving goals instead of merely
1424
complying with rules. Now procurements of up to $25,000 can be
1425
approved by a single individual.
1426
As part of this new approach, the Corps reformed its processes,
1427
revising its policies and procedures to ensure that only those that
1428
were necessary remained. It achieved this reduction, by and large,
1429
by indicating "what"
1430
27GAO/GGD-95-120, May 2, 1995.
1431
1432
1433
Practice 10: Create Incentives
1434
was to be accomplished and leaving the "how" to the initiative
1435
of project staff. Eighty-nine engineering regulations were thereby
1436
consolidated into 7, and the number of pages of Corps' regulations
1437
was reduced from 1,596 to 306.
1438
This streamlining of its organization and processes allowed the
1439
Corps to reduce the number of its management levels. By the Corps'
1440
estimate, the savings created amounted to about $6 million annually
1441
and a reduction of 175 full-time equivalent staff years.
1442
Across government, the best incentive Congress and the executive
1443
branch can apply to foster results-oriented management is to use
1444
performance measurement data in their policy, program, and resource
1445
allocation decisions and to provide agencies with the authority and
1446
flexibility to achieve results. Like Congress and the executive
1447
branch, an agency's top political and career leadership can
1448
encourage a greater accountability for results by providing
1449
managers at each level in the organization with the appropriate
1450
authority and flexibility to obtain those results.
1451
Successful organizations we studied defined their missions
1452
clearly and communicated them to their employees-particularly to
1453
their managers-so that each one would understand his or her
1454
contribution. At both the organizational and managerial levels,
1455
accountability requires results-oriented goals and appropriate
1456
performance measures through which to gauge progress. Our study of
1457
several leading foreign governments, however, showed that although
1458
there was general agreement on how to hold organizations
1459
accountable for results, there was as yet no such agreement on how
1460
best to hold individual managers accountable.28 New Zealand and the
1461
United Kingdom held their program managers accountable for
1462
efficiently providing specific goods and services. Australia and
1463
Canada, on the other hand, hold their program managers accountable
1464
for evaluating the overall effectiveness of their programs.
1465
Congress and the executive branch continue to explore formal
1466
ways to hold individual managers accountable for results. At the
1467
agency level, however, informal incentives are available to leaders
1468
to encourage results-oriented management. Through meetings and
1469
personal contacts, for example, leaders can let managers and staff
1470
know of their commitment to achieving the agency's goals and to
1471
keeping these goals in mind as they pursue their day-to-day
1472
activities.
1473
28GAO/GGD-95-120, May 2, 1995.
1474
1475
1476
Case Illustration: Department of Veterans Affairs
1477
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) comprises three agencies
1478
that provide services and benefits to veterans. The elevation of VA
1479
to cabinet-level status in 1989 spurred the department to make
1480
internal management improvements. To recognize and reinforce
1481
results-oriented management, VA instituted in 1992 a formal
1482
recognition program for quality achievement.
1483
The Robert W. Carey Quality Award is VA's most prestigious award
1484
for quality achievement. It is named for Robert W. Carey, who, as
1485
the Director of VA's Philadelphia Regional Office, was a "Quality
1486
Leader" and champion of excellence in the federal government. The
1487
Carey Award helps promote quality management within VA by giving
1488
the department a prominent means of recognizing high-performing
1489
offices, encouraging outcome-oriented practices, and educating VA
1490
employees about the benefits of results-oriented management and
1491
customer service. According to a VA official, the Carey Award is
1492
valuable, in part, because VA offices that want it must apply for
1493
it and the application itself becomes a useful self-assessment
1494
tool.
1495
VA announced its first Carey Award in 1992. There is one overall
1496
trophy winner annually along with several category winners. There
1497
have been 20 winners to date.
1498
Practice 11: Build Expertise
1499
To make the most of results-oriented management, staff at all
1500
levels of the organization must be skilled in strategic planning,
1501
performance measurement, and the use of performance information in
1502
decisionmaking. Training has proven to be an important tool for
1503
agencies that want to change their cultures.29 Australian
1504
government employees, for example, cited training as one of the
1505
factors that contributed the most to making reforms succeed in
1506
their areas.30
1507
Results-oriented managers view training as an investment rather
1508
than an expense. And as human resource management experts at
1509
leading private and public organizations have pointed out,
1510
organizational learning must be continuous in order to meet
1511
changing customer needs, keep skills up to date, and develop new
1512
personal and organizational competencies.31 But at
1513
29Organizational Culture: Use of Training to Help Change DOD
1514
Inventory Management Culture
1515
(GAO/NSIAD-94-193, Aug. 30, 1994). 30GAO/GGD-95-120, May 2,
1516
1995. 31GAO/GGD-96-35, Dec. 26, 1995.
1517
Page 42 GAO/GGD-96-118 Government Performance and Results
1518
Act
1519
1520
1521
Case Illustration: Department of Defense
1522
a time when overall agency budgets are under pressure, training
1523
budgets are unlikely to increase. Therefore, it is important that
1524
agencies develop innovative and less costly ways to train their
1525
staffs-remembering as well that the level of return for investing
1526
in the skills needed for results-oriented management will depend
1527
largely on how well employees are encouraged to put those skills to
1528
use.
1529
Recognizing the value of training, especially for the people at
1530
the top of the organization, the CFO Council's GPRA Implementation
1531
Committee has begun an outreach effort directed toward senior
1532
managers in the 24 CFO Act agencies. The council's goals are to
1533
familiarize these leaders with GPRA's fundamentals and with the
1534
importance of these fundamentals for the future of federal
1535
management.
1536
In addition, in response to an initiative of the American
1537
Society for Public Administration and with the encouragement of
1538
OMB, over 30 case studies are being developed on the agencies' use
1539
of strategic planning or performance measurement. These case
1540
studies, to be completed in the summer of 1996, are to be made
1541
publicly available.
1542
The Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible for the military
1543
forces needed to deter war and protect the security of our country.
1544
DOD's major service branches-the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air
1545
Force-consist of about 1.5 million men and women on active duty, 1
1546
million members of the reserve components, and about 900,000
1547
civilian employees. As with other federal agencies, performance
1548
information is becoming an increasingly important part of DOD's
1549
budget process. DOD's leadership has come to recognize that if the
1550
Department is to make results-oriented management a success, it
1551
must train its employees in strategic planning, performance
1552
measurement, and the use of performance information.
1553
DOD officials recognized when they were considering various
1554
methods to deliver GPRA training that the costs-in both money and
1555
time-of providing training through traditional, live classroom
1556
instruction would be prohibitive. As an alternative, DOD is now
1557
testing the feasibility of training staff at its GPRA pilot
1558
agencies via satellite. This interactive approach can reach widely
1559
dispersed audiences less expensively than traditional methods. The
1560
GPRA course originates out of a studio and has been broadcast
1561
simultaneously to up to 20 sites around the country. Since the
1562
Practice 12: Integrate Management Reforms
1563
first class in September 1995, the GPRA training has been
1564
delivered 3 times via satellite to 38 sites and has reached 760
1565
people.
1566
In developing its GPRA training, DOD decided to go beyond the
1567
traditional lecture approach to instruction. GPRA training has
1568
included exercises and panel discussions designed to make trainees
1569
think the way they will need to when the training is over and the
1570
real work of implementing GPRA begins. Participants have been
1571
asked, for instance, to develop mission statements for their home
1572
organizations and to develop strategic goals and performance
1573
measures. According to a DOD official, the classes have been well
1574
received.
1575
DOD is also developing a self-paced GPRA course accessible on
1576
the Internet and is considering the use of CD-ROM technology.
1577
Within a given federal agency, the management reforms now under
1578
way may spring from various sources. Some of these reforms may be
1579
self-initiated, others may have been mandated by legislation, still
1580
others may be the result of administration initiatives such as the
1581
National Performance Review. All of this reform activity needs to
1582
be integrated, as the CFO Council urged in May 1995:
1583
Existing planning, budgeting, program evaluation and fiscal
1584
accountability processes should be integrated with GPRA
1585
requirements to ensure consistency and reduce duplication of
1586
effort. In addition, other management improvement efforts, such as
1587
implementation of the CFO Act, and FMFIA [Federal Managers'
1588
Financial Integrity Act], customer service initiatives,
1589
reengineering, and Total Quality Management, etc., should be
1590
incorporated into the GPRA framework to capitalize on the synergy
1591
and availability of key information and to improve responsiveness
1592
to customers and other stakeholders.32
1593
Another management reform initiative that provides a legislative
1594
basis for measuring performance is the Information Technology
1595
Management Reform Act of 1996, which requires each federal agency
1596
to ensure that performance measures are prescribed for information
1597
technology that it will use or acquire and that the performance
1598
measures assess how well the information technology supports agency
1599
programs. In addition, the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of
1600
1994 requires the head of each executive agency to approve or
1601
define the cost, performance, and schedule goals for major agency
1602
acquisition programs.
1603
32Implementation of the Government Performance and Results Act
1604
(GPRA), Chief Financial Officers
1605
Council, May 1995.
1606
1607
1608
Case Illustration: Army Research Laboratory
1609
Taken together, these reforms can help redirect an
1610
organization's culture from the traditional focus on inputs and
1611
activities to a new focus on defining missions and achieving
1612
results.33 Our work has shown, however, that the top leadership of
1613
each federal agency needs to meld these various reforms into a
1614
coherent, unified effort.34 Top leadership-both political and
1615
career-needs to make clear its commitment to the fundamental
1616
principles of results-oriented management and ensure that managers
1617
and staff at all levels recognize that they must do the same.
1618
Traditionally, the danger to any management reform is that it can
1619
become a hollow, paper-driven exercise. Leaders who integrate
1620
results-oriented management into the culture and day-to-day
1621
activities of their organizations will help avoid that danger.
1622
The Army Research Laboratory (ARL) was established in October
1623
1992 as a result of a realignment of a number of Army research and
1624
development organizations. It is now the central laboratory of the
1625
Army Materiel Command. At a time when both staffing levels and
1626
funding had been in decline since fiscal year 1989, ARL was given a
1627
major technological challenge-digitizing the battlefield for the
1628
U.S. Army. ARL concluded that to ensure that it had the capability
1629
to meet the new challenge and continue to conduct its mission of
1630
basic and applied research, it had to work in partnership with
1631
universities and the private sector, as well as operate more
1632
effectively and efficiently. This "Federated Laboratory" concept
1633
guided ARL as it integrated the various management reforms.
1634
As a GPRA pilot program, ARL developed a strategic plan that
1635
included a mission statement and long-range goals. In addition, it
1636
has produced two yearly products: a performance plan with key
1637
measures and a report detailing its progress in meeting its goals.
1638
The annual reports have been integrated into ARL's planning and
1639
budgeting processes and are discussed by agency leadership at the
1640
Director's quarterly meetings. In addition, the reports have been
1641
tied into DOD's Planning, Programming, Budget, and Execution
1642
System. ARL's performance measures gauge the relevance of ARL's
1643
current work to the agency's long-term goals and give ARL's leaders
1644
indicators of productivity and quality. As part of its
1645
performance
1646
33Improving Government: Actions Needed to Sustain and Enhance
1647
Management Reforms
1648
(GAO/T-OCG-94-1, Jan. 27, 1994). 34See, for example, Managing
1649
IRS: Important Strides Forward Since 1988 but More Needs to Be
1650
Done
1651
(GAO/GGD-91-74, Apr. 29, 1991); General Services Administration:
1652
Status of Management Improvement Efforts (GAO/GGD-91-59, Apr. 3,
1653
1991); and Management of VA: Implementing Strategic Management
1654
Process Would Improve Service to Veterans (GAO/HRD-90-109, Aug. 31,
1655
1990).
1656
measurement efforts, ARL established customer service standards
1657
and sent surveys to its customers to obtain feedback on the quality
1658
of its work.
1659
As a National Performance Review "reinvention laboratory," ARL
1660
has been granted waivers by DOD and the Army from internal
1661
regulations in order to streamline its processes. For example, one
1662
such waiver allowed ARL to eliminate redundant reviews of certain
1663
procurements, thereby saving 5 workdays on each procurement. Saving
1664
time on administrative processes frees staff to perform the
1665
principal mission of the laboratory.
1666
Facing pressures similar to those confronting federal managers
1667
to reduce costs and improve performance, leading state and foreign
1668
governments have responded by implementing management reform
1669
efforts consistent with GPRA. The experiences of these
1670
governments-and those of the federal GPRA pilots-demonstrate that
1671
each federal agency will need to chart its own course in response
1672
to its specific environment as it seeks to implement GPRA and
1673
become more results-oriented. Nonetheless, the experiences of the
1674
leading organizations suggest that the steps and practices
1675
discussed in this guide can assist agencies in successfully
1676
implementing GPRA. Federal agencies that apply the practices may
1677
find that their transition to a results orientation is quicker,
1678
smoother, and, most important, more successful in providing the
1679
effective and efficient government the American people deserve.
1680
Appendix I
1681
1682
1683
1684
Overview of the Government Performance and Results Act
1685
The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) is the primary
1686
legislative framework through which agencies will be required to
1687
set strategic goals, measure performance, and report on the degree
1688
to which goals were met. It requires each federal agency to
1689
develop, no later than by the end of fiscal year 1997, strategic
1690
plans that cover a period of at least 5 years and include the
1691
agency's mission statement; identify the agency's long-term
1692
strategic goals; and describe how the agency intends to achieve
1693
those goals through its activities and through its human, capital,
1694
information, and other resources. Under GPRA, agency strategic
1695
plans are the starting point for agencies to set annual goals for
1696
programs and to measure the performance of the programs in
1697
achieving those goals.
1698
Also, GPRA requires each agency to submit to the Office of
1699
Management and Budget (OMB), beginning for fiscal year 1999, an
1700
annual performance plan. The first annual performance plans are to
1701
be submitted in the fall of 1997. The annual performance plan is to
1702
provide the direct linkage between the strategic goals outlined in
1703
the agency's strategic plan and what managers and employees do
1704
day-to-day. In essence, this plan is to contain the annual
1705
performance goals the agency will use to gauge its progress toward
1706
accomplishing its strategic goals and identify the performance
1707
measures the agency will use to assess its progress. Also, OMB will
1708
use individual agencies' performance plans to develop an overall
1709
federal government performance plan that OMB is to submit annually
1710
to Congress with the president's budget, beginning for fiscal year
1711
1999.
1712
GPRA requires that each agency submit to the President and to
1713
the appropriate authorization and appropriations committees of
1714
Congress an annual report on program performance for the previous
1715
fiscal year (copies are to be provided to other congressional
1716
committees and to the public upon request). The first of these
1717
reports, on program performance for fiscal year 1999, is due by
1718
March 31, 2000, and subsequent reports are due by March 31 for the
1719
years that follow. However, for fiscal years 2000 and 2001,
1720
agencies' reports are to include performance data beginning with
1721
fiscal year 1999. For each subsequent year, agencies are to include
1722
performance data for the year covered by the report and 3 prior
1723
years.
1724
In each report, an agency is to review and discuss its
1725
performance compared with the performance goals it established in
1726
its annual performance plan. When a goal is not met, the agency's
1727
report is to explain the reasons the goal was not met; plans and
1728
schedules for meeting the goal; and, if the goal was impractical or
1729
not feasible, the reasons for that and the actions recommended.
1730
Actions needed to accomplish a goal could
1731
Page 48 GAO/GGD-96-118 Government Performance and Results
1732
Act
1733
include legislative, regulatory, or other actions or, when the
1734
agency found a goal to be impractical or infeasible, a discussion
1735
of whether the goal ought to be modified.
1736
In addition to evaluating the progress made toward achieving
1737
annual goals established in the performance plan for the fiscal
1738
year covered by the report, an agency's program performance report
1739
is to evaluate the agency's performance plan for the fiscal year in
1740
which the performance report was submitted (for example, in their
1741
fiscal year 1999 performance reports, due by March 31, 2000,
1742
agencies are required to evaluate their performance plans for
1743
fiscal year 2000 on the basis of their reported performance in
1744
fiscal year 1999). This evaluation will help to show how an
1745
agency's actual performance is influencing its plans. Finally, the
1746
report is to include the summary findings of program evaluations
1747
completed during the fiscal year covered by the report.
1748
Congress recognized that in some cases not all of the
1749
performance data will be available in time for the March 31
1750
reporting date. In such cases, agencies are to provide whatever
1751
data are available, with a notation as to their incomplete status.
1752
Subsequent annual reports are to include the complete data as part
1753
of the trend information.
1754
In crafting GPRA, Congress also recognized that managerial
1755
accountability for results is linked to managers having sufficient
1756
flexibility, discretion, and authority to accomplish desired
1757
results. GPRA authorizes agencies to apply for managerial
1758
flexibility waivers in their annual performance plans beginning
1759
with fiscal year 1999. The authority of agencies to request waivers
1760
of administrative procedural requirements and controls is intended
1761
to provide federal managers with more flexibility to structure
1762
agency systems to better support program goals. The nonstatutory
1763
requirements that OMB can waive under GPRA generally involve the
1764
allocation and use of resources, such as restrictions on shifting
1765
funds among items within a budget account. Agencies must report in
1766
their annual performance reports on the use and effectiveness of
1767
any GPRA managerial flexibility waivers that they receive.
1768
GPRA calls for phased implementation so that selected pilot
1769
projects in the agencies can develop experience from implementing
1770
GPRA requirements in fiscal years 1994 through 1996 before
1771
implementation is required for all agencies. As of June 1996, 68
1772
pilot projects for performance planning and performance reporting
1773
were under way in 24 agencies. OMB also is required to select at
1774
least five agencies from among the initial pilot agencies to
1775
pilot
1776
Page 49 GAO/GGD-96-118 Government Performance and Results
1777
Act
1778
managerial accountability and flexibility for fiscal years 1995
1779
and 1996; however, as of June 1996 it had not done so.
1780
Finally, GPRA requires OMB to select at least five agencies, at
1781
least three of which have had experience developing performance
1782
plans during the initial GPRA pilot phase, to test performance
1783
budgeting for fiscal years 1998 and 1999. Performance budgets to be
1784
prepared by pilot projects for performance budgeting are intended
1785
to provide Congress with information on the direct relationship
1786
between proposed program spending and expected program results and
1787
the anticipated effects of varying spending levels on results.
1788
Appendix II
1789
1790
1791
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
1792
Our objectives were to (1) identify and describe the practices
1793
most helpful to successfully implementing GPRA and related
1794
results-oriented management initiatives and (2) provide case
1795
illustrations of federal organizations that have made progress in
1796
implementing each practice. This report builds on (1) our 1994
1797
report profiling leading private and public sector organizations
1798
that have successfully improved mission performance and program
1799
outcomes through the innovative use of information management and
1800
technology and (2) our 1995 report on the human resource management
1801
principles employed by selected public and private organizations to
1802
build and sustain high levels of organizational performance.35
1803
Together, these reports are intended to suggest frameworks for
1804
Congress and federal agencies to use in implementing GPRA and
1805
related results-oriented management initiatives.
1806
To meet our first objective, we reviewed the experiences of
1807
leading public sector organizations that were successfully changing
1808
their management and accountability practices to be more
1809
results-oriented. As part of that effort, we issued separate
1810
reports on the experiences of six leading U.S. state and four
1811
foreign governments.36 We also reviewed the management studies of
1812
23 large federal departments and agencies that we did during the
1813
last decade as well as a broad array of our other management and
1814
program work. To supplement our work looking at leading
1815
organizations, we identified and reviewed a large body of
1816
literature on management reform, strategic planning, and
1817
performance measurement. From our work, we identified a number of
1818
practices common to successful efforts to become more
1819
results-oriented. We obtained input from a wide range of federal
1820
executives and managers and experts in public sector strategic
1821
planning, performance measurement, and program and policy
1822
evaluation, including those from the Departments of Defense,
1823
Commerce, Transportation, and the Treasury; OMB; the Office of
1824
Personnel Management; the National Academy of Public
1825
Administration; the Urban Institute; and the University of Southern
1826
California. On the basis of their comments and our continuing
1827
reviews of leading organizations, we consolidated and refined the
1828
list of practices to those presented in this guide.
1829
To meet our second objective, we identified those federal
1830
agencies that were instituting results-oriented management from our
1831
ongoing work on the implementation of GPRA at 24 departments and
1832
large agencies (covering about 98 percent of the federal
1833
government's fiscal year 1994 outlays) and
1834
35GAO/AIMD-94-115, May 1994; and GAO/GGD-96-35, Dec. 26, 1995,
1835
respectively.
1836
36GAO/GGD-95-22, Dec. 21, 1994; and GAO/GGD-95-120, May 2, 1995.
1837
The methodologies for selecting these leading governments are
1838
detailed in the respective reports.
1839
Page 51 GAO/GGD-96-118 Government Performance and Results
1840
Act
1841
OMB's identification of agencies making early progress in
1842
implementing selected aspects of GPRA. In this way, we targeted our
1843
work toward agencies that would provide examples illustrating each
1844
of the practices. The fact that an organization is profiled for a
1845
particular practice is not meant to imply the organization's
1846
success or lack of success in meeting other practices. Moreover,
1847
underscoring the fact that implementing management changes required
1848
by GPRA will not come quickly, most of the agencies profiled began
1849
their results-oriented management before GPRA was enacted. We
1850
interviewed agency officials in program offices, strategic planning
1851
and quality management offices, and planning and evaluation
1852
offices. We also reviewed agency documents, such as strategic
1853
plans, performance plans, performance reports, program descriptions
1854
and documentation, and other related documents.
1855
We did our work on this guide from January 1995 to March 1996 in
1856
Washington, D.C., in accordance with generally accepted government
1857
auditing standards. The steps and practices presented in this
1858
executive guide are largely a synthesis of previously published
1859
information and analysis.
1860
We provided a draft of this guide to OMB, the CFO Council's GPRA
1861
Implementation Committee, and to the individual agencies profiled
1862
in the case illustrations for their review and comment. OMB noted
1863
that the guide and the practices suggested in it will help federal
1864
agencies as they implement GPRA. OMB also expressed support for the
1865
guide's focus on agency use of performance information to improve
1866
management and program performance and to demonstrate that federal
1867
agencies are using taxpayers' money effectively. OMB concurred with
1868
our observation that the federal government is at the beginning,
1869
rather than the end, of the process of turning itself into a more
1870
accountable, better managed, more effective organization. Finally,
1871
OMB noted that the development and refinement of performance
1872
measures will be an ongoing process.
1873
We also provided copies of a draft of this guide for comment to
1874
the agency representatives on the CFO Council's GPRA Implementation
1875
Committee and incorporated their individual comments as
1876
appropriate. Generally, their comments suggested that the steps and
1877
practices we identified from the leading organizations studied were
1878
valid and complete, and that the case illustrations were accurate
1879
to the best of their knowledge. We also asked officials in each of
1880
the agencies profiled as case illustrations to verify the accuracy
1881
of the information presented on their respective agencies;
1882
Page 52 GAO/GGD-96-118 Government Performance and Results
1883
Act
1884
however, we did not independently verify the accuracy of that
1885
information.
1886
Appendix III
1887
1888
1889
Major Contributors to This Executive Guide
1890
L. Nye Stevens, Director, Federal Management and Workforce
1891
Issues,
1892
(202) 512-8676 Michael Brostek, Associate Director, (202)
1893
512-9039
1894
J. Christopher Mihm, Assistant Director, (202) 512-3236Lisa R.
1895
Shames, Project Manager, (202) 512-2649 Stephen Altman Thomas M.
1896
Beall Barbara H. Bordelon Janet C. Eackloff Carolyn J. Hill Donna
1897
M. Leiss Victoria M. O'Dea Dorothy L. Self Katherine M. Wheeler
1898
1899
1900
Related GAO Products
1901
Managing for Results: Achieving GPRA's Objectives Requires
1902
Strong Congressional Role (GAO/T-GGD-96-79, Mar. 6, 1996).
1903
GPRA Performance Reports (GAO/GGD-96-66R, Feb. 14, 1996).
1904
Office of Management and Budget: Changes Resulting From the OMB
1905
2000 Reorganization (GAO/GGD/AIMD-96-50, Dec. 29, 1995).
1906
Transforming the Civil Service: Building the Workforce of the
1907
Future, Results of a GAO-Sponsored Symposium (GAO/GGD-96-35, Dec.
1908
26, 1995).
1909
Financial Management: Continued Momentum Essential to Achieve
1910
CFO Act Goals (GAO/T-AIMD-96-10, Dec. 14, 1995).
1911
Block Grants: Issues in Designing Accountability Provisions
1912
(GAO/AIMD-95-226, Sept. 1, 1995).
1913
Managing for Results: Status of the Government Performance and
1914
Results Act (GAO/T-GGD-95-193, June 27, 1995).
1915
Managing for Results: Critical Actions for Measuring Performance
1916
(GAO/T-GGD/AIMD-95-187, June 20, 1995).
1917
Managing for Results: The Department of Justice's Initial
1918
Efforts to Implement GPRA (GAO/GGD-95-167FS, June 20, 1995).
1919
Government Reorganization: Issues and Principles
1920
(GAO/T-GGD/AIMD-95-166,
1921
May 17, 1995).
1922
Managing for Results: Steps for Strengthening Federal Management
1923
(GAO/T-GGD/AIMD-95-158, May 9, 1995). Managing for Results:
1924
Experiences Abroad Suggest Insights for Federal
1925
Management Reforms (GAO/GGD-95-120, May 2, 1995). Government
1926
Reform: Goal-Setting and Performance (GAO/AIMD/GGD-95-130R,
1927
Mar. 27, 1995).
1928
Block Grants: Characteristics, Experience, and Lessons Learned
1929
(GAO/HEHS-95-74, Feb. 9, 1995).
1930
Program Evaluation: Improving the Flow of Information to the
1931
Congress (GAO/PEMD-95-1, Jan. 30, 1995).
1932
Managing for Results: State Experiences Provide Insights for
1933
Federal Management Reforms (GAO/GGD-95-22, Dec. 21, 1994).
1934
Management Reforms: Examples of Public and Private Innovations
1935
to Improve Service Delivery (GAO/AIMD/GGD-94-90BR, Feb. 11,
1936
1994).
1937
Performance Budgeting: State Experiences and Implications for
1938
the Federal Government (GAO/AFMD-93-41, Feb. 17, 1993).
1939
1940
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